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Abstract  
Previous studies have highlighted links between rising levels of ‘Islamophobic’ attitudes, 
increases in direct and structural violence towards Muslim individuals and communities, and 
the electoral success of the Howard Government in Australia. This thesis seeks to extend 
existing research by exploring how and why the wedge politics which the Government 
utilised so effectively during the 2004 election campaign, at the expense of Australian 
Muslims, failed to achieve the same endorsement from the media during the 2007 election 
campaign. 
 
Divergences in media representations of Muslims between 2004 and 2007 point to a crucial 
shift, when the Howard Government suddenly found its political currency devalued as 
support among key players in the media fell away. This study investigates this shift through 
an analysis of manifest content from one influential media genre – news reporting and 
commentary published in two broadsheet newspapers, The Australian and The Sydney 
Morning Herald. The implications of my analysis are explored by drawing on a suite of 
conceptual frames including Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). 
 
This study found that Islam and issues related to Muslims were more likely to be represented 
through essentialist, ‘Islamophobic’ stereotypes, and were more frequently presented as a 
significant ‘problem’, in The Australian than in The Sydney Morning Herald. Whilst the two 
different publications often framed their selected stories with different emphases, the agenda-
setting function of the different papers nevertheless showed a substantial overlap. For both 
publications, however, 2007 election reporting was characterised by increased contestation of 
essentialist discourses and a more adversarial stance towards the incumbent government. An 
analysis of this shift is utilised to suggest potential strategies for disrupting or contesting 
negative representational patterns in future reporting on Muslims and Islam. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
Conditions within nations and races change with the change of periods and the passage of time. 
– Ibn Khaldun 
 
This famous line from the Muqaddimah shows why its author, the fourteenth-century Muslim 
scholar, Ibn Khaldun, is known as the ‘father of social science’.1 Conditions both shape, and 
are shaped by, attitudes and beliefs. The accumulated stock of attitudes and beliefs (often in a 
defined community, such as a nation) is what contemporary social scientists denote by the 
word ‘discourse’, albeit with different emphases in different analytic traditions. Discourses 
limit what people can think, write, or speak about a social object or practice.2  Discourses 
govern social processes of ‘meaning-making’, defining how people interpret what is ‘true’, 
‘factual’, ‘right’, or ‘real’.3  For example, the way people speak and write about globalisation, 
violent conflict, ‘terrorism’ or poverty constitutes those issues as social knowledge and 
makes it difficult to speak outside those terms of reference. 
How does an object or practice, a process of meaning-making or a form of knowledge 
become ‘social’? It is impossible to imagine how this question can be answered in modern 
societies without reference to the media. In particular, mediated discourses are key arenas for, 
and catalysts and determinants of, accounts of the spectrum of social issues that are 
considered as ‘political’. As Manuel Castells has observed: 
What does not exist in the media does not exist in the public mind, even if it could 
have a fragmented presence in individual minds. Therefore, a political message is 
necessarily a media message. And whenever a politically related message is conveyed 
through the media, it must be couched in the specific language of the media.4 
Data for this thesis is drawn from analysis of the manifest content of one influential media 
genre – news reporting and commentary in the print media – and its implications are explored 
by drawing on a suite of conceptual frames including Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). 
                                                
1 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, ed. N. J. Dawood, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1969), p. 24. 
2 Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject  (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 31. 
3 Norman Fairclough, "A Dialectical-Relational Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis in Social Research," in 
Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2009), p. 
162. 
4 Manuel Castells, "Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society," International Journal 
of Communication 1(2007): p. 241. 
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From this perspective, discourse is seen as both ‘socially constitutive as well as socially 
conditioned’; that is, discourses are shaped by events, social interactions and institutions, but 
will also shape them in turn. This means that understanding the social and historical context 
of discursive formations is paramount to CDA.5 
As a leading proponent of CDA, Ruth Wodak, has emphasised, ‘the relationships between 
media, politics (all genres) and ‘people’ are very complex…only interdisciplinary research 
will be able to make such complex relationships more transparent’.6 This thesis therefore 
adopts research practices outlined by Wodak for a ‘Discourse Historical Approach’ to CDA: 
the study is interdisciplinary in nature, employs multitheoretical and multimethodological 
lenses; and is abductive (moves back and forth between theory and empirical data). The 
approach employs detailed analysis and consideration of the socio-historical context of 
discourses and texts, and ‘grand theories’ serve as a foundation for analysis and 
interpretation. Ultimately, ‘practice is the target’ of the ‘Discourse Historical Approach’ to 
research: the end goal of the project is ‘changing discursive and social practices’.7 This goal 
is common to most CDA practitioners. Although the field of CDA contains several distinct 
strands, according to Garrett and Bell, they share ‘an explicit socio-political agenda’ 
dedicated to ‘focusing on the role of discourse in the reproduction and challenge of 
dominance’.8 Exponents of CDA are engaged in an ‘unabashedly normative’ quest to create 
opportunities for ‘change through critical understanding’.9 
This makes CDA a close match and a natural partner for the normative approach of Peace and 
Conflict Studies, the ‘home’ scholarly context of this thesis. Peace and Conflict Studies can 
be contrasted with traditional disciplines such as International Relations. Carolyn Stephenson 
notes that whilst these two disciplines are apparently concerned with much of the same issue 
content, they are clearly differentiated by their approach to their subject matter: ‘Peace 
Studies is value-explicit, with both a positive valuation of peace itself and a commitment to 
                                                
5 Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, "Critical Discourse Analysis," in Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary 
Introduction, ed. Teun van Dijk (London: SAGE, 1997), p. 258. 
6 Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, eds. Ruth 
Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE, 2001), p. 64. 
7 Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," pp. 70-71. 
8 Peter Garrett and Allan Bell, "Media and Discourse: A Critical Overview," in Approaches to Media Discourse: 
A Critical Overview, eds. Allan Bell and Peter Garrett (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 6. 
9 Teun van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis," Discourse and Society 4, no. 2 (1993): pp. 251-53. 
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examine trade-offs between values, while values tend to be more hidden in much 
International Relations research’.10  
As such, a brief explanation of the specific political context in which the ideas for this thesis 
took shape is warranted. Australia at the turn of the new Millennium was a country still 
coming to terms with economic and social upheavals unprecedented, in pace and scope, in its 
modern history. Industries were opened to international competition, barriers to financial 
flows removed and key public services corporatised and/or privatised, all of which were 
presented as necessary adjustments to ‘globalisation’. The newly vulnerable economy was 
particularly hard hit by the global recession of the early 1990s; unemployment for instance, 
surged to its highest levels in Australia since the Great Depression.11 The fiscal pattern shifted 
appreciably from progressive, direct taxation to regressive indirect taxation, with the 
introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) after the 1998 Federal Election. 
Furthermore, high immigration in the closing decades of the twentieth century from 
geographical regions such as Asia and the Middle East had considerably altered the ethnic 
and cultural demographics of a formerly more homogenous country, and was accompanied 
by a controversial move from policies of assimilation to multiculturalism as the basis for 
integration of immigrants.12 
Among those most directly affected by these changes, and the insecurity they brought with 
them, were many traditional voters for Australia’s Labor Party. These rapid developments in 
Australian society gave rise to a volatile ‘politics of anger’,13 the articulation of which 
enabled a former fish-and-chip shop owner, Pauline Hanson, to snatch a safe Labor seat and 
enter the Federal House of Representatives as an Independent in 1996. In her maiden 
Parlimentary speech, Hanson proposed a range of anti-immigration and economic 
protectionist policies which strongly tapped into popular resentment at the unprecedented 
effects of globalisation. Among Hanson’s controversial statements was her notable claim that 
‘if I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who 
                                                
10 Carolyn Stephenson, "Peace Studies: Overview," in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict, ed. Lester 
Kurtz (Oxford: Elsevier, 2008), pp. 810-11. 
11 Australian Bureau of Statistics, A Century of Change in the Australian Labour Market (Canberra:  ABS, 
2001). 
12 Andrew Markus, Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia  (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001), pp. 
44-5. 
13 Keith Suter, "Australia, the Media and the Politics of Anger," Media Development 45, no. 3 (1998): pp. 38-
40. 
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comes into my country’.14 Hanson subsequently founded One Nation, an anti-immigration 
party that rose to prominence in the Queensland state election of 1998, then became a 
significant factor at the Federal level. One Nation continued to draw votes from Labor 
heartlands, but soon began to strongly challenge the National Party (the junior member of the 
Coalition government) and eventually also the Liberal Party (the senior member of the 
Coalition government) across NSW and Queensland. 
By mid-2001, the governing Liberal/National Coalition was languishing in the polls, just 
months away from the next election, when two significant events happened to change its 
fortunes. One was the course towards Australian coastal waters set by the MV Tampa, a 
Norwegian freighter that had picked up over 400 Afghan refugees from a sinking ship. A 
later biography of Prime Minister John Howard notes that Howard was urged at the time by 
one of his ministers, Jackie Kelly, to use the incident to send a signal to swing voters in 
electorates like her own marginal seat of Lindsay, in Sydney’s west, where immigration 
issues were boosting support for One Nation.15 Australia denied entry to the Tampa, and 
within days the Coalition had passed a new Border Protection Bill. Howard used the issue to 
drive a ‘wedge’ into Labor support and recover voters from One Nation, launching his 2001 
election campaign with words very similar to Hanson’s: ‘We will decide who comes to this 
country, and the circumstances in which they come’.16 
Less than a fortnight after this speech came the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon on September 11. Howard happened to be in Washington at the time, and his hotel 
was so close to the Pentagon that he could see the rising smoke from his hotel room window. 
His personal experience strongly impressed upon him the significance of the event not just 
for the US, but for global politics.17 He and his party subsequently capitalised upon the new 
fear of ‘terrorism’ to place still more emphasis on ‘border protection’ and ‘national security’ 
as the key issue of the election – and were returned to Federal Government by a landslide. 
Through this period and the following few years, the two separate phenomena – asylum 
seekers and ‘terrorism’ – came to be conflated in political and media accounts, as ‘threats’ to 
Australia, to be turned away at the border lest they add to the insecurities borne by the 
                                                
14 Pauline Hanson, "Maiden Speech in the House of Representatives (1996)," AustralianPolitics.com, 
http://australianpolitics.com/1996/09/10/pauline-hanson-maiden-speech.html. 
15 Wayne Errington and Peter van Onselen, John Winston Howard: The Definitive Biography  (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2007), p. 301. 
16 John Howard, "2001 Election Policy Speech," AustralianPolitics.com, 
http://australianpolitics.com/2001/10/28/john-howard-election-policy-speech.html. 
17 Richard Fidler, "John Howard on 9/11," ABC, 9 September 2011. 
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economic tides of globalisation.  
Social psychological research during the past ten years has repeatedly demonstrated strong 
correlative relationships between negative attitudes towards asylum seekers, fear of terrorism, 
and prejudice against Muslims. In some studies these traits were also strongly related to low 
levels of personal experiences with asylum seekers or Muslims, leading researchers to 
contend that political and media accounts were playing a significant role in the dissemination 
and legitimisation of  ‘false beliefs’ concerning asylum seekers.18 Pedersen et al., for 
example, highlighted strong similarities between the responses to open-ended survey 
questions asking study participants to explain their attitudes towards asylum seekers and the 
public statements of political figures such as Prime Minister Howard.19 Media content 
analytical studies have similarly demonstrated the forging of linkages between asylum 
seekers, terrorism and Muslims. Peter Manning’s research has shown that in newspaper 
articles published in Sydney between 2000 and 2002 which referred to refugees or asylum-
seekers, fully 37% also contained references to ‘terrorism’; furthermore, he found that ‘threat 
concepts’ such as fundamentalist terrorism were strongly associated with Muslims.20  
Numerous studies during the past decade have supported and extended Manning’s findings. 
Representations of Muslims in the Australian media have been routinely stereotyped, failed 
to reflect the diversity of origin, outlook and aspiration of Muslim Australians, and have had 
significant negative impacts upon the perception of Islam and treatment of Muslims by non-
Muslim Australians.21 In 2004, Australia’s Human Rights Commission conducted extensive 
research on anti-Muslim discrimination, during the course of which they asked Australian 
Muslims to discuss examples of racism they had experienced. ‘I think the media is the main 
                                                
18 For an overview, see Anne Pedersen, Susan Watt, and Brian Griffiths, "Prejudice against Asylum Seekers and 
the Fear of Terrorism: The Importance of Context," in Settling in Australia: The Social Inclusion of 
Refugees, eds. Val Colic-Peisker and Farida Tilbury (Perth: Centre for Social and Community Research, 
2007). 
19 Pedersen, Watt, and Griffiths, "Prejudice against Asylum Seekers," p. 49-50. 
20 Peter Manning, Dog Whistle Politics and Journalism: Reporting Arabic and Muslim People in Sydney 
Newspapers 2000-2002  (Sydney: Australian Center for Independent Journalism, 2004), p. 12. 
21 Shahram Akbarzadeh and Bianca Smith, The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media (Melbourne:  
Monash University, 2005); Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, Race for the Headlines: Racism 
and Media Discourse (Sydney:  Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, 2003); Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission, Ismaعﻉ Listen: National Consultations on Eliminating Prejudice against 
Arab and Muslim Australians (Sydney:  HREOC, 2004); Sharon Pickering, Jude McCulloch, David Wright-
Neville, and Pete Lentini, Counter-Terrorism Policing and Culturally Diverse Communities: Final Report 
2007 (Melbourne:  Australian Research Council Linkage Project, 2007); Scott Poynting and Barbara Perry, 
"Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired Victimisation of Muslims in Canada and Australia since 9/11," 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 19, no. 2 (2007); Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla, 
Islam and the Australian News Media  (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010). 
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cause’, one respondent said, ‘because kids are picking on Muslims at school and these kids 
get it from their parents and their parents get it from the media’.22 After reviewing the 
responses of the study’s participants, Mykonos and Watmough concluded that ‘the media, 
collectively, represents for many Muslims and people of Middle Eastern background an 
important site of racism’.23 Based upon both community consultations and incidence of 
reported discrimination and prejudice in the wake of September 11 and the Bali Bombing of 
2002, Tanja Dreher’s research has similarly highlighted that the media is repeatedly 
identified by Australian Muslims as ‘a central social institution contributing to experiences of 
fear and exclusion among targeted communities’.24  
This phenomenon is of course not limited to Australia. Indeed, as Dunn et al. have observed, 
‘the unreasonableness and defamatory effect of media portrayals of Islam [have become] a 
recurring theme of any contemporary ethnographic work with Muslims in western 
countries’.25 There are, however, particularly clear connections between the political agenda 
and fortunes of the Howard Government and the rise of mediatised anti-Muslim and anti-
Islamic discourses in Australia. 
These developments fit neatly into the pattern described by Murray Edelman as ‘political 
spectacle’. This allows political control to be exerted through the creation of ‘mediated 
dramas’ that both invoke and reinforce syndromes of ‘psychological distancing’. These can 
produce an ‘aroused response’, based on fear and anxiety, to issues expedient to the author(s) 
of the drama, while distracting public attention from other issues less likely to build political 
support for their cause. This strategy can be successful because ‘to personify an issue by 
identifying it with an enemy wins support for a political stand while masking the material 
advantages the perception provides’.26 The Liberal/National Coalition enjoys traditionally 
strong support from the corporate sector of the business community, which prospered greatly 
from the economic changes introduced in Australia under the guise of ‘adjusting to 
globalisation’. These gains were effectively allowed to carry on quietly accruing, away from 
the spotlight, even as voters for whom the changes were, perhaps, a more mixed blessing, 
                                                
22 Cited in George Mykonos and Simon Watmough, Perceptions of Islamic and Middle Eastern People in 
Australian Media: Scope for Improvement (Melbourne:  Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University, 2007), p. 
9. 
23 Mykonos and Watmough, Perceptions of Islamic and Middle Eastern People, p. 7. 
24 Tanya Dreher, "'Targeted': Experiences of Racism in N.S.W. After September 11, 2001,"  UTS Shopfront 
Monograph Series No. 2 (2006): p. 36. 
25 Kevin Dunn, Natascha Klocker, and Tanya Salabay, "Contemporary Racism and Islamophobia in Australia: 
Racialising Religion," Ethnicities 7, no. 4 (2007): p. 582. 
26 Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle  (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), p. 68. 
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were being addressed on the need to secure Australia’s borders. Under the mandate granted 
the Howard Government by its successful leveraging of ‘threat concepts’, a range of far-
reaching policies were implemented which further benefited the business community and 
deepened the disproportionate effects of Australia’s economic transformation. These policies 
included further corporatisation and privatisation of public services and assets; significant 
reductions in barriers to trade; the relaxation of cross-media ownership laws; the reduction of 
upper bracket income tax and introduction of a range of ‘middle class welfare’ schemes; the 
deregulation of the industrial relations market; and significant attacks upon the self-
determination of Indigenous peoples.27 
At some point during the middle of the last decade, however, the pattern shifted. Howard lost 
not only the Federal Election of 2007, but even his own seat, as a Labor government took 
office with apparent commitments to unravel some of the certitudes of its predecessor. The 
incoming government pledged that child asylum seekers would no longer to be kept locked 
up in detention centres. Australian troops in Iraq were brought home from a theatre of war 
Labor said they should never have entered in the first place. For a while, under Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd, Australia even appeared to be moving towards a more even-handed 
approach on a totemic issue to some in the Muslim community, namely the Israel-Palestine 
conflict.28 
The political space for these initiatives opened under manifold influences – some home-
grown, others originating overseas. They were mediated and socialised in various different 
forms, and they took effect by altering the discourse: the terms in which issues like asylum 
and ‘terrorism’ were written and talked about. The core research question of this thesis is to 
investigate the ways in which this change was manifested, concentrating on the content of 
news reporting as a social artefact and comparing two key periods – the build-up to the 
Federal elections of 2004 and 2007 respectively. By expanding our understanding of how the 
pattern of representing Muslims shifted between these two key periods I will be adding a 
significant new dimension to the existing literature on this subject area, as well as generating 
                                                
27 The scope and pace of these reforms were particularly accentuated during the Howard Government’s fourth 
term (2004-2007), when the Coalition had control of both the Upper and the Lower House. 
28 Jake Lynch, "Can the Centre Hold? Prospects for Mobilising Media Activism around Public Service 
Broadcasting Using Peace Journalism," in Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical 
Approaches, eds. Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch, and Robert A. Hackett (Sydney: Sydney University 
Press, 2011). 
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valuable insights into strategies which successfully disrupt or contest negative reporting 
patterns. 
More specifically, this thesis compares the representation of Muslims and Islam in two 
broadsheet publications, The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald, during the month 
prior to the 2004 and the 2007 Australian Federal Elections. The sample of articles analysed 
in this study includes both ‘hard’ new stories, such as reporting on events of significance, as 
well as ‘soft’ news stories, including commentary and letters. Although some studies on 
representation of Islam in the media have discussed significant ‘soft’ news such as opinion 
columns, selection of articles has generally been predicated upon investigation of particularly 
emblematic or inflammatory articles, rather than a systematic investigation of 
representational patterns. Traditional content analytical studies of the media which have 
undertaken such systematic investigations, in contrast, have generally focussed on ‘hard’ 
news stories. When studies of ‘soft’ news stories have been conducted, they have ‘have 
pinpointed a range of issues, including how the inclusion of this ‘subjective’ or 
‘interpretative’ material ‘helps to underwrite the proclaimed “objectivity” of “hard” news 
stories’.29 My decision to conduct systematic content and discourse analysis on a large sample 
of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ news stories is therefore a significant point of divergence from the 
existing literature and should enable consideration of a number of issues which are not 
rendered possible when just one type of content in mainstream newspapers is considered.  
On the basis of previous comparative studies of the Australian broadsheet press, I expected 
that there would be significant divergences between the two publications with respect to the 
representation of Muslims.30 I anticipated that more generally, in the pre-election period of 
2004, Muslims and Islam would tend to be represented in both publications largely through 
essentialist stereotypes, and more frequently be presented as a significant threat and 
‘problem’. In contrast, in the pre-election period of 2007, I hypothesised that the 
representation of Muslims or Islam as ‘problematic’ may be interrogated more frequently, 
with an alternative target, frequently the incumbent government, being represented as ‘the 
problem’. It is anticipated that utilisation of some ‘Islamophobic’ stereotypes may persist in 
this period, although there may be evidence of increased contestation of essentialist 
discourses.  
                                                
29 Stuart Allan, News Culture, 2nd. ed. (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2004), p. 86. 
30 Jake Lynch, Debates in Peace Journalism  (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2008), p. 169; Inez Mahony, 
"Diverging Frames: A Comparison of Indonesian and Australian Press Portrayals of Terrorism and Islamic 
Groups in Indonesia," International Communication Gazette 72, no. 8 (2010). 
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Divergences in the representation of Muslims and Islam between the 2004 and the 2007 pre-
election periods point to a crucial shift, when the Howard Government, ascendant for a 
decade, suddenly found its political currency devalued and its moral authority rapidly 
unravelling as support among key players in the media fell away. This analysis seeks to 
illuminate how and why the wedge politics which the Howard Government utilised so 
effectively in the 2004 election (and earlier, in the 2001 elections),31 at the expense of 
Australian Muslims, failed to achieve the same endorsement from broadsheet media in the 
2007 election. 
The overarching purpose of this thesis is to contest the threat concepts built into the political 
spectacle that gave rise to discriminatory and violent treatment meted out to Muslims by the 
Australian state and some non-Muslim Australians, from the everyday racism encountered in 
such settings as schools and on the streets, through harsh responses to asylum seekers and 
draconian ‘anti-terrorism’ laws that restrict civil liberties, to war and the preparations for war. 
These are inimical to human needs and the fulfilment of human potential, which makes them 
violent in themselves according to two complementary definitions coined by Johan Galtung, 
which are highly influential in Peace and Conflict Studies. According to Galtung, violence is 
that which causes ‘human beings [to be] influenced so that their actual somatic and mental 
realizations are below their potential’.32 It can also be understood as ‘an insult to human 
needs’.33 
As a social scientist, therefore, I am interested not merely in how the violence implicit in 
patterns of media coverage came to be there, and how and why it proved effective in a 
particular locus of time and place. I am also interested in how, why and to what extent it 
shifted, and with what effect. To paraphrase Ibn Khaldun: how did conditions within the 
Australian nation, and between different sections of the community, change with the change 
of periods and the passage of time? From the answers to those questions, what possibilities 
exist to transform the discourse around issues pertaining to ‘border protection’ and relations 
with Islam, to reduce violence and promote mutual understanding and acceptance? 
 
                                                
31 Ian Ward, "The Tampa, Wedge Politics, and a Lesson for Political Journalism," Australian Journalism 
Review 24, no. 1 (2002): pp. 29-31; Shaun Wilson and Nick Turnbull, "Wedge Politics and Welfare Reform 
in Australia," Australian Journal of Politics & History 47, no. 3 (2001): pp. 385-86. 
32 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): p. 168. 
33 Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," Journal of Peace Research 27, no. 3 (1990): p. 9. 
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Overview of chapters 
This thesis utilises an array of theoretical and methodological apparatus to explore a complex 
of issues. My first chapter, therefore, has summarised in brief the overall positioning and 
argument of my thesis. Subsequent chapters go on to explore the theoretical, historical and 
methodological underpinnings of this thesis before moving on to discussion and 
consideration of my data and finally, my conclusion. 
Chapter 2, A ‘millennial enemy’?: representations of Muslims and the construction of 
‘Islamophobia’, examines the phenomenon of ‘Islamophobia’ from a variety of perspectives. 
Considering that ‘Islamophobia’ is a relatively recent and highly contested term for what is 
arguably a very longstanding phenomenon, I discuss the history and evolution of the term 
‘Islamophobia’ as a label for the rising incidence of hostility and prejudice towards Muslims 
which could not be comprehensively defined or explained solely through recourse to the 
terminology of either ‘racism’ or ‘religious intolerance’. I consider the merits but ultimate 
shortcomings of viewing Islamophobia primarily as a psychological construct. The activation 
and reinforcement of Islamophobia serves distinctive ideological purposes, and its 
operationalisation is guided by discourses which establish guidelines for what may be 
discussed in regards to Muslims and Islam and rules out other topics or approaches to the 
issue. I therefore consider the development of some of the ‘master-narratives’ or discourses 
which feed into contemporary Islamophobia, in particular the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis 
and its role in the formulation of the ‘War on Terror’. In closing, I highlight the significance 
of the media in the exportation and application of the ‘War on Terror’ framework and its 
implications for the rise of Islamophobia. 
Chapter 3, ‘Media messages’: The role of the media in contemporary political 
communication, considers the role of the media as a particularly effective site for the 
development and dissemination of discourses of Islamophobia, with particular attention to 
one influential media genre: news journalism. I highlight the significant role the media plays 
in contemporary society in the transmission and reinforcement of stereotypes and the 
delineation of social norms, and then outline a theory of media effects. This issue is explored 
through reference to the tension between the political economy of the media tradition, which 
conceives of the media as essentially an hegemonic practice, and the social responsibility of 
journalism tradition, which sees the media as being in an essentially adversarial relationship 
with power. It is during election campaigns, I contend, that the tension between these two 
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perspectives on the role of journalism are most apparent; whilst consensus on key issues may 
shift rapidly at this time through the exercise of the press’s adversarial role, the complicity of 
the media in the exercise of power may also paradoxically be more apparent during election 
campaigns than at other times.  
Chapter 4, A national history of racism, marks a shift away from explorations of the 
theoretical grounding of this thesis and is the first of four chapters which detail the specific 
socio-historical background and context in which my primary sources, news stories from 
broadsheet newspapers during 2004 and 2007, are sited. Chapter 4 expands upon the 
Discourse Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis and then explores the specific 
history of exclusionary hierarchies based upon race in Australian history. 
Chapter 5, Towards a multicultural Australia, follows on directly from Chapter 3, detailing 
the continued history of racism in the Australian context in the twentieth century. It focuses 
upon the shift from policies of overt racial discrimination to assimilation, and finally to the 
institution of the policy of ‘multiculturalism’ and the disavowal of state discrimination on the 
basis of race in the 1970s. I then consider the rise of a ‘backlash’ against these changes in 
Australian society and a shift towards discrimination and prejudice being articulated in terms 
of ‘cultural incompatibility’ rather than on the basis of biological race or phenotypical 
markers. Finally, I discuss the contribution that legitimisation of this ‘new racism’ played in 
the popularity and electoral success of the Howard Government, which came to power in 
1996. 
Chapter 6, ‘People like that’: Muslims in Australia and the rise of Islamophobia, begins with 
an overview of the history of Muslim settlement in Australia. Whilst Muslim fisherman from 
Indonesia were trading and seasonally settling in northern Australia during the eighteenth 
century, and small numbers of Muslims arrived in the British colonies of Australia 
throughout the nineteenth century, it was not until the late nineteenth century that significant 
permanent Muslim communities were established in Australia. In the early twentieth century, 
the introduction of racially discriminatory immigration and labour laws led to a reduction in 
the size of existing Muslim communities in Australia and hampered the establishment of new 
ones. From the 1960s, following the repeal of such legislation, the size and diversity of 
Muslim communities in Australia expanded significantly. However, these developments were 
accompanied by rising prejudice and discrimination towards Muslims in Australia, 
particularly exacerbated by international events such as the first Gulf War, spikes in the 
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number of (predominantly Muslim) asylum seekers in the early 2000s, and the September 11 
attacks in New York. I consider how firm linkages between asylum seekers, criminality, 
terrorism and Islam were constructed in political and media discourse over the course of this 
period and were then successfully leveraged for political capital by the Howard Government 
during the 2001 election campaign. 
Chapter 7, ‘Better safe than sorry’: The ‘War on Terror’ in the Australian context, continues 
on from Chapter 6, discussing the rising tide of Islamophobia during the mid-2000s as the 
‘War on Terror’ reached its height of support and highest levels of impact upon Muslim 
communities around the world. This chapter focuses on detailing key developments during 
the third and fourth terms of the Howard Government (2001-2004 and 2004-2007) 
respectively, as these form the immediate background to and context for the individual 
newspaper articles within my data sample.  
Chapter 8, Research Methodology, is the first chapter in the final part of my thesis. The 
research methodology is positioned at this point in the thesis because the five chapters within 
the final part of my thesis are best understood when read together, and subsequent to reading 
the second part of my thesis, which provided the context and background against which the 
methodology, results, and discussion chapters of this thesis are to be read. Chapter 8 therefore 
expands upon the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis as they pertain to data analysis, 
and sets out the main characteristics of my research methodology. I detail the reasoning 
behind the selection of the publications analysed in this study and then the parameters for the 
selection of articles within those publications, before highlighting some potential limitations 
and issues with the design of my study. I then discuss the methodology by which I organised 
or ‘coded’ my data. This involved a three-step process; I first read all articles within the 
sample and generated general guidelines for coding of the data, and then I conducted a ‘pilot-
study’ on a small sample of twenty articles, after which I further refined and amended my 
code book and approach to analysis of the articles. I then conducted a full and systematic 
analysis of the 373 articles within my full sample according to the resultant codebook. 
Chapter 8 concludes with an outline of the categories of analysis for both the Pilot Study and 
the full sample analysis. 
Chapter 9, Pilot study, details the analysis of 20 articles from my sample according to 
parameters which were set out in Chapter 6. These twenty articles included five articles from 
the final week of the election campaign from each of the four subsets within my full sample; 
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that is, The Australian in 2004 and 2007, and The Sydney Morning Herald in 2004 and 2007. 
The Pilot Study represented not only a chance to evaluate and improve the coding criterion 
and identify any issues within my methodology, but also to illustrate in detail the process by 
which I evaluated and coded each article. Although the Pilot Study evaluated only a small 
number of articles, I found clear trends towards higher levels of Islamophobic discourse and 
towards representing Islam as a problem in The Australian than in The Sydney Morning 
Herald, and in 2004 as compared to 2007. I further found that the propensity towards 
negative reporting of Muslims was particularly marked in articles reporting on violent 
conflict or ‘terrorist’ violence, for both publications and both time periods. 
Chapter 10, Results and main findings, is constituted by two distinct parts. In the first half of 
this chapter, I discuss the overall results for the coding of the physical features of the full 
sample. This included aspects of the sample including the proportion of hard and soft news 
per data subset, the attribution of sources, and the proportion of local versus international 
news. Some speculative conclusions are drawn considering the patterns of characteristics of 
these different features of the four data subsets before I move to the second part of this 
chapter, the consideration of the content analysis results for the full data sets. I found that the 
representational patterns suggested by the Pilot Study were largely borne out in the analysis 
of the full data sets. The highest levels of Islamophobic discourse and of representation of 
Muslims or Islam as a ‘problem’ were found in The Australian in 2004; whilst the lowest 
levels of Islamophobic discourse and of representation of Muslims or Islam as a ‘problem’ 
were found in The Sydney Morning Herald in 2007. Reporting in The Australian in 2007 was 
on most indicators either more negative or equivalent to reporting in The Sydney Morning 
Herald in 2004. The distribution of ‘extreme’ articles was somewhat surprising. Despite its 
tendency towards negative representations of Islam and Muslims, in both 2004 and 2007 The 
Australian printed articles which were characterised by extremely open views of Islam and 
Muslims, whilst The Sydney Morning Herald printed articles which were characterised by 
extremely closed views of Islam despite its overall lower incidence of negative reporting of 
matters relating to Islam and Muslims.    
Chapter 11, Discussion, moves beyond the discussion of data patterns to consider the 
representational shifts in particular sets of articles between the different time periods and the 
two different newspapers. The first section of this chapter considers the characteristics and 
shifts over time and publication of representing links between Islam and violent conflict. The 
second section of this chapter considers the media coverage of racist campaigning in 
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marginal Sydney seats between the 2004 and 2007 election. The third section of Chapter 11 
explores the relationships between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ news by focussing in particular on a set 
of interrelated and self-referential articles published in The Australian in 2004. The final 
section of Chapter 11 explores the relationships between news articles and broader, 
international discourses on Islam by focussing on one article from The Australian in 2007 and 
the way that this article was commented upon and reproduced by bloggers and international 
journalists. 
Chapter 12, Conclusions and looking forward, is the final chapter of my thesis. I begin with a 
summary of the main findings of my thesis, before moving into a consideration of the 
changes in the media and political terrain which have taken place since the 2007 election. 
From this contextualised point of reference, I then explore how some of the evidence drawn 
from this thesis regarding the contestation and delegitimisation of Islamophobic frames in 
election reporting in 2007 might be applied in the contemporary media and political 
landscape. 
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Chapter 2 – A ‘millennial enemy’?: representations 
of Muslims and the construction of ‘Islamophobia’ 
 
The 9/11 attacks, the launch of the ‘war on terrorism’ and the invasion of Iraq exacerbated 
tensions, in Australia and elsewhere, which exposed Muslims to increased levels of everyday 
racism, as indicated in Chapter 1. One response to this phenomenon was the establishment of 
organisations like the Affinity Intercultural Foundation, based in the Western Sydney suburb 
of Auburn. Founded by a group of young Muslims in the early 2000s, its mission statement, 
set out on its website, commits it to work together with non-Muslim partner organisations – 
which include the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies of the University of Sydney – to 
‘remove bigotry and establish peace and harmony in Australia’. Affinity’s incorporation 
coincided with ‘negative world events’, the statement says, demanding a ‘constructive 
response… to promote education in the face of misinformation and misunderstanding’.34 
The ‘negative world events’ highlighted by Affinity, along with the way they were 
represented and mediated, and responses to them by Australia at an institutional as well as a 
quotidian level, exerted their effect in communities by providing a series of ‘activation tags 
for memory-based information processing’.35 They evoked (and strengthened) much more 
pervasive ideas, attitudes and beliefs, embedded in a densely woven web of relationships, 
procedures, expectations and assumptions established over a longue durée.   
These factors transmit into the present day as a latent hostility towards or fear of Islam, and 
prejudice against Muslims, giving rise to forms of discrimination that have been variously 
described as religious intolerance; racism; ‘new racism’; xeno-racism; xenophobia; as a 
manifestation of Orientalism; or as a by-product of the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ ideology. All 
of these may be regarded as forms of an overarching discourse of ‘Islamophobia’. Use of that 
term comes with inbuilt objections and caveats, which will be explored in further detail 
below. Its use in this thesis is intended to capture the multi-dimensional antecedents and 
manifestations, operating simultaneously on multiple levels, which bear upon acts and 
experiences of meaning-making in response to current events.  
                                                
34 Affinity Intercultural Foundation, "Who We Are," Affinity Intercultural Foundation Website, 
http://affinity.org.au/?page_id=2  
35 Dietram A. Scheufele, "Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects 
of Political Communication," Mass Communication and Society 3, no. 2-3 (2000): p. 299. 
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Neither the events nor the way they were represented just ‘happen’, of course. Dominant 
constructions of meaning attain and maintain their position of dominance through ongoing 
contestation, and it is in this contestation that Affinity and others seek to engage, through the 
peaceful means of fostering dialogue and understanding. Their purpose in doing so is clearly 
set out on their website: to enable ‘Australian Muslims [to contribute] to the positive 
development of the cultural and religious landscape of Australia’. It begs the question of what 
purposes and interests are served on the other side(s) of the same contestation, by activating 
and reinforcing Islamophobia? This question will be considered in this chapter, partially from 
the perspective of the psychology of the individual or the group, but more crucially, at a 
national or international level. The question here becomes: how is hostility towards or fear of 
Islam and Muslims triggered or exacerbated, and who benefits from Islamophobia? 
Defining Islamophobia 
Competing claims exist as to the origin of the term ‘Islamophobia’. The phrases 
‘islamophobe’ and ‘islamophobie’ had been used from the Second World War in several 
French-language publications by Etienne Dinet and Sliman Ben Ibrahim in regards to French 
colonial policies. While the phrases do not appear to have been widely adopted, they did 
happen to be employed by Hichem Djait in a 1975 French-language critique of Edward 
Said’s work on Orientalism. In 1985, possibly due to the translation and wider availability of 
Djait’s work at this time, Said began to use the term ‘Islamophobia’ in his published writings, 
and during the same period, this English-language term began to appear in a variety of 
academic and activist settings in the UK. The term gained somewhat wider currency from 
1991 after the magazine Insight published an article during the Gulf War which referred to 
‘Islamophobia’. In 1996, the Runnymede Trust, a prominent British race equality think-tank, 
founded a Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia and initiated a series of 
community consultations with key Muslim individuals, communities and organisations across 
Britain.36 The Commission’s Report, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, reflected the 
assessment of the Commission that ‘anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so considerably and so 
rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed’. Although it is clear that 
                                                
36 Chris Allen, Islamophobia  (London: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 5-7; Nasir Meer and Tariq Modood, "The 
Racialisation of Muslims," in Thinking through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, eds. S. Sayyid and 
AbdoolKarim Vakil (London: Hurst and Company, 2010), pp. 72-3; AbdoolKarim Vakil, "Is the Islam in 
Islamophobia the Same as the Islam in Anti-Islam; or, When Is It Islamophobia Time?," in Thinking through 
Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, eds. S. Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil (London: Hurst and Company, 
2010), pp. 33-34, 38-41. 
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the term ‘Islamophobia’ was not actually coined by the Commission, the Report did provide 
the first attempt at a definition of Islamophobia and established the term in international 
public policy parlance through the wide publicity generated by the Report.37 
The Report defined Islamophobia as ‘an unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore 
fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’. The Report further characterised ‘Islamophobia’ as a 
constellation of eight dimensions of ‘closed’ views towards Islam, including the perception of 
Islam as a monolithic, static bloc; as separate and ‘other’; as inferior to ‘the West’; as violent 
and engaged in a ‘clash of civilisations’ with the West; and as primarily a political ideology 
rather than a religious faith. The final three dimensions were the dismissal of criticisms of 
‘the West’ made by Muslims; the justification of discriminatory treatment of Muslims, and 
the normalisation of anti-Muslim hostility.38 The Report’s labelling, definition and 
conceptualisation of a phenomenon of growing prejudice against Muslims took on particular 
significance after September 11 2001, when ‘global events had elevated the issue to a 
prominence previously only hinted at’.39  
In the aftermath of September 11 and the subsequent high visibility of anti-Muslim attitudes, 
behaviours and practices, the Runnymede Trust’s definition of Islamophobia was seized upon 
in an effort to document and explain the phenomenon. ‘Without doubt,’ Chris Allen 
commented, ‘the Runnymede report and the model of Islamophobia established through this 
by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, is the seminal source from which 
the most common and widespread definitions and conceptualisations about Islamophobia 
have evolved’.40 Although the Commission’s definition and characterisation of ‘hostility 
towards Islam’ and ‘fear or dislike of Muslims’ drew criticism from an early stage, the 
complexity and adaptive flexibility of the phenomenon has defied attempts to replace the 
moniker ‘Islamophobia’ or to create a universally accepted, contemporary definition of the 
term; the Runnymede Trust’s definition and labelling of has thus become somewhat 
paradigmatic. Despite the proliferation of academic and popular works on the topic, no single 
conceptualisation of Islamophobia has being able to definitively displace the term 
                                                
37 Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (London:  
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38 Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia, p. 4. 
39 Meer and Modood, "The Racialisation of Muslims," p. 73. 
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‘Islamophobia’ or the description and definition set out in the Runnymede Report, which has 
persisted as the ‘default’ definition of Islamophobia.41 
Particularly problematic in the definition and characterisation of Islamophobia (and with the 
very employment of the term ‘Islamophobia’) is the failure of the phenomenon to fit 
comfortably within the boundaries of terminology which would normally be employed to 
describe hostility or prejudice based on, for example, race or religion. The phenomenon of 
Islamophobia encompasses personal attacks on people who are judged to be Muslim through 
a combination of cultural, phenotypical and religious markers. For example, Muslims might 
experience prejudice and discrimination triggered by their ‘foreign’ names, their skin colour, 
or their attire; non-religious Muslims might become been the targets of prejudice and 
discrimination on the basis of their cultural heritage and imputed ‘Muslimness’; and non-
Muslims may become the targets of prejudice and discrimination as a result of incorrect 
identification as Muslims due to a misreading of cultural, phenotypical or religious markers. 
Not just individuals, but Muslim institutions and whole Muslim communities, at both a local 
and international level, have borne the brunt of Islamophobic attitudes and attacks. There is 
therefore a lack of discrimination between potential targets and a high degree of ‘confusion’ 
concerning the typification of Islamophobia. As Meer and Modood have observed, ‘neat and 
categorical delineations within terminology are made implausible by variations in the social 
phenomena they seek to describe and understand, so that a more nimble and absorbent 
nomenclature is preferred’.42 These issues explain the general acceptance of the term 
‘Islamophobia’ and the Runnymede Trust’s characterisation despite its limitations; its very 
imprecision has bestowed it with the ‘nimbleness’ and ‘absorbency’ described by Meer and 
Modood and given the term its surprising longevity. 
On this basis, despite the deficiencies of the term ‘Islamophobia’, it will be employed in this 
thesis as a shorthand for the wide variety of discursive strategies which it captures, including 
discourses rooted in racism, culturalism, and xenophobia. Whilst employing this term, I will 
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seek to keep uppermost the complexity of the phenomenon by accepting as a working 
description of Islamophobia the following outline by Meer and Modood: 
Anti-Muslim sentiment simultaneously draws upon signs of race, culture and 
belonging in a way that compels us to consider how religion has a new sociological 
relevance because of the ways it is tied up with issues of community identity, 
stereotyping, socio-economic location, political conflict and so forth…chief among 
the concepts we identify are those of racialization and cultural racism, for these can 
explain how religious discrimination in most Western societies does not proceed on 
the basis of belief but perceived membership of an ethno-religious 
group…[Islamophobia particularly] employs a form of cultural racism which trades 
on pejorative characteristics of religious groups and communities, as opposed to 
beliefs and opposition to beliefs, and so it is not a pure ‘religious discrimination’ but 
one which traffics in stereotypes about foreignness, phenotypes and culture.43  
Given this outline of Islamophobia, I now proceed to explore the shape of Islamophobia as a 
psychological construct; as an ideological construct; and finally, as a discursive structure.   
 
Islamophobia as a psychological construct 
In the midst of the Vietnam War, the political scientist Murray Edelman published his 
seminal work The Symbolic Uses of Politics, in which he advanced the theory that: 
Politics is a spectacle, reported by the media and witnessed by parts of the public. It 
attracts attention because, as an ambiguous text, it becomes infused with meanings 
that reassure or threaten. The construction of diverse meanings for described political 
events shapes support for causes and legitimises value allocation.44 
Edelman stated that it was a constellation of ‘common social psychological mechanisms’ that 
bound the forms of political symbols and their political functions together.45 In particular, 
Edelman claimed that ‘it is characteristic of large numbers of people in our society that they 
see and think in terms of stereotypes, personalization, and oversimplifications, that they 
cannot recognise or tolerate ambiguous or complex situations, and that they accordingly 
respond chiefly to symbols’. These forms of behaviour are ‘especially likely to occur where 
there is insecurity occasioned by failure to adjust to real or perceived problems’, a situation 
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which was characteristic of Australia at the turn of the millennium, as highlighted in the 
Introduction to this thesis.46  
Edelman had based this component of his argument on then contemporary social 
psychological research. In the past fifty years, research in this area has developed and grown 
considerably, yet has continued to broadly support Edelman’s conclusions. The tendency to 
make generalisations, to use ‘abstract knowledge structures’ such as schemas and stereotypes 
as mental shorthands to enable us to organise and categorise vast amounts of information is 
considered a natural and fundamental characteristic of human cognitive function by social 
psychologists. Stereotypes are acquired at an early age, and can be activated very quickly and 
even without the full awareness or intention of the person who has made the categorisation. 
However, contrary to early conceptualisations of stereotypes and schemas, it is now 
understood that stereotypes about individuals or groups of people are not necessarily 
negative, or even inaccurate.47 In fact, they are best defined quite neutrally as ‘the traits that 
we view as characteristic of social groups, or of individual members of those groups, and 
particularly those that differentiate groups from each other’.48 Nevertheless, as close to a 
century of psychological investigation in this area has demonstrated, stereotypes are more 
likely to be negative, are usually overgeneralisations, and can be highly resistant to 
contradictory information.49 
As foregrounded by Edelman, the impetus behind categorisation processes is simplicity. To 
this end, we tend to emphasise the distinctiveness of different categories of people, and to 
simultaneously emphasise the similarity of people within any one category. Unfortunately, 
these tendencies may also result in distortions of perception and the creation of bias, 
particularly when the categorisation involves differentiation of ingroup members from 
outgroup members. According to Social Identity Theory, being able to identify with a group 
and to evaluate the value of this group by differentiating it from other groups serves a key 
role in building a sense of self-worth and esteem. People therefore tend to hold positive views 
of their own group, and to denigrate members of outgroups or view them as a threat to their 
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own group. They may be able to appreciate diversity within their own group, but will 
frequently overestimate the similarity of outgroup members and find it difficult to distinguish 
between them. Perceiving outgroup members as ‘all alike’ enables members of the ingroup to 
generate a comforting sense of the predictability of the behaviour of outgroup members. This 
perception is also reflected in the preponderance of ‘group epithets’ which emphasise 
outgroup homogeneity.50 
Stereotypes become particularly problematic when they are used to guide expectations of or 
justify behaviour towards individuals. Basing judgements of individuals on category level 
knowledge is unfair, and frequently inaccurate, particularly when categorisations are bound 
up with questions of social identity. Categorisation of this kind frequently forms the 
foundation or rationalisation for prejudice:51 a ‘set of affective reactions we have toward 
people as a function of their category memberships’.52 Discrimination occurs when affective 
reactions based on categorisations guide behaviour, resulting in disadvantageous treatment of 
individuals as a result of their perceived group membership.53 The emerging consensus in 
social psychological research is that social identity is probably the fundamental underlying 
motivation behind prejudice and discrimination.54 According to Social Identity Theory, 
considering one’s social identity to be insecure increases the likelihood that people will 
behaviourally express negative attitudes towards outgroups. A cornerstone of Social Identity 
Theory, advanced by Tajfel from the late 1960s onwards, is it is rare to find examples of 
groups in which there is a completely ‘secure’ identity, even for dominant groups: ‘a 
dominant social position must not only be attained, it must be preserved’. Particularly when 
there are ‘conditions of instability’ which threaten to change or weaken status hierarchies, 
members of dominant groups may feel their group identity is strongly threatened.55 Under 
such conditions, intergroup attitudes which condone discriminatory behaviour may be 
reinforced, and members of dominant groups become ‘more likely to behaviourally express 
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ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes if such attitudes are normative for a self-inclusive and 
contextually salient or important ingroup’.56 
Islamophobia as an ideological construct 
It is tempting to characterise Islamophobia in social psychological terms, that is, as a 
psychological complexus consisting of cognitive components (stereotypes about Muslims and 
Islam); affective components (prejudice towards Muslims); and behavioural components 
(discriminatory practices towards Muslims), with attitudes becoming more likely to be 
expressed behaviourally when social identity is perceived to be under threat.57 This view has 
its merits. However, the notion that Islamophobia may be understood solely as a 
psychological construct has been contested in recent scholarship on Islamophobia.58 The 
thrust of these criticisms is that Islamophobia is not simply a form or variation of prejudice 
but also an ideology, that is, an interrelated system of ideas which form the basis for political 
policies. As Stephen Sheehi states, ‘rather than understanding Islamophobia as a series of 
actions and beliefs that target Muslims and arise from a general misunderstanding of who 
Muslims are and what Islam is’, Islamophobia can additionally be conceptualised as ‘an 
ideological phenomenon which exists to promote political and economic goals, both 
domestically and abroad’.59 These are, in Edelman’s terms, the ‘material advantages’ masked 
by the contrivance of mediated dramas to provide political spectacle (see Chapter 1). 
In underscoring the ideological thrust of Islamophobia, I do not mean to discount other 
aspects of the phenomenon, in particular the serious effects of Islamophobia upon Muslim 
nations, communities and individuals. Since 2001 in particular, these effects have ranged 
from acts of international war, legitimisation of torture, lengthy incarceration without due 
process of law, and intensive surveillance and intimidation, as well as impacting on the daily 
lives of Muslims through harassment and hate speech, institutional discrimination, the 
uncontested airing of virulently anti-Muslim rhetoric by public figures and media outlets, and 
hate acts such as mosque bombings. What must be emphasised, however, is that 
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These effects…will only be understood as scattered, albeit tangentially related acts, if 
they are not seen to be located in a complete paradigm or discourse of Islamophobia.60 
What is particularly of note in this regard is the fact that there has been a diffusion of the 
ideology of Islamophobia across multiple sites and through the actions of multiple actors, 
involving shared stereotypes of Islam, evocation of negative feelings, and a range of 
discriminatory practices (which constitute the psychological complexus mentioned above). 
These could, in Johan Galtung’s terms, constitute examples of ‘cultural violence’, which 
‘legitimise[s] and render[s] acceptable’ other forms of violence – direct and structural’.61 
Galtung posits a ‘causal flow from cultural via structural to direct violence’, but does not 
specify how this flow is instantiated and continued. To supplement Galtung’s conceptual 
schema, I will therefore now return to the idea of discourse – introduced in Chapter 1 – with 
particular reference to the work of Michel Foucault. 
Islamophobia as a discursive structure 
A discourse will always consist of multiple statements, texts and sources. This association of 
statements and ideas ‘provide a language for talking about – i.e. representing – a particular 
kind of knowledge about a topic’.62 The discourse establishes guidelines for the construction 
of knowledge about the topic, or in other words, lays down what can be discussed and rule 
out other topics or approaches to the issue.63 Because of this function in defining the limits or 
boundaries of knowledge about a particular topic, ‘the same discourse, characteristic of the 
way of thinking or the state of knowledge at any one time will appear across a range of texts, 
and as forms of conduct, at a number of different institutional sites within society’.64  
Foucault analysed a variety of historical issues through this lens, including the treatment of 
the mentally ill; the suppression of infantile sexuality; and the regulation and punishment of 
criminals. What he emphasised as crucial in understanding any of these issues was not so 
much the fact that, for example, the bourgeoisie suppressed infant sexuality in the nineteenth 
century, but rather that in this period there were particular mechanisms which were developed 
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to achieve these ends for specific political or economical purposes, and that analysis of 
specific techniques can illuminate the conception or ‘knowledge’ of sexuality which was 
being forged at that time. Foucault labelled such mechanisms as ‘techniques of power’, and 
emphasised that in order to ‘understand how these mechanisms come to be effectively 
incorporated into the social whole’, it was necessary to ‘demonstrate the economic 
advantages or political utility that derives from them in a given context for specific 
reasons’.65 ‘Techniques of power’ are developed through knowledge and understanding of a 
particular subject, knowledge which can be operationalised and applied in the real world to 
the regulation and control of social conduct and practice. In this sense, knowledge is always 
inextricably implicated in the operations of power, and power relations are necessarily 
predicated upon the basis of a field of knowledge, or discourse, about the issue at hand.66 As 
Stuart Hall emphasises, ‘knowledge does not operate in a void…it is put to work, through 
certain technologies and strategies of application, in specific situations, historical contexts 
and institutional regimes’.67  
This is the crucial aspect of Islamophobia which we must investigate and interrogate: we 
must uncover, as Foucault argued, ‘how these mechanisms of power, at a given moment, in a 
precise conjecture and by means of a certain number of transformations, have begun to 
become economically advantageous and politically useful’.68 We must consider how the 
combination of discourse and power – power/knowledge – has produced a certain conception 
of Islam and of Muslims, has had certain real effects for both Muslims and non-Muslims, and 
how these have been enacted in a variety of ways, such as the securitisation of Islam or the 
dehumanisation of asylum seekers.69  When we see the effects of Islamophobia manifesting 
in society, we are detecting the operation of ‘techniques of power’ which are characteristic of 
a specific discourse, a particular way of understanding and knowing, which is inextricably 
enmeshed with questions of power and control. It is this sense that Edward Said drew upon 
Foucault’s notion of discourse in his seminal work Orientalism: 
Orientalism is not a mere political subject matter or field that is reflected passively by 
culture, scholarship or institutions; nor is it a large and diffuse collection of texts 
about the Orient…it is, above all, a discourse that is by no means in direct, 
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corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced and 
exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power…Orientalism is – and does 
not simply represent – a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual 
culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with “our” world’.70 
As Said demonstrated, Orientalism served a specific purpose within the context of the 
colonial expansion of Europe in the nineteenth century, that of legitimating and enacting 
‘Occidental’ hegemony over the ‘Orient’. In the current epoch, Islamophobia serves the 
specific purpose of legitimating and enacting ‘Western’ hegemony, both on a global and a 
local level. 
In emphasising the instrumentalisation of Islamophobia, Sheehi and Allen, among others, are 
going beyond analysing Islamophobia as a psychological construct, to a form of political 
analysis, as defined by Edelman:  
Political analysis…must examine how political actions get some groups the tangible 
things they want from government and at the same time it must explore what these 
same actions mean to the mass public and how it is placated or aroused by them.71 
What is crucial to emphasise, however, is that this hegemony does not operate exclusively as 
a coercive, top-down application of power. Relations of power are not solely engendered 
from the top downwards; for power to be exercised from above there must also exist ways in 
which power is exercised in the opposite direction, in which discourses are diffused upwards 
and outwards as well as imposed from above. Power can also be productive, rather than 
simply repressive.72 As Foucault emphasises, 
Power must be analysed as something that circulates…it is never localised here or 
there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of 
wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not 
only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of 
simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power.73 
Although much discussion in this chapter has focussed upon the purposes of the discursive 
formation of Islamophobia, and the interests it serves, individual actors (‘President Bush’) or 
even large blocs (‘the United States’) should not be regarded uncritically as units of analysis. 
As Sheehi emphasises, it is necessary to resist the claim that an ‘explicit conspiratorial 
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relationship exists’ between members of influential ‘networks’ of political, academic, media, 
and economic actors:  
The amorphous network is not a conspiracy. Rather, it is an ideological class of actors 
that do not share common political beliefs but do share common interests and goals, 
most notably, extending the longevity of global capitalism and the United States’ 
predominance of it. In other language, the term “elites” could simply replace the word 
network.74 
Galtung’s ‘exculpatory perspective’ emphasises that identifiable individuals and groups 
assume roles created by a ‘deficient structure’ or ‘deficient culture’,75 leading to conflict and 
potentially (direct) violence. There is, Foucault allows, such a thing as the ‘local cynicism of 
power’, but that should not be mistaken for a ‘headquarters that presides over its 
rationality’.76 Edelman explains that, while initiatives in political communication promote 
some interests over others, ‘there is no implication here that elites consciously mould political 
myths and rituals to serve their ends. Attempts at such manipulation usually become known 
for what they are and fail. What we find is social role taking, not deception’ (emphasis 
added).77 
One of the most significant ways in which power/knowledge are diffused throughout modern 
societies is through the operation of the media. Understanding the relationship between the 
media and other sources of this discourse, and understanding what effects media 
representations may play in the reproduction and perpetuation of Islamophobia, of forming 
attitudes and shaping behaviour in the general populace, will form the basis for the next 
chapter in this thesis. However, in the following sections, I seek to unpack more fully what 
Islamophobia is, and to seek to understand some of the dominant strands (or ‘master-
narratives’ as Sheehi refers to them) within this discourse, before moving on to understand 
the role of the media in this process. 
Surveying all the strands in this ideological construct would be impossible; even selecting a 
point at which to commence the investigation is difficult. Hostility towards and fear of 
Muslims did not begin with September 11; nor does it necessarily arise from an unbroken 
lineage tracing back to the era of the Crusades. Furthermore, some of the ‘master-narratives’ 
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or discourses which feed into Islamophobia are themselves contradictory. In this sense, 
Islamophobia serves as a ‘discursive formation’ rather than simply a discourse: it draws down 
and enacts the discursive practices of other discourses and sustains a ‘regime of truth’.78  
The ‘truth’ of knowledge from a Foucauldian perspective lies not in any absolute sense of 
truth, but in the notion that the discursive formation in itself imposes a politics of truth: it 
‘will become ‘true’ in terms of its real effects even if in some absolute sense it has never been 
conclusively proven’.79 Thus, we may observe that some of the effects of the discursive 
regime of Islamophobia included the radicalisation of Muslim youth in the West, the 
sharpening of distinctions between ‘Islam’ and the ‘the West’, and the proliferation of 
‘terrorism’ in the Middle East. In this way, the discursive formation can be upheld as truth 
and its discursive practices sustained. Given this complexity, I therefore choose to consider 
one prominent strand of this discursive formation in detail, and then investigate some of its 
pertinent aspects. I begin with a consideration of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, and an 
analysis of how this discourse becomes implicated in the broader discursive formation of 
Islamophobia. 
The Clash of Civilisations 
In the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War provoked 
much debate about the future of forces dominating world politics. Within the ranks of certain 
policy-making theorists, the competition to define a new paradigm for global hegemony was 
on. Initially, the perspective in the ascendant was that of Francis Fukuyama, who had 
speculated on ‘the end of history’ as the foundation for future political contestation. In 
Fukuyama’s formulation, the possibility that wars would continue to be fought over ideology 
was seen to have greatly diminished, as the ideology of capitalist liberal democracy had 
emerged victorious from the cold war and was unlikely to be successfully challenged in the 
future.80 However, among the plethora of alternative voices, one view gained the upper hand. 
                                                
78 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, p. 131. 
79 Hall, Representation, p. 49. 
80  Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man  (New York: Free Press, 1992); Mujeeb R. Khan, 
"The Islamic and Western Worlds: 'End of History' or the 'Clash of Civilisations'?," in The New Crusades: 
Constructing the Muslim Enemy, eds. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2003), p. 170-1; Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Definitions," in The New Crusades: Constructing the 
Muslim Enemy, eds. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 
69-70; John Trumpbour, "The Clash of Civilisations: Samuel P. Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and the 
Remaking of Post-Cold War World Order," in The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy, eds. 
Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 90-91. 
Chapter 2 – A ‘millennial enemy’?: representations of Muslims and the construction of ‘Islamophobia’ 
 33 
In a Foreign Affairs article published in 1993, Harvard-based political theorist Samuel 
Huntington popularised what would later come to be referred to as the ‘clash of civilisations’ 
thesis: 
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not 
be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among 
humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will 
remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global 
politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations. The fault 
lines between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future.81 
Huntington went on to describe a number of ‘civilisations’ and to discuss the historical 
conflicts along their ‘faultlines’, a discussion in which violent conflict between various 
Islamic polities and other ‘civilisational entities’ receives significant emphasis. This emphasis 
led Huntington to declare that ‘Islam has bloody borders’,82 and to claim that the next great 
civilisational conflict would be between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’.83 
Despite the fuzzy definitions of civilisations apparent in Huntington’s article, as well as many 
other errors and inconsistencies within his argument, the intense interest in ‘The Clash of 
Civilisations’ led Huntington to publish a book length expansion of his article.84 Huntington’s 
book does not noticeably clarify many of the issues of definition or historical accuracy, but 
did maintain the emphasis on ‘Islamic civilisation’ as an imminent threat to ‘Western 
civilisation’.85 As Edward Said notes, although Huntington outlines at least seven world 
civilisations, ‘the conflict between two of them, Islam and the West, gets the lion’s share of 
his attention’.86 Indeed, not only is the preoccupation with Islam that characterised his 
Foreign Affairs article sustained, it is even extended. ‘Wherever one looks along the 
perimeter of Islam’, Huntington claimed, ‘Muslims have problems living peaceably with their 
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neighbours’.87 He then goes on to argue that ‘the Muslim propensity toward violent conflict’ 
is responsible for two-thirds to three-quarters of ‘inter-civilisational’ conflict: ‘Islam’s 
borders are bloody, and so are its innards’.88 
Huntington’s preoccupation with ‘civilisational conflict’ between the West and the Islamic 
world, and many of the supposed inherent characteristics of Muslims, Islam and Islamic 
civilisation which he adduces as the foundations for the Muslim predisposition to violence, 
are consonant with, and in some cases directly derived from the work of Bernard Lewis, 
Professor of Near-Eastern Studies at Princeton.89  Even the phrase ‘clash of civilisations’ 
itself was inspired by Lewis. In an article published in 1990 in The Atlantic Monthly, Lewis 
had warned of an impending storm: 
We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and 
policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of 
civilizations – the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival 
against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide 
expansion of both.90 
Dismissing the notion that Muslims and Muslim nations might have ‘specific grievances’ 
which could explain their ‘irrational’ rage towards the West, Lewis argues that the ‘roots of 
Muslim rage’ must be sought within the Islamic faith itself: ‘clearly, something deeper is 
involved…something deeper that turns every disagreement into a problem and makes every 
problem insoluble’.91  
The aspects of Islam which Lewis identified as providing the foundation for ‘Muslim rage’ 
include the claim that there can be no separation between state and religion in Islamic 
theology; that Muslims view hierarchical relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in 
which Muslims are dominant as normal, and are incapable of accepting inferiority to non-
Muslims; that the binary division of the world and all mankind into the dar al-harb and the 
dar al-Islam is central to Islam and that ‘the obligation of holy war therefore begins at home 
and continues abroad, against the same infidel enemy’.92 Despite some individual impulses 
towards mannered and modulated behaviour, ‘there is something in the religious culture of 
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Islam’, Lewis argued, which means that Muslims are unable to control their responses when 
excited: even educated public figures may be taken over by an irrational ‘explosive mixture 
of rage and hatred’ directed against the ‘infidel enemy’, the Westerner.93 
In ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, Lewis was not articulating a new set of ideas: he had been 
proclaiming the ‘clash of civilisations’ as an explanatory framework for relations between the 
Middle East and the West as early as 1964.94 The great contest between what which Lewis 
describes as ‘millennial’ or ancient enemies ‘began with the advent of Islam, in the seventh 
century, and has continued virtually to the present day’.95  For Lewis, the Christian character 
of the medieval Westerner morphed unproblematically into the secular character of the 
contemporary Westerner, whilst the character of the Islamic enemy remained eternally the 
same.  
Lewis’s notion of static and unchanging cultures, as with his characterisations of Islamic 
culture, was picked up and expanded by Huntington. Civilisational conflict, Huntington 
argued, was fundamentally different from conflict over political or economic difference, in 
which the contenders may be amenable to compromise and eventual resolution: ‘in conflicts 
between civilisations, the question is “what are you?” That is a given that cannot be 
changed’.96 It is on the immutability of identity that Huntington plays his trump card against 
Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis: ‘the Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron 
Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line’.97 
There are therefore three principal components of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, as set out 
by Lewis and popularised by Huntington, which are relevant to this enquiry. The first is the 
notion of the essential differences between cultures and their necessarily antagonistic 
relations with each other; the second is a particular constellation of characteristics attributed 
to Islamic civilisation and Muslims; and the third is the emphasis upon the irreconcilability of 
‘Western’ and ‘Islamic’ cultures, through which Islam can be cast as the ‘millennial enemy’ 
of the West. As Stephen Sheehi argues, the importance of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis 
lies not in the originality of its content. Rather, 
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Its force lies in its ability to recast old Orientalist tropes into new Islamophobic 
paradigms appropriate for the global era and US power in it. Lewis integrated 
Islamophobia into the political vision of the neoconservative movement in the 1990s 
while also explaining to policymakers the necessities of using unipolar power in the 
Middle East. Furthermore, Lewis’s cultural argument would resonate with the racist 
unconscious of white America, playing on fears that a brown, Muslim world could 
never be integrated into the global order.98 
The applicability of the ‘clash of civilisations’ theory to policy and foreign relations 
demonstrates its utility, in terms of instilling, reinforcing and defending patterns of socio-
economic dominance, within and between nations, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century. The content of this discourse gives rise to the techniques of power and disciplinary 
technologies which create its ‘regimes of truth’.  The three key components in this discourse, 
and the relationship of each component to the discursive formation of Islamophobia in a 
global context will now be analysed individually. 
Culturalism and the new racism 
One of the most significant impacts of the clash of civilisations thesis in its legitimisation of 
Islamophobia was its strengthening of the trend towards reintroducing culture as a significant 
factor in political debate.99 The Islamophobic aspects of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis 
could be easily adopted by key political figures, policymakers and media outlets because the 
thesis deployed racist stereotypes and analysis which resonated with many historical 
discourses of privilege and exclusion, yet did not in any way refer to ‘race’ in the sense of 
biological determinism. The crucial word in the emphasis of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis 
on ‘the velvet curtain of culture’ is culture. 100 As Martin Barker and others have emphasised, 
since World War II, conservative arguments against immigration or various social policies 
have increasingly been based upon culturalism, because they are perceived to have been freer 
of the taint of racism than arguments based upon biological difference.101 
As a result of both the entrenchment of cultural intolerance towards racism and the 
proliferation of legislative strictures prohibiting racial discrimination, participants in 
psychological experiments have become increasingly reluctant to divulge their prejudices or 
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to reveal stereotypes which they hold. It is for this reasons that measures of implicit prejudice 
have become so significant within social psychological research in the past decade.102 Public 
figures, no matter how conservative, have become similarly savvy to the bête noire of racism. 
From the late 1970s, a shifting focus has been observable in political discourses, ‘one that 
moved away from more traditional markers of race to newer and less legislatively protected 
markers based on cultural and religious difference’.103 This tendency to argue for a ‘pseudo-
biological culturalism’ which is founded on immutable characteristics of different peoples 
can be categorised in two ways: in one sense, culturalism can be used as a strategy for 
cloaking expressions of ‘old racism’. In the other sense, it represents a distinct form of 
prejudice, which emphasises the threat posed by some groups to others, rather than making 
clear biological distinctions between groups. These two different forms of prejudice are 
generally referred without differentiation as forms of ‘new racism’, although the latter sense 
is the one defined and researched by Martin Barker, who is credited with coining the phrase 
‘new racism’.104 What these types of arguments have in common is the positing of essential 
differences inhering in particular groups, but with the locus situated in cultural difference 
rather than racial difference. Trumpbour, for instance, links the arguments of Dinesh D’Souza 
about the basic cultural differences between blacks and whites in America to the basic 
civilisational differences posited by Huntington.105 The vague notion of ‘civilisations’ which 
is central to the Clash of Civilisations thesis builds upon a type of categorisation process 
which is inherently flawed: ‘the personification of enormous entities called ‘the West’ and 
‘Islam’ is recklessly affirmed, as if hugely complicated matters like identity and culture 
existed in a cartoonlike world…certainly neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to 
spare for the internal dynamics and plurality of every civilisation’.106 
As an example of how such ideas play out in contemporary politics, the British Nationalist 
Party (BNP) leader, Nick Griffin, explained the political rationale behind the use of 
culturalist arguments as opposed to explicitly racist arguments to supporters at a branch 
meeting in March 2006: 
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We bang on about Islam. Why? Because to the ordinary public out there it’s the thing 
they can understand. It’s the thing the newspaper editors sell newspapers with. If we 
were to attack some other ethnic group – some people say we should attack the 
Jews…if that was an issue we chose to bang on about when the press don’t talk about 
it…the public would just think we were barking mad…and we wouldn’t get to 
power.107 
Here, the BNP is clearly singling out the fact that since attacks on Muslims may be founded 
in culturalist rather than less socially acceptable ‘racist’ arguments, as attacks on Jews could 
be defined, it is possible to advance such arguments for the sake of political gain without 
alienating the media and other significant players in British society. Griffin’s comments also 
highlight the key role of the media in legitimising and promulgating discriminatory 
discourses. 
This type of cynical manipulation of antagonism towards outgroups is not only a topdown 
process, however, but also reflects developments within other aspects of society. In tracing 
the development of anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain during the late 1980s and 1990s, Chris 
Allen found the shift towards prejudice and discrimination based on cultural and religious 
grounds as opposed to ethnic or racial prejudice was increasingly prominent: 
Whilst acknowledging some overlap with traditional racism clearly existed, a clear 
shift in markers of identification that exacerbated Muslim-ness was becomingly 
increasingly apparent in the discrimination and hostility that was being identified at 
the grassroots level.108 
Although Allen is referring here to the specifically British context of rising anti-Muslim and 
anti-Islamic sentiment, his observations ring true for developments in other parts of the 
Western world. An in-depth analysis of comparative developments within the specifically 
Australian context will be considered in chapters 4-7 of this thesis; in this chapter, however, I 
will continue to outline the shape and functions of Islamophobic discourses more generally. 
Representing Muslims and Islam 
In constructing a characterisation of Islam, writers such as Lewis and Huntington could draw 
on a long and dubious heritage of negative portrayals of Muslims and Islamic culture in 
European history. The formation of many persistent, stereotypical images of Islam during the 
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early medieval period has been documented in detail, in particular by John Tolan,109 whilst 
Tomas Mastnak has traced the diffusion of such tropes and stereotypes through the later 
middle ages and early modern period.110 During the Enlightenment, great change may have 
taken place within European society and European thought, yet the essential European 
attitude towards the Muslim world remained that of the ‘permanent crusade’, in Mastnak’s 
phrase: active promulgation of the need to expulse Muslims from ‘European’ territories and 
curb their influence in adjacent regions. Key Enlightenment thinkers, such as Voltaire, whilst 
laying the foundations for Western modernity and its perspectives on freedom, democracy 
and equality, continued to nurture this dream.111 Finally, as Mastnak notes: 
It was the European world shaped by the revolution that finally executed some very 
old ideas, like the conquest of Egypt…a first major step in the process that, in about a 
century, brought three-quarters of the world Muslim population under European 
domination.112 
Mastnak and the noted crusade historian Carole Hillenbrand both note the continued 
preoccupation of Europeans with interpreting modern developments in light of crusading 
rhetoric, particularly the Napoleonic conquest of Egypt but above all the crowning 
achievement of Lord Allenby’s ‘reoccupation’ of Jerusalem in 1917: it was within the context 
of these developments that the ideology of Orientalism was nurtured and developed.113 The 
application of crusading rhetoric to more recent developments in Europe, in particular the 
Bosnian genocide, have been lamented by Mastnak and Michael Sells, and the valorisation of 
the Crusades occupied a prominent position in the edifice of Orientalism.114 George Bush’s 
references to the War on Terror as a ‘crusade’ can therefore be seen to have a long lineage in 
terms of their framing of relations between ‘the West’ and ‘Islam’;115 it was this type of 
rhetoric that led the late Alexander Cockburn to label the War on Terror as the ‘Tenth 
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Crusade’, implying that this war followed seamlessly from the nine major crusades to the 
Holy Land during the medieval period.116 
Orientalism deserves particular attention when considering characterisations of Muslims and 
Islam in contemporary Islamophobic discourses. The continuity of many of the dogmas of 
Orientalism into the current era have been amply demonstrated by Edward Said, who 
observed that they ‘exist in their purest form today in studies of Arabs and Islam’. The four 
central Orientalist dogmas identified by Said included: 
The absolute and systematic difference between the West which is rational, 
developed, humane, superior; and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. 
Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient…are always preferable to direct 
evidence drawn from modern Oriental realities. A third dogma is that the Orient is 
eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself…a fourth dogma is that the Orient is 
at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the 
brown dominion) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, 
outright occupation whenever possible.117 
The conformity of crucial cornerstones of the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis with these key 
Orientalist dogmas is clear. Anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment have a highly elaborated 
and well-established place in Western society. In an interview with Ania Loomba in 1997, 
Edward Said pointed out the extent to which Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ 
thesis ‘re-appropriated’ and repackaged Orientalism for the contemporary era. Said argued 
that such discursive formations are not homogenous across time and place, but are ‘able to 
multiply and proliferate in all kinds of ways’. Nevertheless, they share a ‘deep structure’, in 
the sense that ‘they all depart from the same premise, that there is a line separating “us” from 
“them”…and it keeps recurring’.118 This ‘deep structure’ is ‘the basic premise of ontologised 
difference’ central to Orientalism, which has in the contemporary era become transferred 
onto the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis and thence into contemporary forms of 
‘Islamophobia’.119  
It is in this sense that Chris Allen postulates that anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiments are 
‘endemic’ in Western culture. By endemic, Allen does not imply that the form of such 
antagonism remains static or unchanging, in the sense that Bernard Lewis implied the 
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‘millennial’ conflict between Islam and the West was constant in its nature. Instead, Allen 
argues that ‘by endemic it is meant that such views and understandings are a condition of a 
particular setting or people: something that can be drawn upon and expressed in different 
ways and at different times as well as being rejected and replaced also’.120 The contemporary 
manifestation of anti-Islamic sentiment would be unintelligible without the historical context 
of bellicose relations between ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’. To trace the lineage of specific anti-
Muslim or anti-Islamic attitudes and beliefs and to note that they may become more or less 
salient at different periods of time is not to suggest that the phenomenon remains the same 
across time, or that the recurrences of such tropes are completely discontinuous but rather, as 
Halliday emphasised, signifies that ‘the past provides a reserve of reference and symbol for 
the present: it does not explain it’.121 This same insight could also be expressed by noting that 
discourses are not ‘closed systems’:  
A discourse draws on elements in other discourses, binding them into its own network 
of meanings…traces of past discourses remain embedded in more recent 
discourses.122 
The discourse of contemporary Islamophobia clearly draws extensively upon historic fears 
and conceits concerning Islam. However, it also exhibits novel features and has been ‘put to 
work’, in the words of Stuart Hall, in ways which are clearly a product of the contemporary 
context. 
The ‘millennial enemy’ 
As the discussion above has emphasised, the notion of Islam as a particular enemy of ‘the 
West’ is not simply limited to American policy or thought or to the latter part of the twentieth 
century. However, it is within the limited sphere of American foreign policy in the past two 
decades that the notion of Islam and ‘the West’ being ‘millennial enemies’ attained 
something of a paradigmatical status. As demonstrated in research by Jonathon Fox, Errol 
Henderson and others, the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis is not defensible as a sociological or 
historical reality;123 nevertheless, the thesis is very useful as a means of unifying, simplifying 
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and making intelligible various complex global political and economic problems. In this 
regard, the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis serves very well as an exercise in ‘maintaining a 
wartime status in the minds of Americans and Others’.124 As the historian Mottahedeh notes, 
with the Clash of Civilisations thesis, Huntington had developed an exceptionally useful 
concept which gave its proponents a ‘principle with which to make order of the post-cold war 
era, and a sense of purpose’.125 
The usefulness of the approaches to ‘the Middle East problem’ espoused by Huntington and 
other public intellectuals sympathetic to his work led to them becoming highly influential 
upon the Bush Administration in the aftermath of September 11. Both Lewis and Huntington, 
for instance, were members of the Council on Foreign Relations, an elite foreign policy 
fraternity, and Lewis was reputed to be the Administration’s favoured academic expert on the 
Middle East, boasting of having visited Washington in an advisory capacity six times in just a 
few weeks immediately following September 11. Through such mechanisms, ‘experts’ such 
as Huntington, Lewis, Fareed Zakaria and Fouad Ajami have ‘sought to supply the 
intellectual ballast and conceptual universe for the geopolitics of the twenty-first century’.126 
Through such strategies, these ‘experts’ introduced their perspectives on Islam ‘deep into 
both liberal and conservative political communities under the guise of scholarly, informed, 
political analysis and cultural explanations'.127 
Following the September 11 attacks, public figures in the United States, in particular within 
the Bush Administration, drew heavily and explicitly on the ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse 
as an explanatory framework and as an agenda for reaction. As Sheehi notes though, 
The mainstream discourses on Islam and Muslims would not be readily available to 
be deployed by the mainstream public if they had not already been effectively 
disseminated and used as political justifications and cultural explanations by the 
network of journalists, pundits, commentators, “native informants”, and academics 
over the past two decades.128  
In this way, many key assumptions regarding Islam were introduced into contemporary 
public parlance, and have come subsequently to form the core of contemporary 
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Islamophobia.129 Writing in 2003, Edward Said noted that there had been a ‘notable de-
escalation’ in the public use of the ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse. Yet he also observed that 
‘to judge from the steady amount of hate speech and actions, plus reports of law enforcement 
efforts directed against Arabs, Muslims and Indians all over the country, the paradigm stays 
on’.130 Said emphasised that ‘the basic paradigm of West versus the rest (the cold war 
opposition reformulated) remains untouched, and this is what has persisted, often insidiously 
and implicitly, in discussion since the terrible events of September 11’.131 
Laying aside the possibility of cynical political manipulation of fear of an enemy for political 
or other gain, military and political advisors, among others, find the simplicity of the thesis, 
with its vast reductions of complex problems, inherently attractive.132 Indeed, in the post 
September 11 world of the Bush Administration, the thesis was to evolve into an even more 
reductive schemata for understanding and formulating responses to complex events. In the 
years following September 11, the language of the administration more carefully defined the 
‘enemy’ as adherents of a ‘perverted vision of Islam’ rather than Islam per se, although this 
fine distinction may have been lost upon many of its audience.133 As Bush goes on to 
describe: 
The war against this enemy is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive 
ideological struggle of the 21st century and the calling of our generation. Our nation 
is being tested in a way that we have not been since the start of the Cold War…This 
struggle has been called a clash of civilizations. In truth, it is a struggle for 
civilization. 134 
Under this formulation, civilisation is seen as an attribute inhering in dominant accounts of 
Western (American) culture alone, whilst their enemy cannot even be said to hold the status 
of a ‘civilisation’ in its own right: it is instead an ‘evil’ Islamic ‘totalitarian ideology that 
hates freedom, rejects tolerance and despises all dissent’. In this sense, the ideology of what 
was to become the ‘War on Terror’ can be seen to be merging the ‘clash of civilisations’ 
thesis with the older colonial theses of la mission civilisatrice and ‘Manifest Destiny’, the 
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notion of a ‘civilised’ Western identity (respectively, French and American), in conflict with 
an inherently inferior, barbarous enemy. 
The role of Orientalist tropes in such colonial projects leads us to return to the central 
argument of Edward Said in Orientalism: the particular set of stereotypes, prejudices and 
assumptions which interlace to form an Orientalist perspective on the people and cultures of 
the Middle East are not merely descriptive and neither are they benign. They are established 
and sustained as means of exerting dominance and control: they are useful and purposeful and 
they benefit one group of people at the expense of others. ‘There is no power that is exercised 
without a set of aims and objectives’, Foucault notes. Even if ‘no one is there to have 
invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them’, there are still 
‘comprehensive systems’ by which power pursues these discernible aims and objectives: ‘the 
logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable’.135 
The concept that the creation of an ‘enemy’ and the predication of an ‘us versus them’ 
dichotomy is essential to the definition of self-identity became a cornerstone of 
neoconservative political theory through the work of Irving Kristol, himself heavily 
influenced by ideas appropriated from the political philosophers Leo Strauss and Carl 
Schmitt.136 Huntington’s assimilation of this perspective and preoccupation with identifying 
an appropriate enemy following the end of the Cold War has been traced in detail by John 
Trumpbour.137 As noted in the abstract for an article published in the 75th anniversary edition 
of Foreign Affairs, Huntington was convinced during the 1990s that: 
Without an enemy to define itself against, America’s identity has disintegrated…The 
United States should scale back its involvement in the world until a threat 
reinvigorates our national purpose.138 
In the absence of a legitimate external ‘enemy’ or threat, the need to fabricate an appropriate 
threat was considered a political necessity by Schmitt; this emphasis can be seen to have been 
adopted by Huntington.139 Huntington’s endorsement of misleading the public in regards to 
the reality of external threats can be seen in his advocacy of the creation of ‘misimpressions’ 
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about Soviet involvement in Vietnam to bolster public support for military action.140 He had 
argued somewhat disturbingly in 1981 that ‘the architects of power must create a force that 
can be felt but not seen. Power remains strong when it remains in the dark; exposed to the 
sunlight it begins to evaporate’.141 
In this search for an appropriate enemy in the post- Cold War world, ‘the millennial war 
against Islam is one sufficiently protracted to supply the West with a renewal of self-identity 
and purpose’.142 The identification of Islam as the threat which could ‘reinvigorate’ the 
United States (and implicitly, the West) can be seen in the increasing focus upon the inherent 
bellicosity of Muslims and Islamic states and the impending sense of a collision course 
between Islam and the West in Lewis and Huntington’s work through the 1990s. 
Huntington’s ambitions towards the creation of a ‘legitimate enemy’ can be seen as 
representative of the type of process underlying Mary Kaldor’s characterisation of the Cold 
War as an ‘imaginary war’. Despite some theatres of limited direct conflict, the two inimical 
sides in the Cold War were, paradoxically, at peace. To justify the state of hyper-vigilance, 
the suppression of civil liberties, the production of huge amounts of munitions, and 
employment of vast numbers of soldiers and spies, people in both the East and the West were 
conditioned to ‘live with the permanent anxiety of war, with many of the forms of 
organisations and control that are characteristic of war’. The need for the ‘imaginary war’ 
was therefore justified through the exaggeration of the threat posed by the ‘enemy’. Kaldor 
interpreted the ‘imaginary war’ as exemplifying a ‘disciplinary technology’, using Foucault’s 
terminology: ‘it is a discourse which expresses and legitimises power relationships in modern 
society’.143 
What emerged from the application of the clash of civilisations thesis and its place within the 
discursive formation of Islamophobia was a new form of ‘disciplinary technology’, akin to 
that of the ‘imaginary war’, but having distinct features of its own: the ‘War on Terror’.  
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The War on Terror, like the Cold War, is viewed as a powerful crusade…the problem 
is of course, that whereas the Cold War was imaginary, the War on Terror is very real, 
especially if you live in Iraq.144 
The ‘War on Terror’ has become an extremely potent tool in the exportation and 
homogenisation of the discourse of Islamophobia and its ‘techniques of power’ globally. In 
the process, journalism, ‘the textual system of modernity’,145 has played a crucial role not 
only in disseminating dominant accounts of ambiguous causal scenarios, but also in 
concealing the relations of dominance that give rise to them, and which are reinforced by 
them. It is to the role of media, then, that I turn next. 
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Chapter 3 – ‘Media messages’: The role of the 
media in contemporary political communication 
 
As presaged in Chapter 2, I will consider, in this chapter, the role of media as a particularly 
effective site for the development and operation of ‘techniques of power’, with particular 
attention to one particularly influential media genre: news journalism.  
Over the past decade or so – the period under scrutiny in this study – both the production and 
consumption of news have undergone rapid changes, driven by developments in technology. 
The horizons of news available to the ordinary reader, listener or viewer need no longer be 
limited by physical proximity, whether to a broadcast transmitter or the distribution network 
of a newspaper. But there is an enduring paradox. As Brian McNair puts it: 
The relevance of political borders has been substantially weakened by the expansion 
of new information and communication technologies . . . [however] most of what we 
consume as media is still national in origin and orientation.146 
As he goes on to add, ‘the technology-driven dissolution of boundaries does not end national 
identity…[but does] force it to engage with other, perhaps conflicting identities’.147 This 
process has been superimposed on a longer-established pattern of ‘news flow’, in which a 
dwindling number of ever-larger corporate news sources, mostly from the US, dominate the 
agenda for global news, the criteria on which it is selected and the manner in which it is 
reported.148 The proliferation of media has complicated the picture, allowing for lateral and 
‘contra-flows’ in what Simon Cottle calls a ‘world news ecology’,149 but the underlying 
pattern is still visible. News is, therefore, a domain in which discursive formations incubated 
within elite political and corporate networks in the US, with a global perspective, are likely to 
‘come true’: to attain worldwide status as a ‘regime of truth’ in the Foucauldian sense, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
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A theory like the ‘clash of civilisations’ can be spread explicitly by its exponents, such as 
Fareed Zakaria, who has occupied a string of highly influential positions as a journalist, 
including Foreign Editor of Newsweek magazine and is now a senior presenter at CNN. It is 
perhaps still more influential, however, in its implicit effect across a much broader canvas of 
representation.  
Steven Lukes’ three-dimensional model of power was assembled from different theoretical 
components, and in a different tradition, from Foucault’s writings, quoted earlier, but came to 
similar conclusions. The first dimension of power, according to Lukes, is behavioural, 
evident in the overt words and deeds of identifiable actors, and their covert interests and 
agendas constitute a second dimension. In the third dimension, ‘the bias of the system can be 
mobilized, recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the 
intended result of particular individuals’ choices’.150 One prime example of a domain in 
which such biases can be mobilised is media, he says, and news can be seen as offering a 
particularly receptive milieu, because of Lukes’ other well-known observation: ‘power is at 
its most effective when least observable’.151 This echoes the judgement of Samuel Huntington 
cited in the previous chapter, that ‘power remains strong when it remains in the dark’.152 
All representation is conventional, but it is in news that ‘representational conventions’ are 
regarded as markers of ‘facticity’, thus rendering ‘reality vulnerable to manipulation’.153 
Political accounts from privileged sources can attain the appearance of facticity, or ‘truth’, on 
being remitted into the domain of news journalism, because of its conventions, thus rendering 
them less observable. These conventions are especially prominent in US journalism, as I shall 
discuss below, and they impose their own shape and structure on the nature and content of the 
political accounts that attain global circulation and spread, in patterns of news flow. One of 
the most prevalent conventions in news journalism, Lynch and Galtung emphasise, is the 
‘trivialisation of conflict into two parties fighting over one issue…from this dualism the step 
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to Manicheism, with one party certified as good and the other not only as other but as evil, is 
but a short one’.154 
This mode of representation emerged, and attained the status of a convention, because of the 
commercial interests of news industries in ‘objectivity’ as a marketing tool: ‘a decision to 
frame a conflict as consisting of two parties…is a good way of insulating the journalist 
against complaints of bias’, or taking sides.155 The promotion of ‘objectivity’ also serves to 
formalise a ‘symbiotic’ relationship between the news media and political elites:  
Politicians gain access to media audiences and an opportunity to shape the public 
definition of political issues; conversely, so long as they follow the rules of 
objectivity, working journalists gain relatively stable access to senior officials and 
politicians, without sacrificing their public image of political independence and 
neutrality.156 
In commercial and non-commercial systems alike, Tehranian argued, the political and 
economic interests embedded in media give rise to representational conventions that tend to 
‘exacerbate international tensions by dichotomizing, dramatizing, and demonizing “them” 
against “us”’.157 As I discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, Manuel Castells has 
emphasised that political messages are now necessarily media messages, and they must 
therefore ‘be couched in the specific language of the media’.158 News coverage therefore 
offers a propitious milieu in which to plant and cultivate dyadic meaning structures such as 
those that construct and promulgate Islamophobia.  
Processes of news production offer a set of differentiated arrangements, enabling power to 
take effect through social bodies, and the effect it takes is all the more powerful in this case 
for being imbricated with dyadic psychological mechanisms – instilled from our insertion 
into the symbolic order in early childhood – which give rise to stereotyping and prejudice. I 
will return to the discussion of news reporting conventions, and their role in the discursive 
formation of Islamophobia, later in this chapter. For now, I concentrate on these two 
interconnected psychological phenomena: how they are constructed and activated, and how 
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they influence the meanings made by readers and audiences in response to political – that is 
to say, media – messages.  
Prejudiced communication 
Stereotypes and prejudice can have serious negative effects upon the physical and mental 
health of those who experience them, as indicated in the previous chapter. When stereotypical 
thinking and prejudicial attitudes underpin discriminatory practices, they may have even 
more far ranging consequences upon members of the outgroup, potentially preventing 
members of the targeted outgroup from accessing or exercising basic rights such as 
education, health services, employment, justice or personal security.159 Stereotyping, 
prejudice and discrimination are complex psychological phenomena and may be examined 
from a variety of different perspectives. This thesis, however, focuses on prejudiced 
communication: 
Prejudiced communication is…a unique blend of stereotyping, prejudice and 
discrimination. It explicitly or implicitly conveys stereotypic beliefs, prejudiced 
attitudes, or discriminatory intentions and may be inherently discriminatory itself; the 
mode of communication may be oral, written, or nonverbal, as well as apparent in 
visual media (e.g. film).160 
Understanding prejudiced communication is significant for the purposes of this study because 
stereotypes and prejudice are notoriously difficult to disrupt or neutralise directly.161 
Understanding how they are communicated may enable us to formulate strategies for 
prejudice reduction, by disrupting the transmission and reinforcement of negative schemas 
via modes such as the media. 
Young children rapidly acquire schemas from their parents and other role models and may 
show rigid and surprisingly robust adherence to stereotypes about outgroups until around the 
age of ten, when their thinking generally becomes more flexible and independent.162 From 
this time onwards, the factors which interact to provide people with the content of 
stereotypes, rationalisations of prejudice, and a grasp of socially condoned discriminatory 
practices are less clearcut. As mentioned in the previous chapter, however, in recent decades 
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people have become increasingly aware of social and legal sanctions against expressing 
stereotypes and prejudice, so that ‘many types of prejudiced communication are less obvious 
than hate speech and explicit discriminatory policies’.163 Stereotypes and prejudice are 
therefore fundamentally anchored in social norms: ‘people hold and express stereotypes and 
prejudice to the extent that they see it as appropriate, within their social contexts, to do so’.164 
Guidance on the boundaries between ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’ stereotyping and 
prejudice can be obtained through a wide array of social interactions, but it is clear that 
within modern, developed societies, the media have a significant role not only in creating, 
reinforcing, and transmitting stereotypes, but also in the delineation of the social norms 
governing attitudes and behaviour towards specific outgroups.165  
Although the broad category of ‘media’ could cover areas as diverse as reality television, 
social networking sites, and talkback radio, for reasons signalled above this study will focus 
on news journalism, and in particular, upon the broadsheet press in Australia, which 
habitually ‘index’ contestation of important social debates and ideas to ‘elite discord’. By 
this, I mean that the range of viewpoints and perspectives on any given issue which are 
reported on will generally be limited to the narrow range of alternative views which are under 
contestation among mainstream political elites and will rarely canvass contestation of 
subjects upon which these elites have reached consensus. Political elites, of course, have 
traditionally played a significant role in the definition of appropriate attitudes and behaviour 
towards outgroups. The ‘psychological distancing’ identified by Edelman as an essential 
component of control by political spectacle, depends on the interactions between the news 
media and political discourse, which thus provides a highly salient area for the investigation 
of prejudiced communication. This chapter will start to consider the interrelationships 
between political elites and the media, and to articulate a theory of media effects through 
which their role in fostering or challenging stereotypes and prejudice may be considered. 
The news media and political processes 
Theories of the role of news in political process can be divided into two broad categories. The 
accounts cited in the brief discussion at the opening of this chapter belong to the political-
economy-of-media tradition, which sees journalism as essentially a hegemonic practice, 
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‘inculcat[ing] and defend[ing] the economic, social and political agenda of privileged groups 
that dominate the domestic society and the state’.166 I have suggested that the conventions of 
news make it receptive to the characteristic discursive structure of Islamophobia, and in 
Chapter 2 I linked that structure, in turn, to the ‘aims and objectives’ inscribed in existing 
relations of dominance that are reproduced along multiple axes in global society, often by 
activating stereotypes and prejudice.  
But there is a second tradition, evident in American scholarship, which emphasises the social 
responsibility of journalism. Exponents of this approach see the ‘free press’ in an adversarial 
relationship with power, at least in Lukes’ first, and often second dimensions, and as one of 
the essential enabling conditions of a liberal democracy.167 The ‘freedom’ of the media 
consists principally of two aspects: firstly, the independence of media organisations from the 
governing institutions, permitting them to exercise a critical function in respect to those 
institutions, and their status as privately-owned commodities capable of being bought or 
sold.168 The most optimistic accounts of the role of a ‘free press’ in democratic societies 
evolve out of John Stuart Mill’s argument that the ‘liberty of the press’ could be a bulwark 
against ‘corrupt or tyrannical government’.169 
In this tradition, the ‘free press’ or independent media is perceived to act as a ‘watchdog’ 
upon government, and is often ascribed the title of the ‘Fourth Estate’.170 The etymology of 
this term refers to the early modern division of the legislative assemblies of France, England 
and Scotland into Three Estates, a development itself based upon medieval conceptions of the 
division of society into three estates or classes: the clergy, the nobility and commoners. The 
label of a ‘fourth estate’ has historically been applied rather arbitrarily to categories of 
people, such as lawyers, intellectuals or women, which were seen in some manner to be 
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outside of the existing estates, and potentially destabilising the hierarchical relationships 
between the existing Estates, or threatening their hegemonic position.171  
The identification of the media as the Fourth Estate, and a powerful Estate at that, is generally 
traced back to Sir Thomas Carlyle’s observation following the admission of reporters to 
proceedings of the House of Commons: 
There were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there 
sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.172 
The Fourth Estate’s clout rests in its ability to expose corruption, malpractice and dishonesty 
among those who exercise real power.173 The other, more positive contribution to democratic 
society envisaged from the idealised Fourth Estate, however, is the facilitation of a strong 
civic culture and informed political debate by providing citizens with an accurate flow of 
information and a diverse range of opinions on matters of policy. 174 
Among modern representative democratic systems, the Fourth Estate may assume even more 
responsibility. Lacking the ability to participate directly in governance, or even to interact 
directly with representative candidates, ‘the citizenry depend on the intermediaries of the 
electoral process – the political parties, who run election campaigns, and the media, who 
report on election campaigns – to interact with the political process’.175 In this sense, the role 
of the Fourth Estate is often represented as that of a strategically significant conduit or link 
between the populace and the actual process of decision-making and enactment of policy 
through their elected representatives, facilitating engaged citizenship.176 
As a result of these high expectations of the media in modern liberal democracies, Jürgen 
Habermas identified the media as the public sphere’s ‘pre-eminent institution’.177 
Commenting on Habermas’s emphasis, Julianne Schultz notes that ‘despite profound changes 
to society, communications and political life, the modern news media, and those engaged in 
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its production, continue to embrace this institutional role’.178 As Schultz underscores though, 
the legitimacy of the media in persisting in claiming this role has become increasingly 
problematised:  
The ideal of the news media successfully fulfilling a political role that transcends its 
commercial obligations has been seriously battered. Its power, commercial ambitions 
and ethical weakness have undermined its institutional standing. There is now a 
widespread, and reasonable doubt that the contemporary news media can any longer 
adequately fulfil the historic role the press created for itself several hundred years 
ago.179 
It is in the coverage of conflicts that the institutional standing of mass media, with its 
attendant compromises between historic role expectations and its imbrication with power 
structures and networks, has been brought most conspicuously into disrepute over the last 
decade. ‘Key claims’ used to justify the invasion of Iraq, in particular, ‘were shown to be 
unfounded’, leaving ‘journalists [to] reflect ruefully on the yawning gap between the way the 
case was reported in advance, and the actual out-turn of events, especially the failure to find 
“weapons of mass destruction”’.180 The Washington Post and New York Times issued front-
page apologies, after publishing large quantities of ‘garbage that powered the Bush 
Administration’s propaganda drive towards invasion’.181 As noted by a chagrined New York 
Times in 2004, ‘information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was 
insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged’.182 
Such episodes show the problems with conceiving of mainstream, mass media journalism as 
being in an adversarial relationship with power. In the previous war on Iraq, in 1991, Robert 
Entman pointed out that the extent of elite discord in the US was restricted to a debate 
between the case for ‘war soon versus more time for sanctions’.183 Other options, such as 
negotiation between Iraq and Kuwait, were ignored by ‘tacit consensus among US elites’.184 
When they did crop up in debate, therefore – from anti-war activists – such proposals 
‘breached the bounds of acceptable discourse’, and were therefore judged ‘unlikely to 
influence policy’. By ‘conventional’ journalistic standards, therefore, ‘such views were not 
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newsworthy’. Reporting of the war and debates around it therefore served to reinforce the 
elite consensus: 
Unpublicised, the views could gain few adherents and generate little perceived or 
actual effect on public opinion, which meant elites felt no pressure to expand the 
frame so it included other treatments for Iraqi aggression, such as negotiation.185 
Daniel Hallin raised comparable issues based upon his analysis of the coverage of the 
Vietnam War. Hallin argued that in recent decades, Americans have frequently exaggerated 
the challenge posed by media coverage, especially to a government conducting a war, 
because of a belief that critical reporting cost the US a military victory in Vietnam. 
Experience of defeat ‘has focused the nation’s historical memory on…divisions…between 
the media and the Administration’. However, Hallin’s study found that critical reporting of 
the war did not commence until after the Tet Offensive, and remained limited in its scope. 
Fundamental assumptions behind America’s involvement in Vietnam in the first place were 
left largely unquestioned, Hallin argued, owing to the ‘enormous strength of the Cold War 
consensus in the early 1960s, shared by journalists and policymakers alike’. In Lukes’ terms, 
these were biases of the system, and the media offered a choice field in which they could be 
mobilised, ‘to control the agenda and the framing of foreign affairs reporting’.186 We may say 
the same about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the erosion of civil liberties, the rising 
incidences of Islamophobia and collective violence against Muslims, including in allied 
countries such as Australia. If you substitute ‘the enormous strength of the War on Terror 
consensus in the early 2000s’ for ‘the enormous strength of the Cold War consensus in the 
early 1960s’, the parallel becomes clear. 
The ideology of the ‘War on Terror’ depends on ‘collapsing the distinction between 
understanding political violence and justifying it’, which is ‘a pre-condition of the view that 
“terrorism” is a phenomenon on which it is possible successfully to wage “war” in the first 
place’.187 Its successful promulgation therefore depends on the presentation of a series of 
events, with little or no contextualising explanation. In this sense, ‘the war on terrorism [was 
a] media strategy as well as [a] military one’188 – lending itself to being couched in the 
specific language of the media and meeting its conventions.  
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The journalistic convention of ‘frequency’ works to instill a bias in favour of reporting events 
whose beginning, middle and end occurs to match the daily or hourly deadlines of news. 
Galtung and Ruge define the ‘frequency’ of an event as  ‘the time-span needed for the event 
to unfold itself and acquire meaning’. The death of a solider in a conflict, for example, takes 
place in a very short time-span which is well-suited to the exigencies of daily news reporting; 
but the process of development or peacebuilding in a nation is very long and is therefore 
difficult to represent within the confines of news reporting conventions.189 
The resultant pattern is of a series of apparently unconnected shocks – depending for their 
audience connection not on ‘making sense of the world’ but on manipulating fear and 
sensation, thus enabling political spectacle. Australia is one of many countries where 
journalistic assumption – backed, to a greater or lesser extent, by survey evidence – suggests 
that screening overseas and political news causes TV audiences to switch off (or switch 
channels), thus leading to a perceived need to simplify things into ‘black and white’ and 
make reporting more ‘entertaining’ in order to retain audiences.190 
Hallin noted in regards to coverage of the Vietnam War that the ideology of the Cold War 
was ‘ideally suited’ to complexity reduction, to addressing the journalist’s need to report on 
multi-dimensional issues, with which the audience probably had no personal connection, in a 
very short story: 
It related every crisis to a single, familiar axis of conflict; it enabled the journalist to 
explain to the news audience (and to him or herself), with minimum effort, and at least in 
appearance, great clarity, “what it all meant” – why South Vietnam, or Laos, or the 
Congo was worth reading about’.191 
In the same way, the ideology of the War on Terror is exceptionally well suited to the 
journalist’s purposes in relating to an audience what complex conflicts were all about and 
why they were worth reading about – whether the context was Iraq, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, The 
Philippines, or Israel. 
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It must be emphasised at this point that there are highly limited circumstances under which 
news about Muslims has been considered ‘newsworthy’ in Australia – and this is the case not 
only for international news but also for domestic news. The main exceptions to this truism are 
stories related to ‘terrorism’, or otherwise so-called ‘wally’ stories; that is stories about 
Australians doing something newsworthy – even if foolish – whilst in a Muslim country. The 
combination of the two factors initially made the detention of the Australian convert David 
Hicks in Guantanamo Bay an unusually ‘newsworthy’ story about a Muslim in the Australian 
context.192 Wilson and Guttiérez’s classic exploration of race and the media in the United 
States found that ‘newsworthiness’ was predominantly predicated upon the relevance of a 
story or its participants to the dominant majority (i.e. white middle-class people). People of 
minority backgrounds appeared in the news only to the extent that their presence could be 
considered to be of consequence to that majority. For Wilson and Guttiérez, this is not only 
an important issue of accuracy and equity, but it also sends a powerful social psychological 
message about the irrelevance and unimportance of minority points of view and of issues 
which were relevant to minority groups, but not the dominant majority.193 An investigation of 
such patterns of marginalisation and stereotyping will be returned to in the discussion section 
of this thesis. 
The role of the media during election campaigns 
The mass media’s adversarial role is seen to best advantage in situations of elite discord, 
while at the same time validating shared background assumptions by concealing contestable 
claims under a mantle of facticity. During elections, elite factions emphasise discordant 
issues at the expense of shared assumptions, so it is, arguably, in the coverage of elections 
that explanations of media content arising from both the political-economy-of-media and the 
social-responsibility-of-journalism models may cast the sharpest light on each other, often in 
the context of the same themes and stories. The assumption that the media is the primary 
conduit between citizens and the institutions of government means that the role of the media 
during election campaigns is generally perceived as particularly significant. This perspective 
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on the interrelationship between reporting and elections led then Chairman of the Australian 
Press Council, Dennis Pearce, to comment in 1999 that election coverage ‘represents the 
point at which the press probably has its greatest impact on the democratic process’;194 a 
traditional ‘social-responsibility-of-journalism’ perspective on the role and value of the news 
media which continues to inform much election reporting in Australia.195 
The notion that elections are the key institution through which the government is chosen by 
‘the people’ and imbued with authority in the name of ‘popular sovereignty’ is central to the 
conception of modern representative democracies, and a tacitly shared assumption even in the 
most apparently partisan reporting of episodes from the hustings. The periodic occurrences of 
elections are undoubtedly important events in the life of liberal democracies, and it is 
therefore understandable why elections generate such intense media interest and activity.196 
The particular significance of media coverage during Australian election campaigns, 
however, may be explained not only by general reference to the perceived role of the media 
as a ‘Fourth Estate’ in ‘liberal’ societies, but also by the specific context of extremely high 
levels of citizen electoral enrolment and voting rates in Australia. Despite global trends 
towards declining voter participation, voter turnout in Australia is generally the highest in the 
world,197 never less than 90% in the past century, and on average 95%.198 This high turnout is 
largely as a result of Australia’s compulsory voting system, which is systematically enforced 
through fines.199 Only 32 countries in the world had some form of compulsory voting at the 
time of this study, and of these only 19 nominally enforced voting through fines or other 
punishment; the number of countries where the practice is effectively supported and enforced 
is even less.200 
Despite the coercive means used to ensure high levels of Australian electoral participation, 
there is a surprising lack of government facilitation of ‘informed citizenship’, resulting in low 
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levels of interest in politics and high levels of poor political knowledge among the Australian 
population. Poor political knowledge is strongly correlated with reliance upon the media as 
the primary source of political information. In a revealing study based on the 2007 Australian 
Survey of Social Attitudes, Pusey and Jones found that more than half of the respondents 
relied upon commercial television as their primary source of political information; reliance on 
this source exceeded even class and education as a predictor for incorrect responses to two 
‘political knowledge’ questions.201 Such findings, Jones and Pusey argue, support claims by 
the political communication theorist Pippa Norris that the media are often ‘behaving as a de 
facto grade-school teacher’ in order to supplement poor political knowledge.202 Those who 
answered both political knowledge questions correctly were more likely to be older, male, 
better educated, with a higher income and social class. They were more likely to favour the 
Public Service Broadcasters (ABC and SBS) over commercial sources, broadsheet 
newspapers over tabloids, and to have an ongoing engagement with politics.203  
Pusey and Jones’ findings are supported by research surveyed by Sally Young. Young points 
out that outside of election campaigns, political coverage has limited appeal for audience 
segments including women, the young, and the socially or economically disadvantaged, 'the 
citizens who would seem to be most in need of the benefits that greater political participation 
can bring'.204 Election reporting appears to have the greatest influence upon voters who have 
limited ongoing political engagement and decide who they are voting for during the period of 
the election campaign. The proportion of ‘late-deciding’ voters has risen steeply over the past 
two decades and at the 2007 Federal election constituted about 40% of voters.205 
These factors make Australian election campaigns ‘highly mediated events’.206 Rhetoric by 
rival political leaders assumes even more hyperbolic proportions during election campaigns, 
and tonally they can present as intensified periods of contestation over the meaning of 
particular social scenarios. There are occasional glimpses, round the side of the official 
agendas, of what Des Freedman, considering the continuing relevance of Herman and 
Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in predicting media content, called ‘cracks and tensions’ in 
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media representations of key issues that grow in size and importance ‘at moments of political 
crisis and elite disagreement’.207 That is, it is possible at this time for the consensus on 
particular key issues to be shifted quite rapidly and radically; as Stuart Hall emphasised, these 
are the ‘political moments…when events which are normally signified and decoded in a 
negotiated way begin to be given an oppositional reading’.208 
At the same time, the ‘sound and fury’ of the election spectacle can concentrate attention on 
behavioural interpretations of the exercise of power, whilst masking Lukes’s third dimension, 
the form that is most effective because least observable. Edelman argues that this very 
mismatch, between the attention devoted at election times to the different forms of power, 
can exert a misdirectional effect on audience perceptions:  
Voting is the only form in which most citizens ever participate directly in government 
and is also the political behaviour that has been most widely and most rigorously 
studied. School teachers, good government groups like the League of Women Voters, 
and candidates themselves never tire of repeating that voting gives the people control 
over their officials and policies, that the citizen who fails to vote should not complain 
if he gets poor government, and that elections are fundamental to democracy. 209  
Despite this received wisdom regarding the significance of voting, political research in 
successive decades has shown rather paradoxically that issues have a negligible effect on 
voting, and furthermore that the post-election legislative and administrative behaviour of 
governments does not relate directly to the preceding election outcomes. ‘It does not follow 
that election campaigns are unimportant or serve no purpose’, Edelman observed, but ‘it is 
rather that the functions they serve are different and more varied than the ones we 
conventionally assume and teach’. Elections do serve an important ‘ritual’ purpose, which 
acts to ‘reinforce beliefs in the reality of citizen participation in government and in the 
rational basis of governmental decisions’.210 If the most ‘cherished’ forms of participation in 
public policy formation are therefore predominantly symbolic, what is crucial, in Edelman’s 
view, is to interrogate ‘just how people’s values do enter into the decisions of public organs 
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and of the extent to which particular procedures make some groups’ values carry more weight 
than others’.211 
Distance from power 
Analysis from both of the two main ‘camps’ of journalism scholarship can therefore have 
salient and illuminating things to say to us at different times and in different circumstances – 
or at the same time during significant ‘moments’. This has both theoretical and 
methodological implications for this study. The theoretical implications are for the status of 
media reports, which will be used as a source of data and treated as a social artefact of 
changes in conditions which occur with the passage of time.  
Both of the two broadly defined approaches to journalism scholarship can lead to such 
artefacts being regarded as secondary effects: expressing or reflecting primary generative 
forces that are instantiated and brought to bear above or behind them. These can be the 
interests of elites, in the political economy model; or the first three estates, over which 
journalism keeps watch, in the social responsibility model. Instead, manifest content from the 
highly encoded discursive practice of news journalism will be viewed here as ‘socially 
constitutive as well as socially conditioned’.212 Implicit in the view of power put forward by 
Foucault (and, I have suggested in this chapter, in some respects by Steven Lukes) is that 
media should be seen as ‘a relatively autonomous institutional sphere’, one which ‘articulates 
with relations of power, knowledge and production more broadly, but which also has a 
certain logic of its own’.213 
That degree of autonomy, Hackett writes, must leave some allowance, at least, for journalistic 
agency and creativity to exert influence on conduct in adjacent fields – notably politics, to 
stay with the example of reporting from election campaigns and hustings. The 
methodological implications of this situation include, therefore, the need to take account of 
journalistic role constructions, by including, in the suite of analytical factors used to theme 
and code the data, ways to gauge ‘power distance’.  
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In the interests of developing a theoretical foundation upon which large-scale comparative 
analyses of journalism culture could be based (for the ‘Worlds of Journalism’ research 
project),214  the media theorist Thomas Hanitzsch proposed a conceptualisation of journalistic 
culture in which ‘institutional roles’ was central.215 This encompasses both the institutional 
roles of journalism in society as well as the role perceptions of journalists, in terms of both 
‘normative responsibilities and…functional contribution to society’.216 One of the three 
dimensions of institutional roles in this model was the journalist’s ‘position towards loci of 
power in society’. In Hanitzsch’s formulation, one end of the power distance dimension is 
represented by the ‘adversary’ pole (high distance from power); the other end of the pole is 
termed ‘loyal’ (low distance from power).217  
As a subsequent part of the ‘Worlds of Journalism’ project, Folker Hanusch conducted 
survey-based research on Australian journalistic culture. Australian journalists 
overwhelmingly considered themselves to have a ‘high’ distance from power; they perceived 
their role as strongly adversarial and celebrated their positioning as a ‘watchdog’ or ‘fourth 
estate’. Journalists were also predominantly left-leaning in political orientation.218 These 
findings echoed the results of earlier studies on Australian journalistic culture.219 
These findings, congruent with research in other countries with roots in the Anglo-American   
journalistic tradition,220 have in the past provided fuel for the thesis of a ‘liberal media bias’; 
that is, that due to the characteristics of individual journalists as revealed in such surveys, the 
news media are predisposed to be critical of and hostile towards conservative politicians, 
administrations and agendas. However, there is little research evidence to support this thesis; 
in fact, the literature actually suggests ‘a net advantage for conservatives across a range of 
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issues and groups’.221 It is likely that the political leanings of journalists are eclipsed by a 
range of features inherent in specific media and political systems, such as the influence of 
corporate advertisers and media proprietors over media production.222 
However, it is unusual to find instances of proprietors, political figures or representatives of 
commercial interests explicitly intervening in the processes of news production. When such 
instances do occur, they generally provoke controversy, indignation and at times outright 
mutiny within the media outlet. 223 As Hallin emphasises: 
Power is exercised indirectly, through the manipulation of symbols and routines of 
working life that those subject to it accept as their own.224 
The outcome of a ‘net advantage’ within the news media for conservatism, as a result of 
either the indirect or (less rarely) direct influence of power upon news production leads to a 
disconnect between journalists’ perceptions of what they do, versus what the results of their 
work actually are.  
On the basis of their comparative work on media systems around the world, Hallin and 
Mancini suggested that this disconnect arises initially as a result of the normative character of 
the educative process for journalists, ‘where it is more important to reflect on what 
journalism should be than to analyse in detail what and why it is’. The ‘normative ideal of the 
neutral independent watchdog’, they argue, then leads to blind spots in the self-perception of 
journalists and obscuration of many of the actual functions they perform, in particular that of 
‘celebrating consensus values that fall outside the normative model’.225 This means that it is 
not only factors such as the political economy of news production that lead to an underlying 
slant towards maintenance of the status quo, but also factors inherent within journalistic 
norms that mitigate the personal characteristics and convictions of journalists. Whilst some of 
these norms have been alluded to already in the course of this chapter, in the concluding 
sections of this chapter I will discuss in further detail the overarching journalistic norms of 
objectivity and of celebrating consensus values, which have considerable bearing upon my 
                                                
221 Robert M. Entman, "Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power," Journal of Communication 57, no. 1 
(2007): p. 170. 
222 Entman, "Framing Bias."; Young, How Australia Decides, ch. 11. 
223 The classic example in Australian press history is the large-scale strikes by staff at The Australian as a result 
of Rupert Murdoch’s assumption of direct editorial control in the mid-1970s. Bridget Griffen-Foley, Party 
Games: Australian Politicians and the Media from War to Dismissal  (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2003), 
ch. 8. 
224 Hallin, The Uncensored War, p. 24. 
225 Hallin and Mancini, Comparing Media Systems, p. 13. 
Chapter 3 – ‘Media messages’: The role of the media in contemporary political communication 
 64 
study and elements of which I will return to in the outlining of the methodology of this study 
and in the discussion of my data. 
The ‘regime of objectivity’ 
The valorisation of ‘objectivity’ is central to the normative notion of the ‘neutral independent 
watchdog’ highlighted by Hallin and Mancini. Robert Hackett has described objectivity as ‘a 
paradigm or a regime, a metaphor that calls attention to the interlinkage of practices, norms, 
epistemology and structures in journalism’.226 The key conventions of the ‘regime of 
objectivity’, Hackett writes, provide bulwarks against sensationalism or propaganda, ‘yet 
they also have predictable consequences that are highly problematic for informing public 
opinion, or incentivising remedial action, in relation to global crises of conflict, ecology and 
poverty’. Hackett singles out the principle of ‘balance’, as particularly problematic. IN 
attempting to adhere to this principle, journalists attempt to give equal coverage to 
authoritative representatives of dissenting viewpoints in ‘legitimate’ controversies, which 
frequently constructs and naturalises the representation of conflicts or controversies as ‘two-
sided zero-sum contests’. It also favours the adoption of complexity-reduction 
representational strategies and gives excessive weight to both extreme, polarising 
perspectives and to ‘official’ sources, such as the leaders or representatives of political 
parties.227 Given experience of the conventions of ‘objective’ journalism, ‘official’ sources 
become practised at preparing and creating ‘facts’ or media messages which ‘they anticipate 
will be reported and framed in particular ways…[and] every time journalists re-create those 
frames, they influence future actions by sources’. 228 Media effects can therefore be seen as a 
non-linear process: Lynch et al. describe a ‘feedback loop’ in which ‘previous patterns of 
news reportage influence the expectations and strategies of political actors as sources, who 
shape reportable news events in conflict situations’.229 
The privileging of credentialised, ‘official’ sources therefore represents a significant 
‘blindspot’ for the normative model of journalism. Press articles are largely predicated on the 
basis on many source discourses; that is, media stories rely upon the use of direct and indirect 
quotes from various participants in or commentators upon the story to construct the 
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appearance of ‘authenticity’, or ‘facticity’.230 Striving to maximise the authenticity of a story 
predisposes the journalist to select sources which are already imbued with an aura of 
legitimacy, such as public figures and in particular, bureaucratic sources. Inez Mahony’s 
study of coverage of Indonesia in the Australian press, for example, found that Australian 
government officials and authorities were by far the most cited sources in her large sample of 
articles. Former Sydney Morning Herald foreign desk editor Peter Kerr defended this 
convention to Mahony by emphasising the ‘credibility and authority’ of such sources.231 
However, as has been observed in numerous studies of the media, the conventional 
journalistic reliance on legitimised sources ‘results in a predominantly establishment view of 
the world, in which lay people are only entitled to their experience but not their opinions’.232 
This is even more critical in reporting of political news (and during an election campaign, 
almost all news has some political import). Journalists are enjoined to adhere to the norm of 
objectivity and report ‘just the facts’, yet political conflicts are largely oriented around the 
contestation of ‘the facts’. Journalism resolves the dilemma, Hallin argues, ‘by taking its facts 
from official sources’. However, ‘the decision to weight equally conflicting accounts of 
political reality is no less a political act than the decision to report only one’.233 In this regard, 
quotation patterns can be seen as a form of ‘gate-keeping’, which maintain the prominence of 
elite attitudes and opinions, whilst excluding the views of other segments of society. Such 
elite views, as Elissa Tivona has highlighted in a study on the ‘backgrounding’ of women’s 
peacebuilding initiatives and creativity around the world, ‘can easily hijack the media to 
serve underlying agendas and many [elite sources] have a vested interest in sustaining 
conflict and inflammatory realities’.234 
Unsurprisingly, a range of studies of quotation patterns of different disempowered social 
groups have found that women, ethnic minorities, or other minority groups are quoted less 
frequently in the media, and are only quoted in particular contexts, which as Teun van Dijk 
emphasises, may more frequently confirm the views of elites on these topics rather than 
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interrogate general attitudes about the group in question.235 For the purposes of this study, it is 
important to emphasise that if stereotypical and negative representations of Islam are 
reproduced in the media, but conventional patterns of quotation exclude challenges to these 
representations, then over time the stereotypical representations will become increasingly 
normalised and therefore resistant to future change.236 Considering the quotation patterns of 
the articles in this study, and the extent to which they are dominated by elite sources, feature 
Muslim voices, and call into question the ‘consensus values’ impacting upon Muslims and 
Muslims communities, will therefore constitute part of the methodology of this study. 
Celebrating consensus values 
The notion of celebrating consensus values is one established and explored in detail in 
Hallin’s earlier work, The Uncensored War. As mentioned above, Hallin argued that despite a 
powerful popular myth that the news media played a consistent and heroic adversarial role 
during the course of the Vietnam War, most news coverage was initially highly supportive of 
American policy. Whilst journalists were committed to reporting the ‘story’, despite periodic 
opposition from the military and government representatives, they also remained deeply 
committed to the national security consensus which underpinned operations in Vietnam, and 
in the early years of the war confined themselves mostly to reliance on bureaucratic 
sources.237 
It was only in the later stages of the war, Hallin argues, that the media assumed a more 
critical stance: 
As the war ground on…and as political divisions increased in the United States, 
journalists shifted along the continuum from a more cooperative or deferential to a 
more “adversarial” stance towards officials and their policies.238 
However, Hallin argues that we should not overemphasise the significance of this shift: the 
Nixon administration retained a strong ability to ‘manage’ the news media. Journalists 
remained broadly ‘patriotic’ in their depiction of American actions in Vietnam throughout the 
course of the war, and although news coverage in the later years of the conflict was much less 
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positive than in the earlier years, it was by no means consistently negative. Therefore, whilst 
the media might claim some credit for the decline in public support for the war, it could also 
be seen to be responsible ‘for the fact that the public came to see the war as a “mistake” or 
“tragedy”, rather than the crime the more radical opposition believed it to be’. 239  
Hallin’s formulation is echoed by Entman, who argues that debate and slanting within the 
American media occur ‘within the boundaries for public discourse on most government 
policies’. This means that there is little evidence of the challenging of ‘deeply entrenched 
values that…help allocate power in American society’, and little movement beyond 
interrogation of the ‘day-to-day contests to control government power within the snug 
ideological confines of mainstream American politics’. 240 In other words, conflict coverage 
has historically been characterised by low levels of ‘distance from power’; a situation which 
as already highlighted has strong parallels with the coverage of issues pertaining to Islam and 
Muslims during the early 2000s in Australia. 
By evaluating the ‘distance from power’ in articles in the critical political periods covered by 
my study, I will seek to interrogate potential gaps between journalist’s perceived and actual 
‘position towards loci of power in society’. The two overlapping consensus frameworks 
which are most likely to meet and predominate in the articles surveyed within this study are 
the consensus of Islamophobia, within which Muslims are conceived of as inherently violent, 
incompatible with Western society, and incontrovertibly ‘other’; and the ‘War on Terror’ 
consensus: that terrorism is a threat to Western civilisation which must be combated, and that 
the ends justify (any) means. During the period of my study, the promulgation and extension 
of the dominance of these consensus frameworks fed fairly directly into party political 
conflict. The Coalition Government benefited significantly from the promotion and 
exploitation of these frameworks, which enabled the furtherance of their political agenda: 
increasingly unfettered pursuit of greater opportunity for enterprise and entrenchment of the 
privileges of dominant social groups, as opposed to greater opportunity for social justice. 
Murray Goot, summarising polling data from 2003-2004, noted that ‘the period from the 
invasion [of Iraq] to the defeat of Saddam Hussein boosted the level of satisfaction with the 
Prime Minister, worked against the Leader of the Opposition in the head-to-head polling with 
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the Prime Minister, and lifted the Coalition’s electoral support’. 241 The mainstream media to 
a large degree served the needs of the Howard Government, to the extent that the consensual 
frameworks were contested and dissenting viewpoints were being neutralised. This was 
particularly the case for the News Ltd. media, as David McKnight has demonstrated in 
regards to their promotion of Australia’s participation in the invasion of Iraq.242  
Although there was fierce debate within Australian politics and within the pages of the two 
newspapers surveyed in this study regarding the specifics of certain issues, such as national 
security or migration, on the broad outlines of the consensual frames outlined above there 
was bipartisan political support, media endorsement and mainstream public agreement. When 
alternative views ‘breached the bounds of acceptable discourse’, in Entman’s phrase, they 
were either sidelined as being ‘unnewsworthy’ or were lampooned and ridiculed. Attempts by 
the Labor leader Mark Latham to challenge the consensus on the War on Terror during the 
2004 election campaign resulted in extremely critical media coverage and public opinion 
polling; subsequently, representatives of the party became reticent to provoke robust debate 
on the topic in the fear of fostering a perception that they were ‘weak on security’.243 These 
issues will be explored in further detail in relation to the articles in my study in a later 
chapter; a brief further example though is the coverage of the case of Ahmed Ali al-Kateb. 
Al-Kateb, a Kuwaiti-born Palestinian, arrived by boat to Australia in 2000 with no papers. 
His application for refugee-status failed; by 2004, he had exhausted all appeals within the 
Australian legal system, yet no country could be found which would accept him. In the case 
of al-Kateb vs Godwin, the High Court found that al-Kateb could be held indefinitely in 
mandatory immigration detention.244 
Journalist and media commentator David Marr writes of his expectation that ‘battles would 
rage’ in the press given the weighty issues which were inherent in the case; yet to his 
surprise, ‘the story proved, essentially, to have no traction’ and the timid, perfunctory 
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treatment of the story by the Australian media amounted at most to a ‘muted thunder’.245 
‘Why did the story die?’, Marr asked, ‘Why has this case not excited fear, anger and public 
debate?’.246 Perhaps a part of the answer to Marr’s demand lies in the continuing consensual 
solidarity of the Australian press with the Coalition Government. At a time when the ‘War on 
Terror’ consensus was being eroded in Britain and America by the increasingly evident 
failures of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the confirmation of the ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ deception, and emergent scandals such as the outrages at Abu Ghraib prison, the 
popularity of John Howard and his Coalition Government were comparatively high in 
Australia and the framework of the War on Terror remained more consensually endorsed. 
Further parallels may be drawn with some of the issues canvassed by Hallin in his study of 
Vietnam War coverage. An example is the fierce debate over appropriate policies towards the 
puppet Diem regime in South Vietnam. As Hallin noted: 
As furious as these battles seemed to those involved, however, they all took place within 
the narrow confines of a tight consensus on the nature of world politics and the American 
role in it; none brought into question the premise that the preservation of an anti-
Communist Vietnam was indeed a legitimate goal of American policy. 247 
The model that Hallin developed to explain this type of situation portrays the world of the 
journalist as a tripartite structure, into which topics and issues to be addressed can be slotted. 
The model, which Hallin conceives of as a series of concentric circles, has at its heart the 
‘Sphere of Consensus’. Issues or topics which fall within this sphere would be those regarded 
by the majority of society as uncontroversial; as given. In this sphere, Hallin argues, 
journalists will not feel constrained by the principles of objective journalism, but will openly 
advocate for or celebrate the consensus values they may invoke. Thus, in the example above, 
Hallin is pointing out the national security consensus that dictated American involvement in 
Vietnam, which was not interrogated by journalists until towards the end of the war. 248 
Beyond the Sphere of Consensus, according to Hallin, lies the ‘Sphere of Legitimate 
Controversy’, which is the realm within which most mainstream political debate takes place. 
Issues falling within this sphere land squarely within the province of the norms of objective 
journalism and balanced reporting: 
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This is the region of electoral contests and legislative debates, of issues recognized as 
such by the major established actors of the American political process. The limits of 
this sphere are defined primarily by the two-party system – by the parameters of 
debate between and within the Democratic and Republican parties – as well as by the 
decision-making process in the bureaucracies of the executive branch. 249 
The ‘furious debate’ over the details of American policy towards the Diem regime, 
mentioned above, would be an example of an issue falling within the sphere of legitimate 
controversy. Both within and between the two major political parties, there was significant 
and polarising debate, which was reported upon cautiously by journalists intent to uphold the 
principles of objectivity and neutrality. Within the storm of controversy over such issues of 
policy, the underlying frameworks will not be addressed or interrogated. 
Beyond the zone of legitimate controversy, in Hallin’s model, lies the ‘Sphere of Deviance’. 
Within this realm are located the perspectives and views of political actors outside the 
mainstream, which may range from simply eccentric to the abhorrent and heretical. Within 
this zone, the principles of neutrality and balance are again de-emphasised, and the 
journalism  ‘plays the role of exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda 
those who violate or challenge the political consensus. It marks out and defends the limits of 
acceptable political conflict’.250 Within the early years of the Vietnam War, any voices 
questioning the national security consensus that the United States should not be fighting in 
Vietnam were sidelined in this manner. It was only in the later stages of the war that the 
perspectives of anti-war advocates became considered part of a legitimate controversy. As 
noted above, however, the most radical perspective on the war, that it was not simply a 
‘tragedy’ or a ‘mistake’, but actually a criminal venture, never gained a place within the 
sphere of legitimate controversy; it remained in the borders of the sphere of deviancy. 
As Hallin’s book illustrates, the extent to which a particular viewpoint, issue or perspective 
may be considered a consensus value to be championed, a point under debate which required 
careful coverage of several perspectives, or a notion to be dismissed out of hand, can change 
over time.251 A general contemporary example might be seen in the increasing consensus 
around climate change. The views of ‘greenies’ and ‘tree huggers’ were routinely ridiculed 
and placed firmly within the sphere of deviancy until recent years, when gradual shifts within 
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mainstream public and political opinion opened up the issue as a ground for legitimate 
controversy.252 Currently, the issue is moving slowly towards the sphere of consensus, with 
the most vehement climate change deniers in some cases beginning to be consigned to the 
sphere of deviance and labelled as ‘crackpots’.253 
In the case at hand, it was only from the mid-2000s that the consensus on the ‘Islamic threat’ 
and the consensus of the War on Terror began to be more effectively contested in Australian 
political discourse and within the Australian media. Thus, during the lead up to the 2007 
election, it is possible to see evidence of certain issues and perspectives entering the ‘sphere 
of legitimate controversy’, whilst if they appeared in the coverage of the 2004 election 
campaign at all, it was generally in the interests of presenting such perspectives as ‘deviant’. 
Examples are the argument that Australian participation in the ‘War on Terror’ made us less 
safe, rather than more safe; the view that the stirring up of communal antagonism towards 
Muslims was harmful to the Australian community as a whole; or the view that all terrorism 
suspects deserved due process of law. The investigation of these issues constitutes a core 
component of the primary research for this thesis. I now move to Part 2 of my thesis, which 
will provide an overview of the political and historical context of my research, before turning 
to Part 3, which includes the methodology and discussion sections of the thesis, in order to 
further expand on many of the points raised during this chapter. 
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Chapter 4 – A national history of racism 
The new global hegemony has its racisms, which confirm ideologically its fitness to rule and the 
inferiority of those peoples and cultures that it subjugates in doing so…[yet] the echoes of these 
racisms are complex: they resonate differentially within distinct local and national cultures, 
conditioned by their disparate but intertwined histories. For example, ‘Islamophobia’ might be taken 
to mean much the same thing in the USA, the UK and Australia, but as lived and practised in each of 
these nation-states, it has been created out of different national histories of racism. 
- Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason254 
 
Although this thesis is concerned with media representations of Islam and Muslims in 
contemporary Australia, the salient characteristics and sites of contestation within and around 
these representations cannot be appreciated without taking into account the historical 
construction of difference, and in particular, racial difference, in Australia. My consideration 
of the specific ‘national history of racism’ in Australia, is guided, in general terms, by the 
Discourse-Historical Method of Critical Discourse Analysis, proposed by Ruth Wodak,255 
which enables influences on meaning-making in the present day to be traced through their 
development within multiple contexts, categorised as operating on four levels: 
1. The immediate, language or text-internal co-text;  
2. The intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances,  texts, genres and 
discourses;  
3. The extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific 
‘context of situation’ (middle range theories);  
4. The broader sociopolitical and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are 
embedded in and related to (‘grand’ theories).256  
In considering the influences that may, at any moment, bear on and emanate from the 
publication of a single newspaper story – the basic unit of data in the empirical portion of the 
present study – clearly, the most immediate ones belong on Wodak’s Level 1, namely, 
conventions governing the everyday practice of journalistic work. One of the most pressing is 
the need for concision – choosing words carefully, albeit against tight deadlines, to fit in the 
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maximum factual information in the smallest possible space. But key words in a story about 
Muslims or Islam in today’s Australia will have acquired their significance, and therefore 
commend themselves for selection and inclusion in such a story, only by virtue of other 
usages (including in historical texts) in multiple contexts. The meanings assigned to them will 
have been constructed by their implication in extra-linguistic social domains, and overarching 
all such symbolic production are historically transmitted ‘grand narratives’ such as those 
inscribed in the contemporary discourse of Islamophobia (as outlined in Chapter 2). The four 
chapters in Part 2, of which this is the first, therefore utilise what Wodak calls ‘an abductive 
approach’, one that ranges freely ‘back and forth’ between analysis of factors pertinent to her 
four levels.257 
In tracing the development of patterns of representing the Other in historical Australian 
contexts, I have consciously adopted a genealogical and postcolonial stance towards 
Australian history. Following Vakil, I consider that it is necessary to ‘eschew linear readings 
and the logics of contained periodisations in [my] approach to problematics such as racism 
and Islamophobia’. This means that I do not ‘merely extend back to a consideration of 
articulations of the exercise of power, categorisation and exclusion…but [I] also read them 
sideways, as a ‘“contrapuntal co-presence” to reading the contemporary’.258 I am, therefore, 
adopting a mode of ‘socio-diagnostic critique’, according to Wodak’s prescription, making 
use of ‘background and contextual knowledge and embed[ding] the communicative or 
interactional structures of a discursive event in a wider frame of social and political relations, 
processes and circumstances’.259 
Construction of Difference in Australian History 
The promulgation of discourses of legitimation predicated upon ontologised categories of 
human difference have been a fundamental characteristic of Australian history since the 
British invasion and settlement of the continent in the late 18th century. The legitimisation of 
colonisation and the subsequent formation of a distinct ‘Australian’ national identity were 
indelibly linked to the emergence of a ‘white’ racial identity, which was constructed through 
the ‘European monopolisation of “civilised humanity” and a parallel monopolisation of 
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Whiteness as its marker’.260 The hegemony of white settlers of British origin over both the 
Indigenous inhabitants of the continent and subsequent non-British, non-European and non-
white migrants was established through the creation and reproduction of ‘racial projects’, that 
is, ‘structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race’. These ‘racial projects’ 
were enacted through the linkage of structural inequity, injustice and representational 
practices, which have continuing ramifications upon Australian society.261 Characteristic of 
such racial projects, however, is that whilst the racial categories that they are based upon are 
presented as timeless and rational, they are actually unstable and frequently illogical. The 
boundaries and definitions of what was ‘white’, and of what was considered ‘non-white’, 
changed over time and considerable slippage between the different categories is visible at 
different times and in different places. They are, as Sneja Gunew has highlighted, ‘floating 
signifiers’.262 
The formative years of Australia as a nation-state and the development of Australian identity 
and consciousness were therefore profoundly marked by the conceptions of race that became 
prevalent during this period. The discourse of a ‘civilising mission’ dominated British official 
attitudes towards the Indigenous peoples of Australia during the early years of colonisation. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, earlier forms of racial thought had largely been 
superseded by the emergence of ‘scientific’ theories of race, based on the assumption that the 
culture of a people was a ‘function of biology’: 
The character of a people changed as a consequence of racial admixture which altered 
the gene pool, not as a result of social change. Where genetic stock was kept ‘pure’ 
the character of the ‘race’ remained constant from one generation to the next; where it 
was ‘tainted’ the race and its way of life died out. 263 
In the late nineteenth century, a variant of this type of racial thought also became widespread, 
which can be referred to as ‘culturalism’, which, whilst emphasising the permanence and 
insurmountability of cultural difference rather than biological heredity, was nonetheless 
congruent with biological racial thought as a result of the core preoccupation of both forms of 
racial thought with essentialism and determinism:  
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There was a necessary or invariable relationship between inherited characteristics and 
behaviour…there was no scope for individuals born into a distinctive racial or cultural 
group to cross boundaries – to change categories – and become full members of 
another racial or cultural group.264 
Although these differing forms of racial thought may appear to merely emphasise the 
distinctiveness of different groups of humans, they are frequently operationalised as 
hierarchical notions of superiority and inferiority between different racial and cultural 
groups. The ‘science of race’ particularly lent itself to operationalisation and mobilisation for 
the purposes of ‘racial projects’ based on racial hierarchies. In the Australian context, this 
was expressed particularly through the endeavour to create a ‘White Australia’, both in the 
national imagination and in fact.  
Having given a brief outline of the dominant forms of racial thought, this chapter will 
proceed to considering the evolution of these discourses of racial exclusion and privilege and 
the enactment of ‘racial projects’ during the course of Australian history subsequent to the 
British colonisation of the continent in 1788. These may be divided into two separate, albeit 
interconnected narratives, one focused on the dispossession of the Indigenous people of 
Australia, and the second focused on the exclusion of non-white peoples from privilege and 
even settlement in Australia. Up until the Second World War, these racial projects could be 
pursued relatively openly; from the mid-twentieth century, however, expression of ‘old-
fashioned’ racism, defined as the belief in the innate, biological inferiority of certain races, 
was increasingly taboo. This chapter therefore moves from consideration of the more 
explicitly racist attitudes and policies so pervasive in Australian pre-war history, to consider 
the rise of new forms of ‘racism’. Whilst exhibiting continuities with older discourses of 
exclusion and privilege, expressions of racism have evolved considerably in recent decades 
and have come to exert considerable force upon political developments in Australia, 
particularly since the mid nineties, as discussed in the Introduction to this thesis.  
Acknowledging the impact of this ‘legacy racism’ is a crucial exercise for understanding 
meaning-making in the present. The framing of Australian national history as ‘legacy racism’ 
enables the acknowledgement that ‘examples and effects of co-called ‘old-racism’ continue 
to be reproduced in contemporary discourse and social relations’ and that such legacy 
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frameworks and practices continue to impact upon ‘present realities and future 
possibilities’.265 
The colonial legacy 
Although this thesis focuses on issues which pertain to Muslims and therefore is largely 
preoccupied with migrant and international issues, it is crucial that any consideration of race 
in Australia also consider the complex of attitudes towards Indigenous people which have 
characterised the history of white settlement in Australia. The colonial context of white 
Australian history has a significant impact on later discourses of privilege and exclusion and 
the marked employment of legitimating narratives in Australian political history. The 
genocidal practices of colonisation in Australia, and the failure to enter into a post-colonial 
treaty or pact have left Australia with an uneasy history of guilt and a sense of ‘unfinished 
business’.266 
Attitudes towards Indigenous people in Australia have changed over time, yet have 
consistently been predicated upon an assumption of the inferiority of Aboriginal peoples to 
white settlers. During the early decades of the colony, the prevailing discourse was that of a 
‘civilising mission’. Settler accounts predominantly represented Indigenous peoples as 
‘savages’, yet were also characterised by sympathy towards the plight of Indigenous people 
and an emphasis on hopeful attempts to ‘civilise’ them and assimilate them into the nascent 
colonial society. In this period, therefore, the notion of white superiority and privilege was 
predicated upon a binary division of people into ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’, rather than 
being articulated in a strictly ‘racial’ way.  
When establishing the initial colony in Sydney, Governor Arthur Phillip was exhorted by 
King George III to maintain amicable relations with the Indigenous peoples, and was 
empowered to punish any British settlers who actively attacked or antagonised them, as they 
were considered British subjects, without sovereignty over their traditional lands.267 
Successive Governors sponsored attempts at evangelisation or ‘civilisation’ of Indigenous 
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communities and sporadically reiterated proclamations enjoining settlers to refrain from 
violent persecution or provocation of Indigenous peoples, but rarely pursued the legal 
prosecution of settlers for criminal actions (as in the case of the Myall Creek Massacre).268 
The representation of Indigenous Australians as ‘noble savages’ who had no property rights 
but could be ‘civilised’ for their own benefit and the benefit of the colonisers was, however, 
rivalled by a popular discourse which characterised Aborigines as ‘pests’ that threatened the 
expansion and prosperity of the colonies and had to be eradicated. This dehumanising 
discourse became markedly more widespread and dominant during the early decades of the 
nineteenth century as settlements began to expand across the continent. When dispossessed 
and provoked Indigenous groups retaliated against settlers, they became subject to state-
sponsored military actions, as in the devastating Tasmanian Black Wars of the 1820s-30s.269  
Only through the dispossession of Indigenous peoples could the British Crown’s colonial 
imperatives and the hopes of white settlers could be realised; as a consequence, the legal 
denial of Indigenous property rights and the construction of Indigenous peoples as inferior – 
in fact, as less-than-human – served as a powerful legitimising discourse for their violent 
dispossession. The first Catholic Archbishop of Sydney, John Polding, lamented in the 1840s 
that the notion that the Indigenous peoples could be ‘civilised’ and assimilated into settler 
society held very little traction with the majority of the white settlers. Instead, he reported to a 
Parliamentary Committee that the prevalent view that among pastoralists was that ‘there was 
no more harm in shooting a native than in shooting a wild dog’.270 
Just as the discourse of colonialism in the late eighteenth century had shifted from an 
emphasis on the binary division between ‘savage’ and ‘civilised’ to the dehumanisation of 
Aboriginals as ‘pests’ to be exterminated, with the ultimate aim of legitimating the colonial 
occupation of the continent, throughout the nineteenth century the discourse shifted towards a 
biological and ‘scientific’ view of difference, yet retained its purpose of legitimisation. The 
‘science’ of race was a powerful discourse, which effectively absolved the settlers of any 
lingering sense of guilt that may have been felt over the colonial process. Polding had noted 
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in 1845 that it was a common view that ‘it was in the course of Providence that the blacks 
should disappear before the white, and the sooner the process was carried out the better for 
all parties’ (my emphasis).271This attitude still tacitly acknowledged settler complicity in the 
dispossession of the Indigenous peoples, despite serving a purpose in exonerating colonists of 
any blame for the decimation of the Indigenous people. 
Scientific theories of race, in contrast, served to completely whitewash the role of settlers in 
their colonial project and to render the social and political processes of colonialism as 
‘natural’: 
Scientific race theory normalised social and biological theories of natural selection in 
scholarly and popular discourse, creating a classificatory system. This classificatory 
system formed the basis of the construction of an inferior other in colonising 
discourses, normalising the superiority of the dominant or colonizing culture.272 
Accordingly, by the latter part of the 19th century, it was common to see views such as this 
widely circulated in the Australian press: 
It seems a law of nature that where two races whose stages of progression differ 
greatly are brought into contact, the inferior race is doomed to whither and disappear 
… The process seems to be in accordance with a natural law which, however it may 
clash with human benevolence, is clearly beneficial to mankind at large by providing 
for the survival of the fittest.273 
In contrast to the views reported by Polding in the 1840s, by the late 19th century it is 
apparent that the dominant discourse had appropriated scientific language to represent 
colonialism not as an ‘act of imperialism’, but as ‘an inevitable act of nature’.274 This 
discourse had considerable utility and was employed well into the twentieth century to create 
disciplinary technologies which ‘controlled, excluded and marginalised the Indigenous 
“other” from Australian society’.275 It can be seen therefore that whilst the specific ways in 
which Indigenous people were represented shifted over time, the purpose remained one of 
legitimating and enacting hegemony of colonists on the Australian continent: ‘these images 
                                                
271Archbishop Polding, Parliamentary Select Committee on the Condition of Aborigines (1845), cited in Thorpe, 
First Catholic Mission to the Australian Aborigines, p. 262. 
272 Deirdre Howard-Wagner, "Colonialism and the Science of Race Difference,"  TASA/SAANZ Annual 
Conference Proceedings (Auckland, N.Z.: 2007): p. 1. 
273 Howard-Wagner, "Colonialism and the Science of Race Difference", p. 5. 
274 Howard-Wagner, "Colonialism and the Science of Race Difference", p. 5. 
275 Howard-Wagner, "Colonialism and the Science of Race Difference", p. 1. 
Chapter 4 – A national history of racism 
 79 
were the reflection not of reality, but of the interests and assumptions of particular groups’.276 
In Wodak’s terms, these can be seen as ‘strategies’, by which ‘we generally mean a more or 
less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) 
adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim’.277 
Towards a ‘White Australia’ 
As well as effectively legitimating the dispossession of Indigenous Australians, the ‘science 
of race’ was to prove an effective discourse for responding to the growth of non-white 
immigration to Australian colonies during the nineteenth century. Cassandra Pybus has 
demonstrated that contrary to the traditional emphasis on the British and white character of 
colonisers in Australian foundation myths, even the earliest colonial settlements in Australia 
were racially and culturally diverse in their composition.278 However, non-white immigrants 
to Australia remained small in number and generally low in profile during the early years of 
the colony; it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that larger numbers of non-white 
immigrants began to arrive in the colony and to begin to be considered a ‘problem’. This was 
therefore a crucial period in the construction of a distinctly ‘Australian’ identity. In 
combination with the colonial context of this development, the positioning of ‘whiteness’ as a 
superior racial category consequently became central to conceptions of Australian identity, 
and white privilege became solidly entrenched in Australian national myths, public attitudes, 
and government institutions and policies.279 
Significant non-white immigration to the Australian colonies began in 1840, when 
transportation of convicts to Australia ceased, and pastoralists began to seek indentured 
labourers from Asia (principally India and China). In 1851, when the Gold Rush begun, many 
of these former indentured labourers moved to the goldfields, sparking public concern which 
led to prohibitions on the use of indentured labourers from China. However, these measures 
were insufficient to stem the rapid growth of Chinese migration; by 1861, close to 40,000 
Chinese had migrated to the Australian colonies. The rapid growth and high visibility of 
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Chinese immigration to Australia provoked considerable xenophobia and led to sustained 
efforts at curtailing Chinese immigration through legislative mechanisms. Limits were 
imposed on the number of Chinese immigrants which any one ship could legally disembark; 
residency taxes were applied selectively to Chinese immigrants; and Chinese immigrants 
were prevented from seeking naturalisation.280 The first anti-Chinese legislation act, passed in 
Victoria in 1855, was titled 'An Act to Make Provision for Certain Migrants', which as Ann 
Curthoys points out is a rather ‘evasive’ title for an explicitly discriminatory act.281 Both the 
tendency to utilise legislative tools to limit and control non-white settlement in the Australian 
colonies and the habit of attempting to conceal the racial underpinnings of such policies have 
remained persistent features of Australian discourses relating to immigration.282 
Despite the introduction of anti-Chinese immigration acts in other Australian colonies over 
the next ten years, prospective miners continued to arrive from China, by disembarking in 
colonies where such legislation had not yet been passed and travelling overland to the 
goldfields, thereby establishing an important push towards the idea of federating the disparate 
Australian colonies into one nation.283 As the Gold Rushes and attendant immigration slowed, 
however, anti-Chinese immigration laws were progressively repealed; during the late 1970s 
when Chinese immigration again surged, there was a reinvigoration of racial tensions and 
clashes and renewed pushes across the Australian colonies for legislative means to limit 
Chinese immigration. As Curthoys has noted, racism was inextricably entwined with 
relations of dominance during this period: attitudes towards the Chinese relaxed ‘only when 
the colonial Australians’ sense of European and particularly British political, social and 
economic dominance was unthreatened’.284 
Recent research has demonstrated that in many regions of Australia, Chinese migrants lived 
and worked in close proximity to white settlers and relations could be amicable between the 
different parts of such communities. In other regions and at particular points in time, 
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however, racial tensions were extremely high and could spill over into violent conflict.285 
Outbreaks of racial violence were frequently linked directly to political developments; the 
infamous ‘Lambing Flat Riots’ of 1861, for example, were sparked following the initial 
defeat of a bill to introduce legislation suppressing Chinese immigration in the colony of New 
South Wales;286 and the mass anti-Chinese strikes, rallies and riots of 1878 precipitated the 
resignation of the sitting Farnell government in New South Wales, as a consequence of its 
opposition to reintroducing anti-Chinese immigration legislation.287 In many instances, such 
tensions were exacerbated by hostile and inflammatory reporting in both local and 
metropolitan newspapers; the press thus served as an important site for the promulgation of 
stereotypes about the ‘barbarous race’ of the Chinese and heightened anxieties about the 
growth of Chinese immigration.288 
The main thrust of the push towards a ‘White Australia’ was represented by the highly visible 
resistance towards Chinese immigration, which was usually predicated on the basis of their 
phenotypically distinctive ‘racial’ characteristics. However, forms of discrimination on the 
basis of cultural unassimilability of the Chinese and other groups of people, in particular the 
Irish and Jews, also persisted through the nineteenth century in Australia. These were often 
expressed in logically inconsistent ways, as has become a feature of ‘Islamophobia’ in the 
contemporary era. Catholic Irish and Jews were stigmatised because of their threatening and 
inferior religion, yet were frequently phenotypically indistinguishable from ‘white’ 
Australians. Nevertheless, these groups of people were often ranked at the same level as 
Africans in many racial hierarchies circulating during the nineteenth century (with the Irish 
sometimes referred to as ‘White Negroes’). Because of the supposed necessary connection 
between the outward form and inner level of civilisation possessed by a people, such illogical 
racial categorisations were justified through emphasising the ‘primitive’ anatomical features 
and social characteristics of non-white people; the Irish, for example,  were described as 
being ‘low of stature, uncouth of feature, and intensely black of hair and eye’, and commonly 
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characterised as immoral, lazy, ignorant and combative.289 ‘Whiteness’ in this specific 
historical setting was therefore a category whose borders were not clearly defined, thus 
allowing continuing contestation and attempts to exploit the issue for political capital – which 
of course generated considerable anxiety for the people affected by them.  
The widely divergent forms and expressions of prejudice and discrimination against 
particular groups of people in Australia were unified by an emergent focus on protecting the 
heritage and privileges of white people of British heritage in Australia. Not surprisingly, the 
hardening of discourses legitimating the privilege of white Europeans in Australia occurred 
during the late nineteenth century, at the same time that other well-established European 
colonies were beginning to move towards relative independence from their ‘mother 
countries’, and the British and other European colonial Empires were straining to consolidate 
their hold over the remainder of the uncolonised globe.290 
This was also a period in which there was a massive surge of participation in popular labour 
and social movements whose goals threatened the interests of traditional elites. The way such 
developments influenced the utilisation of race in Australian politics can be illustrated 
through consideration of the career of Sir Henry Parkes, one of the pre-eminent Australian 
statesmen of the late nineteenth century and five-time Premier of New South Wales, who is 
considered the ‘Founding Father’ of Australian Federalism. Parkes’ strident opposition to 
land reform, trade unionism, infrastructure development, state provision of welfare and 
universal primary education had helped to cost him the Premiership in 1877.291 However, 
Parkes was able to capitalise on anti-Chinese hysteria to oust the sitting government in 1879 
by campaigning strongly for limitations and controls on immigrants ‘who were alien to us in 
language, blood and culture’, and promoting the formerly unpopular policy of assisted 
immigration for British settlers as a defensive measure against alien takeover, necessary for 
the protection and preservation of the ‘British character of this land’.292 Parkes was also 
strongly opposed to Irish immigration, lobbying consistently for limitations on Irish Catholic 
migration and whilst Premier, making dispersal of non-British migrants to New South Wales 
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a condition of settlement aid.293 Parkes was able to leverage and exacerbate hostility towards 
rising non-British immigration to regain his Premiership and to pursue his conservative 
political agenda despite the public’s earlier antipathy towards him – strongly reminiscent of 
John Howard’s reinvigoration of his political fortunes in 2001. 
During the decades immediately prior to Federation in 1901, therefore, the six Australian 
colonies were increasingly characterised by a dynamic of racial antagonism expressed 
through a diverse variety of structural, cultural and direct forms of violence, though in 
particular through the development and application of discriminatory practices aimed at the 
dispossession of Indigenous peoples and the limitation of migration and settlement of non-
white peoples. One of the most significant factors promoted as uniting Australia’s disparate 
colonies was their shared white, British heritage, which advocates of Federation claimed 
could best be protected through becoming one nation: ‘Australian’ national identity was 
therefore predicated explicitly upon commitment to a ‘White Australia’.  
This push towards consolidation of the racial hegemony of a select, privileged minority can 
be seen to be part of broader international developments at the time, as the United States, 
South Africa and other former European colonies attempted to control and limit the migration 
and settlement of non-white or non-European peoples into their borders. Through the 
formation of what has come to be known as the ‘White Australia Policy’, the nascent 
Australian state proved to be eminently successful at crafting and maintaining disciplinary 
practices which enabled the establishment of one of the most racially and culturally 
homogenous societies in the world. As Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds have 
demonstrated, during this period white nationalist movements across the globe drew 
inspiration from the successes of other ‘white men’s nations’ in limiting and controlling 
undesirable immigration. Some practices in Australia therefore drew upon practices current in 
other nations, and in their turn came to inspire developments across the globe when the 
success of Australia’s ‘White Australia Policy’ became apparent.294 
Federation and the White Australia Policy 
From the turn of the twentieth century, when the disparate Australian colonies became 
Federated into one nation and began to exercise more independence from the British Empire, 
                                                
293 Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, Race for the Headlines, p. 19; Jupp, From White Australia 
to Woomera, p. 21. 
294 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line. 
Chapter 4 – A national history of racism 
 84 
questions of race, privilege and exclusion continued to be pertinent issues for the new nation. 
One of the first pieces of legislation passed by parliament subsequent to Australia’s 
Federation was the Immigration Restriction Act 1901. An understanding of the Immigration 
Restriction Act 1901 and of the White Australia Policy which it ushered in (or perhaps merely 
formalised) is central to an understanding of racial thought in Australia, and by extension, of 
Australian history, identity and contemporary politics. This assumption is not, however, 
universally accepted: from the 1990s, debates over the significance and legacy of the 
Immigration Restriction Act emerged as an important frontier in the ‘History Wars’ over the 
interpretation of Australian history. The most vehement critic of the idea that understanding 
the Immigration Restriction Act as an expression of racist thought which has had significant 
ramifications for Australia history, culture and identity was, unsurprisingly, the conservative 
stalwart Keith Windschuttle. On the cover of his 2004 book The White Australia Policy, 
Windschuttle set forth the thesis that ‘Australia is not, and never has been, the racist country 
its academic historians have condemned’.295  
However, it is difficult to view the debate over the introduction of the Immigration 
Restriction Act without coming to the conclusion that the motivations for introducing the 
policy were racist in origin. Windschuttle’s argument was that the inspiration behind the 
White Australia Policy was economic and cultural rather than racial, and based on fears that 
non-white immigration was a threat to jobs and to working conditions for white Australians 
and that an influx of peoples of different racial appearance and cultural backgrounds would 
foster communal conflict. Windschuttle correctly points out that in contrast to the common 
perception that Australian politicians were unified on the issue of immigration restriction, 
there were members of Parliament and spokesmen for the different political parties who 
decried the proposed Immigration Restriction Act as racist and deplorable.296 However, it is 
difficult to see Windschuttle’s claim that those who argued for immigration restriction were 
motivated not by racism but by so-called ‘economic’ or ‘cultural’ issues, as anything except a 
circular argument. Many non-white people in Australia were working for much lower wages 
and in worse labour conditions than white Australians and their presence in Australia clearly 
created some conflict. However, if the debate were not ultimately based on racism, and the 
belief that one subsection of the population, ‘White Australians’, was entitled to a privileged 
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position, then the debate would have focused on how to integrate non-white people more 
effectively into civil and public society rather than on how to exclude them.  
Britain, as the centre of a global empire which included vast numbers of non-white subjects, 
was understandably reluctant to endorse the discriminatory immigration policies which the 
newly federated nation wished to implement. As Prime Minister Edmund Barton noted: 
I candidly admit that if we had the power, and if the British Government give us the 
power…I would go to any extreme of prohibition to prevent a large number of these 
coloured people from settling in the waste lands of the tropical parts of Australia.297 
Vaiben Solomon, who had argued vociferously in Parliament for the introduction of the 
Immigration Restriction Act, based most of his arguments on the type of ‘economic’ 
reasoning which Windschuttle highlights. Yet the core of his argument rests upon the type of 
racist thought Windschuttle has tried to downplay:  
Australia has decided that this country shall not be over-run by Asiatics, but kept, as 
far as possible, for the white races. I feel sure that when the authorities in Great 
Britain really understand the importance of this question, and the strength of feeling 
of the people of Australia, they will yield to our desires. They will realize that if we 
have in Australia a white population increasing year by year, the Empire will have a 
stronger arm to help her in time of trouble than if we developed a hybrid 
population.298 
The racist character of Solomon’s arguments is revealed not only in his culturalist 
assumptions but also his references to that hallmark of biological racism, the abhorrence of 
racial mixtures or ‘hybridity’, which Solomon implies would necessarily create an inferior 
population.299 Solomon was one of the key advocates for the introduction of a ‘dictation test’ 
to potential immigrants as a means to make the proposed Immigration Restriction Act less 
overtly racially discriminatory and thus more palatable to the British Government. Once 
passed, the now infamous ‘dictation test’ enabled the Government to effectively screen 
immigrants to the country; coupled with additional legislation which enabled the deportation 
of illegal immigrants, restricted the rights of coloured aliens, and established a variety of 
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‘white labour’ restrictions, non-white settlement in Australia was effectively suppressed until 
after the Second World War.300 Many communities in Australia were negatively affected by 
this shift in policy, which wilfully paid no heed to the fact that many migrants and their 
families were, contrary to arguments about the incompatibility of ‘alien’ cultures and 
Australian culture, becoming embedded within this culture and this country and were already 
making significant contributions to the prosperity and development of the new nation.301 
Populate or perish 
Between Federation and the Second World War, the legislative suite which constituted the 
‘White Australia Policy’ was effective at limiting and regulating non-white immigration and 
settlement in Australia. However, throughout this period the notion of a ‘threat from the 
North’, of immigration or invasion from Asia which could swamp this far outpost of the 
British Empire, was a recurrent source of anxiety in the public imagination. Anxiety over this 
threat persisted and was recurrently reinvigorated by politicians and the media, although its 
expression shifted and changed with time. During the mid-twentieth century, for example, the 
fear of a Japanese invasion of northern Australia superseded the nineteenth century fears of a 
‘demographic conquest’ by the Chinese.302 Fixated by the looming spectre of the Second 
World War during the 1930s, former Prime Minister Billy Hughes coined the now famous 
phrase ‘populate or perish’ to articulate the longstanding disquiet regarding Australia’s 
distance from the ‘mother country’ and proximity to Asia. Following the Second World War, 
‘populate or perish’ became the catchcry of an ambitious large-scale planned immigration 
scheme, far exceeding any earlier immigration schemes.303 
Arthur Calwell, Immigration Minister from 1945 to 1949, was unabashed about his desire to 
retain Australia’s whiteness despite the large planned intakes, though he repeatedly insisted 
that the motivation behind maintaining the White Australia Policy had been to protect 
Australian working conditions. Nevertheless, in attempting to explain how the Policy was 
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based on economic rather than racial grounds, Calwell was unable to avoid utilising the 
language of racial essentialism: 
The thoughtful Australian realises that his nation’s immigration policy is not based on 
any arrogant claim of superiority, but simply on a recognition of racial differences; on 
the wise desire to avoid internecine strife and the problems of miscegenation, which 
such differences have caused in all countries, throughout history, where races with 
different characteristics have lived side by side.304 
This is indeed distinct from the clear avowals of white racial superiority adduced by 
Australians politicians at the time of Federation; Sir Edmund Barton had openly proclaimed 
that ‘there is no racial equality…the doctrine of the equality of man was never intended to 
apply to the equality of the Englishman and the Chinaman’.305 Calwell’s emphasis on the 
incompatibility rather than inequality of different races indicated a significant shift in the 
contemporary discourse and expression of racism, but did not alter the fact that racial 
discrimination remained a pertinent feature of immigration policy.  
Calwell was still an ardent champion of White Australia more than two decades later, at a 
time when open racism was even less accepted than during his ministry. In his 1972 
biography, Calwell referred disparagingly to many Asian and African nations, asking ‘Do we 
want or need any of these people here? I am one red-blooded Australian who says no and 
who speaks for 90% of Australians’.306 He further commented ‘that no red-blooded 
Australian wanted to see a chocolate-coloured Australia [by] the 1980s’ – and apparently in 
1996 his words were still resonating with many of those ‘red-blooded’ Australians, for he 
was quoted on this topic by Pauline Hanson in her 1996 parliamentary maiden speech.307  
Despite the passion of Calwell and doubtless many other Australians at this time for retaining 
the cultural and racial homogeneity of Australia (though perhaps not the 90% he claimed), 
British migration to Australia declined during the mid-twentieth century, creating tension 
between the perceived need to ‘populate or perish’ and the desire to maintain a ‘White 
Australia’. The system of assisted passages had formerly excelled as ‘a means of populating 
Australia whilst retaining its British character’, and remained central to Australia’s 
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immigration schemes until 1982.308 However, during the post-war boom, even offering 
assisted passages failed to attract sufficient numbers of immigrants from ‘preferred’ regions 
of origin like Britain or from northern Europe. Calwell eventually selected around 170,000 
Displaced Persons seeking to emigrate from Europe following the war, but these immigrants 
were primarily from Eastern and Southern Europe. These were ‘less desirable’ regions as 
people from these areas were considered to be culturally and phenotypically distinct from 
Australians, the British and northern Europeans, but the perceived need to recruit workers 
and grow the population in the post-war period was seen to outweigh the desire to maintain 
Australia’s homogeneity.309 In subsequent years, the Australian Government negotiated 
several intergovernmental agreements for the transportation and resettlement of further 
intakes of immigrants from southern Europe, and eventually from the Middle East. Accepting 
such migrants meant accepting heterogenisation of the Australian populace, as well as 
requiring the progressive dismantling of the immigration and labour laws that formed the 
foundations of the White Australia Policy.310 At the same time, criticisms of the White 
Australia Policy as morally indefensible, and also damaging to Australia’s trade and 
diplomatic relations with other nations, were gaining more traction with some political and 
business elites and with the Australian public, contributing to a movement for gradual reform 
and repeal of racially discriminatory practices, legislation and institutions.311 
Even as semantic and legislative changes took place which began to address the racially 
discriminatory components of Australian immigration policy, skin colour and other 
physiological characteristics can be identified into the early 1970s as the basis for refusals of 
migrant applicants ‘otherwise deemed assimilable, whose fellow nationals, and often close 
relatives were accepted’.312 An Immigration Officer pointed out in 1955 that although 
reference to racial categories such as ‘white’ and ‘coloured’ had been replaced in official 
usage by geographic, national or ethnic labels, such as ‘Asian’ or ‘Italian’, the policy for 
admission of immigrants continued to insist that: 
A person who, whether by cast of feature or by colour of his skin or by mode of 
living, is not readily ‘assimilable’ here, should not be admitted for permanent 
residence. The implicit assumption is that Australians would regard a very dark-
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skinned person [e.g. many southern Europeans] as being ‘Non-European’ just as 
much as they would a person who has the cast of features of a negro or Chinese.313 
In 1958, the Revised Migration Act abolished the dictation test, and the Migration Act 1966 
significantly expanded the opportunities for non-white and non-Europeans to immigrate to 
Australia and achieve naturalisation – in theory. In practice, government policy continued to 
stolidly affirm the necessity of cultural and racial homogeneity in Australia, and the decisions 
of the Department of Immigration continued to be based at least in part upon racial 
preferences. A government press release in 1972 asserted that: 
The aim of immigration policy remains the preservation in Australia of an essentially 
homogenous society…we want one Australian people, one Australian nation. This is 
no racist policy based on bigotry or prejudice. On the contrary it is a policy having the 
valid social objective of preventing the frictions and tensions which can come from 
permanent enclaves and a divided nation.314 
Referring to the constant denial of racism by Australian politicians and officials, and their 
repeated claims that discriminatory legislation, policies and institutions were actually agents 
for social cohesiveness, David Dutton has observed that in effect, this meant by their 
definitions that ‘Australia relied on racial discrimination to avoid becoming racist’.315 The 
‘White Australia Policy’ was only completely dismantled in 1973, when the incoming 
Whitlam Government removed all discrimination on the basis of race from immigration 
policy and legislation. Some aspects of selective immigration policy were, however, retained 
until the late 1980s, with British nationals continuing to receive preference in immigration. 
Contrary to Windschuttle’s claims that Australians defined their identity in terms of ‘civic 
patriotism rather than racial nationalism’, and that the White Australia Policy could therefore 
‘be readily discarded during the first half of the twentieth century’, the Policy’s significance 
to Australian identity and its clear racial character was reaffirmed fervently right up until the 
final dissolution of the policy in 1973.316 The legacy of the Policy was firstly the successful 
creation of the ‘most British’ society in the world outside the United Kingdom and one of the 
‘whitest’ countries in the world, with the non-European population of Australia (excluding 
Indigenous peoples) less than 0.25 per cent of the total population by 1947.317 Secondly, the 
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Policy’s legacy involved the establishment of clear precedents for the use of state instruments 
such as immigration legislation to pursue ‘racial projects’ in Australian politics and a 
tendency for the racist components of such policies to be denied and ‘obfuscated’, for 
example, through the avoidance of explicitly racist language in legislation and the use of 
objectively non-racist techniques such as the dictation test.318 Having given an overview of 
the ‘national history of racism’ in Australia’s colonial and twentieth century history, I now 
turn to looking at the development of efforts to reform and abolish Australia’s racially 
discriminatory policies and institutions and to move towards the redefinition of Australian 
national identity as ‘multicultural’ as opposed to ‘white’. 
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Chapter 5 – Towards a multicultural Australia 
 
In this chapter, I explore the profound changes in Australian society which took place as a 
result of the abandonment of the ‘White Australia Policy’ and the transition to a policy of 
‘multiculturalism’. I then consider the emergence of a range of ‘dissenting’ voices in 
Australian public discourse, who questioned the bi-partisan political consensus on 
multiculturalism. I focus in particular on the re-emergence  of ‘race’ as a significant feature 
of political debates in Australia, albeit with the discourse being framed through the lens of 
‘new racism’ or ‘culturalism’ as opposed to ‘old racism’ based upon biological differences 
between different groups of people. I close the chapter with a consideration of how the 
Coalition Government under John Howard’s leadership adopted the rhetoric and policies of 
more marginal political voices such as Pauline Hanson and began to extract political capitol 
from the deployment of wedge tactics based on race. 
The heterogenisation of Australian society 
The effects of abolishing the White Australia Policy were initially muted. Discriminatory 
administrative practices persisted within the Department of Immigration and growing 
unemployment and economic depression during the early to mid 1970s led to drastic cuts in 
overall immigration levels.  The real impact of the Policy’s demise did not hit until the late 
1970s, when the Department of Immigration had been rebuilt from scratch and immigration 
intake rose again, featuring a much more diverse cross-section of migrants.319 This was to be 
a period of massive transformation of the nation’s demographics. At Federation the 
percentage of overseas born had been 22.6%. This dropped to around 15% for the next 
seventy years as a result of Australia’s restrictive immigration practices, but from 1971 until 
2006, the proportion of overseas born in Australia was on average 21%.320 As well as 
returning to pre-Federation proportions of the population, the composition of the overseas-
born changed dramatically from the 1970s onwards.  
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The overall patterns of immigration to Australia since 1971 have been declining annual 
intakes and overall proportion of migrants from Britain and Europe, and increases in the 
number of migrants from areas formerly proscribed by the White Australia Policy. For 
example, in the early 1970s, the British-born constituted 40% of all overseas-born and still 
accounted for almost half of all incoming migrants; during 1975-1985, the British-born 
component of the overseas population had dropped to 35% and constituted just a quarter of 
incoming migrants. By 2001, the proportion of the overseas born who were British in origin 
had declined to 25% and the number of British-born migrants had dropped to almost 10%.321 
British and European immigration together accounted for 85% of the overseas born 
population in 1971, and non-European immigration just 15%; by 2001, the non-European 
component of the overseas-born had reached 49%.322  
The increase in the non-European migrant intake was characterised particularly by increases 
in the number of people arriving from Asia and the Middle East. In 1971, the top ten 
countries of origin of the overseas born were in Europe, with the exception of New Zealand; 
in 1981, Lebanon became the first non-European country to enter the top ten in nearly fifty 
years, and by 1991, Vietnam, China and The Philippines were represented among the top 
ten.323 Immigration from Asia increased particularly rapidly; from constituting just 0.8% of 
the total population of Australia in 1971, the Asian-born proportion of the population had 
reached 5.3% by 1999.324 One of the most significant factors in the rapid rise in non-
European migration was not just the abolition of the White Australia Policy, but also the 
subsequent creation of a specific and uniform policy addressing the needs of refugees and 
asylum seekers. The Humanitarian Program, devised in response to the large numbers of 
people seeking asylum in the wake of the Vietnam War, commenced in 1977 and at its peak 
in the early 1980s was resettling 20,000 refugees per year, mostly from South-East Asia.325 
Concurrent with the Whitlam Government’s removal of all overtly racial discrimination from 
immigration policy, legislation and institutions, was the introduction of an official policy of 
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multiculturalism. During the 1950s and 1960s, the progressive relaxation of racially 
discriminatory legislation which had previously excluded non-white, non-European, and non-
British people from either entry to Australia or full participation in social and civic life was 
counterbalanced by emphasising the need for ‘outsider’ groups to conform to the dominant 
monoculture of ‘White Australia’ and relinquish any characteristics, languages or cultural 
practices which differentiated them from this norm. The move to a culturally pluralistic 
vision for the nation was therefore a significant shift; one that was to have substantial impacts 
upon Indigenous peoples as well as migrants. In parallel with post-war developments in 
immigration policy, racially discriminatory legislation towards Indigenous people had been 
successively repealed through the 1950s and 1960s, yet assimilation into ‘white’ Australia 
remained the official government policy and little scope was permitted for the maintenance of 
Indigenous cultures or languages.326  
Under the policy of assimilation, both migrants and Indigenous peoples had been subjected  
to ‘unrealistic, unjust and unnecessary expectations for the disappearance of their culture’.327 
By the late 1960s, however, some concessions were already beginning to be made. Bi-lateral 
diplomatic agreements came to include concessions to cultural maintenance in order to attract 
desirable immigrants; under the pressure of the car manufacturing industry, for example, the 
Australian government began to accept large numbers of Turkish workers, and in 1967 
committed to an agreement with the Turkish government that the children of Turkish 
migrants would receive Turkish language education and that employers would be advised of 
the need to respect Muslim religious holidays.328 On the whole however, maintenance of 
Indigenous and immigrant cultures and languages was not encouraged or supported by 
official government policy, and in many cases was officially discouraged.329 
The shift to an official policy of multiculturalism, and concurrent moves towards a limited 
endorsement of Indigenous self-determination and land rights were therefore significant 
developments which served to augment immigration reforms in their effect upon the 
expansion of Australia’s demographic and cultural diversity. The Whitlam Government’s 
policy of multiculturalism was championed by its high-profile Minister for Immigration, Al 
Grassby, but the policy’s implementation was stymied in 1974 when Grassby lost his seat, 
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partially as a result of racist campaigning against him and his policies. The resultant hiatus in 
the implementation of the policy of multiculturalism was compounded by the dismissal of the 
Whitlam Government the following year.330 Nevertheless, the political climate had changed 
significantly enough during these years that the incoming Liberal Government of Malcolm 
Fraser maintained the policy of multiculturalism and the disavowal of the White Australia 
Policy; the creation of the Humanitarian Program by the Fraser Government is highly 
emblematic of this shift.  
The Galbally Report on multiculturalism, commissioned by the Whitlam Government, was 
finalised in 1978, and its recommendations were adopted in full by the Fraser government. 
This report concluded that:  
Migrants have the right to maintain their cultural and racial identity and…it is clearly 
in the best interests of our nation that they should be encouraged and assisted to do so 
if they wish. Provided that ethnic identity is not stressed at the expense of society at 
large, but is interwoven into the fabric of our nationhood by the process of 
multicultural interaction, then the community as a whole will benefit substantially and 
its democratic nature will be reinforced.331 
Among a raft of policies to facilitate the shift to a ‘multi-cultural society’, support and 
services for newly-arrived migrants were expanded, English language courses were 
improved, cultural and linguistic maintenance were funded, and the Special Broadcasting 
Service (SBS) began to broadcast non-English language programs on radio and television.332  
Not only, therefore, had Australia’s demographics altered substantially in an exceptionally 
short period of time, but the divergent languages, cultures and physical appearance of these 
‘new Australians’ were more visible. These new arrivals were less subject to forcible 
submergence into the dominant Anglo-Australian culture in the way that earlier migrants had 
been under the policy of assimilation; instead, cultural differences were being positively 
recognised and in some cases actively promoted. The data coded in the Australian census 
gives some indication of the extent of this cultural shift: 
The 1966 Census did not have a question on language spoken at home; in the 2001 
Census, it was possible to code up to 238 different languages. In 1966, 20 religious 
categories, 15 of which were Christian denominations, were specified in census 
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publications, with Hebrew (sic) the only specified non-Christian religion. In the 2001 
Census there was provision to list 123 religions and religious denominations.333 
In an effort ‘to adapt Australian national identity to the effects of a diverse migration program 
and to adapt social policy to a diverse society’, the Labour governments of Hawke and 
Keating, which followed the Fraser Government, continued to further develop and promote 
the policy of multiculturalism.334 Although Keating was less fervent about multiculturalism 
and the Humanitarian Program than his predecessors, he was passionate about furthering the 
Indigenous rights and reconciliation agenda, and became known for his insistence on the need 
for Australia to embrace a new national identity predicated upon a deep political, economic 
and cultural engagement with Asia.335 
Dissenting voices 
Despite the support of successive governments for this new vision for Australian society, 
‘periodic controversies provoked by prominent dissenters to official policy disturbed 
Australia’s new self-conscious image during the 1980s and 1990s by revealing discontent 
with the principles and workings of multiculturalism’.336 Some commentators pointed out the 
problematic limitations of the policy of multiculturalism as it was conceived of and 
implemented in Australia, and argued that the policy did not go far enough towards 
supporting true cultural plurality and equality in Australia; some of these views shall be 
considered in more detail in the next chapter. The more prominent and ultimately influential 
voices of dissent, however, argued that multiculturalism had gone too far in undermining the 
privileged position of the Anglo-Australian heritage and culture. The emergence of such 
dissenters, who claimed to represent ‘mainstream’ or ‘ordinary Australians’, was exacerbated 
by the wide coverage of their ideas in the ‘national news media, [which] thriving on conflict, 
provided the conduits for these exchanges’.337 The most prominent of these critics of 
multiculturalism was Pauline Hanson, who was initially elected to Federal Parliament as an 
Independent in 1996, but subsequently founded her own political party, One Nation.  
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In her infamous maiden speech, Hanson criticised the high rate of Asian immigration, 
because they ‘have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate’; 
expressed her outrage at the ‘privileges Aboriginals enjoy over other Australians’; and 
attacked both the policy of multiculturalism and its supposed impacts upon ‘ordinary 
Australians’: 
We now have a situation where a type of reverse racism is applied to mainstream 
Australians by those who promote political correctness and those who control the 
various taxpayer funded ‘industries’ that flourish in our society servicing Aboriginals, 
multiculturalists and a host of other minority groups…abolishing the policy of 
multiculturalism will save billions of dollars and allow those from ethnic backgrounds 
to join mainstream Australia, paving the way to a strong, united country.338 
The use of the word ‘mainstream’ to denote the supposed ‘core’ Australian culture is 
significant; this term began to be utilised as a synonym for ‘core’, ‘authentic’, ‘old’, or 
‘white’ Australian culture in conservative populist politics during the early 1990s, and had 
been a central component of John Howard’s denigration of the Labor government’s supposed 
privileging of minority groups and ‘special interests’ over ‘mainstream Australia’.339 
When Australia’s historical record of racial discrimination is considered, it rapidly becomes 
apparent that the ideas of Hanson and other opponents of Australia’s new direction were not 
really that new. David Dutton points out that such arguments can generally be reduced to two 
variants. The first argument was that admitting people who were ‘different’ from 
‘Australians’ was harmful to social cohesion and encouraged the formation of unassimilated 
‘ghettoes’; the second argument held that Australian identity was diminished by the mixing 
of different racial/ethnic/cultural influences, and supposed privileging of minority groups 
over the ‘mainstream’. Both arguments essentially reiterate earlier arguments that had been 
used to justify racially discriminatory and assimilationist policies, legislation and institutions, 
which were based on an assumption that ‘national culture and identity was unitary and 
provided the basis of social cohesion and allegiance’. What distinguishes the arguments of 
Hanson and her ilk from earlier opponents of non-white immigration is that they are founded 
on a discourse in which explicit reference to race has largely been replaced by reference to 
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culture: meaning a particular ‘notion of culture in which difference was largely fixed and 
immutable’ and therefore in many ways analogous to ‘old-fashioned’ conceptions of race.340 
Voting for Hanson’s resurgent One Nation remained a minority pursuit, and the party’s 
momentum at the ballot box, in Australia’s Alternative Vote electoral system, soon fizzled 
out. But its influence was more enduring. Lynch draws attention to similarities with the 
rhetoric adopted by Prime Minister John Howard, to turn the subsequent Federal Election, in 
2001, in favour of his ruling Liberal-National Coalition:  
The government rushed a new Border Protection Bill through parliament, and Howard 
made an election address, which promised, ‘We will decide who comes to this 
country, and the circumstances in which they come’. It carried an echo—no doubt 
unconscious—of Hanson’s maiden speech in the House, five years earlier: ‘If I can 
invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who 
comes into my country’.341 
Other effects were transmitted less directly, but proved arguably no less influential, on 
Australia’s political culture. In particular, the subtle endorsement of Hanson’s rhetoric by the 
Prime Minister had a considerable impact upon the re-legitimisation of racism in Australian 
public discourse. 
Based upon social psychological research, Terry et al. have argued that the wide publicisation 
of the views of Hanson and other One Nation members in the media, and the lack of explicit 
identification and condemnation of the racist implications of their views by leading public 
figures such as the Prime Minister, ‘generated a change in people’s perceptions of the wider 
community norms relating to multiculturalism and racial tolerance’. As discussed in Chapter 
1, members of an ingroup become ‘more likely to behaviourally express ethnocentric and 
xenophobic attitudes if such attitudes are normative for a self-inclusive and contextually 
salient or important ingroup’ and in particular, if there is a perceived threat to the group.342 
That is, for people who self-identified as part of Hanson’s ‘mainstream’ ingroup, and saw that 
social identity as both salient and under threat, Hanson’s ability to publicly articulate views 
which were largely excluded from the public domain between the mid-1970s and the early 
1990s served to convince people of the appropriateness and social acceptability of such views 
and reinforce those attitudes. It can be further argued that ‘by legitimising ethnocentric 
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attitudes through a change in the broader normative climate, a critical condition for the 
translation of prejudiced attitudes into discriminatory actions was met’.343   
If Hanson’s impact on Australian politics and public discourse was played out through the 
repositioning of the Coalition government, then her rise to prominence must be understood as 
a phenomenon of the distinctive political conjuncture to which the Right under Howard 
gained ascendancy. It seems unlikely that either her victory in the seat of Oxley and her 
meteoric rise to notoriety could have occurred at any other point during the previous quarter 
century. As discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, Hanson’s surprising victory in a 
formerly safe Labor seat took place against a background of profound economic and social 
upheaval in Australia.  
Entering this period of change, there had been broad bipartisan support for ending racial 
discrimination in Australian policies, legislation, and institutions; for some level of 
Indigenous self-determination and land rights; and for the policy of multiculturalism. There 
was also bipartisan support for some degree of economic liberalism, which was reflected in 
the comprehensive restructuring of the Australian economy during the 1980s. Over almost a 
quarter of century, the leaders of three successive governments and all but one of the 
Opposition Leaders (John Howard) were committed to the transformation of Australian 
society implicit in the adoption of these policies. As their consequences unfolded, however, 
in the working lives of lower and middle-class white Australians, they brought a backlash 
against sustained and profound changes to the Australian economy and society – which saw 
Hanson join the House of Representatives, as well as the replacement of Keating’s Labor 
Government by Howard’s Coalition Government.344 
The rise of John Howard 
John Winston Howard had been in parliament for twenty-two years at the time that he was 
elected Prime Minister, and had formerly been Opposition Leader for four years during the 
late 1980s. Howard championed a variety of radical neo-liberal economic reforms during his 
time in Opposition and in Government, yet was staunchly conservative on social issues. 
During his time as Leader of the Opposition, Howard lost the 1987 Federal election by 
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campaigning heavily on taxation issues. The difficulty of selling free market economics to a 
public already anxious about the rate and extent of social and economic change in their 
country led Howard to shift focus, instead promoting an agenda of social conservatism and 
family values as a means of differentiating his party from the incumbent Labor 
Government.345 His first attempt to utilise the politics of race for political currency was 
markedly unsuccessful. In early 1988, Howard began to articulate his vision for ‘One 
Australia’, a campaign characterised by increasingly strident criticism of multiculturalism, 
the Indigenous rights and reconciliation movement, and immigration policy, which edged 
towards explicit acknowledgement that Howard favoured cuts in Asian immigration. The 
media’s reception was unfavourable, and existing tensions and dissatisfaction with Howard’s 
leadership were exacerbated by discord over the abandonment of bipartisanship on issues 
pertaining to race. Support for Howard’s leadership rapidly unravelled, leading to his ousting 
as Opposition Leader within the year.346 
In 1993, the Liberal Opposition once again tried and failed to win an election by campaigning 
on an explicit platform of radical neoliberal economic reform. By 1995, Howard was 
reinstated as Opposition Leader. In the lead up to the 1996 election, Howard campaigned 
under the slogan ‘For All of Us’, and took a soft approach both to racialised issues such as 
immigration and to issues of economic reform, avoiding clear formulations of policy and 
election commitments as much as possible and making general statements about his party’s 
approach to issues rather than detailing specific policies.347 Learning from the lessons of 
1988, Howard used much more ‘cautious, coded and ambiguous language to articulate his 
point of view’.348 His rhetoric was strongly coloured by its emphasis on the need to jettison 
‘political correctness’ and refocus attention upon the struggles of ‘mainstream’ Australians: 
There is a frustrated mainstream in Australia today which sees government decisions 
increasingly driven by the noisy, self-interested clamour of powerful vested interests 
with scant regard for the national interest…many Australians in the mainstream feel 
utterly powerless to compete with such groups, who seem to have the ear completely 
of the government on major issues.349 
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As noted above, these were important ideas picked up by Hanson in her maiden speech, yet 
they had not been originated by Hanson or Howard, but instead were prominent features of 
conservative discourses which had developed over the past decade. The promoters of this 
‘new right’ or ‘neoconservative’ rhetoric included academics such as Geoffrey Blainey and 
Keith Windschuttle; industry leaders such as Hugh Morgan; think tanks such as the Centre 
for Independent Studies, the Institute of Public Affairs, and the Australian Institute for Public 
Policy; and conservative media figures, such as Frank Devine and Alan Jones.350 
As Guy Rundle has argued, ‘the forces that were transforming the lives of the mass of people 
living in suburban and regional Australia were those of neo-liberal globalisation’, but to 
divert attention from those who promoted and benefited from these developments it was 
necessary to identify ‘threats’ and scapegoats, both within and without Australia.351 This 
process was heavily promoted by proprietors of the mainstream media in Australia, both 
through the direct financial support of think tanks and through the promotion of the ideas of 
such think tanks and prominent public figures within their media outlets. The principal target 
of such attacks were the ‘liberal elites’ (also referred to as the ‘new class’, ‘cultural 
producers’, ‘chattering classes’, ‘vested interests’, ‘chardonnay socialists’ and ‘latte liberals’) 
who supposedly wielded vast, unmerited social power, and increasingly, those who were 
presumed to have benefited from the liberal elite’s manipulation of society at the expense of 
the ‘mainstream’ – that is, groups of people who had been marginalised and excluded from 
mainstream society until the sweeping social changes of the 1960s and 70s. 
In stigmatising such marginalised groups – in 1990s Australia, principally Indigenous peoples 
and migrants of Asian or other non-European origin – commentators and politicians turned 
increasingly to arguments based upon ‘new racism’ or cultural essentialism and upon ‘coded’ 
and ‘ambiguous’ language, as noted above in reference to Howard’s discursive shift between 
the late 1980s and his rise to government in 1996. The need to negotiate between conforming 
to ‘the standards commonly observed in public discourse’, that is, to avoid being perceived as 
racist, yet to appeal to ‘mainstream’ Australians, resulted in a marked increase of the 
employment of ‘new racist’ logic in Australian politics.352  
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The New Racism wants to be democratic and respectable, and hence first off denies 
that it is racism. Real Racism, in this framework of thought, exists only among the 
Extreme Right. In the New Racism, minorities are not biologically inferior, but 
different. They have a different culture, although in many respects there are 
‘deficiencies’.353 
Framed in this way, the label of ‘racism’ could only be applied to acts of direct physical 
violence. As a discursive strategy, the denial of racism was therefore to become a prominent 
feature of the rise of discrimination and prejudice based on culturalism rather than biological 
difference, as observed by van Dijk in 1992.354 Van Dijk emphasised that in such a context, 
accusations of racism were increasingly being characterised as attempts to ‘impose taboos, 
prevent free speech and a “true” and “honest” assessment of the ethnic situation’.355  
John Howard’s response to the rise of Hansonism can be seen to have conformed in textbook 
fashion to van Dijk’s conclusions, even though van Dijk’s research was based in Europe, not 
Australia, underscoring the global reach of the discourse of ‘new racism’. Pauline Hanson 
had initially stood for election in Oxley as a Liberal Party candidate, but was dumped for her 
unacceptably racist comments; yet following her maiden speech in Parliament, which 
featured similarly racist elements, neither the Liberal Party nor the Prime Minister denounced 
her views.  Instead, speaking at a Queensland Liberal Party convention, Howard announced 
that he ‘welcome[d] the fact that people can now talk about certain things without living in 
fear of being branded as a bigot or as a racist’.356 When Howard was called upon in 
parliament by the Opposition Leader Kim Beazley to affirm that Hanson’s views were racist 
and were damaging to social cohesion, Howard framed his response by emphasising that ‘I 
will always denounce racial intolerance…I will always defend the non-discriminatory 
character of Australia’s immigration policy’; and rather than directly responding to Beazley’s 
question, stated that ‘people are entitled to attack the present immigration levels without 
being branded as bigots or racists…if someone disagrees with the prevailing orthodoxy of the 
day, that person should not be denigrated as a narrow-minded bigot. That is basically what 
has been happening in this country over a very long period of time’.357  
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By this strategy, Howard shifted the terms of reference of the debate to free speech rather 
than racism, and exonerated not only himself, but also implicitly Hanson, of being racist. This 
semantic/labelling approach ‘avoids consideration of essential elements at the heart of the 
racial value system, including emphasis on the “one truth”, “instinctive” and “innate” human 
characteristics, a wilful blindness to other cultures and intolerance of diversity’.358 Similar to 
earlier attempts to naturalise and legitimate racism on the basis of ‘natural laws’, culturalism 
or new racism was justified on the basis of ‘natural’ and immutable human characteristics, or 
‘the genuine feelings of the common man’: ‘it is only natural, in this view, to be xenophobic, 
protective of your way of life, of your job, your family’.359  
In such a context, ‘coded and other forms of indirect denigration take the place of overt racial 
references’.360 Howard had won the 1996 election under the slogan of ‘For All of Us’. 
However, as Mungo MacCallum has argued, during the Howard years, ‘For All of Us’ came 
to mean ‘not the rest of you’.361 ‘All of us’ can be made to deliberately exclude many groups 
or segments of society, including Indigenous peoples or migrants: ‘such messages were 
designed to foment anxiety about racial and cultural difference, but they were couched in the 
language of “unity” and “inclusion”’, leading commentators to accuse the Howard 
government of ‘dog-whistling’.362 Josh Fear writes that ‘practitioners of dog-whistle politics 
often attempt to legitimise feelings of persecution among their target audience’, thus playing 
upon the basic psychological foundations of outgroup construction and discrimination 
highlighted in Chapter 2.363 By the turn of the millennium, ‘the most influential voters in 
Australia were those who most resented the economic revolution of the 1980s and 1990s and 
lived on the margins of the nation’s new prosperity…[Howard] was deaf to them on 
economic issues, but honoured their outlook everywhere else he could’.364 
Howard saw his mission as prime minister not to guide the Australian public in adapting to 
the exigencies of globalism, including increased diversity in the population, but to disavow 
the transformations of Australian society that had been created by the bipartisan accord 
during the Fraser and Hawke-Keating governments, and to hark back to the supposed ‘golden 
age’ of the Menzies era. Menzies’ long tenure as Prime Minister had ended in 1966, and it is 
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worth quoting Howard’s seminal Menzies Lecture from 1996 at length, since his position vis-
à-vis these societal transformations is so clearly expressed in this speech: 
I have spoken tonight of the need to guard against the re-writing of Australian 
political history and, in particular, to ensure that the contribution of Robert Menzies 
and the Liberal tradition are accorded their proper place in it. There is, of course, a 
related and broader challenge involved. And that is to ensure that our history as a 
nation is not written definitively by those who take the view that Australians should 
apologise for most of it. This 'black arm band' view of our past reflects a belief that 
most Australian history since 1788 has been little more than a disgraceful story of 
imperialism, exploitation, racism, sexism and other forms of discrimination. I take a 
very different view. I believe that the balance sheet of our history is one of heroic 
achievement and that we have achieved much more as a nation of which we can be 
proud than of which we should be ashamed.365 
Prominent in this quote is Howard’s utilisation of the phrase ‘black armband view of history’, 
which had first been coined by conservative historian and culture warrior Geoffrey Blainey in 
1993. Howard was openly promoting this argument of Blainey’s within months, though it 
was not to receive widespread attention and notoriety until Howard was in power and used 
Blainey’s phrase in the 1996 speech quoted above.366  
In can be seen therefore that Howard systematically and carefully cultivated a culture which 
denied racism and injustice in both contemporary Australia and in Australia’s past. By 
pursuing and promoting this ‘culture wars’ agenda, Howard created a context in which many 
of the social reforms of the post-Menzies era could effectively be rolled back.367 As van Dijk 
has argued, 
When the dominant consensus is that there is no racism, minority groups and their 
protests or other forms of resistance have a very hard time to be taken seriously…the 
white consensus that denies the prevalence of racism thus is a very powerful element 
in its reproduction, especially since successful resistance requires public attention, 
media coverage and at least partial acknowledgement of grievances. If leading 
politicians and the media refuse to acknowledge that there is a serious problem, there 
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will be no public debate, no change of public opinion and hence no change in the 
system of power relations.368 
After taking office, therefore, Howard was able to move swiftly to institute sweeping changes 
in the areas of multiculturalism, immigration policy and Indigenous rights and reconciliation. 
Overall immigration intake was significantly reduced, from 97,000 in 1995/6 to 79,000 in 
1997/1998, and the emphasis of the immigration program was shifted markedly from family 
reunion to skilled workers.369 Support for migrant settlement and rights to benefits were cut 
drastically; the policy of multiculturalism was deemphasised and the Office of Multicultural 
Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research were 
abolished. In Indigenous affairs, budgets of Indigenous government departments and 
programs were slashed; the need for an apology to the Stolen Generations was dismissed; and 
the Native Title Amendment Bill was bulled through Parliament, which all but ruled out 
hopes of further land rights advances.370  
In 1998, when Howard appeared on the radio show of conservative ‘shock jock’ Stan 
Zemanek, he was to refer to many of these specific developments as reasons why One Nation 
voters should give their second preferences to the Coalition at the impending Queensland 
state election.371 Howard did not denounce Hanson, because her message was consistent with 
his own, yet ‘the extreme statements of Hanson – and her popularity – served to maximise 
damage to their common opponents, without the need for the prime minister himself to adopt 
an overtly extremist stance’.372 Indeed, her rearticulation of many of the themes and much of 
the terminology which Howard and other conservative elites had been promulgating confirms 
the findings of van Dijk that ‘many of the more ‘subtle’, ‘modern’, ‘everyday’ or ‘new’ forms 
of cultural racism, or ethnicism…are taken from elite discourse’ and that ‘elites in many 
respects ‘preformulate’ the kind of ethnic beliefs of which, sometimes more blatant versions 
may then get popular currency’.373 
Marr and Wilkinson have observed that Howard ‘came to office playing on his country’s fear 
of difference and change, yet when he reached the top he proved the most radical leader his 
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party had known for half a century’.374 At the same time, therefore, that the Howard 
Government was attempting radical roll backs of the social changes of the prior quarter 
century, it was also implementing a range of neoliberal economic policies including major 
industrial relations reforms, privatisation of Telstra and the Commonwealth Employment 
Service and downsizing of the public service. Then came the shock announcement that 
despite promises to the contrary during the 1996 election campaign, Howard planned to 
introduce a Goods and Services Tax (GST) after the 1998 election. Dogged by ministerial 
scandals and popular disgruntlement at the unforseen and unpopular economic reforms, 
Howard barely managed to retain office in the 1998 election. Labor actually garnered more of 
the primary vote and two-party preferred vote, but the Coalition managed to cling to power 
through its knack of bringing off narrow victories in marginal seats, albeit with a greatly 
reduced majority. Howard’s failure to delegitimise Pauline Hanson was a factor in the 
Coalition’s precarious retention of power, because although Hanson herself failed to win a 
seat in Parliament and her party did not perform as well as had been expected, they still won 
a million votes and significantly split the vote for the Coalition’s junior partner, the National 
Party. As the GST was rolled out, dissatisfaction with the government rose and polling 
indicated the Howard government would lose office. Howard had achieved a great deal 
towards realising his vision for Australia, yet by mid-2001 he looked set to lose Government 
to the resurgent Labor party.375 
The threat from the north 
The other emergent crisis impacting on the Howard government was the sharp increase in 
refugee arrivals by boat from Indonesia from late 1999. Although this issue was initially a 
sore point for the government, time and chance converged to provide deliverance to the 
Howard Government with the arrival of the Tampa in Australian waters in August 2001. 
Even prior to the rise of the ‘new racism’ and xenophobic nationalism which was coming to 
characterise the Howard era, the arrival of boatloads of people from Asia was capable of 
triggering extremely negative reactions from an Australian public nurtured on the myth of the 
‘threat from the north’. The arrival of comparatively small numbers of ‘boatpeople’ in the 
late 1970s and the early 1990s had created disproportionately extreme reactions; the arrival of 
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some 10,000 asylum seekers by boat in two years sparked a national furore. The flow of 
asylum seekers in the late 1970s was largely stemmed by the Fraser Government’s reluctant 
acceptance of large numbers of South East Asia refugees directly from camps; the Keating 
government quietly offered amnesty to many Cambodian ‘boat people’, permitting them to 
remain in the country, but also took steps to deter any further asylum seekers by making 
detention mandatory for all people who arrived without visas after 1991. Lengthy detentions 
and high rates of repatriation of asylum seekers who arrived by boat, combined with 
changing political circumstances in South East Asia, meant that numbers of arrivals by boat 
dropped in Keating’s second term and remained low during the first term of the Howard 
government.376  
Mandatory detention remained in force under the Howard government but was clearly failing 
to act as a deterrent; the government therefore attempted to slow the influx of asylum seekers 
by introducing a policy whereby even if found to be genuine refugees, ‘boatpeople’ would 
only be eligible for a three-year ‘Temporary Protection Visa’ (TPV). The TPV granted some 
access to medical and welfare services but denied visa holders access to settlement services, 
family reunion applications and travel rights.377 The introduction of TPVs did not, however, 
slow down asylum seekers arriving by boat; instead, it had the inadvertent consequence of 
dramatically increasing the proportion of women and children arriving by boat and entering 
mandatory detention, as individuals who had received TPVs could neither return to their 
families nor bring their families to them via the family reunion program.378  
Emblematic of the Howard Government’s ambitions to recapture the votes lost to One Nation 
is their implementation of policies initially suggested by Hanson’s party. Temporary refugee 
visas had been a One Nation policy proposal at the 1998 Federal Election: One Nation 
advocated that the current humanitarian program should be replaced with a ‘programme of 
temporary refuge for those who meet the UNHCR definition of a refugee, with repatriation 
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when the situation resolves’.379 Ironically, although the Immigration Minister Philip Ruddock 
had lambasted the policy at the time it was proposed, when the Coalition implemented TPVs 
as a policy they actually made them more draconian than One Nation had proposed. One 
Nation’s position on accepting refugees was that for those limited number of refugees who 
were accepted, it was a given that ‘we must grant their wife or husband and dependent 
children residency also’.380 The Howard Government’s dual policies of mandatory detention 
and temporary protection visas meant that between 1999 and 2003, thousands of refugees 
remained separated from their immediate family for many years and over 2000 children were 
held in Australian detention centres, with the average length of time spent by children in 
detention exceeding eighteen months.381 
Most asylum seekers arriving during this period were sent not to the longstanding urban 
detention centres, but to newer, remote detention camps such as Port Hedland in Western 
Australia or Woomera in the South Australian desert, where communication with relatives, 
other refugees, and advocacy organisations was limited and access to legal and other services 
was more difficult, considerably slowing down visa processing. In addition, the management 
of detention centres had been privatised by the Howard Government in 1997, and they were 
administered by a private US prison corporation, thus reducing public access and 
accountability.382 As a result, although the vast majority of asylum seekers were found to be 
‘genuine’ refugees and received either permanent or temporary visas, and 90% of those who 
received TPVs eventually received permanent Australian visas, many were detained for 
months and sometimes years in poorly administered and drastically overcrowded detention 
centres.383 From the middle of 2000, breakouts, rioting and hunger strikes became widespread 
in the camps, and incidence of self-harm and mental illness rose alarmingly.384 
Given Howard’s stance on tougher immigration policy, the bleeding of Coalition voters away 
to One Nation, and the intense public and media scrutiny of all matters pertaining to 
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‘boatpeople’, the government was unlikely to succeed in the type of sleight of hand that 
Fraser and Keating had resorted to in order to ‘stop the boats’. The Indonesian government 
was assisting the Australian Federal Police in people smuggling disruption schemes of 
limited effectiveness, but adamantly resisted Australian government pressure to intern asylum 
seekers in Indonesia.385 Increasingly harsh treatment of asylum seekers was failing to deter 
arrivals, and Pauline Hanson was getting media attention all over the country for her strident 
calls to use force to physically turn boats back to Indonesia.386  
On August 23, the Palapa left Indonesia carrying 438 asylum seekers, only to become 
stranded the following day in international waters north of Christmas Island, one of a handful 
of far-flung reefs and islands in the Indian Ocean which are Australian territories. Australian 
border security monitored the wallowing fishing vessel over the next two days before finally 
transmitting a distress call which requested any ships in the area to go to the aid of the Palapa 
At this point, the Department of Immigration and Multiculturalism controversially requested 
search and rescue authorities to urge any vessel answering the distress call to tow the Palapa 
to Indonesia.387 When Norwegian ship the Tampa answered the distress call, the Palapa was 
judged unseaworthy and its passengers were taken on board the ship. In the meantime, the 
Australian government had engineered the consent of the Indonesian government for the ship 
to disembark its passengers in Indonesia; however, the asylum seekers became distressed and 
given the overcrowding of his vessel the captain of the Tampa agreed to take them to the 
closer port of Christmas Island, which is within Australian territorial waters.388  
The lengths which the Howard Government would go to to deter ‘suspected illegal entry 
vessels’ (SIEVs) entered unprecedented territory at this point; Howard warned that ‘we have 
decided in relation to this particular vessel to take a stand’.389 The government threatened the 
Tampa’s captain with prosecution as a people smuggler, and flatly refused permission for the 
Tampa to land its passengers on Christmas Island. Following days of standoff and a hunger 
strike on the Tampa, a detachment of the army’s elite division, the Special Air Service (SAS), 
boarded the ship and eventually transferred the asylum seekers to a navy vessel. After failing 
to pass a retroactive Bill which would have enabled the government to remove the ship and 
its passengers from Australian waters by force, the government eventually brokered a deal 
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with the small South Pacific island nation of Nauru to receive the Tampa’s passengers and 
detain them in an ‘offshore’ immigration processing centre on Australia’s behalf. This so-
called ‘Pacific Solution’ also featured the ‘excision’ of offshore reefs and islands from 
Australia’s ‘migration zone’, and the commencement of Operation Relex, a military 
operation in which SIEVs were to be intercepted by the Australian Defence Forces before 
they could enter the newly defined ‘Australian migration zone’.390 The prospect of long 
periods of detention in a third country and slim likelihood of resettlement in Australia, the 
highly publicised sinking of an asylum seeker vessel with the loss of 353 lives in October 
2001, and in particular, regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq following political upheavals 
after September 11 eventually ‘stopped the boats’.391 
During the crisis, approval for the government skyrocketed. In the first few days of the 
Tampa affair, the Opposition Labor government provided strong support for the 
government’s actions; in blocking the initial Border Protection Bill, however, which Howard 
had pitched as a clear solution to the problem of the Tampa and any future illegal entry 
vessels, the Opposition had raised the ire of those members of the public who were most 
concerned with the issue of asylum seekers. The Howard government looked set to claw back 
its majority at the impending election. Things were coming together for Howard; the mood of 
xenophobia and normalisation of racism which had been cultivated during the previous five 
years by certain politicians and segments of the media had created a climate ripe for 
extracting political capital through the deployment of wedge politics.392 The influential voters 
in marginal and swing seats, who most resented and suffered from the rapid economic 
developments of the previous two decades, could be successfully appealed to through their 
sense of fear and anxiety over race issues. Introduced to Australian politics by the pollster 
Mark Textor, who managed Howard’s 2001 election campaign, wedge politics relied upon 
finding contentious issues which would fracture the traditional support base of the opponent, 
and ‘there is no more effective wedge than race’.393 The problem of asylum seekers was a 
perfect area in which to deploy wedge tactics because it married xenophobia and racism with 
the more ‘legitimate’ problem of security; racial ploys could therefore be invoked in a coded 
and subtle way, whilst still acting as clear ‘dog-whistles’ to their target audience. 
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In July 2001, the annual ‘Mind and Mood’ report of social researcher Hugh Mackay had 
foregrounded the crucial significance of racialised resistance to asylum seekers arriving by 
boat in the lead up to the 2001 election: ‘some of the most ugly and vicious outpourings of 
hatred occurred in discussion of boat people/illegal immigrants…so strong are the passions 
aroused by fear of illegal immigrants and of Australia being ‘swamped by Asians’ that such 
matters have the potential to overwhelm factors like the GST in the coming federal election’. 
The government’s consistent misrepresentation of asylum seekers as ‘illegal immigrants’ had 
been uniformly adopted among the parts of the public most antagonistic towards non-white 
immigration, and furthermore, the ‘Mind and Mood’ report found there was ‘a widespread 
view that people who have arrived illegally…are likely to behave illegally once here’. In 
sum, the report concluded, ‘just below the surface, there is a high degree of anxiety about 
Asian immigration, about the idea that Australia’s culture is being changed in unexpected 
ways, and that recent immigrants are associated with unacceptable increases in crime and 
violence’.394 
Even at this point, as hysteria and anxiety about ‘boatpeople’ and ‘illegal immigrants’ 
reached new highs, the extent to which the racial and cultural identity of asylum seekers was 
specifically attacked had been limited. Although departing from Indonesia, and therefore 
invoking traditional Australian paranoias about invasion from southern Asia, the great 
majority of asylum seekers arriving in the late 1990s and early 2000s were Muslims of 
Middle Eastern or Central Asian origin, predominantly fleeing the oppressive regimes of 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the furore over ‘Asian’ 
immigration provoked by Pauline Hanson, the specific origin and religion of the majority of 
asylum seekers initially drew limited attention. As an example, in early 2001, the social 
scientist Sharon Pickering, who has recently done considerable work on the impact of anti-
Muslim prejudice upon Muslim communities, particularly in regards to policing matters, 
published an article on news discourses and asylum seekers in the Journal of Refugee Studies. 
In this article she discusses the expectation that large numbers of Afghan and Iraqi refugees 
would shortly be attempting to enter Australia via Indonesia.395 Despite the discussion of the 
impending attempts of high numbers of (Muslim) refugees to enter Australia, and lengthy 
discussion of antagonism towards Bosnian (Muslim) refugees at the time, Pickering does not 
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mention the religion of these asylum seekers, and presumably neither did the news articles 
which she was analysing. Despite a wealth of negative presumptions and representations of 
refugees discussed by Pickering, the Muslim identity of these refugees does not appear to 
have been on the radar until mid to late 2001. As can be seen from the ‘Mind and Mood’ 
summary from June 2001, ‘Asians’ persisted as a focus of racial antagonism for most 
Australians. 
During mid-2001, however, the Middle Eastern/Central Asian origin and Islamic identity of 
‘illegal immigrants’ began to draw more attention, and to be linked by influential political 
and media commentators to other incidents involving Middle Eastern and Muslim migrants in 
Australia, in particular with several high-profile crimes involving people of Middle Eastern 
and/or Muslim background. Ghassan Hage savoured the irony that ‘amazingly, the names of 
the prominent people and journalists now expressing expert opinions on Lebanese and Arab 
culture in the pages of the newspapers are the same ones who thrilled us with their expertise 
on the Asian threat’.396 In such an environment, ‘the carefully nurtured public mood was 
fertile ground for a seemingly automatic association between ‘Muslim’, ‘Middle-Eastern’ and 
‘criminal’’.397 The circle was to become complete with the World Trade Centre attacks on 
September 11, 2001, when Muslims were to be cemented as the principal ‘other’ in 
contemporary Australian society and the demonisation and scapegoating of this particular 
group of people became augmented by the global rise of Islamophobia. Before considering 
these post-September 11 developments in detail, it is necessary to first discuss the history and 
characteristics of Muslim communities in Australia and to track the rise of anti-Muslim 
prejudice in Australia, which I turn to in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 – ‘People like that’: Muslims in 
Australia and the rise of Islamophobia 
 
The way in which Muslims and Islam are represented in the present day in Australia 
necessarily draws upon and reiterates aspects of the specific ‘national history of racism’ in 
Australia which was explored in the previous two chapters. Despite erosion in the notion of 
hierarchies of race as a biological given from the middle of the twentieth century onwards, it 
is clear that ‘race’ and ‘racism’ nevertheless continued to have particular potency in 
Australian political and public discourses throughout the second half of the twentieth century, 
in particular through the shift towards expression of racialised hostility through the lens of 
culturalism, or ‘new racism’. As Omi and Winant have demonstrated in their account of the 
rise of new racism in the United States, ‘the transcendence of biologistic conceptions of race 
does not provide any reprieve from the dilemmas of racial injustice and conflict, nor from 
controversies over the significance of race in the present…views of race as socially 
constructed simply recognise the fact that these conflicts and controversies are now more 
properly framed in the terrain of politics’. For this reason, Omi and Winant concluded that 
‘race is now a pre-eminently political phenomenon’.398  
The cultural essentialism embodied in new racism dovetails neatly with conventional 
nationalism. Rather than justifying prejudice towards a group of people on the basis of 
racialised physical characteristics such as skin colour or appearance, it becomes possible to 
justify prejudice on the basis of a perceived innate cultural incompatibility between one 
group and another - between ‘us’ and the ‘Other’, between ‘Australian’ and ‘un-Australian’. 
Characteristic of manifestations of new racism is that they are constructed primarily on the 
basis of the belief that outgroups (frequently racialised, but in the case of Islamophobia, 
based on a complex combination of cultural and racial factors, as highlighted in Chapter 2) 
violate traditional values and ethics. This chapter therefore briefly considers the history of 
Muslim immigration to Australia, and the shifting attitudes towards ‘Muslims’; in particular, 
the fact that historically, the Islamic faith of most Muslim immigrants has been of less 
concern than other aspects of their (usually) racialised difference. However, the promotion of 
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‘Australian values’ as the values supposedly inherited by a white ‘mainstream’ through their 
British and Christian heritage, and the dissemination of the belief that ‘Muslims’ held 
incompatible ethics and values and therefore could not effectively be part of ‘Australia’ was 
to become a characteristic feature of the Howard era. This chapter therefore goes on to 
consider key developments in the rise of anti-Muslim prejudice in Australia, focussing in 
particular on events during the lead up to the 2001 Federal Election in Australia. 
Muslims in Australia 
The history of Muslims in Australia dates back to approximately the mid-eighteenth century, 
though large-scale permanent settlement of Muslims did not take place until after the 
abolition of the White Australia Policy after World War II. Although Australia’s supposed 
great isolation and distance from ‘civilisation’ have become central to national foundation 
myths, at the time that British colonisation commenced, parts of northern Australia were 
actually involved in complex and longstanding trade and fishing relationships with parts of 
modern-day Indonesia. From at least the mid-1750s, Muslim trepang fisherman had a 
sustained and extensive presence along the northern coastline, impacting significantly upon 
the language and customs of the Indigenous peoples they engaged with and sometimes 
intermarrying with them. Upon encountering the trepangers, British authorities initially 
aspired to founding trade outposts and facilitating this northern connection, but as settlement 
of the continent proceeded, the colonies instead opted for the imposition of prohibitive fees 
and duties which made the trade increasingly unviable.399  
In the southern parts of the continent, a scattering of Muslims arrived during the early 
decades of British colonisation, as sailors, labourers or convicts, but larger, more lasting 
settlement in Australia by Muslims began only from about the 1840s, with the 
commencement of a camel transport industry which relied upon the labour of several 
thousand camel drivers, predominantly from Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, but known 
collectively as ‘Afghans’. These camel drivers played a significant but largely unrecognised 
role in the exploration and settlement of inland Australia. Although many eventually returned 
to their country of origin, some remained permanently in Australia. The first mosques in 
Australia were built by members of these ‘Afghan’ communities, beginning with the Marree 
Mosque in South Australia in 1881; some of the urban mosques subsequently built by 
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‘Afghan’ communities are still in use today. In contrast to Christian groups, who could apply 
to colonial administrations for land and other grants to assist in the building of churches, 
these groups had to raise the substantial funds for mosque construction by themselves. An 
additional wave of Muslim immigration to Australia occurred from the 1870s, when a few 
thousand Muslim Malay and Javanese indentured labourers were recruited to work on 
pearling grounds and plantations in northern Australia.400 The relatively small numbers, 
remote location and vital economic importance of these workers to pastoralists, mining 
companies and other business interests hampered the efforts of white Australians to introduce 
legislation on the model of the anti-Chinese laws which could specifically exclude ‘Afghans’ 
and other Muslim labourers from Australia.401 
The advent of the White Australia Policy (in particular the Immigration Restriction Act 1901, 
the Naturalisation Act 1903 and the white-labour laws enacted in the early 1900s) 
significantly impacted upon Muslim communities in Australia. These communities were 
largely composed of young, single male workers; it was very difficult for non-British women 
to emigrate to Australia during the colonial period, and almost impossible after Federation. 
After 1901, many men who had worked in Australia and periodically visited their wives in 
their birth country were no longer able to come and go freely and were unable to be 
naturalised, but had to decide between their livelihood in Australia and their families 
overseas. Some intermarriage between ‘Afghans’ and Indigenous women occurred, but this 
practice was strongly discouraged by government authorities, and eventually criminalised in 
some states from the early 1900s, with the introduction of legislation to prevent mixed race 
marriages. The dwindling trepang trade was crippled by the closing of many Australian ports 
and ceased in 1907. The sourcing of indentured labour from Asia largely ceased, although 
some Javanese families remained in Queensland and the pearling industry received an 
exemption from the white labour laws which meant small numbers of Malays were employed 
as divers until the 1970s. A small mosque was constructed for the Malay community in 
Broome in the 1930s, but the community never regained its pre-Federation size. Some 
‘Afghans’ managed to maintain their communities and businesses, despite the legal and other 
obstacles to settlement posed by the White Australia Policy and the accompanying 
intensification of racial prejudice and discrimination, but the expansion of rail and rise of 
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trucking made camel transport redundant by the 1920s and the ‘Ghantowns’ of central 
Australia eventually disappeared. As the Australian Muslim population shrank and Islamic 
cultural practices became increasingly circumscribed, eventually few communities were able 
to sustain the practice of Islam, creating significant breaks in the continuity of Muslim 
settlement and practice in Australia.402 
Some insight into the situations facing these beleaguered communities is offered by 
consideration of the events leading up to what is known as the ‘Battle of Bourke’ in January 
1915. This incident involved two members of the ‘Afghan’ community attacking an open 
train at a community picnic event; four people died as a result of the attack and the two 
instigators were killed in the ensuing gun battle with police. One of the assailants, Mullah 
Abdullah, prepared halal meat for the Muslim community, but discriminatory white-only 
labour practices meant that he could not work in the abattoir but had to conduct butchering at 
his home. This led to repeated confrontations with the Sanitations Inspector, one of which 
precipitated the attack on the train. The pair were also allegedly motivated by Australia’s 
state of war with Turkey, whose Caliph was seen as the leader of the umma by many Muslims 
at the time. However, it is possible that the Ottoman flag the pair supposedly brandished and 
their suicide notes linking their attack to the current state of war between Australia and 
Turkey were faked after their deaths in order to drum up antagonism towards ‘enemy aliens’. 
Interestingly, although an angry mob had to be prevented from attacking the Afghan camp in 
Broken Hill that night, violence and official sanctions were quickly deflected from the 
Afghans to the Germans, who were cast as instigators of the event. The local German club 
was burnt to the ground and the local mines fired all ‘enemy aliens’ in their employ, forcing 
six Austrians, four Germans and one Turk from the town. Shortly thereafter, the Australian 
government ordered the internment of all ‘enemy aliens’ for the duration of the war, and 
instituted a variety of control mechanisms over suspected sympathisers of the Ottoman 
Caliph.403 
The First World War was to instil a propensity towards securitisation and surveillance of both 
‘suspect’ citizens and ‘aliens’ in Australian governance and institutions which have had long-
lasting impacts upon migrant communities. Much tighter controls on exit and entry to the 
country were applied across the board, making visas mandatory for most travellers, and a 
number of internal surveillance and security organisations were established: ‘endowed with 
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responsibilities for monitoring and suppressing people whose conduct was deemed 
subversive’, these agencies quickly acquired influence over immigration and naturalisation 
procedures and policies.404 As a result, ‘the needs of national security dictated that allegiance 
become a criteria of eligibility for immigration and citizenship’, and the nation’s new security 
agencies gradually expanded upon and developed their capacity for investigating the political 
sympathies and propensities of potential immigrants and monitoring ‘aliens’.405 Detainment, 
deportation, surveillance and suspicion became permanent features of Australian policy 
towards ‘suspect’ individuals and groups of ‘aliens’.406 As Nahid Kabir has documented, this 
preoccupation has impacted upon Muslims in Australia from the First World War right 
through to the present day, even during periods when there were very few Muslims in the 
country and government surveillance and suspicion were motivated by their national, racial 
or ethnic backgrounds, as opposed to their religious faith.407 
As a result of the White Australia Policy and tightened controls over movement into and out 
of the country, for fifty years the well-established Muslim communities remained small or 
dwindled and the immigration of Muslims was strongly circumscribed, with the exception of 
small numbers of Albanian Muslims arriving from the 1920s onwards, who were accepted as 
migrants to Australia since they were considered ‘white’ by immigration officials.408 In 1956, 
a group of these Albanian Muslims entered the Adelaide Mosque and found there seven 
extremely elderly men who still clung to the practice of their Islamic faith; these former 
camel drivers were the last representatives of the once thriving ‘Afghan’ communities of 
South Australia.409 The ‘Afghan’ community of Brisbane is one of the few that managed to 
maintain an Islamic identity throughout the difficult White Australia period, with descendants 
of the founders of the Holland Park mosque celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2008.410 As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the drive to recruit immigrants to Australia following the Second 
World War led to increasing relaxation of the strictures of the White Australia Policy, and 
eventually resulted a significant increase in the number of Muslims in Australia. Between 
1947 and 1971 the Muslim population grew from 2,704 to 22,311, over half of whom came to 
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Australia in the late 1960s as the result of a single bi-lateral agreement between the 
Australian and Turkish governments.411 
Once racial discrimination was formally removed from Australian immigration policy, the 
Muslim population began to increase steadily, through further immigration as well as high 
migrant birth rates. By 2001, Muslims constituted 1.5% of the Australian population, 
originating from over seventy different nations, making Muslim-Australians the most 
ethnically diverse religious group in Australia. Nevertheless, chain migration, in particular 
through the family reunion immigration category (before this was slashed by the Howard 
Government) has been an important factor in Muslim immigration to Australia, facilitating an 
extremely high concentration of Muslim settlement: almost 50% of Australian Muslims live 
within a 50km radius in Sydney.412 Whilst there are high proportions of Muslims in many 
Asian nations from which there has been high immigration to Australia, such as India and 
Indonesia, the majority of Muslims in Australia are of Middle Eastern origin, with Lebanon, 
Turkey and Afghanistan the most significant countries of birth for Australian Muslims who 
were born overseas.413The high concentration of Muslim settlement, strong familial networks 
between migrant groups, and extremely high diversity in terms of ethnicity, country of origin 
and religious practices have fostered a propensity for different Muslim groups to cluster 
together geographically and to develop their own community and civic centres and 
organisations, such as mosques and cooperatives.414  
Muslim communities in Australia have persistently been characterised by markedly high 
levels of economic and social marginalisation.415 The majority of Muslim immigrants to 
Australia have come from poor rural or urban backgrounds in underdeveloped countries, 
often against a background of widespread conflict and/or persecution; those immigrants who 
had higher education or training have continually found their qualifications were not 
recognised in Australia or faced other forms of workplace discrimination which prevented 
them from working at appropriate levels to their qualification and ability. As a result, 
Australian Muslims have historically been concentrated in low skilled, low paid labour and 
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subject to extremely high rates of unemployment. In a comprehensive study of Muslim labour 
force participation between 1980 and 2001, Kabir and Evans found that the average skill 
level and unemployment of Australian-born, English-born, and Irish-born people were 
closely comparable to the national averages during this period, indicating the persistent 
relationship between white, Anglo-Celtic identity and economic privilege. In contrast, 
unemployment was consistently three times the national average over this period for 
Muslims, despite the fact that the average skill level and participation in tertiary education 
was higher for Muslims than the national average.416  
Kabir and Evans noted that ethnic difference was a major factor in this wide gap, as can be 
seen by the fact that ‘Asian-born’ people also experienced significantly higher unemployment 
levels than the national average. However, religion also played a part in the economic 
marginalisation of Muslims in Australia: overseas-born Christians fared much better in the 
Australian labour market than did overseas-born Muslims from the same ethnic background. 
For example, unemployment of Lebanese-born Muslims was over 30% in 1996, which was 
double the unemployment rate of Lebanese-born Christians and four times higher than the 
national average.417 This bias towards Christian migrants may seem surprising considering 
Australia is an avowedly secular nation in terms of its constitution and institutions. Yet as 
Marion Maddox has observed: 
Christianity is the historically dominant religious tradition, [although] now practised 
actively by only a minority of the population. Yet its political and cultural importance 
far outweighs its demographic standing. Politically, the fact that a large part of the 
population today respects Christianity as a source of ‘traditional values’, even if 
having only a vague idea of what those might be, has proved both an advantage to 
politicians and parties seeking to align themselves with a ‘values agenda’.418 
These factors have led to Muslims being strongly ‘Othered’ in Australian society; not only 
racially distinct from the majority ‘Anglo-Celtic’ population, but also distinct in cultural and 
religious terms. 
The doubling of racial/ethnic and religious difference has made Muslims a highly 
conspicuous if initially small minority, who have not fitted easily within the allotted category 
of ‘ethnic difference’ in multicultural Australia. Following the ending of the White Australia 
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Policy, as discussed earlier in this chapter, it became increasingly unacceptable to voice racist 
beliefs in public forums; overt discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic difference was 
removed from government policy, institutions and legislation; and furthermore, Australia’s 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 enabled individuals and organisations to address racism 
‘either by making complaints of racism, or by negotiating policy changes based on the 
broader principles of racial equality’.419   
As has been highlighted, however, discrimination on the basis of cultural difference remained 
permissible in public discourse and sometimes acted as a method of promulgating ‘old’ racist 
views in a more palatable and less overt form. These forms of discrimination were harder to 
document and ‘prove’ than old racism, and were furthermore not a focus of the Australian 
legal system or political establishment. Reflective of the emphasis in Australian legislation 
upon prohibiting racial but not cultural discrimination, there is no protection from religious 
discrimination in Australian federal law and only limited protections under some state laws. 
The ethnic diversity of the Australian Muslim community means that, unlike members of 
Jewish or Sikh communities, who are considered under Australian to law to constitute distinct 
‘ethnic groups’ because of their shared cultural history, a Muslim who is subjected to 
religious vilification or who is discriminated against on the basis of their religion is unlikely 
to have recourse to legal protection or redress in Australia.420 As a result, markers of religious 
difference, such as the wearing of the veil, restriction of physical contact between people of 
different genders, or prayers during work hours, have been significant in the economic and 
social marginalisation of Muslim people in Australia, yet discrimination on these grounds has 
not been amenable to legal redress in the way that discrimination on purely racial grounds has 
been.421 
The religious faith of Australian Muslims therefore appears to have been a significant factor 
in their marginalisation, compounding the disadvantages already imposed by racial or ethnic 
difference in a society which privileges white racial identity so highly and revealing faultlines 
in Australia’s multiculturalism model. It has been argued, in particular by Ghassan Hage and 
David Dutton, that there were constraints on multicultural policy in Australia which limited 
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its effectiveness and prevented the development of a truly culturally pluralistic nation. Firstly, 
multiculturalism in Australia became characterised by a model in which the ‘old’ Australian 
culture of largely British, white origins came to constitute the ‘core’ or ‘authentic’ Australian 
identity (later labelled the ‘mainstream’), surrounded by what came to be called ‘ethnic’ 
cultures, such as ‘Italian-Australian’ or ‘Chinese-Australian’, which were ‘managed’ through 
the policy of multiculturalism. ‘Authentic’ Australians were ascribed with the quality of 
‘tolerating’ difference, of accepting and accommodating outsiders.422 As Dutton emphasises, 
tolerance is ‘a negative virtue, a matter of putting up with rather than liking one’s different 
neighbours and feeling able to approve or disapprove, tolerate or not’.423  
The second constraint on Australian multiculturalism was the utilisation of a narrow 
definition of ‘culture’, in which only a highly restricted selection of ‘cultural markers’ would 
be ‘tolerated’ by or permitted to contribute to ‘authentic’ Australian society. Aspects of 
‘culture’ which could be ‘tolerated’ more easily included ethnic food, music and dance. 
Discreet maintenance of other aspects of cultural heritage were permitted, so long as these 
were confined to the private sphere. It was far less acceptable to publicly proclaim one’s 
difference through distinctive forms of dress, public usage of languages other than English, 
public displays of religious faith, and commentary on ethics and other social issues. 
Therefore, Australian multiculturalism ‘did not open political and economic institutions and 
values to pluralism; the ‘core’ was no more contestable in multicultural Australia than it had 
been during the period of assimilation…the boundaries of the Australian citizenry were 
extended while an internal boundary was created to preserve the power and national character 
of the core, mainstream, tolerant culture’.424 The highly visible markers of Islamic identity 
make Muslims less ‘tolerable’ and theoretically less ‘assimilable’ than other groups of 
people. At the same time such overt expressions of ‘cultural’ difference enabled ‘authentic’ 
Australians to discriminate against Muslims not through recourse to ‘racism’, but through 
more acceptable strategies based on the supposed ‘incompatibility’ of Muslim 
religion/culture and the ‘Australian way of life’. The core argument here was based on 
cultural essentialism, with Islam being assumed to permeate the life of Muslims in a 
profoundly different manner than the way that the ethnicity or culture of other migrants 
shapes them. 
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Concerns that Muslims are inherently incapable of living peacefully as minorities within 
‘Western’ societies regularly stem from the type of Orientalist theses outlined in Chapter 2, 
which posit a unitary ‘Islam’ which is incompatible not only with the Western way of life, 
but more particularly, with the Western political system of democracy. As Esposito and Voll 
emphasise, this assumption ignores not only the evidence for a theoretical compatibility 
between Islam and democracy, and the existence of a range of different models of 
accommodation between these supposedly incompatible monolithic constructions, but elides 
the presence of considerable diversity of opinion within Western nations, and within the West 
as a whole, as to how ‘democracy’ may be defined.425 Tariq Ramadan is a pertinent example 
of a ‘Western’ Muslim who explores the compatibility of Islam with core characteristics of 
democracy, and by extension, attacks the thesis that Muslims are fundamentally incapable of 
participating in and contributing in a significant sense to civil society and government in 
Western democratic nations. The public intellectual Waleed Aly is an Australian Muslim 
whose writing has similarly focussed on dismantling many of these key Orientalist myths.426 
These alternative views, however, have historically had very little traction in Australia. 
Instead, Orientalising views have had significant influence upon Australian public discourse, 
and have impacted considerably upon general perspectives on Islam and attitudes towards 
Muslims in Australia.  
Attitudes towards Muslims and Islam prior to September 11 
From the late nineteenth century onwards, anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination has been 
directed at Muslims in Australia, and undoubtedly had negative impacts upon individual 
Muslims and their communities, but until the 1980s, the visibility and impact of such 
discourses in the public sphere was limited. There is evidence of common Orientalist tropes 
being deployed in Australian newspapers at the turn of the last century, particularly in the 
regional press of central Australia. There is also evidence of state, media and interpersonal 
anti-Muslim prejudice during World War I, when Muslims in Australia were suspected of 
sympathising with or actively supporting the Ottoman Caliph. However, on the whole, 
religion was a not a highly salient criterion of interest or discrimination during the colonial 
and ‘White Australia’ periods, when the race of Muslims living in Australia was on the 
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whole considered far more salient than their religious faith.427 In Europe and in the United 
States, interest in and concern over Muslims and Arabs began to surface within the academy 
and in public policy discussions from the end of World War II, yet there was a relative lack 
of public and academic concern with or interest in Islam and Muslims in Australian political 
and public discourse until the 1980s. The negligible size and relative isolation of Muslim 
communities in Australia between the First World War and the 1970s goes a long way to 
explain this paucity of interest. 
Muslims and Islam became more prominent in public discourse from the early 1980s as a 
result of both the continued growth of the Muslim population in Australia, and a burst of 
interest in Islam and Muslims among Western journalists, politicians and the public, largely 
as a response to key international events such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the First 
Palestinian Intifada in 1987.428 In the early 1990s, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the US-
led retaliatory war on Iraq, and to a lesser extent later events such as the 1993 World Trade 
Centre bombing in New York resulted in a backlash against Australian Muslims, including 
public harassment and religious vilification of Muslims and people of ‘Middle Eastern 
Appearance’, attacks on mosques, and communal opposition to the construction of mosques 
and Islamic schools. Indeed, despite the still negligible size of the Australian Muslim 
community, they were among the four most discriminated against minority groups in 
Australia by 1991.429 Illustrative of the broader securitisation implications of prejudice 
towards Muslims, Muslims began to be closely surveilled and selectively harassed by 
security forces during the 1990s, as detailed, for example, by former Guantanamo Bay 
detainee Mamdouh Habib. Australian Muslims such as Habib (who had immigrated to 
Australia from Egypt in 1980) were targeted by security agencies for their supposed 
affiliation with or support for political Islam in other countries.430 
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The media was an important player in the repackaging of Orientalist stereotypes into what is 
now called ‘Islamophobia’, and the dissemination of this discourse in Australia. As early as 
1991, an investigation by HREOC (Australia’s statutory Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission) of racist violence in Australia had highlighted the key role of the 
media in legitimising and promulgating racist attitudes, and almost a third of the 
recommendations of the report related to the media. Of these, there were five specific 
recommendations which underline the key issues in media reporting on Muslims at the time, 
in particular the recommendation that use be curtailed of the widespread media terms 
‘Muslim extremists’ and ‘Muslim fanatics’, and that ‘authoritative leaders of representative 
groups be consulted’ when reporting on Islamic beliefs and practice, ‘particularly on 
controversial issues like calls for a jihad’.431 Through much of the 1980s and the 1990s, 
Australia media reporting on issues related to Muslims was predominantly about international 
incidents and conflicts. In doing so, however, they typically adopted racialised stereotypes 
about Muslims, and Orientalist frames, thus promoting an essentialising view of Islam.432  As 
the affairs of Australia’s own Muslim communities rose up news agendas subsequently, this 
view allowed the imputed attributes of ‘Muslims’ and ‘Islam’ elsewhere in the world to be 
projected onto Australian Muslims, and instilled a sense that they should somehow be held 
partially responsible for the actions of Muslims elsewhere.  
Kevin Dunn’s retrospective research has illustrated this transferral process through analysis 
of newspaper reporting on one international conflict involving Muslims (Algeria) during the 
early 1990s and analysis of opposition to mosque construction during the same period. Over 
80% of articles surveyed by Dunn portrayed Islam negatively; they predominantly framed 
Muslims as militant, fundamentalist, fanatical, oppressive towards women and associated 
with criminality. Direct juxtapositions of negative terms like ‘fanatic’, ‘extremist’ and 
‘terrorist’ with Muslim or Islam were ubiquitous.433 These same constructions of Islam and 
Muslim dominated opposition to mosque construction, with frequent allusions to media 
coverage of international events to justify opposition. For example, one letter to Liverpool 
City Council argued that ‘to trust these non-Christians, who have already shown themselves 
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to be aggressive and violent as is evident from the recent news…would be to disrupt the lives 
of the families in the Green Valley/Hinchinbrook area’;434 other opposition centered on 
accounts that ‘we have read about child mutilation…abduction and rape, in the name of 
Islam’.435 A Councillor for Cambelltown City Council published his opposition to a mosque 
in the local paper, pleading that ‘with Iraq declaring holy war against the West, please don’t 
dismiss the Minto people who are genuinely frightened of the prospect of a mosque next 
door’.436  
Some of the strident opposition to mosque construction documented by Dunn was 
accompanied by admissions by letter-writers that their opposition to mosques was based on 
limited experience with Muslim people, revealing that mosques were being opposed on the 
basis of prejudice rather than direct negative experiences. One resident of Sydney’s North 
Shore complained that ‘I don’t know of any [Muslims] living in this area [but] I strongly 
object to a Mosque’. 437 In the colonial and White Australia periods, there had been limited 
resistance to the construction of mosques, presumably because the Muslim communities 
during those periods were not considered to be a threat in the way that they increasingly were 
during the 1990s, when the Muslim population was growing rapidly and there was such 
consistent and persistent negative media reporting on international incidents and conflicts 
involving Muslims. 
Although religious adherence was therefore becoming a greater driver of antagonism towards 
Muslim people and communities, and thus constituting ‘Islamophobia’ more precisely than 
had been true during most of the twentieth century, it is important to note that in both the 
ideology and the practice of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice in Australia, ‘categorical 
confusions between “race” (e.g. 'Middle Eastern Appearance'), ethnicity (e.g. Arab), 
nationality of origin or background (e.g. Lebanese), and religion (e.g. Muslim) are common, 
and distinction in practice between racism directed on “racial”, ethnic, or national grounds 
[was] not always possible or valid’.438 Thus, HREOC’s 1991 report on racial violence had 
highlighted that anti-Islamic vilification and violence were frequently (mis)directed at non-
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Muslim people, organisations and religious buildings, whilst Muslim Australians frequently 
experienced discrimination and violence not on the basis of their religion but due to their 
perceived ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, or national heritage.439 
As an example, during 1998 and 1999, Lebanese Australians became the targets of 
particularly virulent everyday and state racism as a result of the murder of an Asian-
Australian teenage boy by a group of youths of Muslim Lebanese background. During the 
two years it took police to build their case and arrest the perpetrators, the neighbourhood in 
which they lived and young men of ‘Middle Eastern Appearance’ across western Sydney 
were subjected to protracted, intensive and invasive policing, creating significant strain in the 
community and leading to several clashes between community members and police. In both 
the media reporting of the incident and the police handling of the case, the extension of blame 
for violent, criminal acts by individuals were projected as impugning Lebanese Australians as 
a whole, giving rise to a sustained ‘moral panic’ about ‘ghettoisation’ and ‘ethnic gangs’. 
Most of the hysteria, however, centered not on the religion of the perpetrators, but on their 
ethnic origins.440  
By 2001, therefore, there was an established, though intermittent pattern of ‘Islamophobia’ in 
Australia, frequently precipitated by international events and characterised by incidents of 
personal vilification and violence, media demonisation, and increasing levels of institutional 
discrimination towards and securitisation of Muslims. In the months leading up to September 
11, antagonism towards Muslims had been fired up by a series of rapes by a group of young 
men of Lebanese Muslim background. Although the crimes had occurred in mid 2000, the 
identity and background of the perpetrators only became a ‘story’ during mid 2001, when 
several conservative columnists and talk-back radio hosts began to frame the rapes as racially 
motivated attacks by Muslim men against white Australian women. Many of these stories 
contained gross inaccuracies and misrepresentations of sources, which their publishers or 
broadcasters later had to retract.441 Talkback radio host Alan Jones referred to the case as the 
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‘first signs of Islamic hate against a community which has welcomed them’.442 Pauline 
Hanson was quick to link the cases to her own agenda, and proclaimed that ‘a lot of these 
people are Muslims, and they have no respect for the Christian way of life that this country’s 
based on’; ‘white women’, she claimed, ‘are worth absolutely nothing to them, to their race, 
their cultural background’.443 Calls by organisations such as the New South Wales Rape 
Crisis Centre to recognise that violence against women was on the rise across Australia and 
was perpetrated by men of all racial, ethnic, religious and class backgrounds were ignored; 
instead, threatened retributive sexual violence and cases of racialised sexual assault against 
Muslim women increased sharply.444 During this period, therefore, there was a distinctive 
propensity towards virulent anti-Muslim prejudice in Australian public discourse, indicating a 
shift away from prejudice and discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity, though the two 
discourses continued to be mixed to a certain extent. 
Attitudes towards Muslims and Islam after September 11 
The attacks on September 11 in New York strengthened existing negative associations with 
Islam not just in the United States but around the world. The following month in Australia, 
the Howard Government seized the opportunity to even more firmly cement purported links 
between Muslims and Islam, criminality, moral depravity, and ‘unassimilability’. On October 
6, an Australian naval vessel serving as part of Operation Relex intercepted yet another 
floundering asylum seeker vessel. Efforts to tow the boat out of Australian waters resulted in 
the vessel sinking, and 223 predominantly Iraqi asylum seekers, including numerous children, 
had to be rescued from the water. In a deliberately deceitful manoeuvre, the government 
released specially edited footage of the children from the boat in the water, and proclaimed 
that the adult asylum seekers deliberately threw their children into the water in an effort to 
prevent their boat being turned back to Indonesia.445 During an interview with journalist John 
Hamilton two days later, Howard told him that ‘I don't want people like that in Australia. 
Genuine refugees don't do that...they hang on to their children. People say they are desperate; 
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well, you don't get desperate with the lives of your own children’.446 Howard’s 
characterisation of ‘people like that’ was rapidly deployed in Australian public discourse to 
justify the exclusion of supposedly ‘unassimilable’ people, the type of people who could 
commit horrendous crimes like infanticide, multiple perpetrator sexual assaults, and mass 
murder. 
The ‘children overboard’ affair was to have a deep and lasting impact on attitudes towards 
asylum seekers in Australia, despite the fact that a subsequent senate inquiry found that the 
‘children overboard’ claims were manifestly untrue. The inquiry also found that the 
government knew the evidence to have been fabricated, and yet maintained the claims for 
electoral advantage:  
The peculiar sensitivity associated with the claim that children had been thrown 
overboard was that it was made at the beginning of and sustained throughout a 
Federal election campaign, during which ‘border protection’ and national security 
were key issues. That asylum seekers trying to enter Australia by boat were the kinds 
of people who would throw their children overboard was used by the Government to 
demonise them as part of the argument for the need for a ‘tough’ stand against 
external threats.447 
John Howard and senior members of his government campaigned hard in marginal seats such 
as Lindsay in Sydney’s west, adroitly linking the issues of asylum seekers, ‘ethnic’ 
criminality, and the ‘War on Terror’, which became a military engagement the same week as 
the ‘Children Overboard’ affair with the invasion of Afghanistan. Members of the 
Government inferred direct links between asylum seekers and the threat of terrorism, with 
one member of parliament even going so far as to assert that the Taliban could be sending 
terrorists to Australia disguised as asylum seekers.448 Marr and Wilkinson discuss an incident 
where after giving the Courier-Mail’s political editor Dennis Atkins an interview on 
November 6, Atkins showed Howard the mockup of the story on the front page of the paper 
for the following day. The story began: ‘Australia had no way to be certain terrorists, or 
people with terrorist links, were not among the asylum seekers trying to enter the country by 
boat from Indonesia’. Howard indicated strong approval of the mockup to Atkins.449 
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Some sectors of the media had remained sceptical about Howard’s ‘children overboard’ 
claims, and of his scaremongering election campaign in general. However, as a whole, the 
mainstream media were supportive of the government during this period. The general public 
overwhelmingly supported Howard’s stance against asylum seekers, and media proprietors 
had strong commercial reasons for pushing for Howard’s re-election. During the middle of 
the Tampa crisis, Senator Richard Allston made a surprise announcement that if re-elected 
the Government would dismantle Australia’s cross-media ownership laws.450 On the last day 
of the election campaign, unfavourable lead stories ran in most of the major papers, 
extensively quoting navy sources and confirming that the ‘children overboard’ story was not 
true. Nevertheless, the editorials of every major paper except The Age officially endorsed the 
re-election of the Coalition that morning.451 Howard’s ‘resolute leadership’ on the fused 
issues of defence and immigration contributed significantly to rises in the Prime Minster’s 
poor polling of early 2001 and despite the Children Overboard scandal breaking in the days 
just prior to the election, the Coalition won the 2001 Election handily. Labour recorded its 
lowest primary vote since 1934, the support for One Nation was halved, and the Government 
went into its third term with an increased majority in the House of Representatives.452 
Given the political and social circumstances of the second half of 2001, it is little surprise that 
during this period 93% of respondents to a national consultative study by the Australian 
Human Rights Commission reported an increase in racism, abuse and violence directed 
against Arab and Muslim communities in Australia, as well as attacks being recorded against 
non-Muslims such as Sikhs, who were sometimes mistakenly identified as Muslims.453 The 
findings of this study were echoed by other reports. The Australian Arabic Council recorded 
a twenty-fold rise in reports of discrimination in the month after September 11; a hotline 
setup by the Community Relations Commission for a Multicultural NSW after September 11 
was inundated with several hundred reports of racial attacks and abuse.454The Human Rights 
Commission’s comprehensive analysis of these experiences identified three key themes: the 
first, ‘that Australian Arabs and Muslims share responsibility for terrorism or are potential 
terrorists’; the second, ‘that there is no place in Australia for Arabs and Muslims’; and 
thirdly, that Muslims ‘should assimilate and discard their ‘foreign’ dress codes, languages 
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and cultural practices’.455 As with reports on prejudice towards Muslims in the wake of the 
Gulf War, a wide variety of studies indicated that the increased prejudice, discrimination and 
violence directed against Muslims were linked to negative media portrayals – with 
stereotypical images particularly perpetuated through commercial television, talkback radio 
and the tabloid press.456 
In their study of the criminalisation of the ‘Arab Other’ in Australian society during this 
period, Poynting et al. observed that: 
It is one bizarre leap of the imagination to assume a link between the criminal activity 
of some Australian citizens of Middle Eastern ancestry and the terrorist activities of 
extreme Islamic fundamentalists in different parts of the world; it is another to link 
this to the attempts to seek asylum by refugees; and it is yet another to link these 
actions with the different cultural traditions of Arab and especially Muslim 
Australians, and yet this link is made naturally [emphasis added].457 
In was in the process of naturalising these links between ‘a fictitious Islamic homogeneity 
and a cultural pathology of violence and conflict’ that the media’s role was particularly 
pronounced.458 As Poynting et al. have demonstrated, ‘once the criminal behaviour of a 
minority is pathologised as the tendency of a culture, then other acts of difference become 
imbued with criminality’.459 
For an example of how the Muslim community as a whole was being pathologised and 
criminalised during this period, as early as late September 2001 the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), accompanied by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and 
local NSW police began raiding households and workplaces in Sydney. On several occasions, 
they publicised the raids and brought the media with them. All those raided were Muslims. 
The logic of these raids was furnished by influential opinion columnist Miranda Devine: ‘The 
perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were young Middle-Eastern Muslim men. Bin 
Laden’s followers are young Middle-Eastern Muslim men. So it is young men of Middle-
Eastern Muslim background who will be targeted in Sydney’. Devine remarked that she 
appreciated the forbearance of Muslims in ‘having to contend with their homes being invaded 
                                                
455 Dreher, "'Targeted': Experiences of Racism in N.S.W. After September 11, 2001", p. 35; Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission, Ismaعﻉ, pp. 51-52. 
456 See Dreher, "'Targeted': Experiences of Racism in N.S.W. After September 11, 2001", p. 36; Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission, Ismaعﻉ, p. 144. 
457 Scott Poynting, Greg Noble, Paul Tabar, and Jock Collins, Bin Laden in the Suburbs: Criminalising the Arab 
Other  (Sydney: Sydney Institutue of Criminology, 2004), p. 45. 
458 Poynting et al., Bin Laden in the Suburbs, p. 46. 
459 Poynting et al., Bin Laden in the Suburbs, p. 45. 
  130 
at dawn by armed police’, since it ‘helps make us all a little safer’.460 Devine’s article clearly 
serves as a normalisation and rationalisation of the extension of responsibility for 
international acts of terrorism onto Australian Muslims and ‘pathologisation’ of the 
community as a whole. 
Poynting et al. argue that this process of ‘pathologisation’ was so easily adopted by segments 
of the media and the general public because it reduced ‘complex social, political and 
economic phenomena to a simple moral framework of right and wrong, and essentialise[d] 
that wrongdoing as pathological’. They further argue that this complex of representations of 
Muslims and Islam ‘functions…as a condensation symbol, simplifying and making 
intelligible what might otherwise remain unsettling in the social and moral order’.461 The 
operation of ‘condensation symbols’ in political discourse was a central pillar of Edelman’s 
exploration of ‘symbolic politics’: Edelman argued that condensation symbols 
‘evoke…emotions [and] condense into one symbolic event, sign, or act patriotic pride, 
anxieties, remembrances of past glories or humiliations, promises of future greatness…or all 
of them’.462 Edelman emphasised that when ‘condensation symbols’ are operationalised 
around controversial and often intangible issues for which ‘there is no necessity, and often no 
possibility, of continuously checking…convictions against real conditions’, a powerful 
quiescent or aroused mass response can be evoked ‘because it symbolises a threat or 
reassurance’.463 
The apparently tenuous connections between the ‘fictitious Islamic homogeneity and a 
cultural pathology of violence and conflict’ could be adopted so wholeheartedly within 
Australian mediatised political discourses because they made complex events explicable. 
They created solidarity among some sections of the community in the face of ‘threats’, 
purportedly both internal and external to Australian society’; and they reassured and validated 
‘mainstream Australians’ about the value and even superiority of their ‘way of life’.  
Edelman pointed out that ‘the governments which most often outrage their citizens or force 
unwelcome changes in their behaviour plainly have the greatest need for reassuring 
symbols’.464 The Howard Government had been responsible for forcing an unrelenting 
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barrage of ‘unwelcome change’ upon an electorate exhausted and alienated by Australia’s 
social and economic transformation during the 1990s. Yet through operationalising the 
condensation symbols of ‘Australian values’ and national security, Howard had found a 
powerful way to reassure crucial segments of the electorate and redirect their outrage towards 
the threat concept of Islam. As has been demonstrated, the specific history of politicised 
racialisation in Australia created a propitious environment in which the Howard Government 
could exploit fears and anxieties about race to their electoral advantage, whilst 
simultaneously deflecting attention from their neoliberal economic policies. I now turn to an 
exploration of the Howard Government’s third and fourth terms, during which the 
Government attempted to continue to employ wedge tactics on the issue of race with varying 
levels of success. 
Chapter 7 – ‘Better safe than sorry’: The ‘War on Terror’ in the Australian context 
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Chapter 7 – ‘Better safe than sorry’: The ‘War 
on Terror’ in the Australian context 
 
This chapter leads on directly from the previous chapter and discusses the rising levels of 
Islamophobia during the mid-2000s as the ‘War on Terror’ reached its height of support and 
highest levels of impact upon Muslim communities around the world. It focuses on detailing 
key developments during the third and fourth terms of the Howard Government (2001-2004 
and 2004-2007) respectively, as these form the immediate background to and context for the 
individual newspaper articles within my data sample. 
During its final two terms of office, the Howard Government continued to pursue the same 
agenda of social conservatism and radical economic change, somewhat hampered during the 
third term by the absence of a majority in the Upper House. Despite these procedural setbacks 
and the continued unpopularity of many of the policies of the Government, and numerous 
scandals which imputed the credibility and honesty of the Prime Minister and many key 
Government officials and departments, support for the Prime Minister and for the 
Government remained strong. The government’s high levels of support were largely the 
dividends created by Howard’s adroit exploitation of fear and anxiety over issues of defence 
and national security during this peak period of the ‘War on Terror’.  
In the 2004 Federal Election, the Labor Party under the leadership of Mark Latham was 
resoundingly defeated and the Coalition was returned to Government with a much increased 
majority in the Lower House and a clear majority in the Upper House. During the 
Government’s fourth term in office, therefore, significant reforms and controversial policies 
could be implemented more rapidly and with less need for amendment and negotiation than 
had been possible in Australian politics for almost a quarter of a century. Despite this position 
of security, in the months leading up to the 2007 Federal Election, support for the 
Government plummeted, whilst the popularity of the new Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd 
surged. For the first time since the early 2000s, some of the certitudes of the Howard Era 
were being openly questioned and critiqued, among them the consensus on the War on Terror 
and on the place of Muslims in Australian society – leading to the eventual victory of the 
Rudd-led Labor Party at the 2007 Federal Election, during which John Howard lost his own 
seat, as well as government. 
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The following sections of this chapter therefore give an overview of key events and 
developments pertinent to this thesis between 2001 and 2007. As media coverage during the 
2004 and 2007 Federal Election campaigns is the subject of the primary research of this 
thesis, discussion of specific issues from this period will be limited, as many of the pertinent 
events will be returned to in more detail in the Discussion chapter. 
As early as three days after the September 11 attacks in New York, John Howard flagged the 
possibility of Australian military support for the United States in its response to the attacks. 
When the US invaded Afghanistan a month later, a small number of Australian Special 
Forces troops were among the invading forces.465  As the ‘War on Terror’ progressed, 
Australia was to become one of the United States’ staunchest and most vocal allies. Despite 
mass protest movements and the casting of doubt upon the ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ 
narrative by the security analyst-turned-whistleblower Andrew Wilkie, John Howard 
successfully committed Australia to a second theatre of the ‘War on Terror’, in Iraq, in 
2003.466 Australia’s participation in the ‘War on Terror’ is crucial to the linkage between 
issues of ‘border security’, national defence and anti-terrorism measures, which, as has been a 
recurring theme in this thesis, were a significant factor in both the electoral popularity of the 
Howard Government and in the growing levels of Islamophobia in Australia.  
The rhetoric of the world leaders of the ‘War on Terror’, who rapidly declared ‘victory’ in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and proclaimed that the global offensive against ‘terror’ was making the 
world ‘safer’, was belied by the proliferation of violence in the devastated direct theatres of 
war, and a subsequent wave of terrorist attacks upon ‘Western’ targets. In September 2002, 
eighty-eight Australians were among the two hundred victims of a bombing attack in Bali by 
the organisation Jemaah Islamiah (JI). Despite hints of the growth of JI in the region and of a 
backlash against Australia for joining the ‘war on terror’, the Australian intelligence focus in 
Indonesia remained on people smugglers: just three days before the Bali bombings, Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer saw ‘no specific threat to Australia or Australian interests’.467 A 
bombing attack on a train in Madrid in 2004, attributed to a group of young Muslim men, 
prompted Australia Federal and State police chiefs to acknowledge that the involvement of 
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Spain, Australia and other nations in the ‘War on Terror’ increased the likelihood of terrorist 
attacks against their nationals and on their territory. The Prime Minister and senior 
government officials nonetheless continued to deny that such a link existed. Instead, they 
framed such attacks as demonstrating the necessity for stronger defensive and legislative 
measures against terrorism.468 In early 2003, the Government even distributed fridge magnets 
and an information kit across the country instructing people of what to do in the event of a 
terrorist attack and encouraging them to report any suspicious behaviour which could be 
indicative of terrorist activity; actions which inflamed panic about the likelihood of a terrorist 
attack and raised support for Australian participation in the ‘war on terror’, both 
internationally and domestically.469 In the following sections, I will therefore consider the 
domestic ramifications of the ‘moral panic’ over terrorism which emerged out of this 
situation and which was to have such significant impacts upon Muslim communities in 
Australia. 
Anti-terrorism legislation and the threat of ‘home-grown’ terrorism 
Australia, like most other nations which participated in the ‘War on Terror’, quickly acted in 
the domestic sphere to introduce laws bearing directly upon terrorism and initiate ‘counter-
terrorism’ government programs and policy shifts. These actions were to have a predictably 
disproportionate effect upon Muslim Australians. Prior to September 11, 2001 Australia did 
not have any criminal offences related to terrorism, but between 2001 and 2007, major 
international terrorist attacks were repeatedly followed by the passing of additional anti-
terrorism legislation in Australia. On March 31, 2004 the Attorney-General Philip Ruddock 
introduced a new anti-terrorism bill before the Australian parliament. He described it as ‘a 
bill to strengthen Australia's counter-terrorism laws in a number of respects - a task made 
more urgent following the recent tragic terrorist bombings in Spain’.470 This bill was the first 
of two more anti-terrorism bills passed in Australian parliament during 2004. After the 
London Bombings in July 2005, the Australian Government convened a terrorism summit to 
discuss the possibility of introducing even more extensive legislation, and subsequently 
succeeded in formulating and passing further anti-terrorist measures. In conjunction with the 
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creation or expansion of legislation to cope with terrorism, security agencies received 
massive boosts in their jurisdiction, funding and staffing; the Australian Secret Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO), for example, had an increase in staffing levels of 80% between 2001-
2007. Many of these developments came under fire immediately or soon after their inception, 
yet were largely pushed through both houses in rapid succession with little parliamentary or 
other oversight, owing to the supradominance of the Howard government during this 
period.471 
The atmosphere of panic in which Australia’s anti-terrorism laws were enacted and the 
political clout held by the Howard Government during these critical years created an 
extensive suite of anti-terrorism legislation which was overly complex, ill-thought out in 
many cases, eroded key rights of Australians and extended the Commonwealth’s power over 
criminal matters far further than any preceding legislation. The suite was widely labelled as 
draconian and heavily criticised by sectors of government, the judicial system, non-
government organisations and the media. Even a judicial report commissioned by the Howard 
Government itself recommended dramatic reforms to the legislation, and expressed strong  
reservations about the means by which ‘terrorist organisations’ were identified. The anti-
terrorism legislative suite eventually included ‘control orders’ for up to 12 months, extensive 
detention powers (under which people as young as fourteen could be held incommunicado for 
up to two weeks), banning of select ‘terrorist organisations’, and the introduction of 
controversial ‘sedition’ laws.472 Crucial to evaluating the success of this invasive and far-
reaching ‘hyper-legislation’, relatively few charges have been laid under the extensive suite, 
and even fewer convictions have been achieved.473  
Initial fears that Muslims might be targeted by this new suite of legislation were borne out in 
many cases. All convictions under anti-terrorism charges have applied to Muslim men, and 
all but one of the organisations listed by the Australian government as terrorist organisations 
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are explicitly Islamic.474 This latter fact is particularly remarkable considering that in other 
countries which have such lists of ‘proscribed organisations’, the listed organisations 
typically include a wide range of groups including numerous non-Muslim groups. Prior to 
2009, for example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were listed by many 
countries as a ‘terrorist organisation’, yet they were not listed as such in Australia. This was 
as a result of campaigning by community-based organisations in Australia on the grounds 
that because of deep and ongoing connections within the global Tamil diaspora, listing the 
LTTE under the Criminal Code was likely to have a significant and adverse impact on normal 
social, economic and political activities for Tamils in Australia. The Parliamentary Joint 
Inquiry into the proscription of ‘terrorist organisations’ adamantly dismissed claims by the 
Australian Muslim Civil Rights Advocacy Network and the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission that the selection of organisations reflected any anti-Muslim bias, 
though it tacitly admitted that it could be perceived to be so.475  
It is clear that in terms of the impact of the anti-terrorism legislation, the burden was unfairly 
borne by Australian Muslims. In addition to the prosecution of individuals under anti-
terrorism legislation and the proscription of certain organisations, many individual Muslims 
and Muslim communities became subject to intensive policing as a result of the increasing 
securitisation of Muslims. Expanded police and intelligence powers were reportedly being 
used coercively, to intimidate people into cooperating with authorities where they had no 
legal obligation to do so. Officers in the September 2001 raids, mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, as well as later well-publicised large-scale raids on Muslim homes in Australia 
following the Bali bombings and London bombings, are reported to have used unnecessary 
force, and to have threatened people directly (or indirectly through their family members) 
with detention or imprisonment.476 Through the discussion of comparative examples, Waleed 
Aly has highlighted how counter-productive these type of counter-terrorism strategies have 
been historically. Not only did such tactics increase alienation among Australian Muslims, 
but they also indirectly fostered radicalisation. This process reveals the major flaws in the 
logic espoused by Miranda Devine, quoted in the previous chapter: rather than making us 
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safer, unjust targeting of Muslim communities and individuals was likely to increase the risk 
of ‘homegrown’ terrorism, just as the involvement of Australia in the ‘War on Terror’ 
increased the risk of terrorist attacks on Australian targets in the international sphere.477 
The revelation that several Australian Muslims had allegedly acted as combatants against the 
US-led forces in Afghanistan, and that two had been captured and were eventually transferred 
to detention in Guantanamo Bay, served to further inflame fears and anxieties about ‘home-
grown’ terrorism and of Australian Muslims acting as a ‘fifth column’. The Howard 
Government did little to support either of these detainees, Mamdouh Habib, an Egyptian-born 
Australian citizen, and David Hicks, a convert to Islam of Anglo-Australian heritage, and 
much to malign them in the eyes of the public. The fact that Australian consular staff, 
intelligence agents, and Federal Police agents attended interrogation sessions with 
Australians detained by the United States in Guantanamo Bay and at other sites where they 
were rendered meant that Australian government officials were well aware of the abuses 
being carried out within such jails and detention centres.478  
An illustrative example of the Howard Government’s indifference to the fate of these 
Australian citizens is the differential treatment accorded to Mamdouh Habib and two German 
nationals who were captured at the same time as him in Pakistan. Since this was in early 
October 2001, prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, these prisoners were never technically 
considered ‘enemy combatants’, but were nevertheless detained by Pakistani authorities for 
‘questioning’ and then turned over to US forces. Under pressure from their government, the 
two Germans were repatriated to Germany within weeks, but in the absence of strong 
advocacy on the behalf of the Australian government, Habib was transferred to detention in 
Egypt in a case of ‘extraordinary rendition’ under the auspices of the US. Habib subsequently 
obtained copies of Australian government documents from late 2001 which detailed the 
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attempts of consular staff to gain access to him in Islamabad and Cairo, and recorded reports 
that he had been mistreated.479 Within three or four days of Habib’s arrival in Guantanamo 
Bay in May 2002, he was interviewed by two AFP agents, a representative of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade and an ASIO agent. At this stage, Habib was so ill from his 
internment and treatment in Egypt that he had to be wheeled on a gurney to his interview, yet 
the Australian Government failed to intervene with the US government to release him; he was 
finally released from Guantanamo more than two years later without charge.480 
The turning point 
Marion Maddox has reflected that when taken together, the Howard Government’s counter-
terrorism policies ‘painted a “Them” so dangerous (even when they are children) that normal 
civil liberties should not apply’; the result of this campaign of ‘fear-augmentation’, was, 
however, not to create increased security but to instill a ‘heightened sense of a half-visible 
menace’.481 The menacing ‘Them’ were supposedly ‘driven by the frightening values of 
strange religion’, which was increasingly being painted as besieging the embattled ‘Us’ 
(mainstream Anglo-Australians) who featured so strongly in the rhetoric of the Howard 
Government.482 Launching the 2004 Counter-terrorism White Paper, Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer proclaimed that Australia was locked in a ‘struggle to the death over 
values’ against ‘Islamo-fascists’ who were determined to ‘overshadow the democratic West’ 
and ‘destroy our society by waging a version of total war’.483 
Combined with the well-established patterns of media stereotyping and victimisation of 
Muslims and the creeping normalisation of xenophobic and racist attitudes towards minority 
groups discussed earlier in this thesis, the rise of state-led victimisation of Muslims became a 
significant catalysing factor leading to an increasingly volatile environment. As Poynting and 
Perry have emphasised, ‘hate-motivated vilification and violence can only flourish in an 
enabling environment’; 484 that is, ‘if the state assaults, harasses and vilifies Muslims as the 
enemy in the war on terror and thereby terrorises whole communities, then perhaps white-
thinking citizens feel justified in personally attacking this enemy wherever they might 
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encounter it’.485 The seething fear and anger towards Muslims which had been expressed 
through a variety of forms of interpersonal, media and state victimisation at different levels 
during the early 2000s erupted into undeniable public view in December 2005, during the 
Cronulla Riots. 
The Cronulla Riots were triggered by an incident in which several young men of ‘Middle 
Eastern appearance’ became involved in an altercation with lifeguards at Cronulla Beach, a 
southern suburb of Sydney. The iconic status of lifeguards and the beach in Australian 
society served to translate the altercation into a representation of the supposed broader 
‘cosmic’ conflict between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, between mainstream Australians and their value 
systems and the value systems of the Middle Eastern/Muslim minority. Fuelled by the 
incitement of shock jock Alan Jones and other figures in the media, over five thousand people 
gathered at Cronulla on December 11th, 2005, for what was referred to as ‘Leb and wog 
bashing day’ in the text messages circulating prior to the event. Chanting racist and anti-
Muslim slogans, many people who were in attendance were involved in violent assaults on 
people of non-Anglo appearance, yet the Prime Minister, the NSW Premier and other key 
public figures refused to acknowledge that the event revealed a deep-seated racist and anti-
Muslim underbelly to Australian society.486 
Despite this persistent official denial of racism, subsequent to the considerable shock of the 
Cronulla Riots the first cracks in the edifice of support for the Howard Government’s implicit 
fostering of anti-Muslim prejudice began to appear. The injustice of many of the policies 
which could be linked to such virulent outbreaks of racist violence became more publicised in 
the media, as some of the key foundations of the consensus on the War on Terror began to 
move into the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’ and to be challenged. This was initially 
evident in the softening of attitudes towards asylum seekers. The inflammatory government 
claims of linkages between asylum seekers and ‘terrorists’ eventuated to nothing. A 2005 
inquiry documented numerous cases of wrongful and inappropriate detention and other 
actions by the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, as a result 
of recurrent and unaddressed problems in the administration and culture of the Department, 
and the harmful effects of lengthy mandatory detention on the physical and mental health of 
asylum seekers became more widely known, as did the tragic consequences of forced 
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repatriation.487 The publicisation of these findings, combined with the lack of arrivals of ‘boat 
people’ during the last two terms of the Howard Government, led to a de-escalation of fear 
and anxiety over ‘boatpeople’. Polling in the mid-2000s indicated increases in the belief that 
detention was too harsh and also an increase in opposition to offshore detention.488  
The flaws in the anti-terrorism regime were also becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. 
Perhaps partially as a consequence of the exposure of Australian intelligence and policing 
agents to the extreme interrogative procedures and lack of due process evident in 
Guantanamo Bay and prisons in Egypt and Pakistan during the early phases of the ‘War on 
Terror’, or as a result of political pressure to secure arrests and convictions, over-zealous and 
inappropriate actions by intelligence and policing agents in Australia contributed to a series 
of widely-publicised bungles of terrorism cases. The very first conviction made under 
Australia’s anti-terrorism legislation was overturned in 2006, because the evidence on which 
the conviction was based had been obtained under duress whilst the defendant, Joseph ‘Jihad 
Jack’ Thomas, was being held in a Pakistani prison in 2003. Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
agents had attended these ‘interrogation’ sessions and were therefore aware that the 
circumstances under which Thomas had been interrogated created significant difficulties for 
successful prosecution in the Australian court system.489  Another AFP officer, Ramzi 
Jabbour, was among the Australian officials present at an interrogation of Mamdouh Habib in 
Guantanamo Bay.490 The same officer was involved in a later case in which a doctor, 
Mohammed Haneef, was arrested and charged with terrorism-related offences, then cleared 
as the evidence against him unravelled. The official Clarke Inquiry into the affair blamed the 
mishandling of the case on Ramzi Jabbour’s loss of objectivity, making him ‘unable to see 
that the evidence he regarded as highly incriminating in fact amounted to very little’.491 
Because of the totemic significance of this case for the course of the 2007 election campaign, 
it is worth considering the ‘Haneef Affair’ in some further detail, before making concluding 
remarks in this chapter. 
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The Haneef Affair 
The ‘Haneef Affair’ began shortly after 3pm, on Saturday 30th June 2007, when a jeep loaded 
with propane canisters was crashed through the glass doors of the main terminal at Glasgow 
Airport. The vehicle was set on fire by its occupants, and several bystanders suffered injuries, 
though the most serious injuries were suffered by the driver of the jeep, Kafeel Ahmed, and 
his passenger, Bilal Abdullah. Mr. Ahmed was to die of his severe burns on 2nd August. 
During the next forty-eight hours, a number of arrests were made by British police in 
connection with the bombing attempt. Those taken into custody included Mr. Ahmed’s 
brother, Dr. Sabeel Ahmed. On the 2nd July, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) were 
informed by the UK police that Dr Mohamed Haneef, an Indian national working as a 
registrar in a Gold Coast Hospital, was of interest to the case. Dr Haneef was the second 
cousin of Kafeel and Sabeel Ahmed, and preliminary questioning of Sabeel Ahmed indicated 
that Dr Haneef had given him a mobile phone and SIM card which were potentially linked to 
the attacks. Dr Haneef was quickly located and placed under 24-hour surveillance.492 
A few hours after commencing surveillance, Dr Haneef was followed from his home to 
Brisbane Airport, where he was found to be intending to board a plane home to India with a 
one-way ticket. Dr. Haneef subsequently maintained that his intent in leaving Australia was 
to visit his wife and six-day-old daughter, following a difficult birth and health 
complications. It was intended that return tickets and visas for his wife and daughter could be 
arranged once back in India. However, given the context of heightened anxiety over terrorist 
attacks, the Queensland Police officer and AFP officer who were on the scene took Dr 
Haneef into custody. Even at this stage of the investigation, however, there was some concern 
that there were not sufficient grounds for arresting Dr Haneef. The UK police had already 
notified Australian authorities that they had ‘downgraded’ their assessment of the direct 
threat posed by Dr Haneef, though they still considered him a person of interest in the case. 
Although the Queensland Police Officer on site considered there to be insufficient evidence 
for detaining Dr Haneef, the AFP adamantly pushed for his detention and eventually 
prevailed over their state counterparts.493 
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Before coming to work in Australia, Dr Haneef had worked in Cheshire, England. When Dr 
Haneef left England, he gave his cousin Sabeel Ahmed a SIM card and the balance of a two 
year mobile phone contract to use and pay off, in order to save the money of having the 
contract terminated. The supply of the SIM card was the cornerstone of the prosecution’s 
case, and Haneef was held under the terms of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2005. According to this 
legislation, Haneef was denied contact with representatives of the Indian government, his 
family and other inmates. This meant that he was held in solitary confinement for up to 23 
out of every 24 hours, except for interrogations and one hour of supervised exercise each day. 
Haneef was the first person detained and arrested under this specific aspect of the anti-
terrorism legislation, and the first to have his detention extended under the Act. He was 
eventually detained for a total of twelve days (2nd-14th July) before being charged with a 
crime – the longest detainment without charge in Australia’s recent history.494  
After being charged, however, the court granted Dr. Haneef bail. Before bail could be made, 
then Minister for Immigration Kevin Andrews cancelled Dr. Haneef’s work visa and ordered 
him to be remanded into immigration detention. The unusual step by the magistrate of 
granting bail to a terrorism suspect, which indicated severe doubt already as to the strength of 
the prosecution’s case, was therefore overridden by Federal Government intervention – a 
further erosion of the separation of powers that had been a major concern with the new anti-
terrorism legislation from the start. By the 27th July, the Director for Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) had come to the view that there was no prospect of making out an offence against Dr 
Haneef, either in respect to the charge that had already been bought against him, or any other 
information which might emerge from further investigation. Twenty-four hours later, the 
Minister for Immigration permitted Dr Haneef to return home to Bangalore. Dr Haneef has 
not returned to Australia since the affair. This was not, however, the end of the case. The 
DPP’s investigation had found that there were two key flaws in the case against Dr Haneef. 
The first was the prosecutor’s claim that his SIM card was found inside the jeep used in the 
Glasgow attack. This claim later proved to be entirely false – British police maintain that the 
SIM card was found on the person of Dr. Sabeel Ahmed in Liverpool, and that the AFP were 
never informed otherwise. Secondly, in an AFP affidavit submitted to the court, the AFP 
made a number of claims which were not supported by the interview record.495 
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A British court found on 11 April 2008 that Sabeel Ahmed had no knowledge of his brother’s 
activities prior to the event. The main piece of evidence in this finding was email 
correspondence between the two brothers, which was available to the AFP from at least the 
5th July 2007, when British police officers were in situ in Brisbane assisting the investigation 
and vice versa. This evidence was not shared with Dr Haneef’s lawyers during the period of 
the trial, yet it decisively removed any putative connection between Dr Haneef and the 
Glasgow attack, since it was on the basis of the SIM card given to Sabeel Ahmed that Dr 
Haneef was arrested in the first place. The Minister’s decision to revoke Dr. Haneef’s visa 
proved to be just as controversial as the criminal case against him. In August 2007, the 
Federal Court set aside the ministerial decision to cancel Dr. Haneef’s visa. The Minister in 
turn appealed this decision, but a full federal court dismissed the appeal in December 2007. 
Both aspects of the case demonstrated that the ethical and practical implication of the 
essentialisation of Islam as inherently violent was the enablement and normalisation of acts 
of discrimination against Muslims, such as the trying investigation ordeal endured by Dr 
Haneef. At a conference in New Delhi in 2008, Haneef told the audience that: 
I am a living example of how the menace of terrorism has affected innocent lives and 
the phenomenon of how Muslims are stereotyped as being terrorists or sympathisers 
of terrorists whether they are guilty or not.496 
Stephen Keim, Haneef’s barrister, argued that the crucial significance of the case was the 
extent to which ‘politics intruded into the law-enforcement process’.497 During 2008, Keim 
secured the release of over 250 documents which had formerly been withheld by the 
Department of Immigration. An additional 15-20 documents remained undisclosed, with the 
Department arguing that these documents were not covered by freedom of information laws. 
Among these documents was a list of attendees at a meeting between senior members of the 
Immigration and Foreign Affairs Departments with counterparts in the Department of the 
Prime Minister on July 4 2007, just 36 hours after the arrest of Mr. Haneef. Also among the 
suppressed documents was an options paper drawn up as a result of this meeting. Mr. Howard 
had previously denied any involvement in the Haneef investigation.498  
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Whether or not the Prime Minister played a direct role in encouraging the AFP or the 
Minister for Immigration in their witch hunt, he certainly failed to denounce their actions 
even as it became increasingly clear that the investigation was hopelessly compromised, 
instead falling back again on the tried-and-trusted rhetoric of security and threat. ‘When you 
are dealing with terrorism’, Howard declared, ‘it's better to be safe than sorry’.499 As a 
consequence, David Dixon argues,  
With at least tacit encouragement from a government facing a general election which 
had previously exploited security scares for political advantage, sections of the media 
treated Haneef as a prize capture. 
The tabloid media published a range of unsupported and patently untrue claims, most of 
which were never formally retracted, including that Haneef had been plotting to blow up a 
Gold Coast skyscraper and that he was one of a number of doctors of Muslim Indian origin in 
Queensland who had made enquiries or arrangements regarding learning to fly a plane.500 
As with other cases that were seen to have ‘gone bad’ as their legal ramifications unfolded, 
assumptions that the Haneef case would be an asset, helping the Coalition to set the agenda 
for the election on issues of ‘security’, were confounded as the story became rapidly polluted. 
The story began to unravel when two journalists at The Australian exposed the flaws in the 
police case, listed above, and the charges against Haneef were consequently dropped. As the 
first wave of media coverage had apparently been inspired by what Geoffrey Robertson QC 
called ‘smears and leaks [from] police and politicians’, the role of the Australian Federal 
Police in particular now came under scrutiny.501 Commissioner Mick Keelty took the unusual 
step of issuing a statement claiming the AFP was not responsible for any of the claimed 
leaks.502 
Some media and political reactions even picked up on the apparent emergence of a pattern, of 
difficulty in making charges ‘stick’ against high-profile defendants on charges brought under 
anti-terrorism laws, caused in some cases by attempts to use the media to manipulate the case 
in question for political gain. In an earlier case, that of Joseph Thomas, prosecutors turned to 
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admissions made in a media interview which had not been published at the time of the initial 
trial as evidence to support a retrial.503 Against this backdrop, the démarche by Immigration 
Minister Kevin Andrews, of withdrawing Dr Haneef’s working visa and obliging him, 
therefore, to enter detention even though he had won bail through the court system, was seen 
to have backfired, and the Minister was criticised for overturning the presumption of 
innocence in an active criminal case. 
Contesting the ‘war on terror’ consensus 
At the same time that increased scrutiny was being applied to the mishandling and 
inappropriate intervention of government representatives in anti-terrorism cases, 
developments in the so-called ‘war on terrorism’ far away from Australia were also, 
arguably, diminishing in value as a political asset for a government intent on campaigning on 
‘security’ issues. Howard never enjoyed the same level of political ‘cover’, for Australia’s 
participation in the US-led invasion of Iraq, as the governments of other troop-supplying 
countries including the US itself, and the UK – namely, bipartisan legislative and majority 
public support. The Labor Opposition attempted to reject the argument that participation was 
vital to Australia’s own security, as either misconceived or fraudulent. Instead, Howard was 
argued to have followed Washington’s lead regardless, with ministers criticised in memorable 
terms by the then Labor leader, Mark Latham, as ‘a conga-line of suckholes’.504 
Despite the voicing of opposition to towards Australia’s participation in the invasion of Iraq 
by the Opposition Leader and other public figures, such views continued to be discounted and 
lampooned in the mainstream media, which continued to favour the Howard Government’s 
stance on ‘security’ issues through the mid-2000s. In 2004, Latham’s opposition was cited, in 
an election-eve editorial in the mass-circulation Sydney newspaper the Daily Telegraph, as 
justifying the paper’s recommendation to its readers of a vote for the Coalition. Latham’s 
promise ‘to pull Australian troops from Iraq by Christmas raises questions about Labor’s 
relationship with our most important ally’, the paper said, ‘and betrays a dangerous lack of 
understanding of the global nature of the terrorist threat’.505 The following years – the period 
separating that from Howard’s last election as leader in 2007 – were filled with unremittingly 
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bad news from Iraq. A self-proclaimedly civilising mission had encouraged high hopes for 
political and security gains – backed by ministerial rhetoric – and focused attention on the 
conduct of occupying troops. Not only did the country lapse into a destructive civil war, with 
regular reports of large-scale civilian deaths, but claims of misconduct by US forces began to 
emerge on a regular basis. And in the UK, the extent of duplicity by politicians planning the 
invasion was confirmed with the much-reported leak of a memo from the head of MI6, the 
British secret service, commenting that ‘the intelligence and facts’ (on Iraq’s so-called 
weapons of mass destruction) ‘were being fixed around the policy’ – as publics were given 
the opposite impression.506 
At a local level, the cynical promotion of Islam and Muslims as a threat concept for electoral 
gain was exemplified by the evidence that members of local branches of the Liberal Party in 
marginal Western Sydney seats had employed tactics such as anti-Muslim smear campaigns 
against a Labor candidate in 2004 and the distribution of fake, patently Islamophobic election 
materials during the 2004 and 2007 election campaigns. In 2004, such ‘dirty tricks’ remained 
little more than whispered allegations and received limited attention in the mainstream media; 
in fact, as shall be discussed later in this thesis, The SMH’s columnist Paul Sheehan was 
instrumental in facilitating the smear campaign against the aforementioned Labor candidate. 
Yet in 2007, when the perpetrators were caught and documented in the act of distributing 
their fake flyers, what became known as the ‘Lindsay leaflet scandal’ became one of the 
biggest stories of the final days of the election campaign. John Howard’s attempts to 
downplay the significance of the act and to deny its racist characteristics, as he had 
successfully managed to do for so many other key developments during his tenure as Prime 
Minister, were a signal failure.507 
For the first time, the tried and trusted methods of the Howard government and its media 
supporters, for setting an agenda conducive to electoral success, were now beginning to show 
substantial cracks. In so far as these methods gave rise to, and drew strength from, the 
essentialisation and demonisation of Australia’s Muslim communities, could these 
phenomena, too, now be in abeyance, or at least occurring in attenuated form, as manifest in 
the social artefact of media reporting? That is the central question to be investigated in Part 3 
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of this thesis, which is composed of the methodological, data analysis, and discussion 
sections of this thesis, and to which I now turn. 
Chapter 8 – Research Methodology 
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Chapter 8 – Research Methodology 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the analytical methodology employed in this thesis on a 
selection of press articles published during the lead up to the 2004 and 2007 Australian 
Federal Elections. During this chapter I give a brief overview of content and discourse 
analytical approaches to data analysis before going on to consider the characteristics of the 
publications which I focus on in this study and the parameters guiding the sample selection. I 
then outline the methodology of a Pilot Study, undertaken with the purpose of evaluating and 
refining the methodological approach for the study, before turning to a consideration of the 
preliminary research results.  
Content and discourse analysis 
In order to compensate for any possible bias and to increase analytical validity, 
methodological triangulation is employed in this study. ‘Between-method’ triangulation will 
be achieved by using a combination of content and discourse analytical techniques to 
interrogate press representations of Muslims; and ‘within-method’ triangulation will be 
achieved through the use of multiple evaluative strategies within research modes.508 
I employ both qualitative and quantitative approaches to content analysis. Content analysis 
includes the systematic and replicable analysis and categorisation of data from a set of 
specified texts in order to infer answers to particular research questions. This definition of 
content analysis therefore ‘makes the drawing of inferences the centrepiece of this research 
technique’, yet also suggests that the inferences of the content analyst ‘are merely more 
systematic, explicitly informed and (ideally) verifiable than what ordinary readers do with 
texts’.509  
Historically, studies of representation in the media were largely content analytical.510 Despite 
the value of such studies in calling attention to issues such as the incidence of particular 
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stereotypical phrases, much of the sensitive information that researchers seek to extract from 
this type of data is implicit rather than explicit. In other words, it is embedded within a 
discourse: 
Much of the information in discourse, and hence also in news reports, is implicit, and 
supplied by the recipients on the basis of their knowledge of the context and of the 
world… because of social norms, and for reasons of impression management, for 
instance, many negative things about minorities may not be stated explicitly and thus 
are conveyed ‘between the lines’. 511 
In addition, as Entman has suggested, focusing simply on whether terms or phrases are 
negative or positive, and yet without considering the salience of particular elements of the 
text would ‘fail to gauge the relationships of the most salient clusters of messages – the 
frames – to the audience’s schemata’.512 It is necessary to go beyond the study of isolated 
words or surface features of the texts, and study ‘the meanings of sentences or sequences of 
sentences and their role in the text as a whole’.513 
This study will therefore undertake the analysis of texts in the sample not simply from a 
content analytical approach, but also from a discourse analytical approach. Discourse 
analytical approaches systematically describe the various strategies of text and talk, and relate 
these to the social or political context.514 More specifically, a critical discourse analytical 
approach will be employed, following in particular the work of Norman Fairclough and Teun 
van Dijk.515 
Critical discourse analysis is not, as is sometimes suggested, a particular ‘method’ of 
discourse analysis. A wide variety of methodologies may be and are employed by researchers 
working within a critical discourse analysis framework. What distinguishes CDA from other 
discourse analytical approaches is its emphasis upon the fundamental relationships between 
language and power. Moreover, CDA ‘is not merely interested in any kind of power but it 
specifically focuses on abuse of power, in other words, on forms of domination that result in 
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social inequality and injustice’.516 CDA is therefore based on normative assumptions about 
power and its operations, as highlighted in the Introduction to this thesis. 
Characteristics of the chosen publications 
This study focuses upon articles published by the broadsheet daily newspapers The Sydney 
Morning Herald and The Australian. Broadsheets are targeted at a readership which is 
cosmopolitan in outlook, tertiary-educated, clustered in metropolitan centres, white-collar, 
and has an above-average income – in other words, societal elites. The broadsheet press are 
also traditionally assumed to place a high value upon political analysis, in contrast to the 
mass-circulation, ‘sensationalist’ tabloid press, particularly since the larger size of the 
broadsheet format (historically with spreads of A1 size) permitted such papers to provide 
more detailed, in-depth and analytical coverage of issues.517 
The orientation of the broadsheet press towards the reproduction or interrogation of political 
discourses, and the gearing of their production towards elites are the primary basis for the 
decision to conduct this analysis upon broadsheet and not tabloid press. A crucial segment of 
the educated, urban audience which are the targets of the broadsheet press are journalists 
working for other media outlets. Whilst readership in the general public may not be large, the 
broadsheet press remains a leading source of information for journalists, and thus has 
traditionally played a leading role in agenda-setting and the definition of ‘news-worthiness’ 
for the Australian media in general.518 This function of the ‘quality’ press may be in 
contemporary decline as the size of newsrooms and resources for journalism are cut back, but 
for the period covered by this study, The Australian and The SMH still held considerable 
influence in the creation of the national news agenda – particularly in regards to the coverage 
of politics and election reporting.519 
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The major papers printed in the broadsheet format during the period of this study were the 
national newspaper The Australian, and the metropolitan dailies The Sydney Morning Herald 
(henceforth referred to as The SMH) and The Age.520 Despite the nominal metropolitan status 
of The SMH, its extensive coverage of national politics and international news means that it is 
frequently considered to hold the status of a national daily.521 The Australian is owned by 
Rupert Murdoch’s media conglomerate, News Ltd., whilst Fairfax Media publishes the other 
major broadsheets. Most other newspapers in Australia are owned by these proprietors, with 
News Ltd. dominant in metropolitan areas and Fairfax dominant among the regional and rural 
press. The two corporations together currently account for 86% of newspaper sales in 
Australia.522 
The decision to focus this study upon The Australian and The SMH was based upon 
characteristics of circulation outlined below, but also due to their differing proprietors and 
political stances. As noted by Elizabeth Poole in her comparable study of British broadsheets, 
whilst neither of the two newspapers selected can be said to be consistently ‘politically 
partisan’ as such, they routinely endorse one party in electoral contests, and are demarcated in 
terms of ideological and cultural orientation.523 
Since the 1970s, The Australian has been considered right of centre, and The SMH has 
regularly been accused of a pro-Labor bias. These generalisations are complicated by the fact 
that The Australian has editorialised in favour of Labor at some points in Australian political 
history (most notably the 1972 and 2007 federal elections), whilst The SMH has editorialised 
in favour of the Liberal party in numerous elections.524 Nevertheless, the current duopolistic 
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division of the print media in Australia between the Murdoch and Fairfax stables generally 
means that their coverage of political issues is somewhat divergent. 
During the period of this study, The Australian’s Monday-Friday circulation decreased 
slightly from 133,711 (2004) to 133,000 (2007), with Saturday circulation declining from 
300,360 (2004) to 299,500 (2007). The SMH had the largest circulation of the three 
broadsheet papers in Australia, with Monday-Friday circulation dropping from 216,827 
(2004) to 212,700 (2007), and Saturday circulation from 372,750 (2004) to 364,000 (2007).525 
The SMH’s large Saturday circulation is exceeded in Australia only by two of the major 
metropolitan tabloids. The Australian’s Saturday circulation brings its to a par with the 
second highest circulating weekday broadsheet, The Age (which is from the same publishing 
stable as The SMH).526 
Despite concerns that ‘the digital revolution’ would result in the demise of the press media, 
Australian broadsheet newspapers weathered the growth of online news media relatively well 
during the early to mid-2000s. Following decades of steady decline, Australian newspaper 
circulation and readership appeared to stabilise somewhat during the mid-2000s, especially 
when compared against the US or the UK.527 However, within this overall stability, there 
were shifts in patterns of both readership and circulation. According to some measures, the 
broadsheet papers actually demonstrated slight increases in circulation and readership 
between the early and mid 2000s, whilst the circulation and readership of the tabloid 
newspapers dropped more dramatically.528 The broadsheet press developed a particularly 
strong market share of online news readership during this period, with The SMH consistently 
recording the highest readership among the online news sites, and The Australian ranked fifth 
(behind The Age, news.com.au and The SMH Sun).529 
Part of the stability of Australian broadsheets during the early to mid-2000s may therefore be 
attributable to their success in developing online news sites that supplemented hard-copy 
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publications. Significantly, the development of electronic editions of traditional papers gave 
them an opportunity to compete with radio and television in the timely production and 
dissemination of news, addressing one of the major weaknesses of the print media in 
comparison with their electronic counterparts. The significance of ‘geographical reach’ as a 
limiting characteristic of the print media was eroded, at the same time that the main strength 
of the broadsheet press, the ability to provide detailed background and analysis rather than 
simply ‘sound bites’, came to the fore. Online publishing of news stories theoretically enables 
viewers to access more information, simply by clicking hyperlinks to access video footage, 
supporting documentation, interview transcripts, or additional stories on the topic.530 
The claims of stability of the newspaper market must, however, be taken with a grain of salt: 
the newspaper industry, after all, had a vested interest in convincing advertisers that despite 
declines in circulation, they still reached significant audiences.531 The struggle to measure the 
readership of newspapers in opposed to their circulation, in addition to ongoing difficulties in 
quantifying the proportion of readers accessing print versions versus web-only versions of 
papers led to cynical manipulation of circulation figures by newspapers as well as bitter 
disputes during the mid-2000s between industry group The Newspaper Works and pollsters 
Roy Morgan.532 During the past five years, following the clean-up of auditing and the massive 
growth of online news readership, circulation, readership, and revenue for the Australian 
newspaper sector can be seen to have fallen dramatically across the board.533 That said, the 
‘quality’ broadsheet press do appear to have had an edge over the tabloids in weathering the 
growth of online news provision in the mid-to-late 2000s, underscoring the utility of 
focussing upon broadsheet publications for studies of representations of Muslims and Islam 
in Australia during the period of this study. 
Characteristics of the sample 
The material for analysis was selected through Factiva online archive searches on articles 
published in The Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian, during a time period of one 
month prior to each of the 2004 and the 2007 Federal Elections. The exact time frames of the 
study were 12th September – 9th October 2004 and 28th October – 24th November 2007 
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respectively. The search criteria used were the date range of twenty-eight days (four weeks) 
prior to the elections, coupled with the keywords ‘Islam OR Islamist OR Islamism OR 
Muslim OR Muslims’. 
Articles were considered for analysis if they could be determined as being at least partially 
about Islam or Muslims (e.g. Islam as a religion, or a Muslim person, organisation or 
country). To this end, articles were only included if they referred to Islam or Muslims within 
the headline or first two paragraphs, or otherwise the whole of a later paragraph. It was hoped 
that this strategy would therefore exclude passing references to Muslims and Islam, following 
John Richardson’s conventions for sample selection in analysis of representations of Muslims 
in the media.534 
The near synonym ‘Islamic’ was not included in the search. Informal sampling indicated that 
adding this term to the search greatly expanded the number of articles in the data set (for 
example, it resulted in an additional 70 raw stories in the 2007 period for The Australian). 
However, the majority of these additional articles contained only passing references to 
Muslims or Islam, could not be considered to be about Islam or Muslims, and were therefore 
largely excluded from the study given the sample selection criteria outlined above. In 
particular, the word ‘Islamic’ often appeared in an article solely in the context of the name of 
an organisation, such as the ‘al-Ghazzali Centre for Islamic Sciences and Human 
Development’. It was determined that the amount of time required to sift the additional, 
mostly peripheral items could be better spent in analysis. 
It must be noted that the terms ‘Islamist’ and ‘Islamism’ are terms which are generally 
employed in the mainstream media with pejorative connotations. These terms are inextricably 
linked to the notion of ‘Political Islam’, and therefore articles which used these terms would 
be highly likely to be conflating Islam as a faith with the notion of Islam as a political 
system.535 This would mean that such articles would frequently be coded as presenting 
‘closed’ views of Islam, unless they also made a clear distinction between ‘Political Islam’ 
and the practice of Islam as a religious faith, according to the coding categories outlined 
below. In view of these considerations I recorded variations in the utilisation and definition of 
these terms for further analysis. 
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When an article was reproduced in more than one edition of the paper on the same day (e.g. 
in the early or late editions, or the regional vs. country-wide editions), with minor changes 
made to the content or length of the original article, the article with the widest distribution or 
deriving from the latest edition was selected and the other variants discarded. In the event that 
the changes included different patterns of quotation, however, both versions were analysed 
separately. 
Articles from all sections of the paper, including features, local, world, letters and reviews 
were included in the analysis. Each discernible ‘story’ which contained the keywords was 
numbered as a separate unit of analysis. For example, multiple letters on the same day were 
treated as separate ‘stories’, even though Factiva reproduces and counts all letters from the 
same edition as one article. In this sample, there were no discrepancies between the stories 
published in the hardcopy format of the paper versus its online counterpart (i.e. no web-only 
stories). These processes of sample selection and refinement resulted in a sum total of 373 
stories which were subjected to further analysis according to the criteria outlined below. 
Considerations and limitations 
This study has a number of limitations which must be considered from the outset. Firstly, by 
using the explicit terms ‘Muslim(s)’ and ‘Islam’ and near cognates to investigate 
stereotypical representations of Muslims, it is probable that more subtle forms of 
stereotypical reporting about Muslims and Islam are missed. That is, articles which employed 
coded terms for Muslims or Islam, the existence of which are well documented in the 
literature on ‘dog-whistling’ in Australian politics, would not be pinpointed by this study.536  
On the other hand, as Chris Allen has pointed out, the very normalisation of 
Islamophobia/anti-Muslim sentiments means that in the past decade, certain stereotypical 
presentations of Muslims became commonplace, acceptable and even entrenched.537 It is 
therefore posited that only investigating those articles which explicitly refer to Islam or 
Muslims will still be worthwhile in terms of illuminating the dominant types of stereotypes 
employed in referring to Muslims, and shifts in strategies of representation over the period of 
the study. 
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Secondly, as these stories were downloaded from online archives, there is no way to evaluate 
the positioning or prominence of these articles in their respective editions, aside from which 
page the story appeared on, as this data is routinely stored by Factiva. As noted by Lee and 
Maslog in their analysis of Asian reporting of conflicts,538 the creation of coding categories 
from evaluative criteria initially developed as a method of prepublication screening creates 
issues for this type of content analysis.539 
Thirdly, there has been no attempt to analyse images, be it photos or cartoons, which 
accompanied these articles. Visual analysis of accompanying images would be a key area for 
future development of this study. 
Fourthly, the decision to analyse articles regardless of which section of the paper they 
appeared in creates some difficulties for the study. It results in substantial variation between 
many of the physical features of the story. For instance, opinion articles are frequently written 
not in a journalistic style but in a personalised style which does not necessarily conform to 
the norms of mainstream news journalism. Therefore, it was often impossible to collect data 
about patterns of quotation from this style of article, for example, as sources were frequently 
absent from such articles.  
Another example is that the inclusion of Letters to the Editor and other non-‘news’ stories 
(referred to henceforth as ‘soft news’ stories) means that in many stories in the sample 
standard physical characteristics of news stories, such as a clearly defined headline, 
subheader and byline, were missing. For example, the percentage of stories with a subheader 
ranged from as much as 26.8% (The Australian, 2007) to as low as 18% (The Australian, 
2004). The ‘inverted pyramid’ structure common to traditional news stories means that 
classical studies such as Hartmann and Husband devoted special attention to analysis of 
headlines, since the headline would commonly provide a brief summary of the whole article, 
influences the interpretation of the rest of the article and is more likely to be read than the 
whole story. This type of analysis is not well suited to my data sets, considering the lack of 
uniformity in story format.540 
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However, some interesting patterns emerged early on in the process of analysis which meant 
that it seemed pertinent not to exclude these non-standard articles but to analyse them 
alongside traditional ‘hard news’ stories. For example, first impressions upon reading all the 
stories suggested that within the 2004 data sets, there were often reviews, letters and other 
‘soft-news’ stories which seemed to feature surprisingly open views towards Islam, in 
contrast to the predominance of closed views towards Islam in the ‘hard news’ stories. In the 
2007 period, by comparison, whilst it seemed that the dominance of closed views towards 
Islam had waned among the ‘hard news’ stories, it appeared to me that a greater number of 
soft news stories featured extremely or very closed views towards Islam. 
Finally, the time frame selected for this study was four calendar weeks, or twenty-eight days, 
inclusive of the actual day of the respective elections. However, the formal 2004 and 2007 
Election Campaigns were both forty days long and ended on the day prior to the respective 
elections (commencing on 29th August 2004 and the 14th October 2007 respectively).541 It 
must also be noted that the 2004 data collection period commences the day after the third 
anniversary of September 11, and just three days after the bombing of the Australian 
Embassy in Jakarta. My data collection therefore excludes several extremely critical days in 
terms of coverage of issues related to Islam during the 2004 election campaign. I considered 
though that the coverage during the final month before the election and on election day was 
of most significance to the political process: as noted in Chapter 3, late-deciding voters, who 
are particularly influenced by media coverage during the election campaign, have risen 
significantly in Australia over the past two decades, with as high as 20% of voters delaying 
their decision until the actual election day.542 
Data analysis methodology: developing the codebook 
To determine the most productive mode of analysis for the diverse articles in the four data 
sets, I carefully read and then entered into a preliminary codebook the physical features of the 
full 373 articles in the sample, taking note of significant patterns which I observed as 
characteristic of the sample and worthy of detailed investigation. I then conducted a Pilot 
Study on a small selection of these articles prior to beginning more detailed coding and 
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analysis. The Pilot Study was designed to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of my 
proposed coding categories and methodology, and as such included analysis of both content 
and discourse in the selected articles. During the process of coding the articles in the Pilot 
Study I kept detailed notes on the reasoning behind the process of coding each article and 
modified the methodology of my study where required to make it more consistent and 
workable.  
As well as seeking to refine the content analysis categories, I analysed the articles in the Pilot 
Study through a more detailed critical discourse analysis approach following methodologies 
and techniques demonstrated by Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk and Peter Teo.543 I 
posited that detailed analysis of the articles in the Pilot Study might reveal significant themes 
or features of the data set which my planned coding categories failed to account for; for 
example, it was through the process of coding the physical features of the full sample and 
then evaluating and selecting the articles for my Pilot Study that I perceived the importance 
of including both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ news stories in the sample. In this way, and through the 
development of the study’s methodology via systematic processes of evaluation and 
amendment on the basis of the data I had collected, an element of grounded theory was 
introduced into the evolution of the methodology for this project.544 
When selecting articles for the Pilot Study, I wanted to avoid choosing articles that 
represented particular viewpoints, such as the most negative articles from each period. I 
therefore created a relatively neutral selection criterion based on the characteristics and 
subject matter of the article. This is because the purpose of the Pilot Study was more to work 
through any potential issues in the application of my content and discourse analysis approach, 
rather than to necessarily draw any significant conclusions from this very small set of data. I 
selected five articles from each of the four key sets of data, that is, twenty articles in total. 
The five articles per data set were chosen from the five weekdays immediately preceding 
each election, so the time frames of the Pilot Study were 4-8th September 2004 and 19-23th 
November 2007. 
I initially intended to include one article from each weekday of the week preceding each 
Election, but my ability to choose a representative sample of articles was hampered by 
variation in the number and type of articles fitting the search criteria for each different data 
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set. For example, there were no articles matching the search criterion in The SMH on the 20th-
21st November 2007. I therefore included three articles from the 22nd November in the Pilot 
Study. On the preceding day, 19th November 2007, there was just one article matching the 
search criterion in The SMH, a Feature article written by Justice Michael Kirby. I had initially 
intended to analyse only straight ‘news’ articles in the Pilot Study, but these features of the 
data set led me to decide to try and include one Feature article, one article from the World 
section and one from the Local news section for each data set, and then to try and select the 
final two stories by choosing ones which did not overlap significantly with the subject matter 
for the other units of analysis from that specific data set.  
Where possible, I tried to select articles for the Pilot Study which addressed similar subject 
matter in different papers in the same election period. For example, I included one article on 
the EU’s reservations towards accepting Turkey as a member state from each of the two 
papers in the 2004 period, and one article on the Lindsay leafleting scandal from the 2007 
data sets, in order to permit some preliminary comparative comments to be made on the 
representation of the same issue in the different papers. As a result of this process, I was able 
to select the twenty articles which were most appropriate for the Pilot Study. 
Categories of analysis – summary 
Content analysis of the articles in my sample was recorded through the use of a codebook 
which included over thirty variables, analysing the following types of aspects: physical 
characteristics (e.g. newspaper, size, date, etc.); topics and themes; citation and/or quotation 
of actors; the tone of the article; and the presence of certain words and phrases. I anticipated 
that some of these categories would require a second phase of reorganisation or streamlining 
as a result of my experiences during the Pilot Study. 
The five principal categories for analysis of the articles in the Pilot Study were: 
a) Physical features 
b) Islamophobic index 
c) Problem 
d) Language features 
e) Quotation patterns 
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The first three coding criteria enable the identification, quantification and comparison of 
Islamophobic discourses within the four data sets; the final two represent analytical 
techniques which can enable an exploration of how these discourses are evoked, enacted, and 
enunciated within any given article. 
Following the Pilot Study, I determined that the full 373 articles should be consistently coded 
on just the first three ‘core’ categories of analysis (physical features, Islamophobic index, and 
Problem). In addition to this structured analysis of all 373 articles, certain articles or sets of 
articles will be analysed in a more personalised and subjective manner, sometimes including 
analysis according to the language features or quotation patterns of the articles in addition to 
the core categories of analysis. Which articles should be separated out and analysed in more 
detail in this manner will generally be guided by distinctive features of the article or articles 
detected during the content analysis. This could include an article with a particularly high 
Islamophobic index, or an article featuring particularly emotive and/or demonising language. 
It could also include constellations of articles featuring the same primary theme to reveal 
variations in treatment of similar subject matter; a key example here would be the large 
number of articles from the 2007 period relating to the Lindsay leafleting scandal. 
Categories of analysis – coding 
In the following section of my thesis, I will discuss in order the five principal categories for 
analysis of the articles in the Pilot Study. 
a) Physical features 
Before selecting the articles for the Pilot Study, every single article in the sample was given a 
unique alphanumeric code (e.g. A04_01 – indicating the first article from the 2004 data set 
from The Australian), and the details were entered into a codebook and categorised according 
to the following physical characteristics: 
i. Title and Subheader 
ii. Date of Issue and page number 
iii. ‘Hard News’ (World + Local sections)/ ‘Soft News’ (all sections except World & 
Local) 
iv. Section & Subsection (e.g. World/General) 
v. Source (e.g. staff reporter, wire service) 
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vi. Attribution (e.g. named journalist, editorial) 
vii. Subject 
 
The coding of the physical features of articles according to these components of the codebook 
proceeded without any issues. However, some aspects of the physical features were not 
considered worth further detailed analysis. As mentioned above, for example, the title and 
subheader of articles were not analysed in their own right, nor was the location of the article 
(indicated by the page number of the article), as preliminary assessment of the sample did not 
indicate any significant patterns worthy of detailed attention in regard to these features. The 
principal physical features of the articles which were subject to further physical analysis were 
the final five characteristics listed above. The list of articles in the Pilot Study, and their 
coding results, can be seen in Appendix B. 
b) Islamophobic index 
The definition of Islamophobia set forth by the Runnymede Trust in 1997,545 as discussed in 
Chapter 2, has become widely accepted and utilised not only in the UK but internationally in 
a variety of contexts.546 Despite criticisms and difficulties in operationalising this definition 
of Islamophobia, the Runnymede Trust’s formulation of Islamophobia encompasses a variety 
of typical essentialist, new-racism and Orientalist aspects of anti-Muslim sentiment and is 
acknowledged as providing a useful baseline for assessing the presence of ‘Islamophobic’ 
aspects of media discourse.547 Abdalla et al. note that ‘any genuine attempt by the media or 
journalists to challenge and eliminate prejudice in reporting against Islam and Muslims would 
require an appreciation of these identifiers [of Islamophobia]’.548 
The eight indicators of ‘closed’ views of Islam and eight indicators of ‘open’ views of Islam 
shown in Figure, which are derived from the Runnymede Trust’s characterisation of 
Islamophobia, are therefore used as the basis for coding categories for Islamophobic frames.  
                                                
545 Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia. 
546 See for example, Aslan, Islamophobia in Australia; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia, Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia (Vienna:  European 
Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia); Runnymede Trust, Runnymede Trust Activities Report 
2005-2006 (London:  Runnymede Trust, 2007); Vakil, "When Is It Islamophobia Time?," pp. 36-38. 
547 Allen, "Islamophobia," pp. 52-54. 
548 Mohamad Abdalla, Jacqui Ewart, and Halim Rane, "A Way Forward?," in Islam and the Australian News 
Media, eds. Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
2010), p. 235. 
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Frame Descriptor/ 
Dimension 
Closed views of Islam  Open views of Islam 
1. Monolithic / 
diverse 
Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, 
static and unresponsive to new 
realities. 
 
Islam seen as diverse and progressive, 
with internal differences, debates and 
development. 
2. Separate / 
interacting 
Islam seen as separate and other – (a) 
not having any aims or values in 
common with other cultures (b) not 
affected by them (c) not influencing 
them. 
Islam seen as interdependent with 
other faiths and cultures – (a) having 
certain shared values and aims (b) 
affected by them (c) enriching them. 
3. Inferior / different Islam seen as inferior to the West – 
barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist. 
Islam seen as distinctively different, 
but not deficient, and as equally 
worthy of respect. 
4. Enemy / partner Islam seen as violent, aggressive, 
threatening, supportive of terrorism, 
engaged in ‘a clash of civilisations’. 
Islam seen as an actual or potential 
partner in joint cooperative enterprises 
and in the solution of shared problems. 
5. Manipulative / 
sincere 
Islam seen as a political ideology, used 
for political or military advantage. 
Islam seen as a genuine religious faith, 
practised sincerely by its adherents. 
6. Criticism of West 
rejected / considered 
Criticisms made by Islam and Muslims 
of ‘the West’ rejected out of hand. 
Criticisms of ‘the West’ and other 
cultures are considered and debated. 
7. Discrimination 
defended / criticised 
Hostility towards Islam used to justify 
discriminatory practices towards 
Muslims and exclusion of Muslims 
from mainstream society. 
Debates and disagreements with Islam 
do not diminish efforts to combat 
discrimination and exclusion. 
8. Islamophobia seen 
as natural / 
problematic 
Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as 
natural and ‘normal’. 
Critical views of Islam are themselves 
subjected to critique, lest they be 
inaccurate and unfair. 
Figure 1: Content analysis categories - Islamophobic Frames  
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Following the methodology outlined by Lee and Maslog in their intensive comparison of 
peace or war journalism frames in Asian reporting of conflicts,549 these eight indicators will 
be used to elicit from the article which frame – open or closed views of Islam – dominated 
the narrative in each article. I intended to determine which frame was employed in any given 
story through scoring stories as Open, Closed, or Neutral on each of the eight frame 
descriptor dimensions. 
 
During the process of conducting my Pilot Study, it became clear that simply describing each 
article as ‘open’ or closed for each dimension did not sufficiently capture the nuances within 
each unit of analysis. I considered that reverse scoring the results for ‘closed’ framing of 
Islam would facilitate more incisive differentiation between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ frames. Once 
I began experimenting with reverse scoring, I realised that I had the makings of a bipolar 
scale, running from one extreme through to the opposite extreme. These features of the 
coding lent themselves towards creation of a Likert-type scale through which I could 
assemble a quantitative measure to evaluate the ‘openness’ or ‘closedness’ of any particular 
story. Since the score on each of the eight frame descriptor dimensions was three-point (i.e., 
could be positive, negative or neutral), then it was possible that an article could be scored as 
neutral on every dimension/item. Adding a neutral point resulted in the following nine-point 
rating scale: 
Figure 2: Open/Closed views of Islam - rating scale 
 
For each article in my sample, therefore, I allocated a score of -1 (closed), 0 (neutral) or +1 
(open) for each of the eight frame descriptor dimensions. I then added up the overall scores 
for the eight dimensions, and based on this ‘summed score’, coded the article according to the 
rating scale which I devised. If an article’s sum total score was 3, it was coded as being 
characterised by ‘Open’ views towards Islam. This rating scale therefore aggregated the 
                                                
549 Lee and Maslog, "War or Peace Journalism?," p. 316. 
Score -7-8 -5-6 -3-4 -1-2 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 
Descriptor Extremely 
closed 
Very 
closed 
Closed Somewhat 
closed 
Neither 
closed 
nor 
open 
Somewhat 
open 
Open Very 
open 
Extremely 
open 
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scores of open or closed views on eight different dimensions, in effect creating an 
‘Islamophobia Index’, which therefore enabled comparison of large numbers of articles. 
c) Problem 
 
Studies of racism in the media have frequently found that ethnic or racial minorities appear in 
a relatively small proportion of press articles, and when they are present, they are largely 
represented in negative ways.550  Following the classic study of racism in the media by 
Hartmann and Husband,551 many studies analysing stereotypes or negative representatives of 
ethnic minorities have focused on investigating the issue of minority or other outgroups being 
frequently represented as a ‘problem’ in the news media.552 This method of analysing 
representations of minorities dovetails with Galtung’s observations that ‘news’ is traditionally 
focussed upon problems rather than solutions.553 
Articles were therefore coded according to whether they represent Muslims or Islam as a 
‘problem’ (Positive, Negative or Neutral). Following the Pilot Study, I added a category of 
coding to this component of the study: I listed a category for the target identified by each 
article as a ‘problem’ (there were very few articles which did not identify a problem at all). 
d) Language features 
Following Seow Ting Lee, three related criteria were focussed on evaluating the features of 
the language, in particular, determining whether language was a) victimising; b) demonising 
and c) emotive. The three indicators of ‘negative’ language features, and three indicators of 
‘positive’ language features indicated in Figure 3 (opposite) are therefore used as the basis for 
the features of language coding categories.554  
Articles will be coded according to whether they use Victimising, Demonising or Emotive 
language  (Positive, Negative or Neutral). Since these are three of the thirteen indicators of a 
peace journalism approach according to the criteria developed by Lee and Maslog, the results 
for this section of coding will lend themselves to interpretation through the lens of peace 
                                                
550 For an overview, see Teo, "Racism in the News."; van Dijk, Discourse and Power; Wilson and Gutiérrez, 
Race, Multiculturalism and the Media. 
551 Hartmann and Husband, Racism and the Mass Media. 
552 See in particular, Lynch, Debates in Peace Journalism, Ch. 8. 
553 Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News," in Essays in Peace Research, ed. 
Johan Galtung (Copenhagen: Eljers, 1965). 
554 Seow Ting Lee, "Peace Journalism," in Handbook of Ethics in Mass Media, eds. Lee Wilkins and Clifford G. 
Christians (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 271. 
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journalism theory. In keeping with CDA, this is a value explicit definition where peace is 
considered not merely the absence of violent conflict, or negative peace, but also the presence 
of social justice, that is, positive peace. 
 
Negative language features Positive language features 
Uses victimising language (e.g. destitute, 
devastated, defenceless, pathetic, tragic, 
demoralised) which only tells what has 
been done to people. 
Avoids victimising language, reports 
what has been done and could be done by 
people, and how they are coping. 
Uses demonising language (e.g. vicious, 
cruel, brutal, barbaric, inhuman, tyrant, 
savage, ruthless, terrorist, extremist, 
fanatic, fundamentalist). 
Avoids demonising language and uses 
more neutral and precise descriptions, 
titles or names. 
Uses emotive words (e.g. genocide, 
assassination, massacre and systematic). 
Objective and moderate (avoids emotive 
words, reserves the strongest language 
only for the gravest situation, and does 
not exaggerate). 
   Figure 3: Content analysis categories - language features  
e) Quotation Patterns 
The significance of quotation patterns in ‘gate-keeping’ have been outlined in Chapter 3. 
Therefore, for a selection of articles within the sample, sources quoted will be coded on the 
following three criteria: 
i) direct or indirect;  
ii) Muslim or non-Muslim;  
iii) Bureaucratic or non-Bureaucratic.  
 
The development of these coding criteria derives largely from Richardson’s large-scale 
analysis of representations of Muslims in British broadsheet newspapers in the late 
nineties.555 
                                                
555 Richardson, "Who Gets to Speak?," pp. 104-10. 
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It is hoped that the data drawn from this analysis of quotation patterns will enable correlative 
studies both within this dimension (e.g. the extent to which Muslim sources are quoted 
directly or indirectly), as well as across other aspects of the content and discourse analysis 
(e.g. the extent to which Muslim sources are quoted directly in articles which feature either 
open or closed views of Islam). 
In articles which are coded for quotation patterns, all sources will also be recorded by the 
descriptor used in the article of that source (e.g. ‘a male youth’ or ‘Detective Inspector 
Johnson’) for possible detailed analysis of particular articles in terms of actor roles and 
grammatical features such as over-lexicalisation in reference to Muslim sources. 
This chapter has set out the methodological rationale and approach which guides my analysis 
of the individual units of data in this research project – that is, the social artefact of news 
stories from the broadsheet newspapers The Australian and The SMH in the month prior to 
the 2004 and 2007 Federal Elections. In the next chapter, I will describe how I applied, to the 
smaller sample in the Pilot Study, the evaluative criteria which I devised to produce a 
comparative analysis of the extent of Islamophobia in the two periods. The capacity of this 
approach to reveal ideational differences, in response to a change of periods and the passage 
of time, will be evaluated and considered, before moving on to apply it to the rest of the 
articles from my sample.  
Chapter 9 – Pilot Study 
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Chapter 9 – Pilot Study 
 
In this chapter, I report upon the results of my ‘Pilot Study’ and discuss a range of features of 
the twenty articles selected for the Pilot Study. The Pilot Study represented not only a chance 
to evaluate and improve the coding criterion and identify any issues within my methodology, 
but also through the discussion in this chapter, I am able to illustrate in detail the process by 
which I evaluated and coded each article. I begin with an overview of the overall scores for 
articles on the ‘Islamophobic Index’ which I had developed based upon the Runnymede 
Trust’s characterisation of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views towards Islam. I then examine in detail 
the coding process and key results for the eight individual dimensions of the Index, discuss 
the extent to which Islam was represented as a ‘problem’ in articles within the Pilot Study, 
and finally, consider the quotation patterns and features of language in these twenty articles. 
The full results of coding for the Pilot Study can be seen in Appendix B. 
Islamophobic Index – overview 
Although the Pilot Study focused on a very small sample of the larger data sets, patterns 
nevertheless emerged from my analysis. As will be discussed in Chapter 10, the basic 
findings of the Pilot Study were replicated in the results of the full study, and the results of 
the Pilot Study were therefore validated as indicators of the potential for the methodology 
outlined in the previous chapter to accurately identify divergences between different groups 
of texts. Overall, half of the articles in the Pilot Study (ten articles) had negative total scores 
when their scores on each of the eight dimensions of the Islamophobic Index were summed, 
indicating a preponderance of ‘Closed’ views of Islam. Two articles were neutral, or had a 
summed score of 0, whilst eight articles received positive total summed scores, indicating a 
preponderance of ‘Open’ views of Islam. ‘Closed’ articles, which had negative summed 
scores, ranged from -1 (or ‘Somewhat Closed’) to -8 (‘Extremely Closed’); ‘Open’ articles, 
which had positive summed scores, ranged from +1 (‘Somewhat Open’) to +7 (‘Extremely 
Open’). Among the articles selected, one article each from The SMH and from The Australian 
were ranked with the lowest possible score of -8; notably, these were both ‘soft news’ 
opinion pieces and both appeared in 2004. 
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Notable differences between the two election periods and between the two newspapers were 
visible even with this small sample. In 2004, all five articles from The Australian and two 
articles from The SMH were scored negatively; in 2007, this dropped to three articles scored 
negatively from The Australian and zero articles from The SMH. In 2004, articles in The 
Australian ranged from -8 to -3; in 2007, the range had shifted upwards from -5 to +7. In The 
SMH, in 2004 articles ranged from -8 to +5; in 2007, the range had contracted slightly but 
still shifted upwards significantly, with the summed score of articles ranging between 0 and 
+3. 
Within the same time period, treatment of the same issue in the different newspapers also 
revealed divergences. During the 2004 period, for example, the Pilot Study included one 
article from The Australian and one from The SMH on Turkey’s European Union bid. ‘EU 
puts Turkey on 10-year timeline’ (A04_12) was rated as ‘very closed’ with a score of -5, 
whilst ‘Europe cautious in talking Turkey’ (SMH04_10) was rated as ‘very open’, with a 
score of +5. This is a quite substantial difference between two articles on the same subject 
which were published just one day apart. How could the two articles be scored so differently? 
In order to address this question, I describe in some detail below the reason behind the 
differential scores in the two articles. This enables the illustration of the coding method and 
approach of my study as well explaining some of the distinctive features of ‘open’ versus 
‘closed’ approaches to the same news ‘story’. 
‘EU puts Turkey on 10-year timeline’, written by The Australian’s Middle East 
correspondent Nicholas Rothwell, is on the surface a fairly balanced, neutrally worded 
article. Rothwell faithfully records a range of objections to Turkey’s EU membership without 
using heated, inflammatory language; he also notes dispassionately that ‘there are some 
strong pro-Turkey EU members’, namely the UK. But at no point does Rothwell question the 
Islamophobic and xenophobic attitudes which underpinned much of the antagonism to 
Turkey’s membership. Rothwell justly mentions Turkey’s poor human rights record and 
continued abuses in the policing system as obstacles to EU membership. However when he 
describes ‘widespread concern’ over ‘the growing Islamic minorities [in Europe] and the 
threat of terrorism’, as well as the potential for ‘a vast flow of migrant workers into western 
Europe’, Rothwell does not provide any critical analysis of whether such concerns are well-
founded. By not critiquing objections to Turkey’s membership in the EU on the grounds of 
anti-Muslim fears, Rothwell subtly gives the impression that such concerns are legitimate. 
Rothwell also records the unprecedented provision of permitting the EU to close its borders 
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to Turkey at any time, if Turkey’s bid was successful, without critically reflecting upon the 
xenophobia and double standards underlying such a proposal. Rothwell himself refers to 
Turkey as ‘the Muslim nation’, reinforcing the idea that Islam is monolithic and unchanging, 
and potentially primitive and aggressive. His listing of objections to the membership of 
Turkey also reinforces this idea, by implying that Muslim terrorists, Muslim minorities in 
Europe, and Muslim nations are all one within this monolithic entity. Rothwell signally fails 
to critique the role of Islamophobia in the furore; by tacitly accepting the assumption that 
there is some kind of unbridgeable gap between ‘the West’ and Turkey, opposition to 
Turkey’s EU membership on the basis of its ‘Muslimness’ is legitimised and normalised. 
By contrast, ‘Europe cautious in talking Turkey’, penned by The SMH’s London 
correspondent Peter Fray, openly acknowledges and challenges some of the attitudes 
underlying opposition to the EU’s bid. Fray writes that ‘fears are widespread across Europe 
and run the gamut from blatant Islamophobia to legitimate issues about human rights’. Fray 
discusses objections to Turkey’s membership under four headings: financial, human rights, 
employment, and religious. Fray goes through these objections in turn and weighs up to what 
extent the concerns are valid, concluding that the financial and human rights objections are 
significant and justified and that these concerns will be able to be addressed during the ten-
year time-frame set for managing Turkey’s bid. Fray noted in regards to ‘employment’, 
however, that the EU’s suggested provision for blocking migration from Turkey raised 
concerns that Turkey was only being offered ‘second-class membership’, and moreover, that 
the proposal appeared to ‘breach the EU’s own principle of free movement of labour’. On the 
topic of religion, Fray noted ‘growing fears that Europe, especially France, is being overrun 
by what many consider an alien culture’. Nevertheless, Fray emphasised, ‘the prospect of 
Turkey joining the EU one day remains a potentially powerful symbol. The country’s 
geographical location, history and culture make it the perfect bridge between East and West’. 
This vision of the symbolic value of admitting Turkey to the EU, if the Turkish government 
could address the legitimate objections to its admission, is a long way from Rothwell’s 
mechanical and unchallenging recitation of both legitimate and more problematic objections 
to Turkey’s membership bid. 
There are not any other sets of articles covering the exact same topic from 2004, although 
there is one article from The Australian and one from The SMH on the same general topic – 
terrorist violence in south Asia. ‘39 Sunnis killed in “revenge” blasts’ (A04_11) is a story 
based on wire feeds from Pakistan which covers a bomb blast in the city of Multan which 
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killed 29 people; in ‘North Indian Violence’ (SMH04_18), Sydney-based journalist Ben 
Cubby summarises international media coverage of bomb blasts in northern India which 
killed more than 50 people. Both these articles received the exact same score (-5), and both 
had the exact same pattern of scoring on the eight dimensions of the study: -1, indicating 
‘closed’ views of Islam, for the first five dimensions, and 0 for the final three, indicating 
‘neutral’ views of Islam on these dimensions. The ‘sameness’ of these two articles suggests 
considerable constraints for journalists in the reporting of ‘terrorist attacks’, which 
encourages them to fall back onto formulaic depictions of ‘tit-for-tat’ violence, devoid of 
context, which activate the first five dimensions of Islamophobia, according to the Index used 
in this study, and singularly fail to critique or problematise such constructions (the final three 
dimensions of the Index).  
This can be compared to articles on the same broad topic in 2007, where the closest 
comparisons are ‘PM frees political prisoners as Musharraf talks to Saudis’ from The 
Australian, which includes reference to a bomb blast in Pakistan (A07_32), and ‘Honour for 
journalist hostage’, which described in detail the kidnapping of an Australian-trained 
journalist by a militant group in Iraq (SMH07_20). The article from The Australian scored -4 
(indicating a Closed view of Islam), whilst the article from The SMH scored 0 (neither Open 
nor Closed); A07_32 in many respects continued the patterns of reporting on violent conflict 
which were found in the two articles from 2004 discussed above. The particular details of this 
article will not be discussed in detail in this chapter, however, as I will return to this article in 
depth in Chapter 11.  
‘Honour for journalist hostage’ will be discussed here in some detail though. This an 
interesting article because although many of the same stereotypes and problematic language 
regarding ‘terrorists’ persist in this article (particularly the repetition of phrases such as 
‘hardline Islamic groups’ and ‘Islamic extremists’), the article takes a ‘human interest’ angle 
on the kidnapping of a journalist which had occurred three years previously whilst she was 
covering the war in Iraq. The article focuses on the fact that the journalist herself was a 
Muslim (of Indonesian origin), who became a campaigner for the safety of journalists 
covering the war in Iraq as a result of her experiences. Her work there led to her receiving a 
prestigious journalism award in Sydney; hence why the story was being covered in The SMH 
in 2007. The sympathetic portrayal of the journalist and emphasis upon her faith enabled the 
article to draw away from the representations of Muslims as monolithic and universally 
violent and barbaric which were common to many other articles covering ‘terrorist attacks’. 
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In terms of the coding for this article, positive scores on Dimensions 1 and 2 balanced out the 
negative scores on Dimensions 4 and 5, resulting in the final score of 0 for this article. Within 
the Pilot Study articles, there was therefore a clear decrease between 2004 and 2007 in the 
prevalence of closed views of Islam in the reporting of ‘terrorist attacks’ – which were 
demonstrably one of the most central issues to representations of Islam in this period – 
though this decrease was more marked in The SMH than in The Australian. 
During the 2007 period the Pilot Study included two sets of paired articles, that is, where I 
analysed articles reporting on the same event from both papers. The first of these events was 
the ‘Annapolis’ summit on Israel-Palestine brokered by President Bush; both newspapers 
reported on rumours that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia would pull out of talks, with The 
Australian’s article which I included in the Pilot Study scoring -1 overall (A07_37), and The 
SMH’s article on the topic scoring 0 (SMH07_19). The second of these ‘paired events’ was 
the Lindsay leafleting scandal: in this case, within my Pilot Study there was one article on the 
topic from The Australian, which scored +7 (A07_22), and two from The SMH, which scored 
+3 and +1 respectively (SMH07_17, SMH07_18). During 2007, the reporting on paired 
issues was much closer between the two newspapers than reporting on paired issues in 2004, 
and articles were much more likely to feature open views in 2007 than in 2004. In contrast to 
the other trends observed for articles in the Pilot Study, it was an article from The Australian 
which actually demonstrated the most ‘open’ views of Islam out of the whole collection of 
articles in the Pilot Study. Overall, however, the trend was for articles in The SMH to feature 
more open views than comparable articles in The Australian. 
Islamophobic Index – results for individual dimensions 
When I compared the number of articles which were coded as either ‘closed’, ‘neutral’ or 
‘open’ on each of the individual dimensions of the Index, some interesting patterns also 
emerged, as represented in Figure 4. The dominant feature of the distribution of open and 
closed articles by dimension was that there were distinctive, similar patterns for scoring of 
the first five dimensions (where ‘closed’ views outweighed neutral and ‘open’ views) as 
opposed to the final three (where neutral views outweighed either ‘open’ or ‘closed’ views). 
Rather than going through each dimension in turn, I will consider in detail the patterns of 
scoring for Dimensions 5 and 3, which were characterised by the highest and second highest 
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incidence of ‘closed’ views and then briefly consider the scoring for Dimension 4, before 
moving on to discuss the scoring for Dimensions 6-8 of the index. 
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Figure 4: Pilot Study - Islamophobic Index results for Individual Dimensions (number of total articles 
in Pilot Study which were coded as closed, neutral or open on the eight individual dimensions) 
 
As mentioned above, the highest number of articles coded as ‘closed’ for any individual 
dimension was Dimension 5. Dimension 5 concerns the perception of Islam as ‘manipulative’ 
rather than ‘sincere’, that is, ‘as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage’, 
rather than ‘a genuine religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents’. On dimension 5, 
there were no ‘positive’ scores recorded within this sample; articles were split evenly 
between negative and neutral, indicating strong support for closed views of Islam on this 
dimension. Negative scores on this dimension were particularly common in articles about 
terrorist attacks, which were liberally peppered with phrases such as ‘radical Sunni Muslim 
groups’ combating ‘rival Shi’ite minority’ (A04_11), ‘Islamic fundamentalist groups’ 
(SMH04_18) or ‘Islamic extremists’ and ‘hardline Islamic groups’ (SMH07_20), and did not 
include points which would indicate that Islam was a genuine religious faith. ‘39 Sunnis 
killed in ‘revenge’ blasts’ (A04_11), for example, described an attack upon a prayer meeting 
in Multan, Pakistan, which could potentially have provided an opportunity for consideration 
of Islam as a genuine religious faith. Instead, the article actively constructed even this prayer 
meeting as primarily political in nature: ‘two bombs’, the correspondent wrote, ‘ripped 
through a gathering of Sunni Muslim radicals’ and ‘hit the most radical of Pakistan’s hardline 
Sunni militant organisations’.  Discussions of peace talks and regional instability similarly 
made frequent references to political/military confrontations between different Muslim states 
or groups, such as referring to ‘Sunni Muslim Arab States’ being against ‘Shiite Muslim Iran’ 
(SMH07_19). Such constructions reinforced the idea of Islam as a ‘political ideology, used 
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for political or military gain’ and eclipsed any consideration of Islam as a genuine religious 
faith. 
Constructions of Islam as a political ideology rather than a genuine religious faith appear to 
have been the most difficult ‘closed’ view of Islam for journalists and commentators to 
contest or to deconstruct, even if they may have tried to. One of the most promising articles 
in terms of potential for representing Islam as a genuine religious faith was an advertorial 
article appearing in The Australian in 2007, as part of a promotional campaign for the annual 
Multicultural Marketing Awards (A07_34). The winner of the grand prize at the Awards 
ceremony was the National Interfaith Festival on Queensland’s Sunshine Coast. The festival 
was held, the organisers said, ‘to combat what they called the rising level of tension and fear 
within Australia, arising from parts of the major religions’, and included a variety of activities 
‘aiming to counter negative messages and polarisation emerging along faith lines in our 
society’. Yet even in this article, with such honourable aims clearly articulated, the author 
seems to struggle with the idea that Islam can be a genuine religious faith. Listing the 
activities during the weekend, which include information and seminars on a variety of faiths. 
The faiths represented at the festival are then listed, and at the end of the list appears 
‘Aboriginal spirituality’ and ‘the nature of Islamic prayers’. These two items on the list alone 
are marked with quotation marks. It seems curious that only these two forms of religious 
practice needed to be marked in this way. It suggests that they can be differentiated from 
other forms of religious worship or practice; that they are somehow different from the 
practice of Sikhism, Seventh Day Adventism or Progressive Judaism, which were some of 
the other faiths represented at the festival and included in the list. It is almost as if the author 
is calling the authenticity of Aboriginal spirituality and Islamic prayers into question; they 
cannot be taken as givens, as genuine expressions of religious faith, but must be marked as 
quotes from a secondary source. 
Similarly to the patterns seen for Dimension 5, only two articles could be seen to exhibit 
‘open’ views on Dimension 3, and the other eighteen articles were evenly split between 
‘closed’ and ‘neutral’ views of Islam on this dimension. Open views towards Islam on this 
dimension were marked by representations of Islam as ‘distinctively different, but not 
deficient, and as equally worthy of respect’, in contrast to closed views on this dimension, 
which represented Islam as ‘inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist’. 
Notably, for most articles the reason that they were coded negatively on this scale was not so 
much because of the language of the author of the article, but because of the content of key 
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quotes within the article, which were not challenged but were given prominent positioning. In 
‘Northern Indian Violence’ (SMH04_18), for example, which described a series of bombing 
attacks in North India, The communities affected by the blasts are emphasised as being 
Christian and the negative effects upon their community and their solidarity in the aftermath 
of the attack are described, humanising them and building empathy for their plight: ‘We are 
numbed by the explosions and are yet to come to terms. So the best way to heal the wounds is 
to pray for the departed souls and wellbeing of those wounded’. The perpetrators, in contrast, 
are labelled as ‘barbaric’ by a quoted [Christian] community leader and are speculated by 
Cubby to have been ‘Islamic fundamentalist groups’. The juxtaposition of the humanity of 
the Christian community and the ‘barbarity’ of the (speculated) Muslim attackers positions 
the latter as inferior. Other comments within the article indicate a context to the attacks which 
is not really explored in this article: the attacks may have been in response to violent 
repression and expulsion of Muslims from the region. Furthermore, other articles within the 
sample indicated that no organisation had claimed responsibility, but that it could have been 
perpetrated by a non-Muslim militant group active in northern India – see for example 
A04_05). 
A more subtle example of the positioning of the Christian ‘West’ as superior to Islam is 
found in an opinion piece by columnist Paul Sheehan, ‘Spreading the word of intolerance: 
Labor’s zealots have a scheme which will put religion in the dock’ (SMH04_19). Sheehan is 
one of Australia’s most prominent (and prolific) mainstream conservative voices. In this 
article, Sheehan quotes then Deputy Prime Minister Peter Costello at length, on the topic of 
the intrinsic centrality of the introduction of Christianity to Australia as the ‘critical and 
decisive event that shaped our country’. Had Australia been Islamised via Indonesia, Costello 
argued, ‘our country today would be vastly different. Our laws, our institutions, our economy 
would all be vastly different’. By valorising Australia’s culture and institutions, and 
contrasting its ‘Judeo-Christian-Western’ heritage against that of Islam, Costello (and by 
extension, Sheehan), concretely positions Islam as inferior. 
A more difficult case is seen in ‘White House aghast at Saudi rape victim’s sentence for 
“using media”’ (A07_29), which described a legal case in Saudi Arabia in which a woman 
who was raped was sentenced to 90 lashes for being in a car with an unrelated male; the 
sentence was subsequently stiffened to 200 lashes and six months in jail when the woman 
appealed to the media on the case. The critical views of the case by US and Canadian 
government officials were extensively quoted in the article, including depictions of the 
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sentence as ‘barbaric’. The treatment of this woman should by rights be criticised; yet the 
uncomfortable selection of quotes by the author implicitly supported an essentialist 
characterisation of Islam and Muslims as barbaric, sexist and inferior to the ‘West’. No 
Muslim source which was critical of the sentence was quoted; the particular quotation 
patterns in this article are worthy of in depth discussion though and will be addressed later in 
this chapter. 
A different approach to criticising Islamic legal systems can be seen in an opinion piece by 
Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Selective tolerance is not tolerance at all’ (SMH07_21). Kirby 
discusses a legal case in Malaysia where a woman who was born a Muslim converted to 
Christianity as an adult and wished to marry a Christian man. However, under Malaysian law 
she would be unable to do so unless she could have her new status as a Christian also 
recognised under Malaysian law, which required having her identification card amended to 
reflect her change of religion. After successive appeals, the case was finally heard by 
Malaysia’s highest judicial body, the Federal Court. Her appeal failed when two of the three 
judges found against her; the two majority judges were Muslims and the minority judge was a 
non-Muslim. Kirby’s response allows for the possibility of reform within Islam, as in 
Christianity; ‘in earlier times, Christianity had a very similar approach to renouncing 
religion… we have overcome this sectarian divide’. Kirby then goes on to describe how he 
was impressed by the criticism of the case by a member of the Malaysian Parliament, Dr Thio 
Li-Ann. Kirby records his subsequent ‘disappointment’ at finding that Dr Li-Ann had 
campaigned to prevent the repeal of anti-homosexuality laws on the basis of her Christian 
convictions, claiming that ‘you cannot make a human wrong a human right’. Kirby firmly 
denounced Dr Li-Ann’s actions: ‘It is not good enough for Christians or people of the 
Christian tradition, to be selective about tolerance and acceptance. We cannot selectively 
denounce Islam for its views on apostasy but then do equally nasty and cruel things to each 
other by invoking imperfect understandings of our own religious tradition’. Kirby’s nuanced 
critique which calls for self-introspection on the part of would-be critics of other cultures and 
religions marks a departure from the type of unreflexive criticism of A07_29. 
The most notable article in terms of featuring open views of Islam was an article from The 
Australian on the 2007 Lindsay election leafleting scandal, ‘Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final 
address’ (A07_22). This article was the highest scored article from this sample; the only 
dimension on which it was not coded with a positive score was Dimension 5. I scored it with 
a neutral ‘zero’ on this dimension because whilst not directly espousing the view that Islam 
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was reducible to a political ideology, it did not actively challenge this notion. This was a 
particularly interesting article; further discussion of this article will be conducted below, in 
the section on quotation patterns in the Pilot Study articles, as well as in the next chapter, in 
the course of a broader comparison of the whole cohort of articles discussing the Lindsay 
leafleting scandal, but some preliminary notes are called for at this point.  
In many points this article is a particularly clear example of the core journalistic norms at 
work. It strenuously avoids ‘taking sides’ and adheres to the principles of ‘objectivity’, 
carefully balancing quotes and counter-quotes from representatives of the Liberal Party and 
of the Labor party. It dispassionately recounts the ‘facts’ of the case; including the attempts 
of Liberal member for Lindsay, Jackie Kelly, to cast the scandal as a ‘joke’ or a ‘Chaser-style 
prank’, and Prime Minister John Howard’s frustration with the repeated questions concerning 
this issue and his adamant denial that the scandal reflected racism within the Liberal Party. 
However, the article also prominently features Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd’s response, in 
which he rejected the denial of racism which had characterised Howard’s era and ‘challenged 
Mr Howard to take a strong stance against the racist campaigning’. The space given to views 
which contradict the Howard Government’s denial of racism and the seriousness of inciting 
anti-Muslim prejudice is a notable departure from other articles on this same topic within this 
sample. 
‘Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final address’ further diverges from other articles in this sample 
concerning anti-Muslim prejudice by going on to report the views of two Muslim community 
leaders and clearly stating that the scandal ‘threatens to further divide the Islamic community 
from mainstream Australia’, thereby lending legitimacy to the idea that there was a problem 
with racism/attitudes towards Muslims in Australian and that they had been alienated from 
the ‘mainstream’ through the actions of people like the Liberal Party members who 
distributed the fake leaflets. Ameer Ali, ‘the former chairman of Mr Howard’s Muslim 
reference group’, described the flyers as ‘vicious… and disrupting our communal harmony’. 
Aziza Abdel-Halim, ‘the nation’s most prominent female leader’, was quoted as saying that 
‘the smear campaign exploited the Muslim community and showed disrespect to its beliefs in 
the interest of achieving a political goal’. These two quotes, in particular the second quote, 
were the main reason why this article received the status of ‘Extremely Open’. As very few 
other articles in this sample were able to do, in an oblique manner made necessary by 
journalistic norms, the quotes in the latter part of this article served to challenge the Prime 
Minister’s assertion that the scandal did not reflect racism in Australian politics, and to 
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interrogate the normalisation of Islamophobia. The article’s serious consideration of Muslim 
criticisms of Australian politicians and the political process in this country was highly 
unusual in articles within the sample. 
The coding results for one further dimension are worth discussing in detail: Dimension 4, in 
which ‘closed’ views of Islam were characterised by a representation of Islam and Muslims 
as ‘the enemy’, and Islam was portrayed as ‘violent, aggressive threatening, supportive of 
terrorism’, engaged in ‘a clash of civilisations’. Although the patterns of distribution for open 
and closed views for Dimension 4 were not particularly marked, closed views of Islam on this 
dimension were particularly concerning in terms of the vitriol of their language. In ‘Howard 
seen as safe bet’, an opinion piece in The Australian in 2004 (A04_19), former Liberal Party 
federal minister Neil Brown opined that we were at ‘a point in the cycle of history where our 
civilisation is at risk’. Clearly invoking the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ frame with this language, 
Brown asked ‘how will we stop the Muslim fanatics who hate our way of life and want to kill 
us’? Lambasting what he referred to as the ‘bedtime story’ of addressing the root causes of 
terrorism through peaceful negotiation and regional strategies, Brown argued forcefully that 
voters should look favourably upon Howard’s government because they ‘would take them 
[‘terrorists’] out in a pre-emptive strike as soon as look at them’.  
In The SMH in the same year, Paul Sheehan’s opinion piece attacked the introduction of 
religious discrimination laws in Victoria (SMH04_19). The first case brought under the new 
laws involved accusations of religious vilification of Muslims by a evangelical Christian 
organisation, Catch the Fire Ministries. Sheehan avoids using the inflammatory language 
which Brown employs, but through careful and sympathetic framing, manages to let Pastor 
Danny Nalliah, a representative of Catch the Fire Ministries, articulate much the same point: 
‘I have lived in Saudi Arabia and learned the real nature of Islam’, Nalliah is quoted as 
saying, ‘it is to dominate other religions and other cultures. The Koran speaks of world 
domination… if peaceful methods fail, the Koran says you can use violence’. Alarmist claims 
of this kind about Islam and Muslims are particularly employed in order to justify and 
normalise attacks and upon and discrimination towards Muslims. This can be seen, for 
example, in Neil Brown’s legitimisation of pre-emptive strikes, whilst Sheehan’s aim in 
airing Nalliah’s views was to excuse and justify the religious vilification employed by Catch 
the Fire Ministries and to discredit the introduction of religious vilification laws in Australia; 
a ‘very bad law’, as Sheehan labels it. The dismissal of the value of religious vilification laws 
is particularly problematic, given that this gap in the legal system in Australia impacts 
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disproportionately upon Muslims, as was noted in Chapter 6. Movements towards remedying 
this gap would significantly improve the ability of Muslims to seek redress for discrimination 
and to collectively delegitimise Islamophobia in Australia. 
Justification or denial of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination and the normalisation of 
Islamophobia are particularly highlighted by Dimensions 6-8 of the scale. As can be seen 
from the table above, although it was rare for articles to openly dismiss criticisms of actions 
by the ‘West’ or explicitly defend and normalise discrimination against Muslims, there were 
also relatively few articles which scored positive scores for presenting open views on these 
dimensions; by far the most common score for articles on these three dimensions was 
‘neutral’.  The few articles which were scored with ‘open’ views on this scale were those 
which seriously considered or foregrounded criticisms of Western actions, and accurately 
identified and problematised discrimination against Muslims. Most prominent in this case 
were the articles dealing with ‘dirty’ politics which inflamed anti-Muslim prejudice in 
marginal seats (SMH04_17, A07_22, SMH07_17). The most strident denial of the reality of 
discrimination against Muslims emanated from Paul Sheehan, mentioned above, who claimed 
in 2004 that there was an ‘absence of evidence’ for claims by Muslim community groups and 
the Anti-Discrimination Board that there had been an increase in attacks and prejudice 
against Muslims (SMH04_19). His misrepresentation of the evidence of anti-Muslim hostility 
and violence and complete denial of the ugly role that racism had played in political debate in 
Australia from the 1990s was a clear ‘out of hand’ rejection of criticism of the ‘West’ 
(Dimension 6). As shall be discussed below his rejection of the reality of anti-Muslim 
prejudice in Australia was strongly linked to his defence of ‘discriminatory practices towards 
Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society’, (Dimension 7) and his 
normalisation of anti-Muslim hostility (Dimension 8).  
A shift on these three dimensions is discernible between 2004 and 2007. In 2004, none of the 
articles in this sample from The Australian received a positive score on these three 
dimensions (in fact, only one article from this subset of the sample received a positive score 
on any of the dimensions), and in The SMH, just two articles received positive scores on any 
of these dimensions. In 2007, by contrast, only one article in The Australian had negative 
scores on any of these three dimensions, and in The SMH there were no negative scores 
recorded, just positive and neutral scores. 
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Taken together, analysis of the scoring on the Islamophobic Index for the articles in the Pilot 
Study indicated that there were strong patterns of higher levels of ‘closed’ views of Islam in 
2004 than in 2007, and overall, higher levels of ‘closed’ views of Islam in The Australian 
than in The SMH. Neither paper had a monopoly on either open or closed views though; both 
The Australian and The SMH had the dubious distinction of printing opinion pieces in 2004 
which received the lowest possible score of -8; yet in 2007 it was The Australian which 
printed the article with the highest score in this sample. The ‘soft news’ stories from the 2007 
period, in contrast to the distinctly low scores of the ‘soft news’ stories from the 2004 period, 
received scores of 4 (Open) in The Australian and 2 (Somewhat Open) in The SMH. This 
pattern is actually contrary to what I expected from the sample as a whole – I anticipated 
from my initial reading of the articles in the whole data sample that open views of Islam 
would be more common in soft news than in hard news in 2004, and that closed views of 
Islam would be more common in soft news than in hard news in 2007, yet the trend in the 
limited number of articles in this Pilot Study actually showed the opposite pattern. This issue 
will therefore need to be revisited when discussing the analysis of the data as a whole.  
Framing Islam as a ‘Problem’ 
Half of the articles in the Pilot Study (ten articles) framed Islam as a ‘problem’, with four 
articles coded as neutral and six articles coded as having either framed something other than 
Muslims as a ‘problem’ or did not identify any target as a ‘problem’. Differences between the 
two election periods and between the two newspapers were once again noticeable. In 2004, 
four articles from The Australian and just two articles from The SMH framed Islam as a 
‘problem’; there was one article from each newspaper which was coded as ‘neutral’, and two 
articles from The SMH which were coded as either identifying no target or an alterative target 
as a ‘problem’. In 2007, this dropped to three articles framing Islam as a problem in The 
Australian (with two articles either identifying an alternative target or none at all) and just 
one article from The SMH framing Islam as a problem (with two coded as ‘neutral’ and two 
coded as identifying an alternative target or no problem). In 2004, articles in The Australian 
ranged from -8 to -3; in 2007, the range had shifted upwards from -5 to +7. In The SMH, in 
2004 articles ranged from -8 to +5; in 2007, the range had contracted slightly but still shifted 
upwards significantly, from 0 to +3. Of the soft news articles, three were coded as 
representing Islam as a problem (A04_19; SMH04_19; SMH07_21); the exception was the 
advertorial on the Multicultural Advertising Awards in The Australian in 2007 (A07_34). 
  180 
 
There was a strong relationship between the Islamophobic Index rating and whether articles 
represented Muslims as a ‘problem’ or not. All articles which had a negative sum total (i.e. 
predominantly presented ‘Closed’ views of Islam) were found to either present Islam as a 
problem or were coded as neutral on this measure. The two articles which received a summed 
score of 0 (‘neither open or closed’) were also coded as neutral in regards to presenting Islam 
as a problem. Only one of the articles which had a positive summed score (i.e. predominantly 
presented ‘Open’ views of Islam) could be said to have presented Islam as a ‘problem’; this 
was the opinion piece by Justice Michael Kirby in The SMH in 2007 (SMH07_21). Justice 
Kirby’s comments, discussed above, led to an overall score of 2, which can be construed as 
presenting ‘Somewhat Open’ views of Islam, according to the scale I presented in the 
previous chapter. The distinctive feature of his article was his urging of recognition that it 
was ‘not good enough for Christians… to be selective about tolerance and acceptance’. 
However, whilst this was an important point, and his critical approach to a contentious issue 
clearly demonstrated some ‘Open’ views towards Islam, overall, the article retained a sense 
that religious faith in and of itself could be problematic. In addition, because Kirby does not 
distinguish clearly between ‘Islam’ as a monolith and the actual diversity of Islam and 
Muslims, his claim that we cannot ‘selectively denounce Islam’ for ‘nasty and cruel’ 
practices, nevertheless frames ‘Islam’ as a problem – albeit one on the same level as 
‘Christianity’. 
After conducting this Pilot Study I felt that my analysis of this dimension did not go far 
enough. I had metrics on whether Islam was represented as a problem, but I felt that I needed 
more information about alternative targets identified as the ‘problem’ in order to make more 
illuminating conclusions about this factor of analysis. I therefore determined that during the 
analysis of the full data set I would not merely record whether Islam was represented as a 
problem or not, but also code any alternative or secondary targets identified as ‘problems’. I 
hoped in particular to be able to interpret this information in regards to the ‘distance from 
power’ exemplified by different articles. 
Features of language 
As can be seen in Figure 5 below, over half the articles in the study did not use victimising, 
demonising or emotive language. There were discernible differences between the two 
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newspapers and the two different time periods, but not as heavily marked as for other 
indicators. In 2004, two of the five articles from The Australian were coded as having used 
all three negative language features, with two articles neutral in regards to victimising 
language but still employing demonising and emotive language, and the fifth article neutral 
on all three measures. In contrast, in the The SMH during 2004, four of the five articles did 
not employ any of the negative language features, with one article using some demonising 
and some emotive language. In 2007, just one article from The Australian employed all three 
negative language features, with one article employing some demonising language but neutral 
in terms of victimising and emotive language, one neutral on all three dimensions and two 
articles using positive language features on all three dimensions. In The SMH, four articles 
employed positive language in regards to all three dimensions and one article avoided the use 
of victimising language but did employ demonising and emotive language. The trends 
therefore suggest similar outcomes to other measures considered above: an overall decrease 
in use of negative features of language in 2007 as compared to 2004, and in The SMH as 
compared to The Australian (for full data see Appendix A). 
Negative language 
features 
1. Victimising 2. Demonising 3. Emotive 
Yes 9 8 9 
Neutral 7 4 9 
No 4 8 2 
Figure 5: Pilot Study - Summary of scores for features of language (number of total articles in 
Pilot  Study  featuring negative language features) 
 
I thought that comparing the features of the language of articles which I classified as closed 
would give me valuable insight into the characteristics of negative or positive representations 
of Muslims and perhaps suggest strategies for countering the dominance of closed views 
towards Islam. There was a clear relationship between the Islamophobic Index rating and 
whether articles contained negative features of language. All articles which had a negative 
summed score on the Index (i.e. predominantly presented ‘Closed’ views of Islam) were 
found to have utilised at least one form of negative language, whilst every article which had a 
positive sum total (i.e. predominantly presented ‘Open’ views of Islam) included no negative 
features of language at all. Of the two articles which received a sum total of 0 (‘neither open 
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or closed’), one article was coded as including no negative language features whilst the other 
included some demonising and emotive language but no victimising language. 
Another strong pattern discernible in regards to the usage of negative features of language 
was the subject of the article. Every article on the subject of either ‘terrorist violence’ or  
‘counter-terrorism’ either received negative summed scores on the Islamophobic Index 
(closed views of Islam) or zero (neither open or closed), and every single one of these articles 
contained some negative language features. With one exception, articles from the Pilot Study 
on subjects other than ‘terrorist violence’ or  ‘counter-terrorism’ did not contain any negative 
language features at all: negative language features were therefore highly linked to the 
subject matter of violent conflict and terrorism. The exception was the article ‘White House 
aghast at Saudi rape victim’s sentence for “using media”’ (A07_29), which was on a Saudi 
Arabian court case now known as the Qatif rape case, in which a woman received a jail 
sentence for appealing to the media following her sentencing to 90 lashes for being in a car 
with an unrelated male (a circumstance which indirectly led to her rape by multiple 
assailants). The article, which was sourced from Australian Associated Press, is written in a 
dispassionate style which largely avoids the use of negative language features. However, the 
article repeatedly refers to the woman as the ‘Saudi rape victim’ or ‘victim’, including in the 
title to the article. Although there is not a clear consensus in media reporting guidelines 
regarding the use of the term ‘rape victim’ as opposed to ‘rape survivor’ or another 
alternative term which avoids victimisation, the repetition of the term ‘victim’ in this article 
is quite problematical. At other points in the article the woman is referred to by more neutral 
phrases such as ‘the 19-year-old woman’ and ‘the woman’.  
The article also uses the term ‘gang rape’ to refer to the sexual assault suffered by the 
woman; current Australian Government guidelines for best practice for media reporting of 
sexual assault emphasise that: 
Cases of sexual assault with more than one perpetrator should be referred to as 
multiple perpetrator rape/sexual assault. Avoid using terms like "gang" or "pack" 
rape, as these obscure the responsibility and choice of each individual perpetrator.556 
Other than these instances of problematic labelling, the article largely avoids negative 
language: it ‘reports what has been done and could be done by people’ (for example, ‘she was 
                                                
556 Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault, Reporting on Sexual Assault: Media Backgrounder 
(Canberra:  Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2013), section 5. 
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raped there by seven men, three of whom also attacked her friend’), uses ‘neutral and precise 
descriptions’ (‘a court source’, ‘Saudi Arabia’s Higher Judicial Council’, ‘her assailants’), 
and uses ‘objective and moderate’ language (‘Saudi Arabia enforces a strict form of Sunni 
Islam called Wahhabism’). However, some of the quotations from Western government 
representatives which are used in the article use some demonising language, such as 
‘barbaric’. It is clear that in reporting on subjects which are particularly emotionally loaded, 
such as sexual assault cases and cases involving terrorism, it may be difficult for journalists 
to completely avoid the inclusion of negative language in their articles, but also underscores 
that when writing about such highly emotive subjects it is vitally important for journalists to 
make particular efforts as to the choice of words, selection of quotations and style of writing. 
Use of negative features of language in articles concerning terrorist attacks or anti-terrorism 
were more pervasive in The Australian than in The SMH, and in 2004 in particular. In The 
SMH, the two articles which contained negative language features in regards to the 
representation of Islam both used demonising and emotive language but avoided the use of 
victimising language. In Ben Cubby’s ‘North Indian Violence’ (SMH04_18), Cubby quotes 
international newspapers as referring to the ‘carnage’ of ‘barbaric blasts’ blamed on ‘Islamic 
fundamentalist groups’, but avoids the utilisation of negative language features in his own 
framing text. Louise Williams’ ‘Honour for journalist hostage’ (SMH07_18) is written in a 
more emotive tone, describing in detail the kidnapping of journalist Meutya Hafid in Iraq by 
‘Islamic extremists’. Williams recounts that Hafid was ‘imprisoned in a desert cave’ after 
being ‘snatched on the notorious road from Baghdad’, and described the ‘lifetime of 
memories flashing before [Hafid]’ as she was ‘faced with beheading, and the knowledge that 
even Muslim journalists were dying at the hands of hardline Islamic groups’.  
The utilisation of negative language features in those two articles from The SMH is relatively 
innocuous in comparison to some of the language used in comparable articles from The 
Australian in 2004. In ‘39 Sunnis killed in “revenge” blasts’ (A04_11), a correspondent from 
Multan, Pakistan reports on an attack in which ‘two bombs ripped through a gathering of 
Sunni Muslim radicals’. The article describes a series of ‘bloody sectarian attacks’ by 
‘fanatics from Pakistan’s Sunni majority and Shi’ite minority’, in a city referred to as ‘a 
hotbed of extremism’. After the attacks, the site was said to be ‘littered with body parts and 
bloodstains’ whilst ‘splinters, debris and chattered glass from nearby windows carpeted the 
ground’. In ‘Terrorist’s wife now suspect’ (A04_23), Sian Powell and Olivia Mellisa 
speculate on whether Munfiatun, the wife of ‘notorious Jemaah Islamiah mastermind Noordin 
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Mohammed Top’ and possibly linked to other ‘Jemaah Islamiah militants’ would face 
terrorism charges in regards to ‘terrorist bombings that have plagued Indonesia’, including 
the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta.557 Munfiatun’s sister and mother, 
interviewed by journalists from The Australian, are described as ‘desolate’, ‘sad and 
shocked’, and ‘distraught’.  
In summary, I therefore found that in ‘hard’ news articles dealing with emotive subjects such 
as violent conflict or sexual assault, levels of negative language features were particularly 
elevated. By far the most common negative language feature was the use of demonising 
labels such as Islamic or Muslim ‘extremists’, ‘fanatics’, ‘militants’, and ‘radicals’. A full 
half of the articles analysed as part of the Pilot Study either actively used demonising 
language or were neutral on this dimension; every article in this subset of the full sample 
which referred to ‘terrorism’ also utilised demonising language). However, I also found that 
the tone of the journalist and their choice of phrasing sometimes indicated that they had 
attempted to employ neutral language, yet the quotations which they selected and inserted 
without qualification into their articles often featured strongly inflammatory negative 
language features (e.g. SMH04_18, ‘Northern Indian Violence’). This is an important point 
which underscores the limitations of the norm of objectivity and neutrality in reporting: even 
if the journalist themselves adheres broadly to the norms, the inclusion of source discourses 
which are not bound by the same conventions can mitigate the intention of the journalist.  
In contrast to these patterns in the ‘hard’ news stories analysed in the Pilot Study, no clear 
relationship was discernible between whether articles were soft or hard news and their 
tendency to employ negative language features. If we take the example of the two articles 
with the lowest scores on the Islamophobic index, Neil Brown’s opinion piece advocating re-
election of the Howard Government (A04_19) and Paul Sheehan’s column opposing the 
introduction of racial vilification laws in Victoria (SMH04_19), the patterns of language 
features are diametrically opposed. Brown’s article hits the trifecta, employing victimising, 
demonising and emotive language; yet Sheehan’s article manages to articulate closed views 
towards Islam on all eight of the dimensions of the Index and to represent Islam as a distinct 
problem, without employing any of these negative language features.  
                                                
557 Mufiatun was later found to have been innocent of involvement in any attacks, though she did receive a jail 
sentence for concealing her husband’s whereabouts from the police. 
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Brown, a former Liberal politician, paints people as helpless victims, vulnerable to attacks 
from ‘terrorists’ in a variety of unlikely situations, constantly ‘at risk’ from ‘Muslim fanatics 
who hate our way of life and want to kill us’. Sheehan, by contrast, comes from a journalistic 
background. His writing adheres to many of the conventions of journalism, for example in his 
avoidance of emotive language and construction of neutrally worded, apparently balanced 
stories. Sheehan constructs the impression that he has done careful, measured investigative 
research into the incidence of attacks on Muslims, and ‘reports’ that it has been overestimated 
by organisations such as the Victorian Equal Opportunity Commission and the NSW Anti-
Discrimination Board; he frames his arguments not through emotive and demonising 
language but by using ‘objective and moderate language’. He uses ‘neutral and precise 
descriptions, titles and names’ for those he attacks, such as Chris Puplick, ‘president of the 
Anti-Discrimination Board’ and May Helou, ‘of the Islamic Council of Victoria’. When he 
discusses the case brought against Catch the Fire Ministries, he ‘avoids victimising language, 
reports what has been done and could be done’. For example, Sheehan details in neutral 
language the exact cost of the legal case, the exact length of the mediation session (‘seven 
hours and forty minutes’) and the hearings (‘forty days, spread over nine months’), and the 
exact steps in the case (‘hearings began in the Administrative Tribunal in October…’).  
The two people Sheehan quotes in this article, Peter Costello and Pastor Danny Nalliah, also 
avoid the use of emotive, victimising and demising language, appearing as rational and 
moderate. Nalliah, for example, is quoted as saying ‘Even Christians believe that everyone 
should know about Christ and want people to follow Christ. But the worry is with Islam, it 
goes one step further’. Nalliah seems relatively balanced and fair in this selected quote. 
Sheehan neglects to mention in his article that Nalliah was actually a candidate at the 2004 
Federal Election for the ultra-conservative evangelical Christian political party Family First, 
and that Nalliah is not exactly as temperate in his views as Sheehan portrayed him. Nalliah 
was forced to resign from Family First immediately after the election, when it was found that 
he had been calling on his supporters to ‘tear down Satan's strongholds’, which included 
mosques and Buddhist temples as well as brothels and gambling places.558 Nalliah 
                                                
558 Nalliah first gained notoriety in Australia with this case, but has drawn considerable negative attention for 
his extreme beliefs several times since that time. Even Peter Costello, former Deputy Prime Minister, who 
was quoted along with Nalliah in this article and subsequently met with Nalliah to receive Nalliah’s 
‘blessing’ prior to the 2007 election, eventually disavowed Nalliah, after he claimed to have had a revelatory 
dream in which he was informed that the devastating Victorian bushfires of 2009 were divine retribution for 
the decriminalisation of abortion; subsequently, Nalliah claimed that the Queensland floods of 2011 were 
divine retribution against Kevin Rudd after he ‘spoke against Israel’ in December 2010. AAP, "Pastor Says 
Kevin Rudd to Blame for Floods," news.com.au, January 11 2011; Tony Jones, "Family First Close to 
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subsequently founded his own political party, Rise Up Australia, which campaigned on an 
explicitly anti-Muslim and anti-multiculturalism platform at the Federal Election in 2013.559 
The fact that the articles by Sheehan and Brown employ such different linguistic techniques 
yet nevertheless convey extremely closed views of Islam is interesting. The article by 
Sheehan is much more difficult to dismiss than that of Brown’s. Sheehan’s journalistic 
credentials insulate him to some degree from accusations of bias or partisanship, even though 
he is writing an opinion column and not ‘reporting the news’. The tone of his article is so 
seemingly reasonable, and its arguments are more subtly expressed that it becomes difficult 
to rebut, at least within the limited confines of the news media. To address his claims about 
the lack of evidence of Islamophobia in Australia for example, a range of evidence collected 
by many different sources about the rising incidence and impact of anti-Muslim hostility in 
Australia could be presented. Yet such a text would not conform to dominant news values 
and would be more likely to appear in academic contexts than in the mass media, as 
Sheehen’s polarising but popular columns do. Brown’s article, in contrast, is clearly 
identified as a former Liberal party minister, and his partisanship is clearly apparent. He is 
therefore not protected by the mantle of ‘neutrality’, and his bombastic and extreme language 
can be more easily dismissed and his extravagant claims rebutted. In the long term, the type 
of article which has a much more damaging effect in terms of its normalisation and 
rationalisation of anti-Muslim hostility is likely to be Sheehan’s more insidious justification 
of Islamophobia. 
Quotation patterns 
Because of the number of variables involved, quotation patterns proved to be one of the most 
difficult aspects of the study in terms of coding and of interpretation. The bare quantitative 
data are complex and require substantial ‘unpacking’ in order to illustrate trends and 
relationships between the different variables and levels of coding (Figure 6, opposite). 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
Gaining Pivotal Senate Role," Lateline, 11 October 2004; Christian Kerr, "Peter Costello Slams Cult's 
Victorian Bushfire Retribution Claims," The Australian, February 11 2009; Marion Maddox, "A Secular 
Cancellation of the Secularist Truce: Religion and Political Legitimation in Australia," Annual review of the 
Sociology of Religion: Religion and Politics 2(2011): p. 304. 
559 Both Labor and The Coalition ranked Nalliah’s party highly in their how-to-vote materials for many 
electorates. Bianca Hall, "Labor Gives Preferences to Extremists," The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 
September 2013. 
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Data set 
Direct 
Quotations 
Indirect 
Quotations 
Muslims 
Quoted 
Non-
Muslims 
Quoted 
Non-
Bureaucratic 
Sources 
Bureaucratic 
Sources 
The Australian 
(2004) 
9 3 9 3 3 9 
The Australian 
(2007) 
20 3 12 11 9 14 
The SMH 
(2004) 
4 6 1 9 5 5 
The SMH 
(2007) 
9 2 2 9 5 6 
Total	   42 14 24 32 22 34 
Figure 6: Pilot Study - Quotation patterns per data set 
 
Overall, from the fifty-six separate sources quoted in the twenty articles from the Pilot Study, 
there were more direct than indirect quotes, more non-Muslim than Muslim sources, and far 
more bureaucratic than non-bureaucratic sources. In both 2004 and 2007, the articles from 
The Australian featured more Muslim than non-Muslim sources than articles from The SMH 
(twenty-one separate Muslim sources in the ten articles from The Australian, compared to 
just three Muslim sources in the ten articles from The Sydney Morning Herald). However, 
The Australian featured far more bureaucratic than non-bureaucratic sources (twenty-three 
separate bureaucratic sources in the ten articles from The Australian, compared to just eleven 
non-bureaucratic sources in the ten articles from The Sydney Morning Herald). 
Correspondingly, in many cases, although particular articles from The Australian contained 
numerous Muslim voices, quite frequently they were bureaucratic voices which exhibited 
extremely low distance from power and did not serve a particularly productive role in 
deconstructing either the consensus on Islamophobia or the consensus on the ‘War on 
Terror’. As an example, in the article concerning the bomb blasts in Multan, Pakistan 
(A04_11), there are five sources in total, of which all five are ostensibly Muslims. Just one of 
these sources is non-bureaucratic (a witness to the bomb blast); the other four are 
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bureaucratic sources such as the District police chief, Pakistan security officers and the 
Pakistani Information Minister, who predictably labelled the attack as ‘an act of brutal 
terrorism aimed at creating instability’ and did not attempt to offer a more nuanced 
explanation for the violence in Multan. Many elements in the Pakistani government, as in 
other nations to which the ‘War on Terror’ was successfully exported during this period, 
benefitted from the ‘complexity reducing’ rhetoric of the ‘War’ as well as the ability to 
garner military, financial and other support from the US and its allies for their extension of 
the ‘war’ onto their own internal dissidents and thus had little investment in contesting this 
consensus. 
Furthermore, although there were far fewer indirect than direct quotations, indirect quotations 
were more likely to be from non-bureaucratic Muslim sources than from other sources. 
Although I did not specifically quantify gender data for quotation patterns, my informal sense 
was that gender also played a significant role in quotation patterns: the smallest subset within 
quotation patterns was therefore Muslim women who were not in bureaucratic roles and were 
quoted directly; this occurred in just three articles within the Pilot Study (A04_23, A07_22, 
SMH07_20). This finding strongly recalled to me the famous line from Marx’s The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon which Edward Said employed as one of the 
epigraphs to Orientalism: ‘they cannot represent themselves; they must be represented’.560 
The premier example of this trend towards marginalising the voices which were probably 
most important to a story was in the article on the Qatif rape case, ‘White House aghast at 
Saudi rape victim's sentence for ‘using media”’ (A07_29). Six sources were quoted in this 
article, of which there were three non-Muslim and three Muslim sources. The three non-
Muslim sources were US and Canadian bureaucratic sources, of which one was a woman. 
The Muslim sources were the woman who had been sexually assaulted, and subsequently 
received a prison sentence, and two representatives of the Saudi Arabian judiciary. All of 
these sources were quoted directly, except the woman who was the subject of the article, who 
was only quoted indirectly in the article.  
The preponderance of bureaucratic sources and the lack of a direct quote from the woman 
who was at the centre of this story are deeply troubling. The article could have been framed 
in a completely different way if the correspondent had either included direct quotations from 
the woman who was at the centre of the case, or had in addition, sourced an opinion on the 
                                                
560 Said, Orientalism. 
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case from, for example, a female Muslim activist for women’s rights. Instead the article is 
dominated by the voices of Western bureaucratic figures damning the Saudi judicial system 
(which is emphasised as being Islamic/Muslim) and Saudi judicial sources defending the 
woman’s sentence and responding to criticism of the case by calling for ‘constructive 
criticism, away from emotions’. There were two other articles on this case in the broader 
sample, one of which, ‘Victim of rape to fight sentence’ (A07_15) was constructed very 
similarly to A07_29, took a very similar angle on the story, and had very similar quotation 
patterns. This article included a quote from one Saudi court source justifying the verdict 
(direct), and three quotes from ‘Western’ sources condemning the attack (one direct, two 
indirect). This article additionally quotes the woman’s lawyer, who had his license suspended 
as a result of his work in the case and is described as ‘a leading human rights activist’. He is 
quoted as saying that the case ‘sums up the major problems the Saudi judiciary faces’, but his 
comments are not expanded upon or explored by the journalist. 
The third article from my full sample which addressed this case took a significantly different 
approach to the story. Titled ‘Saudi rape stirs social revolution’ (A07_6), this story focuses 
on the emergence of reformist movements in Saudi Arabia and emphasises the courage of the 
Saudis involved in challenging the case. The journalist, Martin Chulov, refers to ‘the faint 
stirrings of a social revolution’ as a result of the ‘the bravery of the unnamed victim, the 
daring of her 24-year-old husband in attacking the establishment, and the derring-do of young 
activist lawyer Abdulrahman al-Lahim, who criticised the judiciary’s stance on his client’. 
Chulov highlights the ‘delicate position’ that such cases put the US government in given their 
promotion of Saudi Arabia as a partner in the region and a ‘model of moderate Islam’, and 
does not quote any US or Saudi bureaucratic sources. Instead, the sole quotes in the lengthy 
article are reserved for the husband of the woman at the centre of the case and her lawyer, 
and focus on their consideration of how the case might have ‘sparked a rethink of attitudes in 
the Kingdom’. Chulov quotes the woman’s lawyer at length: 
The kingdom is going through a reformist period and I believe what we’re going 
through will lead to a more modern judicial system that all citizens can enjoy. I’m 
confident that this line of thought will vanish one day, and indeed the country will be 
reborn. 
Chulov’s highlighting of differences of opinion within the Muslim world, of the emergence 
of reformist movements, and of the problematic nature of ‘Western’ support for repressive 
regimes mark a significant shift in focus from the other two stories discussing this case. 
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Within this story, his selection and framing of sources constitutes a significant feature of the 
differential narrative articulated about the same case.  
Differential narratives articulated about the same story are also articulated via quotation 
patterns in articles referring to the issue of ‘dirty tricks’ in election campaigns. The different 
quotation patterns in the three articles on this subject surveyed within the Pilot Study distinct 
differences between the different time periods and different newspapers. As was mentioned 
in Chapter 7, Labor candidates in Western Sydney were subjected to smear campaigns 
including Islamophobic fake leaflets in both the 2004 and 2007 campaigns. However, in 
2004, the issue attracted very little media attention until after the election had taken place 
(and then the reaction was still quite muted). In 2007, by contrast, the distributors of a leaflet 
which alleged that Labor ‘supports our new Mosque construction’ and ‘support to forgive our 
Muslim brothers who have been unjustly sentenced to death for the Bali bombings’ were 
caught in the act of distributing the flyers and the incident became one of the most-reported 
matters in the days just prior to the election.561  
Within the Pilot Study, one article from The SMH referred to the smear campaign against Ed 
Husic, the Labor candidate for the marginal seat of Greenway in 2004. In the article, ‘Pure 
theatre: Latham takes stage with no script and wows 600’ (SMH04_17), senior political 
journalist Tom Allard reports on a ‘town-hall’ Q&A session held by Opposition Leader Mark 
Latham in Adelaide four days prior to the Federal election. Allard records that there was ‘an 
ugly attack on the race of Labor’s Muslim candidate’, but that Latham retorted that ‘Ed is a 
Bosnian Muslim. His parents came out here with nothing and built a life. It’s a great 
Australian story’. Although it is a very small component of the article, it sufficiently 
problematised the spread and normalisation of Islamophobia during the period, and managed 
to attack some of the conceptions of Islam as monolithic and ‘incompatible’ with ‘Australian 
values’, to receive a summed score of +5, or ‘Very Open’, on the Islamophobic Index. 
However, the article does not refer to the wider campaign against Husic, but limits itself to 
the discussions during the ‘town hall’ session and Latham is the only person quoted in the 
article. 
There were three articles within the Pilot Study which addressed ‘dirty tricks’ in the 2007 
election: two from The SMH (SMH07_17, SMH07_18) and one article from The Australian 
                                                
561 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Conduct of the 2007 Federal Election and Matters Related 
Thereto: Events in the Division of Lindsay (Canberra:  Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). 
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(A07_22). In ‘Playing dirty an artform in the west’ (SMH07_17), Andrew West, Jacob 
Saulwick and Paul Bibby surveyed voter opinions on the election fraud in the seat of Lindsay, 
with two residents directly quoted in the article on their disdain for the ‘pathetic’ leafleting 
ploy. The article also included one direct quote from a former Liberal party campaign worker 
who accused the retiring member for Lindsay, Jackie Kelly, of ‘dirty tricks’ at the 2004 
election, stating that she had produced fake how-to-vote cards to fraudulently capture the 
preferences of a local activist group. The article also discusses the smear campaign against 
Ed Husic in 2004, referring to a leaflet which was distributed in Greenway during that 
election campaign which carried a picture of Husic, the ALP logo and campaign slogan, and 
stated that ‘Ed Husic is a devout Muslim. Ed is working hard to get a better deal for Islam in 
Greenway’. Husic was then indirectly quoted as saying that ‘the revelations prove race-
baiting is an established Coalition technique’. The issue in the two cases of fraudulent leaflets 
was ‘not so much who produced the propaganda but who benefited from it’. This article 
could have made a much stronger statement on the racist angle of the leafleting scandal by 
directly quoting Husic and addressing in a more robust way the issue of ‘race-baiting’ in 
Liberal Party election campaigning. This article received a summed  score of +4, or ‘Open’, 
on the Islamophobic Index. 
In ‘Lib shame over fake pamphlet’ (SMH07_18), The SMH’s Chief Political Correspondent, 
Phillip Coorey, quoted five sources in total, all of which were non-Muslim bureaucratic 
sources (such as the ALP and Liberal party’s respective campaign spokespeople, and the 
Liberal Party NSW Director). Whilst clearly labelling the scandal as ‘a dirty tricks campaign 
involving race hate’, Coorey’s article does not delve any further into the problematic racial 
dimensions of the fake flyer. He does quote from the leaflet though, and refers to how the 
leaflet fallaciously portrayed Labor as ‘sympathisers of Islamic terrorists’ and ‘applauds the 
Labor Party for supporting Muslim terrorists’. In fact the leaflet, despite its deplorable 
content, never actually uses phrases like ‘Muslim terrorists’; Coorey himself actually brings 
these demonising negative terms into his article. This article received a summed score of 1, or 
‘Somewhat Open’ on the Islamophobic index. 
‘Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final address’ (A07_22) was a complex article involving quotes 
from eight different sources; it was compiled by Patricia Karvelas and Matthew Franklin with 
‘additional reporting’ from Richard Kerbaj, Sanna Trad and Cath Hart and includes four 
direct quotes from the usual bureaucratic sources: the Prime Minister, the Opposition Leader, 
the Deputy Prime Minister, and Jackie Kelly (whose husband was implicated in the leafleting 
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scandal). Two of the non-bureaucratic sources are nevertheless closely connected to the 
political party system; there is one direct quote from the husband of the Liberal candidate for 
Lindsay, Karen Chijoff, who was also implicated in the scandal, and an indirect quote from 
the same disaffected Liberal party campaign worker quoted in ‘Playing dirty an artform in the 
west’ (SMH07_17). In comparison to the two articles on this topic in The SMH, ‘Bogus flyer 
stunt hijacks final address’ contains two direct quotes from Muslim community leaders, 
which were discussed earlier in this chapter, and played a large part in this article receiving a 
summed score of +7 – the highest score for any article in the Pilot Study. 
Although the inclusion of Muslim voices in this article is a significant move, it is interesting 
to make some observations on the sources chosen. I postulate that the major part of the 
‘additional reporting’ done by Richard Kerbaj and Sanna Trad was the sourcing of the 
Muslim quotes, which were tacked onto the end of a fairly run-of-the-mill political news 
story which is not drastically different from the stories on the same issue printed in The SMH. 
Kerbaj was one of the few Arabic-speaking journalists employed by the mainstream media at 
this time, who built his career upon his ability to report on unique angles in regards to 
‘Muslim matters’.562 Trad was a cadet journalist at the time but is no longer working in the 
media; she is the daughter of socially conservative Muslim spokesman Keysar Trad and 
during her time at The Australian she too wrote several articles on Muslim community issues. 
Whilst it is certainly a positive that the voices of socially progressive Muslim community 
leaders are directly quoted in articles in The Australian by Kerbaj and Trad, they had a habit 
of quoting the exact same sources, introduced with very similar descriptions, in their other 
articles on ‘Muslim matters’, which is why I speculate that this part of the article was their 
work.563 Thus, whilst it is a positive thing to see more Muslim voices in the mainstream 
media, some scrutiny must also be paid to the diversity of views represented and the framing 
of such sources.  
The repeated utilisation of the same voices to represent the Muslim community in Australia 
can, as Tanja Dreher argues, amount to a ‘command performance’. Although the 
opportunities for Muslim Australians to be heard expanded through the focus placed upon 
                                                
562 Kerbaj has attracted considerable criticism for some of his inflammatory and poorly researched coverage of 
Muslim community news; see for example Media Watch, "The Australian's Sheik Swap," ABC, 31 July 
2006. 
563 See for example, Richard Kerbaj, "Muslim Leader Blames Women for Sex Attacks," The Australian, 
October 26 2006; Richard Kerbaj, "Andrews' Agenda Was "Anti-Islam"," The Australian, July 21 2008; 
Sanna Trad, "Muslim Leaders Back the Kilings, but Not Time Lag," The Australia, November 10 2008. 
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them by the War on Terror and other events of the past decade, Dreher observes that ‘the 
stage is set and the script is already determined’. The increased interest in Muslim women, in 
particular, has ‘provided some opportunities for a diversity of women’s voices and stories to 
appear, but primarily on the terms determined by standard news values…[which] reflect the 
perceived interests and prejudices of a non-Muslim audience rather than the issues of most 
importance or relevance to Australian Muslims themselves’. Therefore, Muslim voices 
remain of interest to the news media largely ‘in response to the agendas and misconceptions 
of the “mainstream”’.564 Such issues in the selection and promotion of the voices of particular 
Muslims over other Muslim voices will be further addressed in the next two chapters, which 
focus on the results for the full sample of my study and in-depth discussion of these results. 
Overall, the Pilot Study suggested that an exercise in content analysis using, as the model for 
evaluative criteria, a Likert scale based on the Runnymede Trust definition of Islamophobia, 
is capable of illuminating significant distinctions in the representation of a wide range of 
issues and stories pertaining to Islam and Muslims in the Australian press. To state them at 
their simplest, the findings from the mini-sample of 20 articles are, first, that the period 
leading up to the election of 2004 saw more Islamophobia than the equivalent period of 2007; 
and that The Australian is more Islamophobic than The SMH – albeit with important 
exceptions on individual stories. There was more media contestation of the signature method 
of the Howard government, of fomenting and exploiting xenophobia and anti-Muslim 
sentiment, in the later election campaign, than in the earlier. The next task was to determine 
how far these incipient patterns were borne out in the full sample, and to explore further some 
of the detailed characteristics of the reporting that may enable a more nuanced judgement of 
the extent and scope of change between the two date ranges.   
                                                
564 Tanya Dreher, "Community Media Intervention," in Islam and the Australian News Media, eds. Halim Rane, 
Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010), p. 201. 
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Chapter 10 – Results and Main Findings 
 
The purpose of this chapter of my thesis is to discuss the results for the coding exercises 
carried out on all articles across the four data sets, in order to determine the extent to which 
the patterns observed in the articles analysed as part of the Pilot Study were borne out in the 
full sample, and to build up a more detailed picture of the nature and extent of changes in 
coverage by the two newspapers between the two different time periods. 
The full 373 articles were coded according a range of physical features which included 
descriptive features of the article as well as characteristics such as what section of the 
newspaper the story originally appeared in, whether the story was classified as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ 
news, and the authorial attribution of the story. Following this, the full sample of articles 
were coded according to their scores on the eight dimensions of the Islamophobic Index. 
These scores were summed to give an overall picture of the level of Islamophobia present in 
individual articles and to enable comparison between the four different data sets and specific 
groupings of articles.  The full set of articles were also classified according to whether they 
represented Islam as ‘a problem’, and according to what type of alternative targets might 
have been defined as ‘problems’ in each article. I will therefore begin with a description of 
the physical characteristics and features of the articles in my full sample before proceeding to 
compare patterns for the scores on the Islamophobic Index between the four data sets and to 
consider to what extent Islam was represented as a ‘problem’ in these articles.  
Physical Characteristics of the Sample  
The full sample of articles analysed in this study included a total of 373 stories. The 
distribution across the four data sets was as follows: 
I. The Australian  – 2004 Election (128 stories) 
II. The Australian  – 2007 Election (127 stories) 
III. The SMH  – 2004 Election (68 stories) 
IV. The SMH  – 2007 Election (50 stories) 
 
The differences in density of articles between the two newspapers and across the two 
different time periods clearly indicate that Islam and issues related to Muslims featured far 
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more strongly in The Australian in the lead-up to both the 2004 and 2007 elections, but still 
had a significant presence in The SMH. For both publications, the number of articles relating 
to Muslims or Islam was higher in 2004 than in 2007. 
As discussed in the Chapter 8, to provide a snapshot of general characteristics of the sample 
and variations within and between the different data sets, all 373 articles were coded 
according to the following physical characteristics: 
a) ‘Hard News’ (World + Local sections)/ ‘Soft News’ (all sections except World & 
Local) 
b) Section & Subsection (e.g. World/General) 
c) Source (e.g. staff reporter, wire service etc) 
d) Attribution (e.g. named journalist, editorial etc) 
 
In the following sections of this thesis, I present a summary of the results of the coding for 
these aspects of the physical characteristics of my sample and discuss some of the pertinent 
points raised by these results. 
a) Hard News/Soft News 
In Figure 7 (below), we can see that in three of the four data sets, ‘hard news’ stories 
outnumbered the ‘soft news’ stories, with the proportion of hard-to-soft news stories ranging 
between 53% (The SMH, 2007) and 62% (The Australian, 2004). The exception is The SMH 
in 2007, where only 42% of the stories could be classified as traditional, ‘hard news’ style 
articles. 
Data Set Hard Soft 
The Australian (2004) 60% 40% 
The Australian (2007) 62% 38% 
The SMH (2004) 53% 47% 
The SMH (2007) 42% 58% 
                      Figure 7: Hard/soft news as a percentage of total stories per data set 
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Within the ‘hard news’ category, it can be seen that world/international stories outnumbered 
local news in all data sets, though clear increases in the proportion of local-to-international 
news stories are visible in both 2007 data sets (Figure 8). This reflects the strong focus by 
both papers upon the Lindsay election fraud scandal and the dismissal of a high profile 
counter-terrorism case in the weeks prior to the 2007 election. 
Data Set World Local 
The Australian (2004) 79% 21% 
The Australian (2007) 62% 38% 
The SMH (2004) 72% 28% 
The SMH (2007) 52% 48% 
                    Figure 8: World/local news as a percentage of 'hard' news stories per data set 
 
b) Section and Subsection 
For both time periods in The Australian, the largest number of articles were from the World 
section, followed by Features and then Local, with these three sections including 94.5-96.5% 
of all stories. In The SMH during both time periods, the order of dominance was slightly 
different, with the highest number of articles in both periods coming from Features, followed 
by World, then Local. However, these three sections included 96% of all stories in 2004, thus 
being closely analogous to the distribution of articles in the two data sets from The 
Australian. Unusually, only 75% of all stories from 2007 fell within these three sections (See 
Figure 9 below).  
This unusual distribution is probably due to the significantly lower number of stories from the 
World section in 2007 (just 22%). However, it is possible that the unusual distribution of 
articles in 2007 in The Sydney Morning Herald is more a result of the much lower number of 
stories overall than of any other factors: for this data set, only 50 articles fell within the 
parameters of the study, as opposed to the 68 articles available in the 2004 set and the 
127/128 articles in The Australian data sets. The possibility that this much smaller data set 
may be unrepresentative must be considered in the interpretation of other potentially 
anomalous aspects of the data. 
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Data Set World/ 
Internat. 
Feature Local Review/ 
Spectrum 
Finance Misc. 
The Australian 
(2004) 
48% 36% 12.5% 2% 0.8% 0.7% 
The Australian 
(2007) 
39% 32% 23.5% 4% 1.5% 0.0% 
The SMH (2004) 38% 43% 15% 1.5% 0.0% 2.5% 
The SMH (2007) 22% 33% 20% 12% 8% 5% 
   Figure 9: Newspaper section as a percentage of total articles per data set 
 
The 5-15% of stories not falling within the three major categories were from a wide variety of 
sections within the two different newspapers, from Traveller, to Drive, to Sport. The two 
dominant categories from these were Review/Spectrum and Finance/Business & Investing, 
and have accordingly being listed separately. All other sections were subsumed within the 
heading of Miscellaneous. 
Within the six dominant sections, the subsection in which a story fitted was also recorded. 
The specifics of this analysis are not reflected in the table above, as it was in large part too 
detailed and too disparate to reveal many clear trends. However, some aspects of this analysis 
are worth brief mention. In particular, for some but not all data sets, Letters formed a 
significant subsection within Features, ranging from 0% (SMH, 2007) to 14.7% (SMH, 
2004). 
Another significant finding was the presence in each paper in both time periods of a 
particular subsection or subheading within the Local section, titled ‘Election 2004’ and 
‘Election 2007’ in The Australian, and slightly more imaginatively ‘The Choice 2004’ and 
‘Decision ‘07’ in The SMH. These accounted for a range of 31% (The Australian, 2004) to 
80% (The SMH, 2007) of the stories in the Local section. 
In 2004, when the data collection period began within days of the Jakarta Embassy bombing, 
both The Australian and The SMH had subsections of the World/International news section 
dealing exclusively with terrorism in Indonesia, titled ‘Terror at our door’ and ‘Evil at our 
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gate’ respectively. Stories in the ‘Terror at our door’ subsection only accounted for 2.3% of 
the total stories in the data set for The Australian in 2004, yet stories in the ‘Evil at our gate’ 
subsection accounted for 5.9% of the total stories in the data set for The SMH in 2004.  
It is worth noting that the decision to commence the time period of this study on September 
13, 2004 means that the data sets include only the tail end of the mass of stories generated the 
previous week under the subheadings ‘Terror at our door’ and ‘Evil at our gate’; notably the 
Embassy bombing occurred the day prior to the third anniversary of September 11, 
highlighting the significance of this period for reporting of terrorist violence. Had the full six 
week period of the election campaign been considered, many more stories from these 
subcategories would have fallen within the purview of this study. The dominance of these 
sensationalist and alarmist section headings and preoccupations bears further investigation. 
A key aspect of the table above worth noting is the jump in the percentage of articles in the 
Local section for both newspapers in the 2007 time period. As suggested above in relation to 
the proportion of hard/soft news between the 2004-2007 periods, the increase in numbers of 
articles from the Local section particularly reflects the high interest generated by the Lindsay 
election fraud scandal during the 2007 election campaign. 
Overall, despite the much greater number of articles containing the keywords in the two data 
sets for The Australian, the proportions of articles in different sections and overall trends 
between 2004 and 2007 are actually quite similar for the two different newspapers. The 
creation of analogous subsections within the World and Local sections of the two papers to 
reflect contemporaneous developments such as election campaigns and terrorism in Indonesia 
is a particularly noteworthy similarity, and perhaps undermines some assumptions about the 
distinctiveness of the two papers and their approach to news. While they may often frame 
their selected stories with different emphases, their agenda-setting function shows a 
substantial overlap. 
c) Source 
When we consider the attribution of particular stories to specific authors or sources, it is 
important to note that the patterns discussed below refer only to the sample, and may not be 
representative of the papers in their entirety. However, the observed differences in attribution 
patterns between the two papers are quite striking and worth considering in some detail in 
regards to their relationship to the parameters of this study. The issue of sourcing of articles is 
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crucial given the consolidation of the majority of news media outlets into the hands of a 
diminishing number of powerful proprietors, as alluded to in the opening section of Chapter 
3. 
One reason that issues regarding sourcing and authorial attribution are significant to this 
study is in relation to the inclusion of articles from all sections within the paper, rather than 
just the traditional ‘hard’ news section. This means that a significant number of stories within 
any one data set are not even necessarily composed by journalists. Between 6-30% of stories 
in the different data sets were derived from non-journalistic sources, such as political 
commentators, prominent intellectual figures, letter writers, and columnists. This has 
implications for any conclusions about the production and presentation of ‘news’ and of 
media effects which may ultimately be drawn from this study. Although the editorial process 
which collates and assembles this diverse array of material may be assumed to be overseen 
by journalists, focusing exclusively upon journalistic culture and audience reception of 
‘news’ may not give me the full picture I am seeking. 
Despite media conventions regarding the separation of ‘news’ from ‘opinion’, and the 
printing of sub-bylines to indicate the affiliations of contributors, the boundaries between 
hard and soft news are not necessarily clear in a newspaper, and the strictest maintenance of 
journalistic ‘objectivity and neutrality’ in articles printed on one page may easily be eclipsed 
by the more partisan views printed in an opinion piece on the opposite page. Part of my study 
will therefore include comparative analysis regarding differences between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
news stories with regards to contestation of Islamophobic frames or levels of distance from 
power. 
My superficial sense of the data sets, prior to conducting full analysis of the articles, was that 
in 2004, articles showing higher levels of Islamophobia, and lower levels of distance from 
power were more likely to be those from non-journalistic sources, e.g. opinions expressed in 
Letters or Reviews. In 2007, I sensed a reversal of this trend, where the overall levels of 
distance from power were much higher and the Islamophobic levels were much lower in the 
articles produced by journalists. Interestingly, however, there were articles at both extremes 
in all data sets. The parameters of the discourse had therefore not shifted sufficiently to make 
extremely ‘open’ or ‘closed’ views towards Islam ‘unprintable’, though the level of 
endorsement of extreme perspectives did appear to shift between the two different 
newspapers and different time periods. Articles by the influential conservative commentator, 
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Paul Sheehan, for example, demonstrated high levels of Islamophobic discourse and low 
levels of distance from power in 2004 in The SMH. In contrast, in 2004, when the majority of 
the hard news stories from my sample in The Australian indicated high levels of 
Islamophobic discourse and low levels of distance from power, the paper ran a book review 
by the Australian Muslim academic Shakira Hussein, a feature article by Canadian Muslim 
feminist Irshad Manji and a series of letters were printed over a week including a debate over 
the values of peace in Islam, which included a wide diversity of viewpoints on the issues. 
These stories will be considered in more detail in the next chapter. 
These patterns may be taken to indicate two things. Firstly, they may indicate that although 
editorial policy or individual journalistic leanings may have supported a more Islamophobic 
perspective and less distance from power in 2004 and the reverse in 2007, this shift may to 
some extent have been mitigated by the accommodation of opposing views within the ‘soft’ 
sections of the paper. Thus, by careful editorial oversight, both papers could maintain an 
illusion of overall ‘balance’ and ‘objectivity’, thus conforming to one of the dominant 
journalistic norms. 
Secondly, the fact that the most ‘extreme’ views from either period were still able to be 
accommodated within the spectrum of views represented within the two papers indicates that 
in Hallin’s terms, whilst the boundaries of the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’ may have 
shifted, the shift may not have extended the debate significantly into territories which were 
previously ‘deviant’, or conversely, made extremely Islamophobic perspectives so ‘deviant’ 
that they could no longer be accommodated within the paper. 
The influence on news content of editors’ observance of the principle of ‘balance’ may be 
illustrated by two examples. As part of the research for her book The Content Makers, an 
overview of media proprietors and issues facing news production in Australia, the journalist 
Margaret Simons was permitted to sit in on editorial meetings at her former paper, The Age in 
early 2007. At one of these meetings, she recalls two different stories about Muslims being 
pitched to the editor, one with a ‘hardline’ focus on issues related to terrorism, and the other 
on the success of an Islamic school. The editorial decision was to lead with the story on 
‘Islamic terrorism’, but in order to be ‘balanced’ in their coverage, another story was cut so 
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that the positive story on Muslims could be run in the same edition, albeit buried within the 
middle of the paper.565  
In another example, Tom Switzer, the editor of The Australian’s opinion pages from 
September 2001 until February 2008, and therefore responsible for the selection of the 
opinion pieces within the paper over both periods of this study, affirmed that The Australian 
had a deliberate strategy of selecting pieces for the ‘soft’ news sections of the paper to 
balance coverage in other areas of the paper. In October 2006, his paper had broken a story 
on the inflammatory comments of controversial Lakemba-based cleric Sheikh Hilaly on 
women’s responsibility for sexual abuse and adultery. This story then led the Australian news 
agenda for several days, and continued to dominate talkback radio and The Australian’s 
opinion pages and letters for several weeks afterwards.566 Switzer responds to claims that 
racism and bigotry characterised The Australian’s treatment of this story by emphasising that: 
In the immediate aftermath of the publication of the Hilaly story, the Australian 
commissioned several ‘moderate, middle-class Muslims’ to write the lead opinion-
page articles, including Abdullah Saeed…Tanveer Ahmed…and Shakira Hussein. 
In addition, Switzer notes, his paper had ‘published a variety of moderate Muslim voices over 
the years to articulate concerns about the clash between conservative Islam and Western 
modernity’, including articles by Waleed Aly and Irshad Manji. The publication of these 
articles, in Switzer’s opinion, made it ‘clear that The Australian presented a fair and balanced 
spread of opinion on this issue. Not much evidence here of ‘racism and religious bigotry’.567 
As noted above, the fact that some divergent opinions are presented in the ‘soft news’ 
sections of a newspaper does not necessarily outweigh the fact that the bulk of the coverage 
may be overwhelmingly one-sided, or that by the time that dissenting voices are raised in the 
opinion pages, the flurry of reporting which precedes it has already served to frame the 
debate to an extent that cannot be undone simply by commissioning articles for the inner 
pages of the newspaper from ‘moderate, middle-class’ Muslims. It is also evident from 
Switzer’s account that the move to include more Muslim voices was a response to criticisms 
by journalist Mike Carlton and online commentator Irfan Yusuf rather than a desire to present 
alternative views from the outset; that is, that they were retroactive responses to claims that 
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The Australian had not maintained ‘the principle of balance’. In addition, the move to include 
‘moderate, middle-class Muslim’ voices within the opinion pages of The Australian may be a 
step in the right direction, yet still falls into the trap of privileging a very select group of 
Muslim perspectives: those deemed by Switzer and his colleagues to be ‘good’ Muslims 
rather than ‘bad’ Muslims.  
Switzer’s strategy can be considered to align with a Western global narrative justifying 
attitudes and policies towards Muslims and Muslim nations in which governments and other 
representatives of this hegemonic system are ‘selflessly assisting “good” Muslims to fight a 
narrow band of “bad” Muslims infected by a hateful anti-Western ideology’. In this narrative, 
according to Yan Islam, there is a ‘need to co-opt Muslim community leaders as necessary 
interlocutors in the battle of ideas’, a process which ‘along with the global narrative of a 
“good” Muslim/”bad” Muslim dichotomy – can paradoxically sustain Islamophobic 
sentiments’.568 It also amounts to a ‘command performance’, following the prescription of 
Tanja Dreher set out in the previous chapter: although the opportunities for Muslim 
Australians to be heard have expanded through the focus placed upon them by the War on 
Terror and other events of the past decade, Muslim voices are of interest to the news media 
largely ‘in response to the agendas and misconceptions of the “mainstream”’.569 Indicative of 
this issue is Switzer’s explanation of the motivation behind commissioning Muslim 
contributors for The Australian, which he frames in terms of the need to ‘articulate concerns 
about the clash between conservative Islam and Western modernity’. This framing reflects an 
Orientalist and conservative outlook, borrowing heavily as it does from the rhetoric of 
Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis. This perspective on relationships between Muslims 
and non-Muslims and the place of Muslims in Australian and global society is clearly 
problematic. It could be construed that Switzer’s definition of “good” Muslims worthy of 
being printed in the Australians was limited to Muslim voices which did not contest the 
‘clash of civilisations’ framework. 
The other issue which Switzer rightly brings up though is the prominence of The Australian 
in breaking major news stories which impact upon the areas of interest to this story: ‘in the 
lead-up to the 2001 election it was The Australian that exposed the children-overboard story 
as a Howard government fabrication and… [later] torpedoed the government’s legal case 
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against Indian terror suspect Dr Mohamed Haneef’.570 However, even in cases such as this, 
perspective needs to be maintained when valorising prominent examples of ‘adversarial’ 
reporting at the expense of shifting reporting conventions which on a day-to-day basis 
perpetuate Islamophobic frames. The Australian’s breaking of the ‘children overboard’ story, 
for example, occurred in the context of that same newspaper’s adoption of an extremely 
‘loyal’ orientation towards the incumbent government. The Australian formally endorsed the 
Coalition at the 2001 election, despite the Government’s demonstrable deceit over the 
‘children overboard’ case.571 The case against Dr Haneef was ‘torpedoed’ when his lawyers 
leaked police interview transcripts to Hedley Thomas of The Australian. Thomas’ reporting 
was clearly significant as a catalyst towards reframing the discussion on counter-terrorism in 
Australia. However, Thomas himself admitted that until this point, ‘most journalists working 
on the Haneef case, myself included, swallowed the official line’.572 Jacqui Ewart concludes 
that much of the ‘good’ journalistic practice around the reporting of this case ‘was not 
initially driven by the deliberate attempts of journalists to expose the problematic nature of 
the case, but rather largely by dint of circumstances and the lawyers’ handling of the case’. 573 
Returning to the data, in sum, excluding the articles with no authorial attribution at all, there 
was a fairly high variation between the two papers and between the two different years 
regarding the proportion of stories that were derived from journalistic or non-journalistic 
sources (see Figure 10 below). 
When we consider the detailed patterns of authorship or sourcing for stories in the study, 
however, more distinctive patterns emerge (see Figure 11 below). The most noticeable 
disparity between The Australian and The SMH is the much higher reliance of The Australian 
upon wire services, reporters from other publications in the same stable, and unnamed 
sources. No articles in either the 2004 or 2007 data sets for The SMH recorded a wire service 
as the sole source of an article, though three articles in 2007 included both the name of a 
Herald correspondent and an accreditation to a wire service. By contrast, the reliance upon 
wire services ranged between 10.7-18.2% for stories from The Australian. 
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Data Set Total Journalistic Sources 
The Australian (2004) 74.2% 
The Australian (2007) 78.7% 
The SMH (2004) 69.1% 
The SMH (2007) 96% 
                  Figure 10: Total journalistic sources as a percentage of total articles per data set 
 
Two other issues to note regarding the significant difference in authorship patterns between 
the two newspapers is the verbatim reproduction of articles sourced from other papers in the 
same stable. As high as 10% of the articles in the 2004 data set for The Australian were 
sourced in this manner, in contrast to zero articles for either time period for The SMH 
appearing to have been sourced in this way. Similarly, not a single article from The SMH 
considered in this study lacked any attribution to a named individual as the author of the 
story. In contrast, between 10-15% of articles in The Australian had no attribution to any 
author or source at all. 
Data Set Paper’s 
Journalist 
Stable 
Journalist 
Non-Stable 
Journalist 
Personality Letters Wire Other No 
Author 
The 
Australian 
(2004) 
40% 10% 2.3% 4.6% 4.6% 19.5% 3.9% 
(leader) 
15.1% 
The 
Australian 
(2007) 
63% 1.5% 0.0% 6.2% 7.8% 10.2% 1.5% 
(staff) 
9.8% 
The SMH 
(2004) 
63.2% 0.0% 1.5% 16.2% 14.7% 3 mixed 4.4% 
(editorial) 
0.0% 
The SMH 
(2007) 
86% 0.0% 6% 4% 2% 0.0% 2% 
(leader) 
0.0% 
Figure 11: Attribution sources as percentage of total stories per data set 
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Whilst the figures above tend to favour optimistic assessments of the level of original content 
in The SMH as opposed to The Australian, it should be noted that the percentage of stories 
based upon wire copy in both publications may be much higher than the formal accreditation 
figures suggest. As noted by Johnston and Forde in a study on the usage of wire copy by the 
major Australian media proprietors, Australian newspapers routinely employ a variety of 
practices which obscure the heavy reliance upon stories produced by news agencies such as 
the Australian Associated Press (AAP). These include ‘cannibalising’ of wire copy (minimal 
additional reporting or fact-checking, but just enough tweaking of copy to legitimise the use 
of the staff reporter’s byline); printing the name of the wire service journalist as if they were 
a staff reporter; and eliding the origin of a story in wire copy through crediting stories drawn 
from other papers in the same stable to that newspaper, not the wire service as in the original 
accreditation.574 
The incidence of these types of practices within the sample analysed in this study is difficult 
to assess. It is possible to determine that reassuringly, the Australian journalists who are 
credited with a byline in the samples analysed for this study were all bona fide staff reporters. 
Determining the percentage of stories which were not credited to a news agency, but were 
reproduced with minor tweaks under the bylines of staff reporters is even more difficult to 
assess, and is beyond the scope of this study.575 
Some general conclusions may still be drawn regarding the significance of a heavy reliance 
upon wire copy. Wire copy appears to be being used increasingly to fill the ‘news hole’ 
created by 24/7 publishing. Reliance upon wire copy for breaking news in an online context 
then tends to produce a situation where stories covered by the wire services set the daily news 
agenda for the hard copy edition of newspapers.576 For example, in a significant study on 
media sources conducted for the ABC, Pearson et al. found that wire services were a highly 
trusted and the most heavily utilised source for the 100 journalists interviewed, with 78% of 
subjects using wire services as a news source most days.577 
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The implications for news diversity are clear, and taken together with increasing 
concentration of media ownership, it is increasingly apparent that ‘fewer major news 
producers are informing more people and…doing so from fewer sources’.578 It also has 
implications for accuracy, with a high potential for errors in wire copy being reproduced  
without question by many different Australian media outlets, as recent job cuts in Australian 
newsrooms have particularly impacted upon editorial oversight and ‘fact-checking’ 
procedures.579 Although retractions and corrections will usually be printed, these often appear 
days later and buried within subsequent editions, whilst the inaccuracies have already been 
widely publicised, as in the case of the inaccurate reporting in regards to the Haneef case.580 
The entrenchment of ‘churnalism’ (tweaking wire copy or press releases to generate a 
constant flow of news) is therefore a particularly troubling development in modern news 
production.581 
Another aspect of reliance upon wire copy is that in the interests of making their copy a 
useful resource for a wide spectrum of secondary media outlets, news agencies adhere to a 
particularly strict form of the journalistic norms of ‘objectivity and neutrality’, which may or 
may not be conformed to by their clients.  As emphasised by Chris Paterson in his study of 
the dominance of news agencies in the reporting of international news, ‘in so doing, they 
manufacture an ideologically distinctive and homogenous view of the world’.582 
Characteristic of this approach, agencies generally have little motivation in challenging the 
‘ideological positions’ of dominant international actors such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  
On the other hand, the emphasis on traditional journalistic norms can also prompt more 
radical approaches to reporting, as exemplified by Reuters’ policy regarding the use of the 
words ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ in their copy. This policy rests on the basis that the description 
of acts of violence is a sensitive issue which generates widely divergent opinions about how 
the perpetrators should be portrayed, and Reuters journalists should therefore aim to use 
‘dispassionate’ and specific terms such as ‘bomber’ or ‘hijacking’ rather than ‘terrorist’ or 
‘terrorism’ (except where directly or indirectly quoting a source). This is noted as part of ‘a 
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wider and long-standing policy of avoiding the use of emotive terms’: Reuters advises 
journalists not to ‘label’ the subjects of news stories, but ‘to report objectively their actions, 
identity and background’. 583 
Such strict application of the norms of ideological and/or linguistic objectivity and neutrality 
are not necessarily followed by the media outlets which utilise agency copy. In a study of the 
types of changes to online stories by CNN, the BBC and Al Jazeera, Kutz and Herring  found 
that the second most common form of revision was what they termed ‘ideological’; that is, 
the addition of the outlet’s own particular ideological ‘spin’ and the insertion of the type of 
‘emotionally manipulative’ language that the agencies explicitly avoid.584 An example of this 
is the controversial back-substitution of ‘terrorist’ for neutral terms like ‘insurgents’ and 
‘rebels’ by the Canadian publishing giant, CanWest, which led to a surprising development in 
which Reuters requested newspapers from the stable to not to credit them in the bylines of 
stories which had been altered in such a manner.585 
Kutz and Herring posit that such changes might not simply be driven by the agendas and 
worldviews of the editorial staff or the publisher, but may reflect an attempt to increase 
circulation by shifting to more provocative language. In either case, these types of changes, 
Kutz and Herring emphasise, are ‘typically superfluous to the events of the story’ and ‘are of 
no news values to the reader’. Instead, their value lies in the ‘persuasive impact’ that they 
might create upon readers.586 
The use of emotive, victimising and demonising language was an explicit category within my 
content analysis, and higher proportions of these types of language are strongly associated 
with a ‘war journalism’ approach, with its concomitant psychological effects upon the 
audience. When undertaking my content and discourse analysis, I will need to keep in mind 
the two characteristics of wire copy and its use outlined above: that the ‘objectivity and 
neutrality’ espoused by the major news agencies may on the one hand through its 
‘homogenising’ approach foster a lack of critical engagement with hegemonic global forces, 
or may alternatively reveal a site at which the ideological bent or framing preferences of 
particular news outlets are projected upon the ‘facts’ of a story.  
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Dispatches from Reuters or the Associated Press, for example, from newsworthy conflicts 
such as in the Middle East are intended for use by clients worldwide, including in many 
countries that lack Australia’s specific discursive framework, evolved through the historical 
processes outlined in earlier chapters, in which Islam and Muslims have been thoroughly 
essentialised and demonised for political purposes. The sample of news stories for the present 
study would, therefore, most likely contain examples of agency copy having been 
significantly tweaked on its insertion into an Australian mediascape.  
These issues may be less apparent in my analysis of articles in The SMH, for as outlined 
above, the majority of stories based on journalistic sources are attributed to staff reporters and 
correspondents. With regards to The Australian, however, at least 29% of the stories from the 
2004 data set, for example, were reproduced content generated by journalists working for 
wire services or other branches of News Corp., rather than staff reporters. This has important 
implications for considering the origin and impact of dominant discourses discernible in the 
paper, especially given the reputation of The Australian as a ‘quality’ broadsheet paper. 
Traditionally, such a paper could be expected to perform much of its own research and 
development of stories, as well as having a distinctive ‘voice’.  
The relatively low quotient of original content in The Australian, as opposed to The SMH 
reveals an interesting divergence in the political economy of news production. It can be 
assumed that the high use of unoriginal content would substantially reduce the cost of 
production, which can then potentially foster the sidelining of staff reporters. Such 
developments are therefore a significant feature of the contemporary media landscape. 
d) Attribution 
The previous section contains numerous, largely speculative references to the balance of 
structure and agency in supplying factors influencing the content of news. While early studies 
in content analysis attributed significant, even primary influence to the individual journalist, 
as a ‘gatekeeper’,587 an evolving scholarly consensus has since tended to downplay such 
factors, instead typically modelling a more complex array of domains of influence. A much-
cited study by Reese and Shoemaker suggests organising news influences into five 
hierarchically nested levels: the individual, media routines, and organisational imperatives – 
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all tangible in day-to-day journalistic work – as well as the tacit operation of extra-media and 
ideological levels.588 
One of the key arenas in which journalists may exert some degree of agency over what they 
write is the byline. The byline is a signal to readers that a named reporter’s personal 
credibility is invested in the story, over and above the reputation of the news organisation 
itself. The presence or absence of bylines, as a convention observed to a greater or lesser 
extent in different publications, can therefore carry its own ideological significance, as a 
bulwark against the erosion of journalistic values by narrowly conceived corporate 
objectives. That, in turn, could have implications for the potential in Australian media for 
contestation of dominant representations of Islam and Muslims. News managements may 
exhibit ‘subservien[ce]…because in wartime [the media] considers its commercial and 
political interests lie with supporting the government of the day’,589 but this may come into 
implicit tension with what Mark Deuze found were ‘ideal-typical traits or values’, shared 
among journalists worldwide, including ‘public service… objectivity [and] autonomy’ in 
their working practices, guided by some sense of ‘ethics, validity and legitimacy’.590 Deuze’s 
work resonates with the evidence presented in Chapter 3 of the perceived ‘distance from 
power’ of the majority of Australian journalists. 
The Economist has steadfastly retained a policy of no personal attributions for its journalists 
up until the present day, maintaining that ‘what is written is more important than who wrote 
it’, and that prohibiting bylines enables the paper to speak with a unified voice. This is, 
however, by no means the standard within the news media milieu.591 Whilst the norm of 
authorial attribution in the media was slow to develop and remains inconsistent among many 
news outlets, the overall trend during the twentieth century was towards less arbitrary and 
more transparent attribution regimes, such that in some publications, such as The New York 
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Times, all contributors to an article will receive some form of public recognition of their 
contribution in the form of a byline, whether ‘star’ writers, wire agencies or ‘stringers’.592  
This more inclusive type of attribution regime is evident in The SMH, where all articles in my 
samples had authorial attributions, with multiple attributions present in a number of cases, 
and the use of significant amounts of wire copy was explicitly acknowledged. In contrast, the 
attribution regime that this study indicates as prevailing at The Australian during 2004 and 
2007 is characterised by its arbitrariness. When the lack of personal attributions on stories 
sourced from agencies like AFP or AAP is taken into account, between 19% and 32% of 
articles from the two samples drawn from The Australian do not have a personal authorial 
attribution.593 
Data Set Named 
Journalist 
Named 
Non-
Journalist 
Editorial  Total 
Attributed 
Total 
Unattributed 
The 
Australian 
(2004) 
54.7% 9% 3.9% 67.6% 32.4% 
The 
Australian 
(2007) 
64.5% 15% .7% 80.2% 19.8% 
The SMH 
(2004) 
64.7% 30.9% 4.4% 100% - 
The SMH 
(2007) 
92% 6% 2% 100% - 
        Figure 12: Authorial attribution as a percentage of total articles per data set 
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It is probable that the arbitrariness of this attribution system could contribute to alienating 
writers from the implications of their work. If journalists are required to produce copy 
without a byline, they may not truly feel accountable for their writing, in particular for any 
stereotypes they may perpetuate. Authorial attribution is crucial to a real and metaphysical 
sense of ownership over what is produced: 
Reporters’ bylines are a focal point of some of the most fundamental issues in 
journalism theory. These ostensibly frivolous honours may convey the extent to which 
news constitutes an institutional or individual enterprise, reflecting its creativity or 
objectivity and echoing the power relations between the people at the front of the 
journalistic stage and those who pull the strings behind it.594 
A potential further reason for the significance of bylines was suggested by the website/blog 
Things Journalists Like. The site suggests that ‘that one line of ink means the world to 
journalists’ because in an environment of cutbacks and hiring freezes, the byline provides a 
measure of productivity: 
Who cares if a journalist won a Pulitzer in 2006 for an amazing investigative 
piece…how many bylines have they had in the past three days? That’s what editors 
care about, and if the answer isn’t 35 look out. 
The bottom line, according to this blog, is that ‘bylines equal job security for journalists’.595 
This popular culture analysis of the significance of bylines is supported by a study into the 
significance of authorial attribution by Duke Professor of Law, Catherine Fisk. Fisk locates 
the significance of attribution in four key functions: ‘a reward and incentive for future 
creativity’; ‘a form of discipline that punishes unacceptable work’; creation of a brand; and 
humanisation, by ‘linking the products of work to the reality of human endeavour’.596 The 
extension of bylines to most, if not all of the contributors to a news story, fulfils the first two 
functions in a practical sense: it recognises and makes explicit the contributions of all 
participants in the process of creating a story, and it serves corporate self-interest, so that 
‘fault for journalistic scandals can be attributed to individuals rather than to the paper as a 
whole’.597  
                                                
594 Reich, "Constrained Authors: Bylines and Authorship in American News Reporting," p. 21. 
595 Christopher Ortiz and David Young, "#14 - Bylines," Stuff Journalists Like, 
http://www.stuffjournalistslike.com/2008/12/14-bylines.html. 
596 Fisk, "Attribution," pp. 56. 
597 Fisk, "Attribution," p. 62. 
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In addition to what bylines signal to journalists and their employers, bylines also provide 
signals to the audience. In this sense, bylines function as a ‘brand’, indicating the reliability 
of the journalists attached to a particular media outlet or humanising their work, such that the 
audience can connect with and approach news from a level of personal engagement: 
‘Attribution is a type of signal, and it operates in labour and other markets plagued by 
information asymmetries in which reliable signals are important’.598 I would argue that 
journalism operates in exactly one of those types of markets. 
Finally, it is interesting to note variations between the proportion of articles between different 
data sets which contained the description of the author as a correspondent or editor from a 
particular region or speciality (Figure 13). In The Australian, attributions such as ‘Jakarta 
correspondent’ or ‘correspondents in Baghdad’ were frequent but often in the absence of a 
journalists’ name – perhaps indicating utilisation of wire copy rather than staff 
correspondents. In this sense they are more of a dateline than a byline as such. 
Data Set Geographical/Speciality 
Byline  
The Australian (2004) 18% 
The Australian (2007) 25.9% 
The SMH (2004) 23.5% 
The SMH (2007) 32% 
Figure 13: Geographical/speciality byline as a percentage of total articles per data set 
 
I see the inclusion of such sub-bylines as a strategy akin to providing clear authorial 
attribution to named journalists: they lend weight and authority to the paper, and affirm their 
commitment to traditional news values. The consistent use of bylines combined with 
datelines for Herald correspondents, for example, gives the impression that the correspondent 
is close to the source of news and is ‘breaking’ the story to the audience at home. I suspect it 
may also reflect differences in journalistic culture between the two papers: the more frequent 
inclusion of titles such as ‘Chief Political Correspondent’ or ‘Asia-Pacific Editor’ for articles 
                                                
598 Fisk, "Attribution," p. 54. 
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within The SMH may indicate prestige markers within the organisation, as well as signalling 
status and authoritativeness to the audience. 
These factors impact upon my study because they reveal the nature of the relationship 
between journalists, or other contributors, to newspapers. Whilst much research on media 
effects and the relationship between politics and the media focuses specifically on journalists 
and journalistic culture, by analysing articles from all areas of the paper in my study I have 
been required to go beyond these factors and consider the composition of the paper as a 
whole. In terms of representations of Islam, it is clearly apparent from my study of the 
physical features of my data that a significant proportion of content is derived from sources 
other than journalists, or by sources which are not even named. Nevertheless, the selection of 
these opinion or feature articles, as discussed above, is still dictated by journalistic 
conventions such as the norms of balance and objectivity. 
It also helps to explain some of the potential discrepancies between high levels of distance 
from power reported by Australian journalists, and the low levels of distance from power 
sometimes manifested in content. Perhaps in situations such as those that appear to pertain at 
The Australian, where bylines were not consistently granted, and status markers such as 
editorial position were not routinely recorded, the influence of journalists over their content is 
reduced. 
If this chapter has concentrated on the physical characteristics of articles included in the 
present study – and their potential significance regarding more substantive issues of ideology 
in representation – I now move on to apply to the full sample of my articles, the evaluative 
criteria which I devised to produce a comparative analysis of the extent of Islamophobia in 
the two periods, as evident in the social artefact of news.  
Islamophobic Index – Overview 
Many of the patterns which I observed in the Pilot Study held true for the patterns observed 
in the full data sets: in short, ‘closed’ views of Islam were more prevalent in 2004 than in 
2007, and in The Australian than in The SMH (see Appendix x for the full results for this 
section of the study). The results for the proportion of articles in each data set which were 
coded as characterised on the whole by either  ‘open’, ‘neutral’ or ‘closed’ views of Islam can 
be seen in Figure 14: 
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Figure 14: Islamophobic Index - Summed Scores as a percentage of total articles per data set 
As can be seen from this chart, the Summed Scores for ratings on the eight dimensions of the 
Islamophobic Index reveal clear differences between the two different time periods and the 
two different newspapers. Overall, the highest proportion of articles with negative sum totals, 
that is, articles which were classified as ‘closed’, were found in The Australian in 2004 
(66%), followed by The Australian in 2007 (48%), then The SMH in 2004 (38%) and The 
SMH in 2007 (24%). The highest proportion of articles with positive summed scores, that is, 
articles which were classified as ‘open’, were found in reverse order, with The SMH in 2007 
(64%) and 2004 (50%) followed by The Australian in 2007 (47%) and The Australian in 
2004 (25%). In fact, the proportions of closed to open articles in The Australian in 2004 (66% 
closed, 25% open) are almost exactly the inverse of the proportions of open to closed articles 
in The SMH in 2007 (64% open, 24% closed). The proportion of stories which were coded as 
‘neutral’ was quite similar across the four data sets, ranging from 9% to 13% in The 
Australian, and being exactly 12% in both 2004 and 2007 for The SMH. 
 
Although this is the type of pattern I anticipated from analysis of the full four data sets based 
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Study, I was not expecting the distinction between the two newspapers to be quite so stark. In 
particular, I was struck by the fact that although I did find that there were fewer articles from 
The SMH in 2007 which were classified as ‘closed’ and more which were classified as ‘open’ 
in 2004 than was found for articles from The Australian from 2004, there were still more 
closed articles and fewer open articles in The Australian in 2007 than in The SMH in 2004. In 
other words, although there was a significant decrease in the levels of ‘Islamophobic’ 
representations of Islam and Muslims in The Australian between 2004 and 2007, the levels of 
Islamophobia identified in this study were still higher in The Australian in 2007 than they 
were in The SMH in 2004. Despite the significant increase in ‘open’ views towards Islam and 
decrease in ‘closed’ views towards Islam and Muslims, it is notable that even in the data set 
with the highest levels of ‘open’ articles, The SMH in 2007, almost a quarter of the articles 
were still classified as ‘closed’.   
Distribution of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ views of Islam and Muslims 
When I considered the distribution of articles along the spectrum of closed and open views, I 
found that in both time periods and both publications the range of scores was quite high 
(Figure 15).  
   
Figure 15: Islamophobic Index Summed Scores - range per data set 
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The greatest range was found in The Australian in 2004, when there were articles within my 
data set which received the lowest possible score, -8, but also one article which received the 
highest possible score of +8, denoting ‘extremely open’ views towards Islam. The range of 
summed scores for articles from The Australian in 2007 and The SMH in 2004 was identical, 
with both data sets containing articles receiving the lowest possible score of -8, extending 
through to an upper limit of +7. The most restricted range was found in The SMH in 2007, 
where the lower limit was -4 and the upper limit remained at +7. Restriction of the range of 
scores indicates a shifting of the boundaries which define ‘legitimate controversy’. In articles 
analysed from The SMH in 2007, there were no articles classified as ‘extremely closed’ or 
‘very closed’; this suggests that such views were no longer endorsed as acceptable or 
legitimate; in fact, they may have been in the process of becoming consigned to the zone of 
‘deviancy’. That such extreme views continued to be printed in The Australian even in 2007, 
however, suggests that the boundaries of discussion had not shifted so far in this publication 
(and potentially in wider public discourse). 
In order to further elucidate the distribution of ‘open’ and ‘closed’ articles within the four 
data sets, I then compared the most extreme articles from the four data sets. Detailed analysis 
of the more extreme articles is particularly valuable because it further delineates shifts in the 
parameters of debate over Islam and Muslims. Such articles reveal the most extreme 
viewpoints on the subject which were considered within the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’ 
by the different publications and to what extent the definitions of what it was acceptable to 
say in public discourse shifted between the different time periods and across the two different 
publications. I defined the ‘most extreme’ articles from the four data sets as articles which 
received a rating of either ‘Extremely Closed’ or ‘Extremely Open’. The rating of ‘Extremely 
Closed’ was applied to articles which received a summed score on the Islamophobic Index of 
either -8 or -7; the rating of ‘Extremely Open’ was applied to articles which received summed 
scores of +7 or +8. I found a similar pattern of distribution of the most extreme articles to that 
observed for the overall proportions of open and closed articles. 
As can be seen from Figure 16, the number of articles which were classified as being 
‘Extremely Closed’ was highest for The Australian in 2004 (11 articles). There was a 
significant difference between the number of ‘Extremely Closed’ articles recorded for this 
data set and for the other three data sets; The SMH in 2004 had the next highest number at 4 
articles, which was comparable to the results for The Australian in 2007. In 2007, there were 
no articles classified as ‘Extremely Closed’ from The SMH. The number of articles which 
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were classified as ‘Extremely Open’ was comparable across the four data sets, with no 
significant variation between the sets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Figure 16: Number of 'Extremely Closed' and 'Extremely Open' articles per data set  
 
On balance, therefore, extreme articles were predominantly those articles which featured 
closed views towards Islam rather than more open views. The range of articles highlighted in 
the previous paragraph suggests that in all data sets except that of The SMH in 2007 there was 
a large variety of viewpoints on Islam and Muslims articulated with each newspaper, perhaps 
indicating an attempt at satisfying the principle of ‘balance’ in printing both extremely 
negative and extremely positive articles on matters pertaining to Islam and Muslims. 
However, comparison of the number of extreme articles reveals that in The Australian in 
2004 and 2007 and in The SMH in 2004, there were numerically more ‘extremely closed’ 
articles on Islam than there were ‘extremely open’ ones. The Australian in 2004 demonstrated 
the greatest disparity between extreme articles, with 11 articles classified as ‘extremely 
closed’ and just one article classified as ‘extremely open’. It is particularly pertinent to note 
that only one article received the score of +8 out of all four data sets, and this article was in 
The Australian in 2004 (A04_111), even though this was the data set which was most 
dominated by closed views of Islam and Muslims. As will be discussed in the next chapter, 
The Australian made clearly discernible efforts to try and ‘balance’ the extremely negative 
coverage of issues related to Islam and Muslims in both time periods, and the inclusion of 
this ‘extremely open’ article in 2004 was highly likely to have been a deliberate editorial 
decision to counteract claims (or potential accusations) of a lack of ‘balance and fairness’ on 
the part of the paper. 
Data set 
No. 'Extremely 
Closed' articles 
No. 'Extremely 
Open' articles 
The Australian (2004) 11 1 
The Australian (2007) 3 2 
The SMH (2004) 4 2 
The SMH (2007) 0 1 
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Islamophobic Index - average summed scores 
As well as considering the extreme cases, it is worth analysing the averages of the scores 
across the different data sets to see whether this information supports the picture which is 
emerging so far of differences between the two publications across the two different time 
periods. Figure 17 presents the average score for all summed scores per data set as well as the 
average of the closed and open scores. 
Figure 17: Average Score for Summed Scores, 'Closed' Scores, and 'Open' Scores per data set 
The averages of the summed scores cluster around zero, which is not particularly surprising 
given the large range of scores in the four data sets, as discussed above. The pattern of 
difference between the four data sets mimics the pattern noted for the overall incidence of 
closed versus open views, that is, the lowest average of summed scores was found for The 
Australian in 2004 (-0.8), with the average of summed scores for The Australian in 2007 
slightly higher (-0.2). The average for summed scores in The SMH in 2004 was a perfect 
zero, and reached 0.9 in The SMH in 2007. The incidence of closed articles for the different 
data sets were more strongly associated with the year rather than the publication, with the 
lowest average negative scores actually found in The SMH in 2004 (-4.2), but with the 
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average getting closer to zero for both publications in 2007. Another surprising result is that 
the lowest average positive score across all four sets was actually for The SMH in 2007. In 
2004, the average summed score for ‘closed’ articles in both publications is more extreme 
than the average of ‘open’ articles, but this pattern is reversed in 2007. Taken together, these 
averages suggest a pattern of an aggregate movement towards more open views towards 
Islam and Muslims between 2004 and 2007 and overall more open representational patterns 
of Muslims in The SMH than in The Australian, though with some minor exceptions to this 
pattern. 
Islamophobic Index – results for individual dimensions 
As with the overall results, the results for individual dimensions on the Islamophobic Index 
demonstrated very similar patterns to those that were observed in the Pilot Study and for the 
overall summed scores for the whole sample. For every single dimension of the Index, the 
highest level of negative scores (indicating ‘closed’ views of Islam on that particular 
dimension) were for articles from The Australian in 2004, and the lowest level of positive 
scores (indicating ‘open’ views of Islam on that particular dimension) were for articles from 
The SMH in 2007. For five out of the eight dimensions, articles from The Australian in 2007 
were less likely to be coded as ‘closed’ than articles from The SMH in 2004; therefore the 
year of publication more strongly influenced the reduction of closed views on individual 
dimensions of the Index than did the publication. The lowest level of ‘open’ scores was for 
articles from The Australian in 2004, and the second lowest level of ‘open’ scores were for 
articles from The Australian in 2007, which had a lower percentage of open scores than 
articles from The SMH in either 2004 or 2007 on six out of the eight dimensions. The 
distinction between The SMH in 2004 and 2007 on open views was not as clearcut; on many 
dimensions the percentage of ‘open’ views were very close and on two dimensions the 
percentage of ‘open’ stories was actually higher in The SMH in 2004 than in 2007.   
When considering patterns within the scoring for the different dimensions, a distinct divide 
was visible between the first five dimensions of the Index (Figure 18), which pertained to 
representations of Islam and Muslims, and the final three dimensions of the Index (Figure 
19), which related more directly to the justification or condemnation of hostility, 
discrimination and prejudice directed towards Islam and Muslims. ‘Closed’ views of Islam 
were generally much more prevalent on the first five dimensions than on the final three; it 
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seems apparent from this study that even though negative stereotypes about Islam and 
Muslim were routinely endorsed and promulgated in many of the articles surveyed, to go the 
next step and actively defend or advocate repressive or discriminatory actions towards 
Muslims was far less acceptable.    
Figure 18: Articles defined as 'open' or 'closed' on each of the first five dimensions of the 
Islamophobic Index (as a percentage of total articles per data set) 
 
In each of the four data sets, the dimension with the highest percentage of ‘closed’ scores and 
among the lowest percentage of ‘open’ scores was Dimension 4, Enemy/Partner. In The 
Australian in 2004, 55% of articles were coded as negative/closed on this dimension, which 
means that Islam and Muslims were predominantly represented as ‘violent, aggressive, 
threatening, supportive of terrorism, engaged in a “clash of civilisations”’, rather than being 
presented as ‘an actual or potential partner in joint cooperative enterprises and in the solution 
of shared problems’. Even in The SMH in 2004, which had the lowest percentage of articles 
coded as negative on this dimension, fully 30% of articles still represented Muslims and 
Islam as the ‘enemy’ and just 6% of articles represented Islam as a ‘potential partner’. 
Dimension 5 followed a similar pattern as Dimension 4, with the second highest percentage 
of articles coded as closed on this dimension in every data set. As was foregrounded in the 
Pilot Study, scoring of articles on this dimension was characterised by the lowest proportion 
of ‘open’ views towards Islam. The range of articles which presented Islam as ‘a genuine 
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religious faith, practised sincerely by its adherents’ was only 6-9% (highest in The Australian 
in 2007).  
As noted in the previous chapter, the justification or denial of anti-Muslim prejudice and 
discrimination and the normalisation of Islamophobia are particularly highlighted by 
Dimensions 6-8 of the scale, and slightly different patterns of response were recorded for 
these three dimensions than for the first five dimensions of the Index, with an overall 
tendency on these three dimensions towards neutral scores and markedly lower proportions of 
negative scores on these dimensions. As can be seen from the table above, although it was 
rare for articles to openly dismiss criticisms of actions by the ‘West’ or explicitly defend and 
normalise discrimination against Muslims, there were also relatively few articles which were 
coded with positive scores for presenting open views on these dimensions; by far the most 
common score for articles on these three dimensions was ‘neutral’. The effect of the year was 
particularly pronounced upon these three dimensions. In 2007, for both publications the 
highest proportion of open articles and the lowest proportion of closed articles were in these 
three categories: in fact, in 2007 in The SMH not a single article was coded as negative on 
Dimensions 6, 7 and 8. That means that not a single article dismissed criticisms of the ‘West’ 
‘out of hand’; used ‘hostility towards Islam’ to ‘justify discriminatory practices and exclusion 
of Muslims’, or normalised anti-Muslim hostility. This is a quite significant finding.  
Figure 19: Articles defined as 'open' or 'closed' on each of the first five dimensions of the 
Islamophobic Index (as a percentage of total articles per data set) 
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Hard vs Soft news 
Although my initial reading of the articles in the full data set had led me to suspect that there 
might be strong patterns distinguishing the representations of Islam and Muslims in ‘hard’ as 
opposed to ‘soft’ news, the data analysis did not strongly support these initial assumptions. 
No clear patterns emerged from the data, aside from general indications of the shift towards 
more open views of Islam in 2007 than in 2004 and in The SMH than in The Australian, 
which were already evident from the other aspects of this study.  
As can be seen from Figure 20, for three of the four data sets, the average Summed Score for 
soft news articles was higher for the soft news items than for the hard news items, with the 
average summed score for hard news items always in the negative (indicating a 
predominance of ‘closed’ views towards Islam in the article). The sole exception was for The 
SMH in 2007, where the hard news average Summed Score slightly exceeded the soft news 
average Summed Score, and both were positive, indicating considerably more open views 
towards Islam and Muslim than was true for the other three data sets. The incidence of 
‘extremely closed’ and ‘extremely open’ articles shows only weak patterns: in most cases, for 
example, articles at the extremes are roughly balanced within the same data set. This is seen 
most clearly in The SMH: in 2004 there are two ‘extremely closed’ soft news stories, and two 
‘extremely open’ soft news stories; in 2007, there are no ‘extremely open’ or ‘extremely 
closed’ soft news stories. 
Figure 20: Average Summed Scores for Hard and Soft News per data set 
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The range limits for summed scores show similarly weak patterns (Figure 21). In 2004, for 
example, there are no hard news stories which were classified as ‘extremely open’ for either 
newspaper, and the range for hard news stories in this period was identical for both 
newspapers (-8 to +5).  I suspect this is due to the fact that hard news stories which contained 
reference to Muslims and Islam in this period were dominated by accounts of terrorist attacks 
and the War in Iraq, and that this subject set numerous reporting constraints which favoured 
the inclusion of more ‘closed’ views of Islam and limited the inclusion of more ‘open’ views 
of Islam. In contrast, in 2007 when the most reported subjects in hard news stories were the 
Lindsay leafleting scandal and the dismissal of a prominent counter-terrorism case, the 
possibilities for presenting more open views of Islam and for circumventing conventions 
which favoured closed representations of Islam were greatly expanded. Correspondingly, 
there were no hard news stories scored as ‘extremely closed’ for either newspaper in 2007. 
Despite the lack of clear numerical patterns regarding the distribution, incidence and range of 
hard versus soft news, there were nevertheless interesting interactions between particular 
story threads which are worth detailed consideration, and will be considered in the next 
chapter. First though, I will summarise the findings of my study regarding the representation 
of Muslims as a ‘problem’ before moving to more detailed discussion of particular clusters of 
articles in Chapter 11. 
Figure 21: Range of Summed Scores for Hard and Soft news per data set 
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Representing Islam as a ‘problem’ 
The numerical data for the proportion of articles which either did or did not identify Islam as 
a problem were generally in line with the results for other aspects of this study (Figure 22). 
The highest percentage of articles identifying Islam as a problem, and the lowest percentage 
of articles which specifically identified an alternative problem or no problem at all were from 
The Australian in 2004. In contrast, the lowest percentage of articles identifying Islam as a 
problem, and the highest percentage of articles which specifically identified an alternative 
problem or no problem at all were from The SMH in 2007. There were proportionally fewer 
articles identifying Islam as a problem from The Australian in 2007 than there were from The 
SMH in 2004, yet The SMH in 2004 nevertheless identified an alternative problem in 
proportionally more articles than in The Australian in 2007. The proportion of articles which 
were coded as ‘neutral’ on this measure was much higher in 2007 for both publications, and 
in all data sets, a considerable minority of articles were coded as ‘neutral’ on the issue of 
whether ‘Islam’ was a problem. Reductions in framing Islam as a ‘problem’ therefore 
frequently translated into a more neutral framing of the ‘problem’, rather than a clear-cut 
transition towards framing alternative targets as a problem. 
Figure 22: Percentage of articles per data set which identified Islam as a problem 
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undeniably a problem, I coded it as having framed Islam/Muslims as a ‘problem’. I coded 
articles as neutral if they did not specifically identify Islam or Muslims as a problem in a 
generalising and essentialising manner. Finally, I coded articles as having identified an 
alternative problem if they framed, for example, a specific Islamic practice, or a specific 
Muslim person or organisation as a ‘problem’, but explicitly distinguished between Islam as a 
religion or Muslims as a whole and the specified ‘problem’. Many articles which were not 
classified as framing ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslims per se as a problem identified a joint problem: 
Muslim extremists, for example, and the US Government and its allies in the War on Terror.  
A significant issue which I found in coding on this dimension was that the majority of articles 
which I coded as neutral, and many of the articles I coded as identifying an alternative target, 
specifically identified as a problem targets which may have been clearly differentiated from 
‘Islam’ as a religion and ‘Muslims’ as whole in that specific article, but were not necessarily 
distinguished in this way in other articles from the sample. The list of predominant alternative 
targets in this case included Islamism, Islamists, and terrorists, militants, extremists, 
fundamentalists, insurgents, fanatics or radicals, with the latter terms almost invariably paired 
with ‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim’. These are the exact type of terms which the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission had singled out as early as 1991 as harmful, demonising 
labels which should be avoided in media coverage of conflicts, as highlighted in Chapter 6, 
and contemporary analysis has identified as a continuing problem in the representations of 
Muslims and Islam.599  
Even in cases where the author of a story carefully defined or explained their use of such 
labels, the definition of terms varied widely across the wider sample and therefore even clear 
distinctions between minority views within Islam and broader consensus between Muslims 
worldwide, or careful, neutral definitions of, for example, ‘Islamism’ could be negated by the 
less discriminate writing in other articles within the same newspaper, or even within the same 
article. An example worth considering is ‘Credo of the Knife’, by The Australian’s Middle 
East Correspondent, Nicholas Rothwell (A04_56). Rothwell’s story is predominantly a 
profile of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born leader of the Iraqi militant group 
Tawhid al-Jihad, who had claimed responsibility for several executions of hostages during 
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2004. Rothwell clearly distinguishes between the ‘creed’ of Zarqawi and the beliefs and 
practices of the majority of Muslims: 
He [Zarqawi] believes his killings of bound victims are sanctioned by sharia, or 
Islamic law, and that the men he holds are not hostages but spies or captives of war. 
Zarqawi, then, is a clear, consistent enemy of the Western armies in Iraq and of all 
who support them. He speaks for a tiny minority within Islam and the 400 million 
inhabitants of the Middle East. Moderate governments abhor him and his methods; 
few devout Muslims would endorse his aims. 
This, then, is promising: clear references to the diversity of viewpoints within the Islamic 
world and emphasis on the fact that the ideology of Zarqawi is that of a ‘tiny minority’. Yet 
the article as a whole is framed as a story about the ‘clash of civilisations’; the article begins 
with this chilling image: 
When the blade wielded by master terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi first broke the 
frail skin of American hostage Eugene Armstrong’s neck this week, two worlds on 
collision course met in blood. One of those worlds, the narrow domain of militant 
Islam, is full of grievance, anger and certainty; the other, the amorphous, sentimental, 
economically potent West, is a vulnerable target. 
In his story of a ‘clash of opposites’, as Rothwell terms it, it is difficult for Rothwell to 
sustain an emphasis on the diversity within Islam. On the same day in The Australian, 
moreover, the majority of articles referring to Muslims or Islam detailed terrorist attacks, 
military insurgencies and repressive laws in Muslim countries including Sudan, Chechnya, 
Indonesia, Iraq, and Turkey (A04_49; A04_50; A04_57; A04_58; A04_60). Another article 
discussed how ‘economically backward Muslims’ were the fastest growing demographic in 
India, with concerns raised over the fact that ‘Muslims had the highest fertility rates [yet] 
they had the lowest overall literacy and employment rates’ (A04_55). The Australian printed 
one short story that same day criticising the War on Terror (A04_55), but not a single story 
about Muslims or Islam which was positive. In the face of such a weight of evidence of the 
essential similarity and association with negativity of Muslims across the globe, maintaining 
a clear sense that the views and actions of individuals like Zarqawi were not representative of 
the majority of Muslims or definitive of Islam as a whole would therefore be difficult for 
readers of The Australian. 
The definition of terms used to describe Muslim actors also varies widely within different 
articles, so the careful definition of a particular label in one article in order to explain why 
that term is being chosen or applied is easily counteracted by the prevailing usage of terms. 
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This is particularly true of the term ‘Islamist’. Use of this term is problematic because 
although it is used offhand as a descriptor in multiple articles, there is no universally agreed 
definition for ‘Islamism’ or ‘Islamist’. An academic definition of ‘Islamism’ would 
acknowledge the distinction between ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islam’, and emphasise the wide 
diversity of movements, organisations and political parties which could be labelled ‘Islamist’, 
as in this definition by Teti and Mura: 
‘Islamism’ is simply a set of political and social movements aiming to “bring Islam 
back” into politics and society. Islamists aim for some kind of “Islamisation” of the 
state and/or of society, meaning essentially the return to a more socially and morally 
just life. 
Teti and Mura further emphasise that although some groups which can be seen as having 
‘Islamising’ aims endorse violent means to achieve such ends, ‘most Muslims and most 
Islamist politics remain non-violent and desirous of more, not less, democracy’.600  
The term ‘Islamist’ is used in a relatively neutral sense in some articles within my sample 
which accords relatively well with the definition given by Teti and Mura. Turkey’s 
government is referred to in several articles as ‘Islamist’, for example, which if given the 
definition above is certainly true (A04_58; A04_84; A04_122). However, this type of 
understanding of Islamism is extremely rare within articles in my sample, where the term is 
applied almost universally as a negative label, and is frequently paired with terms such as 
‘extremist’, ‘terrorism’, ‘militants’ or ‘fanatics’. If given the definition of ‘Islamism’ 
expanded upon in some of the articles in my sample, it is clear that the casual and frequent 
usage of this term in newspaper articles is highly problematic. In an article which originally 
appeared in The Times, for example, Richard Beeston and Stephen Farrell define Islamists as: 
Religious fanatics with aims that include establishing sharia law across the Muslim 
world, toppling secular Arab regimes and removing US, Israeli and "infidel" forces 
from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Palestine (A04_98). 
In another article which originally appeared in The Times, journalist-turned-politician 
Michael Gove used even more inflammatory language to define Islamists as ‘barbarians’ who 
‘shed infidel blood in pursuit of a medieval ideology of death’ (A04_39). Using the term 
‘Islamist’ indiscriminately to refer to specific political groups, governing parties, and in 
polemical attacks serves to collapse distinctions between different political movements and 
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groups across the world, to foster the notion of Islam as monolithic, unchanging, and 
unreservedly ‘barbaric’ and aggressive. There are, therefore, some issues with my 
categorisation of some articles within my sample on the question of whether they represented 
Islam as a problem, because the care taken by some authors in definition of terms and 
clarification of the ‘problem’ was not always consonant with the more common patterns of 
labelling and usage of terms within other articles in the sample. 
For those articles which identified an alternative target as ‘the problem’, or identified no 
target at all, the leading alternatives were considerably similar between the two publications. 
In 2004, articles in The Australian which clearly did not identify Islam as a ‘problem’ most 
frequently identified Islamophobia/anti-Muslim discrimination, the War on Terror, and 
religious intolerance as alternative ‘problems’; in 2004 in The SMH, some articles identified 
the ‘War on Terror’, ‘terrorism/terrorists’, and ‘Islamic militants’ as problems. As has already 
been noted, the distinction between ‘terrorists’ or ‘Islamic militants’ and Islam and Muslims 
as a whole may have been observed in some articles, which were therefore coded as not 
representing Islam generically as a problem, yet given the broader context in which such 
articles are situated the overwhelming picture remains one in which ‘Muslims’ and ‘Islam’ 
are problematised and associated strongly with violence.  
In 2007, the two main alternative targets identified as problems in both publications were 
‘dirty tricks’ in election campaigns and ‘counter-terrorism’ policing and legislative issues. 
The third most common alternative target in The Australian in 2007 was ‘Islamophobia/anti-
Muslim discrimination’, and in The SMH was the ‘War on Terror’. ‘Dirty tricks’ was the 
most common alternative target, with thirteen articles framing dirty election tricks as a 
problem in 2007 (six articles from The SMH and seven from The Australian). No other 
alternative target was identified even nearly as frequently. The appearance of articles which 
represented the ‘War on Terror’ as a problem in all four data sets is therefore noteworthy, but 
the extremely low numbers of articles challenging this consensus must be emphasised: in 
both The Australian in 2004 and The SMH in 2007 there were just three articles per 
publication which explicitly challenged the ‘War on Terror’ consensus and represented the 
war as a ‘problem’. 
This chapter has highlighted the dominant features and characteristics of the patterns in the 
full sample of articles considered in this study which were revealed through my coding 
exercises. In the next chapter, I now move beyond the discussion of data analytical patterns to 
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consider the representational shifts in particular sets of articles between the different time 
periods and the two different newspapers. 
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Chapter 11 – Discussion 
This chapter will focus upon in-depth discussion of specific clusters of articles and individual 
articles which are deserving of more detailed discussion. The first section of this chapter 
considers the characteristics and shifts over time of the representation of links between Islam 
and violent conflict. The second section of this chapter considers the media coverage of racist 
campaigning in marginal Sydney seats between the 2004 and 2007 election. The third section 
of Chapter 11 explores the intertextual relationships between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ news by 
focussing in particular on a set of interrelated and self-referential articles published in The 
Australian in 2004. The final section of Chapter 11 expands my analytical framework by 
exploring the intertextual relationships between news articles and broader, international 
discourses on Islam. 
Islam and Violence 
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, there is considerable difficulty in 
distinguishing between articles which explicitly identified Islam and Muslims as a ‘problem’ 
and those which may have implicitly characterised Islam and Muslim as a problem. A strong 
relationship between Islam and violence is frequently fostered by patterns of reporting on 
issues related to Islam even if particular articles contain evidence of individual 
journalists/commentators attempting to avoid the utilisation or activation of negative 
stereotypes and prejudices towards Islam and Muslims. As has been established in much of 
the literature on Islam and the Media, canvassed in earlier chapters of this thesis, the linkage 
between Islam and violence is particularly widespread, with the majority of this emphasis in 
the past decade being characterised by a conflation of terrorism and Islam. I therefore wanted 
to investigate what proportion of articles from each sample were broadly concerned with the 
linkage between Islam and violent conflict. In order to do so I compared the proportion of 
articles which focussed on the subjects of counter terrorism and national security, terrorist 
violence, and violent conflict in Islamic countries between the four different data sets. The 
results are represented in Figure 23 (opposite). 
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Figure 23: Articles on the subject of Islam and Violent Conflict (as a percentage of the total number 
of articles per data set) 
 
As can be seen from this chart, there was a stronger relationship between the proportion of 
articles on subjects which linked Islam with violence and the newspaper than there was with 
the year of publication, with over half of all articles in The Australian in both 2004 and 2007 
on these subjects. The proportion of articles on the three subjects of counter terrorism and 
national security, terrorist violence, and violent conflict in Islamic countries was highest for 
The Australian in 2007 and lowest for The SMH in 2007. Within the category of ‘violence 
and Islam’, the proportion of articles on the different subjects within this broader category of 
Islam and violent conflict differed significantly. In The Australian in 2004, for example, 
‘terrorist violence’ was the subject of a full 23% of the stories; in 2007, by contrast, ‘terrorist 
violence’ was the subject of just 2% of the stories – exactly the same proportion as for The 
SMH in the same year (Figure 24).  
Significantly, the proportionally high number of stories on ‘terrorist violence’ in 2004 did not 
necessarily reflect an extremely high number of individual terrorist attacks or incidences of 
violence. Instead, it reflects an overwhelming number of articles reporting on slightly 
different aspects or developments of a limited number of actual incidents, in particular the 
aftermath of the Jakarta Embassy bombing which occurred a few days before the start of the 
period under analysis in this study. As was mentioned in Chapter 8, both publications created 
special sections of the newspaper in every edition for over a week after the Embassy 
bombing, which featured exhaustive coverage of every speculative detail of the case as it 
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emerged. These sections were titled ‘Evil at our Gate’ in The SMH and ‘Terror at our Door’ 
in The Australian. 
Figure 24: Percentage of articles from each data set on the subjects of either 'counter-terrorism' or 
'terrorist violence' 
 
Another issue which generated significant levels of coverage was hostage-taking in Iraq, with 
sixteen stories dedicated to this issue in the The Australian in 2004, and four in The SMH. 
The proportion of articles referring to the spate of hostage-taking and executions of 
foreigners taking place in Iraq at that time, however, far exceeded this number. The 
conventions of ‘newsworthiness’ in Australia mentioned in Chapter 3, which predispose 
Australian editors to choose stories focusing on Australians involved in overseas incidents, 
meant that the majority of these stories focused on a case in which two Australians were said 
to have been kidnapped and held to ransom. Although the claim was later found to have no 
substance, it gave scope for many articles to be written detailing the numerous other cases of 
executions of hostages and fuelled speculation on the potential fate of the supposed 
Australian captives (see for example, A04_104, A04_118, A04_119). 
The claims that two Australians were being held hostage in Iraq also fuelled speculation 
about how the Australian Government should react were the claims to be confirmed. In 
‘World that brooks no compromise’ The Australian’s Foreign Editor Greg Sheridan, explored 
the dilemmas raised for countries whose nationals had been kidnapped: 
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At the time of writing we still don't know whether two Australians have been 
kidnapped in Baghdad. But whether they have or not, the issue should force us to 
think through what an Australian government should do in such a circumstance, who 
it should negotiate with, or whether it should negotiate at all (A04_104). 
Sheridan’s conclusion is that it is not only wrong to negotiate with ‘terrorists’, but moreover 
impossible; unlike historical figures such as Irish resistance leader Michael Collins, Sheridan 
argued, the adage that ‘today's terrorist is tomorrow's national leader’ could not be applied to 
contemporary Islamic ‘terrorists’: 
The demands of JI [Jemaat Islamiah] and al-Qa'ida are literally absolutist and 
totalitarian. To say you can't negotiate with them is not only to make a moral 
judgment but simply to describe reality (A04_104). 
Never mind that the hostage scenarios Sheridan is referring to did not involve either of the 
two organisations he names: the principle, it seems is what matters most to Sheridan. Islamic 
terrorists, Sheridan argued, ‘represent a completely new type and level of threat’, who could 
not be negotiated with but only combated by force. Sheridan closed his article by inflaming 
anxiety over the threat of terrorist attack by citing a claim from a US expert negotiator invited 
to Australia by the Lowy Institute that ‘nuclear terrorism was "more likely than not" in the 
next five to 10 years’.  
The dilemmas of the tension between the resolve of non-negotiation for the lives of hostages 
and the emotions evoked by the spectacle of suffering involved in the hostage crisis were also 
explored in several stories by Nicholas Rothwell. Rothwell focused on how kidnappers are 
seeking to ‘barbarise the conflict’ and portrays the hostage-takings as a calculated strategy to 
manipulate public opinion and elections in Western countries. In such a situation, Rothwell 
maintains, maintaining resolve was paramount (A04_46; A04_56; A04_64): 
How can the watching heart not melt, as the 11-minute-long ordeal by video of British 
hostage Kenneth Bigley unfolds? And how can Western leaders escape the trap laid 
by the terrorists, as reasons of state hang in the balance against compassion and fellow 
feeling…What sort of society are we in the West, who have come up against the 
sword of militant Islam so uncompromisingly raised? What do we stand for? One 
life? Or the higher good of nations and the abstract war on terror? (A04_64) 
Paul Sheehan represents the dilemma of the West over hostage negotiations in very similar 
terms in The SMH in the same year in ‘There’s nothing overboard about public resentment of 
moral blackmail’ (SMH04_66). Sheehan describes the execution of two French journalists in 
Iraq earlier that month (later broadcast on Al-Jazeera, which Sheehan refers to as ‘the 
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megaphone of pan-Islamic fascism’). He attributes their death to the weakness of the French 
government in the face of global terrorism: ‘This is exactly why two French journalists were 
left to die by the same nation that led opposition to the invasion of Iraq.’ Sheehan then lists a 
series of violent acts associated with Muslims that had occurred over the course of that 
month:  
Ten murders in Israel gave way to a dozen ritual executions in Iraq, this time 
Nepalese civilians working there who were kidnapped and then butchered in the cause 
of what their killers called "Islam and its holy warriors"…the normalisation of murder 
and blackmail in the Middle East was then eclipsed by the killing of hundreds of 
Russian children in the city of Beslan, murdered by Islamic terrorists from Chechnya. 
The impact was universal revulsion, including disgust and introspection through much 
of the Muslim world at the increasing depravity of those who invoke the name of 
Islam when murdering civilians. Last Thursday, it was our turn. But the massive blast 
outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta succeeded in killing only Indonesians, most 
of them Muslims, drew Australia and Indonesia closer together against a common 
enemy, and hardened the Australian public further against Islamic medievalism. 
All such acts, Sheehan claimed, represented attempts at ‘moral blackmail’ of the US and its 
allies in the War on Terror, but in Australia would have little purchase, since ‘John Howard 
remains politically strong on the issue of national security’. Sheehan thus exemplifies the low 
levels of ‘distance from power’ which were strongly characteristic of articles on the subject 
of violent conflict in 2004. 
Neither Sheehan nor Rothwell engages with the underlying causes of the violence they 
chronicle, nor do they feature any Muslim voices: a trend that is echoed in the majority of the 
rest of the coverage of violent conflict in Muslim countries. On rare occasions, as in 
Sheridan’s article cited above (A04_104), or another of Rothwell’s articles (A04_56), there 
are quotations from extreme clerics or militants which are used to bolster their arguments – 
but in very few articles do reporters from either publication cite the views and perspectives of 
Muslims other than extremists, nor do they provide any contextualising information which 
would make the violence that is being reported explicable in any way. 
Two prominent exceptions to this trend are an article from The Australian in 2004 which was 
originally published in The Sunday Times, and a series of articles in The SMH in 2004 by 
senior correspondent Paul McGeough. In ‘Innocents die in “precision” US attack’, Lebanese-
British journalist Hala Jaber narrates a story which is very different from the prevailing type 
of coverage of the war in Iraq in articles from my sample. Jaber details the aftermath of a US 
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attack on a compound near Fallujah, which the US military described as ‘a successful 
precision strike on a confirmed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi terrorist meeting site’. Yet, as Jaber 
records, ‘many women and children were also killed and injured in the attack’. Jaber 
discusses the case of one young girl, injured and in great pain in Fallujah general hospital, 
who did not yet know that most of her immediate and extended family had been killed in the 
attack, including her father. Her mother and little sister were in a coma. Jaber quotes a 
relative of the girl, who had driven her to the hospital, asking how the Iraqi Prime Minister 
‘can claim to love Iraqis and to represent the Iraqi people and their interests, and then permit 
the Americans to do this?’. ‘Such comments’, Jaber wrote, ‘reflect the anguish of many of 
Fallujah’s inhabitants over the large number of civilians caught up in the US operations 
against supporters of Zarqawi’. Jaber then goes on to discuss the antagonism of Fallujah 
inhabitants towards Zarqawi’s forces, divergences within the different groups involved in 
insurgency actions, including disputes over the practice of hostage-taking, and the efforts of 
civilians to conduct their lives in the midst of the war. These topics are notably absent from 
most other articles reporting on the war in Iraq within my sample. 
Paul McGeough’s reporting from the war in Iraq and in Afghanistan (SMH04_06; 
SMH04_16; SMH04_34; SMH04_59) similarly contextualises the conflict and includes the 
voices of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan who are being affected by the wars, rather than 
simply listing acts of violence absent of context, or utilising the ‘War on Terror’ frame as a 
‘complexity-reducing’ device. He writes about complex matters in detailed feature articles 
with multiple, varied sources and provides some explanation of the background and real 
situation in the conflict zones he writes about. His articles on Afghanistan are particularly 
significant, since these are the only articles in my sample which discuss the progress of the 
war in Afghanistan. McGeough strongly contradicts the official line that the war in 
Afghanistan is a fait accompli: he concludes that ‘Afghanistan is not the success that George 
Bush claims it to be; and it certainly is not a mission accomplished’ (SMH04_06). A full 
feature article on the 6th October was devoted to the situation of women in Afghanistan, in 
which he concludes that since the US-led invasion, ‘little has changed for rural women and 
the country’s war widows’ (SMH04_16). McGeough interviews two female Afghani activists 
in the country and discusses different strategies they are utilising to try and work for 
women’s rights in their own way: 
Activists like Dr Jalal believe their best argument in a very conservative, religious 
society is that all the reforms they demand are in the Koran – if it is read properly. 
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Shukria Barakai, who carried the torch for women as a member of the committee that 
drafted the new Afghan constitution, agrees. “The constitution gives us equal rights 
and Islam gives us rights in work, business and marriage. But Afghan tradition closes 
all these doors.” 
The acknowledgement of the failures of the ‘war on terror’, the distinction between Islamic 
and cultural traditions, and the inclusion of Muslim women’s voices are also significant 
departures from the majority of reporting on violent conflict in articles within my sample. 
The effect of the high levels of negative reporting of Muslims and strong association with 
violence in much news reporting in this period was summed up in a feature article from The 
SMH in 2004 by Joseph Wakim, former Multicultural Affairs Commissioner on the impact of 
anti-Muslim and anti-prejudice (SMH04_32). Titled ‘Any Tom, Dick or Harry can beat 
prejudice’, the article refers to the common prejudice directed against people with Muslim or 
Arab names and the resultant pressure upon members of these communities to Anglicise their 
names in order to achieve parity in the job market and escape constant attacks on the basis of 
their ethno-religious background: 
Many are fed up with having to constantly fend off knee-jerk reactions, prejudices, 
phobias and pregnant pauses from some who immediately associate recognisable 
Arabic and Islamic names with the terrorism that dominates our news. The pre-
emptive defence becomes a mantra. No, I am not a terrorist. No, I was not born 
overseas. No, I do not support al-Qaeda…As each terrorist attack and hostage 
beheading adds another layer to the entrenched Arabic and Islamic stereotype, those 
bearing the names and thus bearing the brunt feel more entrenched in their fear that 
they will never have a fair go. 
Wakim’s article is an important example of the way that the weight of negative reporting 
combines to create an atmosphere in which Australian Muslims are marginalised and 
excluded, and that events overseas come to impact upon and be attributed collectively to all 
Muslims. 
My personal experience of reading through the high volume of predominantly negative 
stories regarding violent conflict Iraq, Indonesia, Chechnya, Pakistan and other places in the 
Muslim world was rising despair and anxiety. Even though I knew that these articles were 
about events that occurred years ago it was emotionally draining and exhausting to read these 
stories. For all the emphasis on ‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’ in news journalism, it was 
impossible for me as a consumer of news to feel detached, when reading story after story 
about such tragic events, especially when the violence they depicted was predominantly 
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framed as irrational, unrelenting and unstoppable. In 2004 in particular, the suggestion that 
there were potential causes, or any solutions other than warfare, for this ‘cycle of violence’ 
was frequently lampooned and demonised. The potential for hopeful responses to conflict 
narratives, or to empathy for the people involved in them, were therefore not simply absent 
from many of the articles I read as part of this study, but in fact were frequently actively (and 
sometimes aggressively) shut down. 
Tom Allard and Cynthia Banham’s ‘Terrorism’s causes need exploring’ is a rare example of 
an article which seriously engaged with the need to understand potential causes of terrorism 
(SMH04_39). The difficulty of pursuing the argument that there were real causes for 
terrorism which needed to be understood and acknowledged in order to form cogent foreign 
policy responses was highlighted by reference to the Federal Government’s strident 
opposition to such a perspective. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer was quoted by Allard 
and Banham as claiming that: 
It’s not what we’ve done but what we are that inflames the terrorists’ unassuageable 
sense of grievance… it misconceives the problem to think there are root causes like 
poverty or hopelessly entrenched political impasses. 
By contradicting this perspective on terrorist violence, Allard and Banham were adopting an 
‘adversarial’ position towards the incumbent government, represented in this case by 
Downer. Hamish McDonald, The SMH’s Beijing correspondent and a former al-Jazeera 
anchor in south-east Asia, similarly attempted to encourage consideration of the causes of 
terrorism in ‘Sifting through the web of motives behind the Jakarta bombing’ (SMH04_63). 
McDonald adopted an even more adversarial stance than Allard and Banham, strongly 
criticising the Howard Government’s ‘efforts to demolish cultural bridges into Asia’ and the 
‘rapid erosion of respect for civil rights and legal protection’ in Australia. McDonald 
particularly singles out ‘the disgraceful David Hicks case’ and ‘the even more disturbing’ 
case of Mamdouh Habib: surprisingly this is the only article from my sample in 2004 that 
referred to either of these cases. Finally, McDonald concludes that Australia ‘need[s] to 
employ less khaki…and more police blue’.  
McDonald’s article was printed on the page opposite letters responding to Paul Sheehan’s 
article ‘There’s nothing overboard about public resentment of moral blackmail’, discussed 
above (SMH04_66). One of these letters comments that ‘Paul Sheehan makes a good case for 
not cuddling up to terrorists’, whilst a second provides a response to another reader’s letter in 
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which an argument similar to that of McDonald and Allard is lampooned:  
John Hill (Letters, September 13) feels we should analyse the terrorists’ problems 
before deciding upon a solution. The analysis is complete: the problem is militant 
Islam as propagated around the world. Quick John, what’s your solution? 
(SMH04_62).  
Other attempts at contextualising terrorist violence or proposing non-violent solutions to 
international conflict are ridiculed in The SMH in ‘Green on the outside, empty inside’, in 
which Ted Lapin (Associate Editor of pro-Israel publication The Review) attacked the foreign 
policy position of the Australian Greens: 
Instead of maintaining a highly trained, well-armed military, the Greens would defend 
Australia through "a comprehensive strategy of non-violent conflict management". 
Nettle would sooner dispatch the Love Boat to deal with a terrorist threat than an 
RAN frigate. The Greens do not appear to comprehend that there is no such thing as 
Santa Claus in international affairs (SMH04_15). 
This type of ridicule is comparable to the views espoused by Neil Brown in The Australian 
that same year, discussed in detail in Chapter 9, in which he compared the validity of regional 
meetings and non-violent responses to terrorism as a ‘bedtime story’ akin to Harry Potter 
(A04_19). In another article in the same data set, ‘It’ll pay to stay right’, Brown condemned 
Latham’s policies in regards to the War on Terror given the ‘rampant terrorism and all of the 
extremist Muslim hatred and jealousy that gives rise to it’. ‘In increasingly dangerous times’, 
Brown opined, ‘it is only natural that people will go for a safe pair of hands – and the more 
conservative the better’. Brown confidently predicted that Howard would win the election – 
as he did. 
It was a changed landscape during the lead up to the 2007 election. The proliferation of 
opinion pieces, leaders and letters ridiculing and refuting any criticism of the War on Terror, 
so apparent in both newspapers in 2004, was notably absent in The SMH in 2007, and there 
were very few stories of this ilk in The Australian in 2007. In one of these stories, ‘The US is 
missing the point’, by former US Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan, the 
need to continue to combat the growth of terrorism is portrayed as being so important that 
almost any means was justifiable, including the support of repressive dictatorships: 'military 
men willing to intervene to prevent their countries from falling to Islamism are surely 
preferable to elected Islamists such as Ahmadinejad' (A07_31). In another of these articles, 
conservative commentator Noel Pearson attacked arguments published in the paper by Hal 
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Wooten, Q.C. that terrorism could be countered by attempts to understand and ameliorate the 
causes of violence: 
I fully support bridge-building policies for peace and justice, but I disagree with 
progressive opinion that this is a solution to terrorism and Islamist extremism. If 
Western policy were radically reoriented, I do not think that extremism would be 
significantly reduced because Islamist extremism feeds off an irrational attribution of 
real and imagined grievances to Western and Zionist conspiracy. 
Pearson’s response to Wooten was echoed a few days later by a reader’s letter in which they 
too argue that there is only a ‘single narrative’ in regards to ‘Islamists’: they don’t tolerate 
religious or political diversity and they believe the whole world should be ruled under Islam, 
Sharia-style. Those who don’t conform to this extreme form of Islam get killed… any other 
excuse or “narrative” for Islamic terrorism just doesn’t wash’ (A07_117). On the whole 
though, the incidence and extremity of reporting and commentary on Islam in regards to 
violent conflict was significantly reduced in The Australian in 2007. 
As I discussed above, one of the major shifts in reporting on Islam and violent conflict 
between 2004 and 2007 was that the number of articles specifically covering terrorist 
violence or attacks was greatly reduced in 2007, yet the number of articles on issues related 
to counter terrorism and national security increased. Within the subset of articles reporting on 
counter terrorism, however, there was a further significant shift: many of these articles do not 
simply report upon the introduction of anti-terrorist measures in different countries or on the 
proceedings of counter terrorism legal cases, but a significant subset of the articles reflected 
critically upon the suite of anti-terrorism legislation in Australia and its effects upon Muslim 
individuals and communities. Overall, there were three such articles in The SMH in 2007 (9% 
of the data set) and nine such articles in The Australian in that same year (7% of the data set). 
Although the overall context remained negative, in that the linkage between Muslims and 
violence was maintained in such stories, the more critical approach to the War on Terror and 
its impacts upon all countries involved is notable.  
The spate of stories on problems with Australia’s anti-terrorism legislation and policing was 
triggered by the dismissal of a high profile Commonwealth case against a young former 
medical student named Izhar ul-Haque in mid-November 2013. In the discussion of the case 
in articles from my sample, strong linkages were generally drawn between the failure of this 
case and of other anti-terrorism cases. Most also emphasised not simply the ‘bungling’ 
aspects of the case but also the erosion of due process and legal protections: 
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The collapse of the case follows a series of flawed terror prosecutions including the 
bungled charges brought against Gold Coast doctor Mohamed Haneef in July and the 
decision last year by the Victorian Court of Appeal to overturn the conviction of Jack 
Thomas. In a damning judgement, NSW Supreme Court judge Michael Adams said 
key interviews…were inadmissible because of gross misconduct by ASIO agents and 
Australian Federal Police officers (A07_67).  
Many of the articles constructed ul-Haque sympathetically, referring to his ‘trauma’, his hard 
work at school and university and his ‘brilliance’ (for example, A07_67; A07_66; A07_73). 
Tom Allard’s article ‘Spies in the eyes of others’ centres the whole article around the 
personal story of ul-Haque and sites it within the post-9/11 context of rising antagonism 
towards Muslims in Australia: 
When Izhar ul-Haque went back to Pakistan for his older brother's wedding, he was a 
bitter young man. It was early 2003 and the Bali bombers had wrought their carnage 
only a few months earlier, creating deep suspicions in the Australian community 
about those of Islamic faith. It was a difficult time for all Muslims and ul-Haque's 
family was under great strain. They had never really settled into Sydney's western 
suburbs after migrating three years earlier and ul-Haque's father could not find work. 
To compound matters, ul-Haque, a brilliant student at North Sydney Boys High, had 
failed his second-year medical exams. "I'm fed up with Westerners," he wrote to his 
father. "Western patients look at me as if I'm a frog. They don't wish to speak English 
to me. How can I spend five to six years with them?" (SMH07_25) 
In addition to humanising ul-Haque and others formerly demonised as ‘terrorists’, some 
articles even included references to and quotations from Muslim community members 
documenting their hounding and intimidation by intelligence officers (A06_66), as well as 
some references to the political impetus behind misuses of the anti-terrorism legislation 
(A07_67; A07_65). 
The changes between 2004 and 2007 in regards to reporting on Muslims and terrorism are 
encapsulated by an article in The Australian in 2007 titled ‘The tragedy of extremism reveals 
a hero in Hicks’ (A07_8). The article reviews a play inspired by the case of David Hicks. In 
conclusion, the article notes the following: 
This is the second play in the past 18 months to tackle the Hicks story. Nigel 
Jamieson's 2006 dance and multimedia spectacular, Honour Bound, looked at it in its 
Guantanamo Bay context, and is an examination of the erosion of humanity and 
legality in the so-called war on terror. It will be interesting to see what the next 
treatment will be, for, as a lightning-rod figure for the post-September 11 era, it seems 
very likely that the leitmotif of David Hicks as tragic hero will run and run. 
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It seems highly unlikely that an article framing Hicks as a ‘tragic hero’ or referring to the ‘so-
called’ war on terror could possibly have been published in The Australian in 2004. This 
article perhaps more than any others shows just how far the parameters of the debate  had 
shifted between 2004 and 2007. 
Racist election campaigning: the cases of Greenway and Lindsay 
As was mentioned in Chapter 7, and then alluded to again in Chapter 8, a key subject which I 
intended to investigate as part of my research was the differential reporting of anti-Muslim 
‘racist’ campaigning in marginal Sydney seats at the 2004 and the 2007 elections. At the 
2004 election, the Labor candidate for the seat of Greenway, Ed Husic, was the target of a 
smear campaign based on his Muslim heritage, yet this story received limited attention from 
the press prior to the 2004 election. In contrast, one of the biggest stories of the final days 
prior to the 2007 election broke when Liberal Party members were caught distributing a fake 
election leaflet in the neighbouring electorate of Lindsay which was intended to foment and 
exploit anti-Muslim hostility for electoral gain. Although the drama of catching the 
perpetrators in the act certainly accentuated the ‘newsworthiness’ of the Lindsay leafleting 
scandal, the differential treatment accorded to the two cases more specifically highlights 
shifting attitudes towards the acceptability of anti-Muslim hostility in public discourse 
between the two periods. 
The reporting of the election campaign in Greenway in 2004 also reveals some key aspects 
concerning the dynamics of representation of Muslims in Australia. In 2004, there were three 
articles from The Australian and five from The SMH which discussed the electorate of 
Greenway and mentioned the Muslim identity of Ed Husic. In six of these eight articles, the 
‘Muslimness’ of Husic was emphasised by way of contrasting his ‘difference’ from the 
evangelical Christian identification of his principal opponent, the Liberal Party’s Louise 
Markus (A04_16; A04_108; SMH04_07; SMH04_09; SMH04_13; SMH04_31). In several 
cases, stories from both newspapers verged on presenting the contest as a ‘clash of 
civilisations’ style conflict: 
Religion is shaping as a factor in several close contests around the country as the 
major parties grapple for power before the election….in the western Sydney seat of 
Greenway, social worker Louise Markus, from the Hillsong community – one of 
Australia's largest congregations – is challenging Ed Husic, a Muslim (A04_108). 
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The Labor candidate, Ed Husic, is the former public affairs spokesman for Integral 
Energy and a non-practising Muslim. The Liberal candidate, Louise Markus, is a 
social worker and a member of the Hillsong church, the largest Pentacostal (sic) 
church in Australia. It has been a long time since religion has played a part in 
Australian politics, but Greenway may change this (SMH04_13). 
As Peter Manning has demonstrated, the representation of the contest between Husic and 
Markus as a religious one was led by the national media, not the local media, who had 
focussed instead on reporting policy differences and local funding commitments by the neck-
and-neck contenders. As Manning also noted, the decision of the national press to frame the 
story in this manner impacted negatively upon Husic and upon Labor, because ‘in Australia, 
being a Christian is a plus, particularly if the federal Treasurer dances at your Church. Being 
a Muslim is a very intense negative’.601 
The negativity associated with having a Muslim candidate had impacts far from western 
Sydney. Both The Australian and The Sydney Morning Herald reported on an incident at a 
Labor Party ‘town hall’ session with Labor Leader Mark Latham in Adelaide: 
A man stood to question why Labor had chosen a Muslim candidate, Ed Husic, to run 
in the Sydney seat of Greenway with its high – and increasing – proportion of 
Christian constituents. Latham bristled with discomfort and his heartfelt lecture on 
tolerance and selecting people on their merits brought the house down (A04_16). 
There was also an ugly attack on the race of Labor's Muslim candidate for the Sydney 
seat of Greenway, Ed Husic. "Ed is a Bosnian Muslim. His parents came out here 
with nothing and built a life. It's a great Australian story," Latham retorted 
(SMH04_17). 
These mentions of the ‘ugly’ racist/anti-Muslim undercurrents stirred by the selection of a 
Muslim parliamentary candidate are relatively cursory and do not go any deeper into the 
issues raised by the incident. In fact, as the election date drew closer, the racist/anti-Muslim 
aspects of campaigning against Husic in Greenway intensified, with Labor election officials 
maintaining that phone calls were being made to Greenway constituents warning voters that 
Husic was a Muslim, triggering a ‘whispering campaign’ against Husic. Finally, in the days 
just prior to the election, a flyer was distributed throughout the electorate, stating that ‘Ed 
Husic is a devout Muslim. Ed is working hard to get a better deal for Islam’. The flyer was 
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purportedly issued by the Labor party but was in fact, a fake, intended to arouse suspicion 
and hostility towards Husic and Labor.602  
Husic attempted to raise awareness of the ‘whispering campaign’ against him, and the story 
was reported upon by local media prior to the election. It was not until over a month 
following the election that the ‘whispering campaign’ and fake leaflets were more widely 
reported upon by the national media; by this time, Markus had won the seat of Greenway 
with a margin of less than 1% and the Liberal Government had been returned to office. 
Within my sample, that is, in the crucial period prior to the election, just one article from 
these two newspapers referred to the underground campaign against Husic, and this article 
actually dismissed Husic’s claims and instead strongly cast aspersions upon Husic himself: 
Husic also recently used the Labor-friendly Blacktown City Sun to float a story about 
a "whisper campaign about his religious affiliations". As far as I can deduce, while 
every story about the Greenway contest has mentioned that his Liberal opponent is a 
member of the Hillsong Church, the largest evangelical congregation in the country, 
Husic believes there is something sinister about discussing his religious practices. 
Why? Because his parents, Hasib and Hasiba, are Muslims who emigrated from the 
former Yugoslavia. "I am not a practising Muslim," he told The Blacktown City Sun 
"[but] I can't dishonour my parents by disavowing their religion." Nobody has asked 
him to. Strange behaviour for the front-runner in a must-win marginal seat’ 
(SMH04_31).   
The author of this article was the columnist Paul Sheehan. Sheehan dismisses out of hand 
Husic’s concerns regarding the ‘whispering campaign’ conducted against him. He 
demonstrates no sensitivity as to why this was problematic for Husic, despite himself having 
being instrumental in the dissemination and promulgation of extreme fears and anxiety 
regarding Muslim Australians. As Peter Manning observed, ‘in this atmosphere of public 
prejudice, it would not be surprising if 34 year-old Husic was anxious to avoid his religion 
becoming an issue in his first campaign to hold the seat of Greenway for Labor’.603 
Sheehan went on to characterise Husic as dishonest and evasive for not doing an interview 
with him and implies he had been involved in ‘union warfare’, before lavishing praise upon 
the Liberal candidate, Louise Markus, ‘a social worker’, who was eager to meet him and 
detail her plans for the electorate. Considering Sheehan’s stance towards Muslims and the 
Labor party in his columns, and his dismissal of the significance of the anti-Muslim 
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components of the campaign in Greenway, it is understandable that Husic was not eager to 
meet with him. This was the only story about ‘dirty tricks’ in either Greenway in 2004 or 
Lindsay in 2007 which received a negative summed score on the Islamophobic Index (-6, or 
‘very closed’). 
Compared to the limited and contradictory treatment of anti-Muslim/racist campaigning in 
the seat of Greenway at the 2004 election, the attention given to very similar tactics in the 
neighbouring seat of Lindsay at the 2007 election is quite remarkable. In 2007, there were 
thirteen articles from The Australian and eleven from The SMH which discussed the 
electorate of Lindsay and mentioned the anti-Muslim/racist leaflets distributed there by 
Liberal Party members. This is more than triple the number of articles which referred to anti-
Muslim campaigning in Greenway in 2004. None of the articles on the ‘Lindsay leaflet 
scandal’ were rated in this study as framing Muslims or Islam as a problem and none of them 
received a negative summed score on the Islamophobic Index. The range of scores varied 
from 0 (neither open or closed) to 3 (open) for The SMH, and from 0 to +7 (extremely open) 
in The Australian. The article which scored +7 was ‘Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final address’ 
(A07_22), which was one of the articles in the Pilot Study and was discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter. This article proved to have the most strident condemnation of the anti-
Muslim character of the stunt, and was the only article of the twenty-four articles on this 
subject which included the voices of any Muslim community representatives. There was, 
however, one story from the sample of articles, ‘Labor gets a flyer as shocked locals switch 
sides’ (A07_19), in which a Muslim community member was directly quoted, and another, 
‘Playing dirty an artform in the West’ (SMH07_17) in which Ed Husic was indirectly quoted. 
These were the only Muslim voices cited on this contentious issue across twenty-three 
articles; the majority of sources were bureaucratic sources with a couple of articles 
investigating the attitudes of (non-Muslim) Lindsay constituents towards the incident. 
In terms of the identification of a ‘problem’, there were similar patterns between articles from 
The SMH and articles from The Australian, with the majority of articles identifying the 
problem as ‘dirty tricks’ and a substantial minority defining the problem as racist or 
prejudiced campaigning or as socially divisive electoral tactics. As Dunn and Kemp have 
highlighted, the flyers were distributed in an area which was predominantly white and 
working class, with a rising proportion of Christian constituents and a lower percentage of 
Muslims than is the national average:  
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The leaflet developers gambled that readers of the pamphlet assumed that Australia 
was a Christian country and were fearful that Christian hegemony was being 
threatened by an emergent and deviant Muslim presence. The leaflet cultivated the 
impression that a cultural takeover was in train, that Muslims were seeking to convert 
all Christians to Islam, that mosques were being built in every suburb, and that key 
institutions had become prisoners to Muslim demands. The latter included the 
argument that the Australian Labor Party (ALP) supported the cultural take-over if 
Australia by Muslims, were sympathetic to Muslim terrorists, and supportive of 
controversial Muslim clerics.604 
These are deeply important matters and the limited number of articles highlighting the 
seriousness of the affair is deeply concerning. In The SMH in particular, there was a strong 
undercurrent of lampooning the activities of the distributors of the flyer. Such articles 
emphasised the overall ridiculousness of the campaign and the depths that Australian politics 
had plunged to (see for example, SMH07_04, SMH07_05, SMH07_13), rather than 
emphasising the seriousness of the act of inciting anti-Muslim hostility and fear for electoral 
advantage. Such articles were characterised by mocking spelling errors in the fake leaflet 
(SMH07_13, SMH07_14), and references to the ‘Lindsay Jihadists’ (SMH07_14) and ‘Jihad 
Jackie’ – one of the group responsible for the flyer was the husband of outgoing Member for 
Lindsay, Jackie Kelly (SMH07_07).  
Whilst attempting to be satirical and humorous, in downplaying the seriousness of the affair, 
such articles potentially played into justifications by Kelly that the leaflet creation and 
distribution was ‘just a bit of a Chaser-style prank’ (SMH07_07). Among the articles from 
The SMH, several made passing reference to the intent of exploiting or fomenting ‘race hate’ 
(e.g. SMH07_16; SMH07_18). Yet in few cases was this the focus of the story. The far more 
common angle was of portraying the scandal as an example of ‘dirty tricks’ or ‘dirty 
campaign tactics’ (e.g. SMH07_16; SMH07_17; SMH07_18). ‘Playing dirty an artform in 
the West’ (SMH07_17) focused on the issue of dirty election tricks, drawing comparisons 
with accusations of fake leaflets being distributed in other electorates by the anti-abortion 
activist group Right to Life Australia. This article also made reference to accusations that 
Kelly had distributed fake how-to-vote cards at the 2001 election in order to falsely capture 
voters’ preferences, and also indirectly quoted Ed Husic at length on the Greenway leaflets in 
2004: 
Ed Husic, a Labor candidate for the seat of Greenway in the 2004 election who was 
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the subject of a racist letterboxing campaign, said the revelations prove race-baiting is 
an established Coalition technique. Mr Husic, a Muslim who lost to the Liberals’ 
Louise Markus by about 800 votes, said the only difference between the 2004 and 
2007 incidents is that this time the perpetrators have been caught. 
Despite the interesting connection made by Husic between the two campaigns, the authors of 
this article do not pursue this angle but remain neutral in tone. They make no assertions 
regarding any possible links between the different cases of ‘dirty campaign tactics’.  
The angle of ‘dirty tricks’ was also prominent in The Australian; on the day prior to the 
election there was a double-page spread in the paper devoted to coverage of the story, under 
the heading ‘DIRTY TRICKS’. To develop the theme even further, The Australian even 
republished an article from The Times detailing the ‘dirty tricks’ being employed in the lead 
up to the US elections (A07_14; for examples of this focus in articles on the Lindsay 
leafleting scandal see in particular A07_09 and A07_12). However, as a whole, reporters in 
The Australian took a serious approach to the scandal and rather than satirising the event 
published a number of articles which dealt head-on with the issue of racism and Islamophobia 
inherent in the incident and sought comment from a much wider array of voices than was the 
case for articles on the subject in The SMH.  
The significance and impact of the incident was particularly highlighted by stories in which 
the perspective of views other than that of federal politicians were highlighted. The article 
discussed at length in my Pilot Study, for example, included the views of Muslim community 
representatives (A07_22), whilst other articles referred to the outrage provoked over the 
incident in the wider community, referring, for example, to bloggers and Muslim community 
forums which ‘slammed the leaflet drop as racially inflammatory’ (A07_20). ‘Labor gets a 
flyer as shocked locals switch sides’ (A07_19) featured numerous interviews with half a 
dozen locals from the area. One recipient of the flyer details his reaction upon receiving the 
flyer: 
The 54-year-old spray painter, who had been “leaning” towards voting for Labor 
tomorrow, said yesterday he was horrified by the false claim that the ALP supported 
forgiveness for the Bali bombers. “That would have changed my vote (back to the 
Coalition) for sure”. 
The man was reportedly “shocked” by the revelation that the flyer was bogus and claimed he 
would definitely be voting for the Labor party on election day as a result. Another woman 
from the same area  “said the tactics were indefensible”: 
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I don’t think it was a joke…I think this scandal will affect everyone a lot as to how 
they vote. I think it will do the Government a lot of harm…they have degraded the 
Muslim community. 
The article also quotes a Muslim woman who works in the area as referring to the flyer as 
“very wrong” and “prejudiced”, as well as discussing a number of residents who claimed to 
have decided to vote for Labor, many for the first time, as a result of the scandal. The 
repetition of this aspect of the narrative is particularly interesting; it normalises the decision 
to vote for Labor, and equates it with the high moral ground, while by contrast in the 2004 
period the majority of articles from The Australian from my sample assumed a highly ‘loyal’ 
orientation towards the Coalition and characterised voting for any other party as a deviant, 
irresponsible decision. 
One article from The Australian, by senior reporter Brad Norrington, adopted an even more 
stridently adversarial perspective on the scandal and linked the fake flyer tactic to the pattern 
of exploiting anti-Muslim sentiment for electoral advantage at the national level: 
What if there was a broader strategy behind the document, intended to help a racist 
undercurrent that still exists across much of western-oriented Australia to bubble to 
the surface? It is not long since the Cronulla riots in Sydney’s south in December 
2005 incited Muslim hatred. The Howard Government won the 2001 election in the 
wake of the Osama Bin Laden-inspired US terrorist attacks on September 11, but an 
anti-Muslim sentiment was already stirred by the Tampa affair that preceded it. Some 
senior Labor figures believe The Australian’s exposure of the so-called “children 
overboard” affair as a fraud just days before the election did not help Labor’s standing 
with voters; rather it harmed it. Why? Because, bizarrely, it brought to the surface 
once more the fear of invading boatpeople (A07_20). 
It is quite remarkable, considering the anti-Muslim and anti-Labor focus of The Australian in 
2004, to then read an article such as this, which not only acknowledges the significant role 
played by Islamophobia in Australian politics during the early 2000s but also champions the 
role of The Australian as watchdog and groundbreaker in investigative journalism. 
Considering the tendency towards denial of racism/Islamophobia so pervasive in articles for 
both newspapers in the lead up to 2004 this is a quite striking article, which in many ways 
contradicts the long-term trends evident in The Australian. In 2010, for example, features 
editor Tom Switzer still adamantly maintained that The Australian did not accept that the 
Cronulla Riots revealed ‘a racist underbelly’ and ‘a widespread tendency to demonise 
Muslims’ led by John Howard and the media. Instead, ‘we believed that as racist as white 
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Australia was 40 years ago and as imperfect as she maintains today, Australian is one of the 
most tolerant nations in the world by almost any criterion’.605 
Taken together, the reporting of the Lindsay leafleting scandal in The Australian reveals a 
multifaceted approach towards repositioning the paper in support of the Labor government, 
assuaging voter anxieties about the ethics of voting for Labor, and positioning itself as a 
champion of investigative reporting and ‘Fourth Estate’ values. Although in many ways the 
coverage of the scandal in The Australian is much more nuanced and complex than that of 
The SMH, the about-face of the newspaper was quite disconcerting for me to read when I was 
directly contrasting its election coverage in 2004 with that of 2007. What had changed? One 
factor was the changed political landscape. The new Labor Leader, Kevin Rudd, was at the 
time a close personal friend of the editor-in-chief of The Australian, Chris Mitchell. Mitchell 
claims credit for persuading Murdoch to permit the flagship broadsheet to endorse Rudd for 
election in 2007: 
He [Murdoch] was in my office and I spoke to him about it [and] said it was time for 
a change of government. It seemed to me the man who had the agenda for the next 
three years was Kevin Rudd.606 
Perhaps under Mitchell’s influence, perhaps as a result of a sense that the Labor Party’s win 
was a foregone conclusion and that it was prudent to be on the side of the ‘winners’,607 the 
allegiance of The Australian had clearly and dramatically shifted between 2004 and 2007. 
Intertextual relationships between different articles: principle of balance 
Overall, my data suggests a strong sense of an artificial ‘balancing’ of extreme viewpoints, 
particularly in regards to soft news stories. Given the anecdotes discussed in Chapter 8 of 
editorial interventions to achieve ‘balance’ in reporting of issues related to Muslims and 
Islam, it is fair to assume that some effort may have been made by the newspapers in these 
periods to actively seek out and publish stories which promoted ‘extremely open’ views of 
Islam in order to provide ‘balance’ to the ‘extremely closed’ stories which they were 
publishing, particularly in 2004. In order to explore these issues, I will discuss in detail a 
collection of articles published over the course of a week in mid-September 2004 in The 
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Australian. On the 13th September 2004, The Australian published two opinion pieces which 
I classified as ‘extremely closed’, with scores of -8; one of these was the Leader (A04_126) 
and the other was an opinion feature by anti-Muslim columnist Mark Steyn, who is based in 
the US but writes for News Corp. publications in several countries (A04_125). On the same 
day, The Australian published an opinion piece by controversial Canadian Muslim feminist 
Irshad Manji, provocatively titled ‘For God’s sake, rescue Islam from killers’. Over the next 
week The Australian then published a series of letters responding to these three opinion 
pieces. These articles are worth discussing in detail, to seek to demonstrate how the principle 
of ‘balance’ can play out in the pages of a newspaper over the course of a week, and also to 
consider how ‘soft’ news stories might interact with and influence the interpretation of ‘hard’ 
news stories. Studies of ‘soft news’, including leaders, feature articles, opinion columns and 
entertainment news ‘have pinpointed a range of issues, including how the inclusion of this 
“subjective”, “interpretative” material helps to underwrite the proclaimed “objectivity” of 
“hard” news stories’.608 
‘No negotiating with ideology of unreason’ (A04_126) discusses the Jakarta embassy 
bombing which had taken place four days previously. This editorial piece, with no attributed 
author, dismisses the notion that the actions of the US and its allies in the War on Terror have 
any relationship to the bombing, and clearly sets out the position of The Australian on issues 
related to Islam and Muslims at this point in time: 
The Australian maintains a constant view that it is our values – who we are – that 
make us a target for Islamist terror… while the idea the war on terror is a clash of 
civilisations does not figure in the strategic thinking of either Western or Muslim 
nations, it clearly looms large in the delusions of the Islamists. Which is one reason 
that, contrary to another suggestion emerging on the Left, there can be no negotiation 
with the terrorists… such fanciful talks would quickly reach the bedrock of our 
values. So would it be allowing women to show their faces in public, gays to follow 
their own lifestyle, or children to read literature other than the Koran that we 
bargained away next? 
The first line of this quote is strikingly similar to the comment from Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer cited above, that ‘it’s not what we’ve done but what we are that inflames 
the terrorists’ unassuageable sense of grievance’ (SMH04_39), underscoring the high level of 
agreement between the Federal Government and The Australian on the War on Terror 
framework in 2004. This leader, therefore, can be said to exhibiting extremely low levels of 
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‘distance from power’, in contrast to the much more critical reporting on the actions of the 
Government and higher levels of ‘distance from power’ which were evident in 2007. 
The leader then goes on to describe how the pro-US government of Jose Maria Aznar in 
Spain was ousted after the Madrid train bombings. The Spanish electorate, the author argued, 
‘presumably hoped it had bought security from terror’, yet a few weeks later apparently 
another attempt was foiled: ‘so much’, the writer of the article argues, ‘for trying to 
understand the intentions of murderous unreason’. As with other articles discussed above in 
the section on reporting on terrorism, any attempt to explore the possible causes of terrorism 
or non-violent responses to violent conflict are dismissed out of hand in this article: 
opponents of the ‘war on terror’ are dismissed as a ‘coalition of the whining’ and ‘some 
supposedly responsible Australian Muslim leaders’ are denounced for advancing the idea that 
there are real reasons behind the attacks. The article concludes that ‘only tighter security at 
home and united action against terror abroad can make life safer for all of us in the West’. It 
is interesting that the author of this article so strongly identifies with ‘the West’, despite 
having dismissed earlier the notion that the ‘war on terror’ was influenced by the notion of 
the ‘clash of civilisations’, which of course turned upon the essentialisation of a variety of 
Anglophone and European nations as an entity Huntington referred to as ‘The West’. 
The opinion piece by Mark Steyn also dismisses the arguments of Australian Muslim leaders 
that consideration must be paid to potential causes and explanations for the Jakarta bombing 
– these views are, Steyn argues, flatly ‘wrong’: 
Last week’s bombing would still have happened…with or without Bush, Australians 
would have opened their morning papers these past three years and found themselves 
looking at pictures of carnage and slaughter in Jakarta… All that Bush has done is 
provide a context (A04_125). 
The ‘context’ that Bush provides is one for explaining apparently unconnected events across 
the globe: 
9/11 gave these events a unifying narrative. We understand now that Jakarta and 
Madrid and Istanbul and Beslan and lower Manhattan are all part of the same story. 
The terrorists act locally, and we think globally. 
This is exactly the type of ‘complexity-reducing’ function of the ‘war on terror’ consensus 
which was described in Chapter 3. Not just these cases, Steyn argues, but also ‘unassimilated 
Muslim immigrants in Europe, disaffected black Muslims in British and American jails – and 
Chapter 11 – Discussion 
 251 
one day, Kim Jong-Il’s nuclear bargain basement in north Korea’, were all threats and tools 
for use by ‘Islamists’ which could be explained by the ‘unifying narrative’ of 9/11. For these 
reasons, according to Steyn, local Australian Muslim leaders have ‘got it wrong’ in seeking to 
explore the causes of terrorism: ‘throughout the ‘90s, the Islamists threw stones at the West, 
and the West threw nothing back. And with each stoning, the enemy grew emboldened’. 
During a period when Muslim voices were notably absent from much of the ‘hard’ news 
reporting on the war in Iraq, it is notable that in opinion pieces like this the pleas of Muslim 
community leaders for peace and reason are given attention – but only in order to stridently 
denounce them. 
On the same page as this highly inflammatory article by Steyn, and on the page immediately 
following the leader ‘No negotiating with ideology of unreason’, was Irshad Manji’s article 
‘For God’s sake, rescue Islam from killers’ (A04_124). Manji was a popular featured writer 
in The Australian during the mid-2000s, despite her views on Islam being highly 
controversial and MediaWatch accusing her of repeated incidents of self-plagiarism and 
unattributed recycling of columns.609 The printing of articles by Manji was cited by Features 
Editor Tom Switzer as evidence of the newspaper’s commitment to the presentation of a ‘fair 
and balanced spread of opinion’ on matters relating to Islam.610 Although Switzer might have 
thought Manji’s work to be very positive and to counter-balance the extremely negative 
views towards Islam which were concurrently being published in the pages of The Australian, 
Manji’s articles are not ideal in terms of presenting ‘fair and balanced’ views of Islam. She 
contributes to the construction of Islam as monolithic and the consensus of the War on Terror 
by echoing points raised by Steyn and even mimicking some of the same rhetorical strategies, 
such as listing and linking recent acts of violence committed by Muslims around the world 
and divorcing them from any contextual meaning: 
Given the last two weeks of Islamist terror – the murderous explosion at Australia’s 
embassy in Jakarta, the slaying of 12 Nepalese cooks and cleaners in Iraq, the double 
suicide bombings in Israel, the kidnapping of two French journalists and, of course, 
the hijacking of a school in Russia… one thing seems clear: Muslims worldwide need 
new leadership. 
Whilst Manji makes some excellent points about the opportunities for young Muslims in ‘the 
West’ to act as Islamic reformers, her extremely emotive writing and valorisation of the West 
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leaves a strong impression that all Muslims who are not young, reformist and living in the 
West are unreservedly backward, aggressive and sexist. It is difficult to see how this type of 
article can be justified as ‘balancing’ the type of anti-Muslim views espoused in the articles 
against which it was juxtaposed in The Australian on September 13, 2004. 
As well as considering the arrangement of these three articles, it is worth further investigating 
the letters of readers which were published in response to these articles two days later. 
Readers’ letters are often considered to be ‘the last remaining area within a newspaper that 
provides opportunities for individual and amateur authors to contribute to public debate in a 
spontaneous and uncoordinated way’. However, research on the publication of reader’s letters 
in newspapers, particularly during the period of heightened political salience that 
characterises election campaign coverage, suggests instead that there is significant evidence 
of ‘growing professionalization by both journalists and letter writers in the co-construction of 
the letters page’.611 Richardson and Franklin argue that: 
Letters editors are not merely gatekeepers who ratify letters in accordance with 
“newsworthiness” selection criteria. Rather, letters are selected and edited in 
accordance with the identity of the newspaper, the (often only perceived) preferences 
of the readership, and other more mundane requirements of space and balance. During 
this process, editorial teams regularly change the order of sentences and paragraphs, 
purposefully place readers’ letters in relation to other letters, and, by doing so, 
construct debates within and between letters and contiguously signal the pertinence of 
the included letters to the “debate,” thereby acknowledging and on occasion 
(depending on how the letter is being used) legitimating their contents.  
 As a result, the letters page reveals not the unmediated views of the readership, so much as 
‘what is seen as justifiable, acceptable, or “normal” comment by a newspaper’s editorial 
team’.612 Allan similarly reinforces the idea that the criteria for selection and arrangement of 
readers’ letters ‘delimit the ideological boundaries of legitimate or fair comment’.613 
The boundaries that were set within The Australian’s letter pages were of a wide diversity of 
viewpoints on Islam, from extremely closed to extremely open. The first letter from the 15th 
September which was considered in my study was a close reiteration of the views put forward 
in the Leader in particular but also to a lesser extent the opinion piece by Mark Steyn: 
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Some hypotheticals for those who feel we should negotiate with the Islamic 
fundamentalists who follow the al-Qa’ida ideology of ‘jihadism’… sharia law would 
have to be implemented to protect women’s rights and homosexuals destroyed to 
prevent the spread of disease. Frivolities like television, music and cinema should be 
banned and public executions and amputations introduced. Everything else, of course, 
would be negotiable (A04_110). 
The alarmist, ill-informed views in this letter are therefore an example of what was 
considered at one edge of the boundaries of ‘legitimate or fair comment’ by The Australian in 
2004.  
The other two letters printed that day which were within my sample were, however, more 
‘fair and balanced’. Both articles criticised Manji’s article of 13th September. Under the title 
‘Islam a haven of peace’, M. Tahir wrote that Manji’s article was: 
…As devoid of scholarship as it is full of vitriol against Islam. Of course the heinous 
acts of terrorism in Bali, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere must be condemned 
by all civilised people of the world, including Muslims, irrespective of who the 
perpetrators are. But to hold Islam and its teachings responsible for the actions of 
some of its followers is grossly inaccurate and unfair to this great religion, which 
means “peace” and which has a proud history of tolerance (A04_111). 
Tahir emphasises the need to examine and address the root causes of extremism and terrorism 
‘rather than blaming everything on the religion these people claim to follow’. Tahir concludes 
by noting that ‘it would be a travesty of justice if we start blaming Christianity for the 
shameful acts of some US military personnel in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq’. This was the only 
article in this data set which was coded as ‘extremely open’, with the highest possible score 
of +8. The final article in this set was a short, succinct response to Manji’s article by Amal 
Awad of Vaucluse:  
Herein lies the problem for moderate Muslims such as myself: with violent extremists 
on one side and unbending reformers on another, there exists an unfortunate 
imbalance in how Muslims are viewed – two radical sides, both hijacking their 
religion to promote a cause. 
Finally, the ‘extremely open’ views of Islam which were contained in M. Tahir’s letter of 15th 
September were ‘balanced’ out by a letter from Andrew Murphy on 16th September: 
M. Tahir promulgates the convenient half-truth that the word Islam means “peace”. 
Yes, Islam means “peace” but the word also defines a context for the achievement of 
“peace”. That context is submission to Allah. In other words, we’ll all be at “peace” 
when we all convert to Islam. 
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This letter clearly promotes key closed views of Islam whilst undermining the more open 
views of Islam presented by M. Tahir. This is of course just a small sampling of the type of 
interactions between articles within my sample, and with the wider public debate in Australia, 
but I think a significant one.  
The comments of Amal Awad are particularly interesting for the light they throw upon the 
tactic of attempting to artificially construct ‘balance’ by counterposing extreme viewpoints. 
As David Knight has argued in his analysis of Fox News’ tactic of pursuing conservative 
agendas through the appearance of adhering to the norm of balance, ‘constructing a device of 
balance on some issues can strongly support a conservative view’. This is achieved, Knight 
argued, by moving the ‘centre’ of a debate by the choice of ‘extreme parameters’ and by 
creating ‘the perception of a public controversy’: in this way, legitimacy can be given to one 
side of the debate, because the notion of ‘balance presumes that both sides are equally 
legitimate’.614 Given that this snapshot of the wider ‘debate’ on Islam took place in the 
context of a flood of hard news stories reporting on every possible detail and angle of the 
Jakarta embassy bombings and the role of Islam in the bombing, it is difficult to conceive 
how the artificial ‘balancing’ of extreme viewpoints in the opinion and letters pages really 
created an environment of true fairness, balance and objectivity in regards to reporting on 
issues related to Islam and Muslims. 
Intertextual relationships between articles within the sample and wider 
discourse on Muslims and Islam 
To illustrate the potential form that relationships between newspaper articles and broader 
societal discourses on Muslims can take, as well as some of the key responsibilities for 
journalists in reporting on sensitive issues, I will discuss in detail the claims put forward in 
one article from the sample, ‘PM frees political prisoners as Musharraf talks to Saudis’ 
(A07_39). This article begins as a fairly innocuous discussion of Pakistani military ruler 
Pervez Musharraf’s precarious position in the wake of the return of former President Benazir 
Bhutto. It claims that Musharraf was under pressure from his Saudi backers to entice back 
another former President, Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf ousted in 1999, as a 
counterbalance to Bhutto. However, the final three paragraphs relate not to Musharraf’s 
problems but are devoted to relating ‘horrifying new details’ about the bomb blast which 
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killed 149 people and injured 402 on the day of Bhutto’s return to Pakistan (18th October, 
2007).615 
The new information about the attack, supplied by ‘investigators from Ms Bhutto’s Pakistan 
People’s Party [the PPP]’, alleged that the bomb was believed to have been ‘strapped to a 
one-year-old child carried by its jihadist father’. The ‘investigators’ claimed that ‘the suicide 
bomber tried repeatedly to carry the baby to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle’ but was blocked by guards 
who believed he was ‘not behaving normally’. This highly distressing claim, and its segue 
from the first half of the story triggered my interest, and I attempted to find out more about 
the claims made in the story.  
The identity of those responsible for the blast was still unknown in April 2010, when a UN 
Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances of Bhutto’s subsequent assassination was 
concluded. Although Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf did his best to cast the blame upon a 
range of outlawed extremist groups, none of them accepted responsibility for the attack. The 
Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, the largest intelligence agency in Pakistan, conducted its 
own investigation and may have arrested four suspects in October 2007. However, at the time 
of the UN Inquiry into Bhutto’s assassination, these suspects could not be located and both 
their identity and their fate are uncertain.616 
Bhutto herself accused high-ranking members of the Pakistani government of orchestrating 
the attack. In her posthumously published memoir Reconciliation, Bhutto emphasises that 
‘this was meant to appear to be an Al Qaeda-style suicide attack… but in Pakistan things are 
almost never as they seem’. The ‘sophistication of the plan’, Bhutto claimed, ‘suggested a 
larger conspiracy… I had identified those I suspected in my letter to the general before my 
return’.617 
In fact, the only corroboration of the claim that the attack was perpetrated by a jihadist using 
a baby as a decoy that I could find was in an excerpt from the Simon & Schuster edition of 
Reconciliation which was printed in The Sunday Times in early 2008.618 Curiously, the two 
different published editions of Reconciliation which I consulted had slightly different 
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accounts of the Karachi bomb attack to that of The Sunday Times’ excerpt, in which all 
mention of the baby as a vehicle for a bomb has been excised.619 
In the version of the story published by The Sunday Times, Bhutto retells the story of the man 
offering up the child, and that she and her party ‘now suspect the baby’s clothes were lined 
with plastic explosives’.620 However, she never states that he was the child’s father, or claims 
that it was proven that this man was behind the attack, as is implied by the article in The 
Australian. 
It seems possible that in the immediate aftermath of the motorcade attack that speculation 
among Bhutto’s inner circle and members of the PPP who survived the attack threw up the 
possibility that a certain man behaving strangely with a baby could have been linked to the 
attack. However, the excision of this detail from Bhutto’s own published account, and the 
failure of the story to be picked up by the media (with the major exception of The 
Australian), indicates that by the time of the publication of Reconciliation, key members of 
the PPP thought better of trying to use the story to stir up enmity towards their rivals. 
The image conjured up by Bruce Loudon’s story, however, quickly grew to have a life of its 
own, being rapidly reproduced and commented on by bloggers. One blogger, ‘Girl from the 
Right’, reproduced the section of Loudon’s story describing the ‘jihadist father’ offering up 
the baby with the bomb strapped to it. She then commented that: 
Islam for example is merely some kind of evil sex and death cult masquerading as a 
religion. Think I’m wrong? Religion of Peace, my fat white ass. There is no God in a 
cult(ure) that would goad its adherents to such acts.621 
Another blog, maintained by an Israel-based organisation named  IRIS (Information 
Regarding Israel’s Security), reproduced the same chunk of text, noting that ‘this horrific 
story (which will be ignored by the mainstream media) should remind us that our Islamist 
enemy is evil’.622 Unsurprisingly, the blog does not cite the source of the story as The 
Australian, a fact which would somewhat undermine their claim that the story was unlikely to 
appear in the mainstream media. This separation of the essence of the story from its original 
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context indicates that the image of the ‘baby bomb’ had become an internet meme in its own 
right.623 
At least ten other blogs reproduced the ‘baby bomb’ section of the original news story. Each 
post provoked numerous comments echoing the revulsion and outrage towards Islam 
exemplified by the two blogs above. Only one article which I came across questioned 
Loudon’s story. This critique was from the conservative electronic newspaper, Canada Free 
Press: 
Given the unbridled ambitions of Benazir Bhutto to reclaim power in Pakistan, do 
investigators in Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party have any credibility in their 
statement that the bomb intended to kill their leader was strapped to a one-year-old 
child? 624 
The article noted that the ‘wily’ Bhutto might have degrees from Oxford and Harvard, but 
‘her degrees are in philosophy, politics, economics and government, not sleuthing’.  
Similar issues of credibility were addressed in a review of Reconciliation in the UK’s The 
Sunday Times just a few months later: 
Benazir was, by all accounts, a devoted patriot, a loyal friend and a loving 
mother…[but] Benazir was duplicitous to the point of being delusional, playing a 
constant multiple game, saying one thing to her supporters, another to the Pakistani 
army, another to the intelligence services, another to London and Washington, and 
something else again to the western media.625 
Fareed Zakaria, in his review of Reconciliation, mirrors many of the same points, praising 
Bhutto’s courageous and intellectually brilliant analysis of Islam and of global politics, yet at 
the same time noting that ‘the idea of Benazir Bhutto has always been more powerful than the 
reality’. Zakaria emphasises that her treatment of her own presidency and that of her father is 
‘neither fresh nor frank’, marked particularly by ‘little introspection and much spin’.626 
My investigation into the permutations of this story highlights a number of issues in both my 
subject matter and my methodology. Firstly, it highlights the difficulty of assessing the effects 
of news stories in a study, such as the present one, which is based on the use of hypothetical 
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evaluative criteria to analyse the manifest content of news articles. The meanings made in 
response to such stories are richly layered, and sometimes far exceed the degree of nuance 
and variation that can be conveyed from the content analysis itself.  
My ad hoc follow up on my own personal, visceral reaction to this story is a highly 
impressionistic and personal method of investigation. Yet the surprise of finding that this 
unusual passage had similarly caught the attention of bloggers and commentators 
internationally actually revealed with particular clarity the emotional reaction which may be 
unleashed by this type of emotive and uncritical journalism. 
The issues with the credibility of the story are a separate but equally concerning aspect. 
Despite the credulity with which the story was received by some in the blogosphere, 
professional journalists and commentators from varied backgrounds, including those quoted 
above (Judi MacLeod, Patrick French and Fareed Zakaria) all treated the most disturbing 
claims of Bhutto and the PPP with considerable caution. It seems all the more surprising 
therefore that Loudon, or his editor, did not themselves apply this level of caution toward the 
claims of an organisation with a strong reputation for ‘spin’, to use Zakaria’s phrasing. It 
appears that the grotesqueness and the sensationalism inherent in the PPP’s claims may have 
outweighed any caution that might be expected regarding such serious allegations. 
It is reminiscent of the type of credulity applied by journalists in the United States to the 
testimony of Ahmed Chalabi and other Iraqi exiles, and the significant role that their claims 
assumed in the playing out of the ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ saga. As noted by a 
chagrined New York Times in 2004, ‘information that was controversial then, and seems 
questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged’. 627 As the 
Times admitted, the common feature shared by many of the ‘problematic articles’ was a 
heavy and uncritical dependence upon ‘information from a circle of Iraqi informants, 
defectors and exiles bent on "regime change" in Iraq, people whose credibility has come 
under increasing public debate in recent weeks’, which was compounded by the uncritical 
support given to such claims by ‘United States officials convinced of the need to intervene in 
Iraq’, who ‘now acknowledge that they sometimes fell for misinformation from these exile 
sources’.  The parallels between the ‘misinformation’ of Chalabi and other Iraqi exiles and 
the claims of the PPP faithfully reproduced in Bruce Loudon’s article are clear. 
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The frank Times editorial goes on to discuss a number of the ‘problematic’ articles which 
appeared in its pages between late 2001 and mid 2003. The possible explanations for the 
unverified or questionable claims which the Times provide include:  
Editors at several levels who should have been challenging reporters and pressing for 
more scepticism were perhaps too intent on rushing scoops into the paper. Accounts 
of Iraqi defectors were not always weighed against their strong desire to have Saddam 
Hussein ousted. Articles based on dire claims about Iraq tended to get prominent 
display, while follow-up articles that called the original ones into question were 
sometimes buried. In some cases, there was no follow-up at all.628 
The lack of editorial oversight, emphasis on ‘dire claims’ and lack of follow-up are all 
features of the Bruce Loudon article which concern me, particularly as one of the 
characteristics of the current media landscape is a tendency towards less editorial oversight 
and less fact-checking, as was highlighted in the previous chapter. The failure of journalistic 
conventions had clearly discernible consequences in the case of the WMD scandal; in the 
case of the claimed infanticide by a Pakistani jihadi in the story in question, the impact is 
more difficult to quantify, but perhaps no less significant. 
In terms of the specific relationship which this story has with representations of Islam, I was 
particularly alarmed by the linking of jihadism with infanticide. In his influential work on 
justifications for collective violence through the creation of ‘scapegoats’, René Girard wrote 
that casting potential scapegoats as perpetrators of ‘primeval’ crimes such as parricide, sexual 
violence and infanticide characteristically preceded acts of collective violence upon 
designated victims.629 As seen by examples such as the ‘Children Overboard’ incident and the 
‘gang rape’ controversy, these are the specific type of taboo crimes that Muslims were 
increasingly portrayed as committing during the early 2000s. Essentialising these type of 
accusations involves promulgating the notion that any Muslim, simply by virtue of their faith, 
is a potential rapist, perpetrators of infanticide, or terrorist. Sensationalist crimes generated 
some of the most emotive and inflammatory writing in articles in my sample; the death of 
over a hundred children in the Beslan school hostage crisis, for example, was one of the 
major stories of the week prior to commencement of my 2004 data sets and was still being 
commented on in articles in my sample as an example of the type of crimes that Muslims as a 
whole might be expected to commit (for example, A04_60; A04_99; A04_125). 
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Girard wrote that the second necessary condition for the creation of scapegoats was the 
designation of an appropriate category of people for scapegoating. As well as being accused 
of primeval crimes, potential victims must be members of a ‘sacrificial category’, that is, a 
category of people who could be subjected to communal violence without threat of reprisals: 
All our sacrificial victims…are invariably distinguishable from the nonsacrificeable 
beings by one essential characteristic: between the victims and the community a 
crucial social link is missing, so they can be exposed to violence without fear of 
reprisal. Their death does not automatically entail an act of vengeance.630 
The condoning of the lies of the Howard government, represented in their re-election at the 
2001, represents a crucial link between the successful pinning of taboo crimes upon innocent 
victims, and the creation of a category of scapegoat which may be subjected to violence 
without threat of vengeance or condemnation.  
Essentialist stereotyping of Muslims as inherently violent and incapable of living within the 
Western world were promulgated by leading Australian politicians, sections of the Australian 
media, and influential talk-back radio hosts, and filtered into the general population. 
Deliberate malice was not necessarily the motivation for these actions – indeed, self-interest, 
a desire to exploit wedge politics, and intellectual laziness can account for much of this 
development. However, the consequence was that as these stereotypes continued to be 
reinforced, without censor or alternative views gaining any purchase in either Australian 
politics or the media, it became increasingly apparent that Muslims had become a target for 
violence which could go uncriticised and unavenged.  
It is in this context that numerous examples of hate crimes against Australian Muslims 
occurred in the wake of the September 11 attacks, that harsh laws against terrorism were 
introduced which were used to terrorise Muslim communities and individuals, and that the 
Australian nationals apprehended overseas during the War on Terror were able to end up in 
Guantanamo Bay. It is also in this context that the Cronulla Riots occur; the Riots can be seen 
as the expression of acts of communal violence against a section of the community who 
fulfilled both of Girard’s preconditions for scapegoating: they could be accused of ‘primeval’ 
crimes, and they could be attacked without fear of reprisals or condemnation. By 2007, 
fortunately, these trends were starting to be reversed in Australia: the 2007 election campaign 
constituted a ‘political moment’ in which significant shifts in the political landscape 
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occurred. The more open criticism of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination and of the 
‘War on Terror’ and its consequences, both in Australia and internationally, are clear trends 
illuminated through the data in this chapter. Yet even in 2007, as has been outlined in this 
chapter, the voicing of extremely Islamophobic attitudes was still acceptable in The 
Australian, and publication of ‘somewhat closed’ views of Islam and Muslims were still 
commonplace in The SMH. As has also been highlighted in this chapter, there were still many 
features of reporting on issues related to Muslims and Islam which were problematic. In order 
to summarise and draw some conclusions from the evidence of shifting attitudes towards 
Muslims and Islam visible in 2007, I now turn to the final chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter 12 – Conclusions and Looking Forward 
 
In this chapter, the concluding chapter of my thesis, I summarise my research findings, before 
turning to consider the contemporary Australian political and media landscapes. Since the 
Federal Election of 24 November 2007, which was the end point of data-collection for this 
thesis, both the Australian media and political landscapes have seemingly undergone radical 
transformations; yet in many ways the same issues encountered during the process of 
researching and writing this thesis have re-emerged to characterise public debates over recent 
months as Australia moved towards the 2013 Federal Election. Against this background, I 
then move to a consideration of potential strategies for reduction of negative reporting 
patterns before closing with some remarks on the necessity of and prospects for combating 
prejudice and discrimination in Australian society. 
Summary of research findings 
The principal finding from my research was evidence of a significant reduction in the levels 
of closed views towards Muslims and Islam and an increase in open views of Muslims and 
Islam in reporting in two broadsheet newspapers during the 2007 Australian Federal Election 
campaign as compared to the 2004 campaign. There was also a reduction in the proportion of 
articles representing Islam as a ‘problem’ from the first to the second of these two time 
periods, and based on the slight reduction in density of articles between the different periods, 
there were some indications that ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ held less salience as a ‘newsworthy’ 
topic in 2007 than in 2004. These same patterns broadly illustrated the differences in 
reporting between The Australian and The SMH: in both time periods, articles in The 
Australian on issues related to Islam and Muslims were more likely to be characterised by 
closed views towards Islam and to represent Islam as a problem. The density of articles on 
subjects related to Muslims and Islam from The Australian was also significantly higher than 
for The SMH.  
Between the different time periods and newspapers, it was notable that the incidence of 
stereotypical views of Islam as monolithic, violent, and a manipulative ideology rather than a 
true religion (characteristic of ‘closed’ views of Islam on the first five dimensions of the 
Islamophobic Index) utilised for the study did not decrease as markedly as the incidence of 
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denial and normalisation of Islamophobia and justification of discrimination and prejudice 
towards Muslims (‘closed’ views of Islam on the final three dimensions of the Index). That 
is, one of the most significant factors in changes to the overall levels of Islamophobia 
between the two different time periods and publications was that whilst core representational 
stereotypes concerning Muslims retained salience in 2007, there were higher levels of 
recognition and acknowledgement of the existence of and serious negative impacts of 
Islamophobia upon Muslim people and communities. Further development in these areas 
was, however, still clearly required. Overall, the results of my research indicated that an 
exercise in content analysis using, as the model for evaluative criteria, a Likert scale based on 
the Runnymede Trust definition of Islamophobia, was capable of illustrating significant 
distinctions in the representation of a wide range of issues and stories pertaining to Islam and 
Muslims in the Australian press. 
The validity of considering a full range of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ news sources in studies of 
representational patterns in the media was also ratified by my study. The characteristics of 
soft versus hard news for each publication in the different time periods largely mirrored the 
overall patterns for the different data sets. However, surveying both hard and soft stories also 
enabled the illumination of practices of apparent efforts to artificially construct the 
appearance of ‘fair and balanced’ reporting, through the commissioning and juxtapositioning 
of opinion articles and letters which represented (generally extreme) viewpoints on particular 
issues. Furthermore, consideration of the relationship between different articles printed within 
the same edition of the newspaper, and of how hard news stories were frequently framed and 
‘explained’ through opinion articles, letters and feature articles, underscores the importance 
of considering intertextuality when designing media analytical studies.  
The potential for investigating the wider impact of particular news stories was also indicated 
by my research into the commentary and dissemination through online blogs of one particular 
story, ‘PM frees political prisoners as Musharraf talks to Saudis’ (A07_39), by The 
Australian’s Bruce Loudon. The global context of Islamophobia should not be 
underestimated when conducting research on this phenomenon; proponents of Islamophobia 
draw inspiration from other anti-Muslim individuals and movements around the world. The 
manifesto of Norwegian Anders Breivik, which described his motivation for attacks which 
claimed the lives of over 90 people, included praise for the anti-Islamic or anti- ‘political 
correctness’ policies and statements of four Australian public figures: former Prime Minister 
John Howard, Former Treasurer Peter Costello, Archbishop George Pell, and historian Keith 
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Windschuttle. Breivik also described his links to or admiration for numerous individuals and 
organisations across Europe, including the Dutch anti-Muslim campaigner Geert Wilders and 
his Party for Freedom and the far-right English Defence League.631 Australia now has its own 
Party for Freedom and Australian Defence League, patterned on these European-based 
organisations: 
Ralph Cerminara [President of the Australian Defence League] says his group is 
fighting the same cause as the English Defence League, which is to stop Muslim 
immigration. With a federal election ahead…the Australian Defence League wants to 
work with any political group willing to oppose Muslim immigration. He supports the 
ideas of the Rise Up Australia Party and politician Pauline Hanson, as well as the new 
Australian Party for Freedom.632 
The global, online networks between such organisations are underscored by the fact that the 
English Defence League, the Irish Defence League and the Finnish Defence League all 
‘liked’ the Australian Defence League’s Facebook page. As well as connecting via social 
media, Liz Fekete emphasises the plethora of anti-Muslim online discussion forums and 
blogs as crucial to the dissemination of Islamophobic ideologies, particularly through the 
reproduction and circulation of news stories from around the world which provide support for 
the maintenance and strengthening of closed views towards Islam.633  
As with analysis of the full range of articles in my sample, in-depth consideration of 
particular subsets of articles revealed trends towards more Islamophobic reporting in 2004 
than in 2007, and in The Australian as compared to The SMH, but with significant exceptions 
for particular articles. In my analysis of the representation of Islam and violence, I found that 
discussing or reporting on issues related to terrorist violence or conflict situations in Islamic 
countries were characterised by negative language features (such as emotive and demonising 
language) and as a rule perpetuated stereotyped views of Islam and Muslims, as has been 
highlighted in numerous studies of Islam and the media. The persistent widespread use of 
demonising terms such as ‘Islamic terrorism’ or ‘Muslim extremists’ is deeply problematic, 
given significant evidence of the negative impact of such language and longstanding calls 
from bodies such as the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and the Anti-
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Discrimination Board to abstain from using such terms. This advice had clearly failed to be 
implemented by mainstream media sources at the time of data collection for this study. 
A lack of diversity of sources was also a strong feature of articles dealing with conflict 
situations, and with hard news stories in my sample in general. Particularly in 2004, articles 
in both newspapers were dominated by bureaucratic sources and showed a significant dearth 
of Muslim sources. When Muslim sources were quoted, they were frequently either 
representatives of governments in Islamic countries or represented extreme, inflammatory 
views held by a small minority within Muslim communities. Of the few articles dealing with 
conflict which received positive scores on the Islamophobic Index, articles by Hala Jaber and 
Paul McGeough stood out, as did articles on people negatively affected by anti-Muslim 
discrimination, such as Izhar ul-Haque. Such articles featured the voices of ‘ordinary’ 
Muslim men and women and humanised them, contextualised the conflict situations they 
referred to, eschewed the use of simplistic ‘complexity-reducing’ frameworks such as good 
vs evil or the ‘War on Terror’, and contained reference to positive efforts by individuals and 
groups to resist and collectively respond to oppression and conflict. The ‘newsworthiness’ of 
stories related to Islam and violent conflict and the concentration of negative reporting 
patterns in such stories make reform of conflict reporting standards a key area for future 
development. 
Analysis of depictions of ‘dirty tricks’ in the 2004 and 2007 campaign also highlighted 
interesting divergences and distinctions between the two time periods and newspapers. 
Evidence of ‘racist campaigning’ against Muslim Labor candidate Ed Husic in 2004 was not 
a significant news story at all, and in the one article which did deal with the issue at length, 
Husic’s claims were dismissed out of hand. In 2007, in contrast, coverage of deceitful racist 
campaigning in the seat of Lindsay was extensive and diverse, with many articles strongly 
emphasising the problematic and serious issue of attempting to use Islamophobia for electoral 
gain. Articles on this subject in particular highlighted the considerably higher levels of 
‘distance from power’ displayed in 2007 than in 2004; that is, there was increased media 
contestation of the Coalition Government’s strategy of fomenting and exploiting xenophobia 
and anti-Muslim sentiment, in the later election campaign, than in the earlier period. It also 
highlighted an unusual pattern in which some reporting in The Australian more stringently 
adhered to an idealised model of ‘adversarial’ reporting than articles in The SMH, and 
correspondingly received high positive scores on the Islamophobic Index. Such articles were 
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characterised by extensive investigative reporting, contextualisation of stories, and high 
source diversity, including Muslim community representatives and community members.  
Even in 2007, however, the voicing of extremely Islamophobic attitudes was still acceptable 
in The Australian, and publication of ‘somewhat closed’ views of Islam and Muslims were 
still commonplace in The SMH. The fact that ‘extreme’ views were still able to be 
accommodated within the spectrum of views represented in The Australian in 2007 indicates 
that in Daniel Hallin’s terms, whilst the boundaries of the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’ on 
the subject of Islam and Muslims may have shifted somewhat between the two periods, the 
shift did not make extremely Islamophobic perspectives so ‘deviant’ that they could no 
longer be printed within the paper. It should also be noted that the most extreme closed views 
of Islam from The SMH were found in articles by the columnist Paul Sheehan in 2004. No 
columns from Sheehan appeared in my sample in 2007; however, to the present day Sheehan 
writes regular columns for The SMH which continue to contain extremely inflammatory anti-
Muslim views. Therefore, just because no such articles appeared in my sample does not mean 
that The SMH does not consider such extreme views within the ‘zone of legitimate 
controversy’ to this day.  
Sheehan’s continued presence at The SMH may enable the newspaper to defend itself against 
claims of ‘bias’ and ‘lack of balance’ but reveals the problematic nature of such valorisation 
of the principle of ‘balance’: it can legitimise extreme views which on their own merits are 
demonstrably harmful to social cohesion, and under no real pressure to justify themselves 
against evidentiary criteria. In addition, the incidence of ‘very open’ or ‘extremely open’ 
views of Islam did not substantially increase for either publication in 2007; such views 
therefore remained on the far edges of the ‘zone of legitimate controversy’. Nevertheless, 
there is a clear overall shift for both newspapers in 2007 towards less Islamophobic 
representations of Islam and Muslims, increased contestation of the ‘War on Terror’ 
consensus, and a significantly more adversarial stance towards the Howard Government.  
What might account for the shifts in representational patterns between the two periods and 
the two newspapers? The effect of shifts in the wider political context, referenced in previous 
chapters, may have been accentuated by the newspapers coming under implicit pressure to 
respond to well-attested criticisms of their unfair, unbalanced and inflammatory reporting on 
issues related to Islam and Muslims in the mid-2000s. One of the responsive strategies of The 
Australian was to commission features from prominent Muslims in order to address these 
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accusations, as discussed in the previous two chapters. The Australian also strongly 
celebrated its record for adversarial journalism, exemplified by ‘breaking’ major news stories 
such as the manufacturing of the Children Overboard affair and the bungling of the Haneef 
case.634 However, Abdalla et al. argue in relation to the latter case that ‘the “good” work that 
was done’ by two journalists from The Australian ‘does not counter the fact that several 
aspects of the media coverage during the case were problematic [and] that the media lacks 
self-reflexivity’. The reporting of the case, they argue, ‘points to the need for the media to be 
critical of government spin, and to deal with such reporting in a more critical and analytical 
manner’.635 In regards to the commissioning of features, the commitment to the principle of 
‘balance’ meant that printing extremely positive stories about Islam made the continued 
printing of extremely negative stories about Islam justifiable. The printing of ‘soft news’ 
articles which included more open views towards Islam and Muslims and the celebration of 
individual hard news stories which exemplified ‘Fourth Estate’ values therefore did not seem 
to be matched by any commitment to address the entrenched patterns of Islamophobic 
representations which I found strongly characteristic of articles from The Australian surveyed 
in this study.  
In contrast, The SMH responded to criticisms of its coverage of issues related to Islam and 
Muslims by initiating a project called ‘Faces of Islam’ in early 2007. The paper 
commissioned and ran a series of special articles which according to senior reporter Hamish 
McDonald was explicitly aimed at ‘reader education’ and required journalists to ‘get back to 
basics’. The commissioned articles considered ‘how the Muslim community arrived in 
Australia, what kind of lifestyles and beliefs, [and] ethnic flavours are represented here’, and 
reportedly acted as ‘quite an education for the staff who worked on it’.636 This project, which 
developed journalistic understanding of the diversity of Muslim communities in Australia and 
emphasised critical reflection on the part of journalists, may be assumed to have played a role 
in the patterns of representation which I found in articles in my sample from this paper in 
2007. In reference to this project, Lynch argued that ‘it is when journalists and news 
organisations question [representational] conventions – go “back to basics”, in McDonald’s 
words – that exertions of definitional power are more likely to be supplemented with a 
greater openness and plurality’.637 This project therefore had arguably far-reaching and 
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holistic impacts upon the orientation of the newspaper towards reporting on Islam and 
Muslims. In contrast, the strategies of The Australian were in the end superficial and limited 
in their impact: the excellence of occasional individual feature articles or exposés stands in 
stark contrast to the conformity to traditional news values and an unchallenged overall 
tendency towards negative reporting on Islam and Muslims. 
Finally, consideration of the physical features of my articles raised a number of speculative 
points which have resonance in the current era of considerable change and uncertainty for the 
newspaper market. The patterns I highlighted were the high incidence of shared copy 
between newspapers from the same publishing stable, heavy reliance on wire copy, large 
proportions of content produced by non-journalists, and for The Australian, lack of authorial 
attribution. These are all trends which have become exacerbated and entrenched even further 
in the past few years, in the face of shrinking newsrooms and the rise of 24-hour news cycles. 
Such developments in the media landscape will be considered in more detail below, 
following a summary of the current political landscape in Australia, before I turn to 
discussion of potential strategies for challenging Islamophobic representation in the media 
based upon my research. 
The contemporary political landscape 
The Rudd Labor Government came to power in 2007 on a wave of renewed public optimism 
about the potentialities for bringing about substantive change in Australian politics, and 
bestowed upon the incoming government a strong mandate for change and for unravelling 
some of the certitudes of the Howard Era. Rapid policy shifts and actions by the Rudd 
Government included dismantling of some of the more unpalatable neo-liberal reforms of the 
Howard Government, including its industrial relations reform package, known as 
‘WorkChoices’. Serious engagement with the threat of anthropogenic climate change was 
presaged by adding Australia to the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions. A shift towards a more humane and compassionate policy towards asylum seekers 
was signalled by ending the ‘Temporary Protection Visa’ scheme and offshore processing. A 
reorientation towards facing rather than denying the painful, racist policies which formed part 
of Australia’s colonial legacy was signalled by Rudd’s Apology to the Stolen Generations. 
The Clarke Review was established to review Australia’s anti-terrorism legislation, with a 
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mandate to both explain how the mishandling of the Haneef case could have occurred, and to 
recommend reforms to prevent such incidents occurring in the future.638 
Many of these shifts, however, were to prove either illusory or transitory. After strong 
statements attacking the denial of racism by the Coalition Government in the wake of the 
Lindsay leafleting scandal, as discussed in this thesis, Rudd responded to a spate of attacks 
upon Indian students in Melbourne and Sydney by claiming that he did ‘not believe that 
racism is at work in Australia on these matters at all’.639 The Department of Public 
Prosecutions took former Guantanamo Bay detainee David Hicks to court in 2011 to try and 
prevent him from receiving any remuneration from the sales of his memoir which it called, in 
a highly politically inflammatory attack, ‘proceeds from crime’.640 Despite symbolic actions 
such as the Apology, real action and rollbacks of Howard Government policies which 
impacted disproportionately upon minorities were lacking; Howard’s widely decried 
‘Intervention’ in Northern Territory Indigenous communities was maintained by the Rudd 
Government, and the much hyped Clarke Inquiry led to only minor, cosmetic alterations to 
Howard’s anti-terrorism legislation. When asylum seeker arrivals by boat began to once 
again climb and were providing the Opposition with plentiful fodder with which to attack the 
Government and reignite the anxieties of the public over this issue, the Labor government 
began to implement ‘deterrent’ tactics which mimicked those of the Howard Government, 
including moratoriums on processing of refugees and eventually, under Rudd’s successor 
Julia Gillard, the reopening of offshore detention centres and resumption of practices such as 
mandatory detention of children. The intimations that the Rudd Government was moving 
towards a more measured attitude towards the issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict were 
abruptly scuttled by the Gillard Government following the ousting of Rudd as Labor party 
leader and Prime Minister in 2010.641 
The Gillard Government clung to office at the 2010 election only by managing to secure the 
support of key Independent Members of Parliament and the Greens Party and form a minority 
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government. Public support for the Labor party continued to seep away well into the final 
months before the election; polling suggested the Coalition would attain a significant 
majority in the Lower House, and make significant gains in the Senate, at Labor’s expense.642 
Part of the collapse of support for Labor lay in the dissatisfaction and disaffection of the 
public due to its perceived failings, fuelled by merciless hounding of the Prime Minister by 
the mainstream media and endless speculation about whether Rudd would be able to make a 
comeback. Yet it was also partly due to the Coalition’s attempts to leverage the same issues 
that had maintained its power under Howard, methods by which it attained significant 
mileage from the climbing numbers of asylum seekers.  
Just before Christmas 2010, however, an asylum seeker boat foundered on the rocks of 
Christmas Island, and over fifty people drowned. When the Government paid for family 
members settled in Australia to fly to the funerals, Opposition Leader Tony Abbott and his 
Shadow Immigration Minister, Scott Morrison, seized the opportunity to lambast the 
government. Their approach created serious contention even within the Coalition, with 
members of the party such as Shadow Treasurer Joe Hockey publicly rebuking their leader. 
Soon after, concerned senior members of the party leaked to journalists at the Sydney 
Morning Herald that at a recent shadow cabinet meeting, Morrison had urged the Coalition to 
‘capitalise on the electorate’s growing concerns about ‘Muslim immigration’ and Muslims’ 
‘“inability” to integrate’. The controversy almost led to the termination of Abbott’s 
leadership; however, he managed to maintain his position as he and Morrison toughed it out 
through accusations of inciting Islamophobia; it seemed they had overplayed their hand in 
this instance and that the boundaries of ‘legitimate controversy’ had not shifted as far back 
towards the certainties of the Howard era as Abbott and Morrison may have supposed.643  
In the aftermath of this affair, Abbott and Morrison were more circumspect and careful to 
‘code’ any references that could be construed as racist or Islamophobic. Yet as the 2013 
federal election drew closer, ‘immigration issues’ re-emerged as a definitive election issue, 
with Morrison taking a prominent role in the Coalition’s campaign. In July, Morrison 
addressed the Affinity Intercultural Foundation in Sydney – the interfaith organisation 
discussed in the introduction to Chapter 2. Political sociologist Alana Lentin argued that at 
the event, Morrison’s ‘combination of tough talk on refugees and softer talk on migrant 
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integration to an organisation initiated by young Muslims sends the message that those 
Australia accepts must play by “our” rules’. Lentin also highlighted as problematic 
Morrison’s emphasis on a shift away from ‘multiculturalism’ towards an emphasis on 
‘integration’ of minorities.644 In the same marginal seats which the Howard Government had 
won through hard campaigning on ‘threat concepts’ such as Muslim asylum seekers, 
Morrison was particularly visible during the election campaign, appearing, for example, as 
the keynote speaker at a Liberal Party ‘Immigration Forum’ in the NSW outer–metropolitan 
electorate of Robertson in June.645 Robertson was Australia’s fourth most marginal seat at the 
2010 election – sandwiched in terms of its marginality between those two key electorates 
which have featured so heavily in this thesis, Greenway and Lindsay.646  
Morrison’s address at this forum was strongly characterised by nostalgia for the days of the 
Howard Government. He emphasised the Coalition’s desire to ‘turn back to the clock’ to 
before 2007, and to restore immigration policy to an assimilatory ‘join it, not change it’ 
stance. Morrison outlined the Coalition’s intent to ‘stop the boats’, by whatever means 
necessary, including military action to turn back boats entering Australian waters, the 
resurrection of TPVs, mandatory offshore processing, and even forced repatriation for some 
asylum seekers.647 The local Liberal candidate, Lucy Wicks, emphasised that the money 
which was being spent on asylum seekers could be better spent on infrastructure such as 
roads and the health system, yet neglected to mention that funding for these categories 
actually declined under Howard.648 Morrison’s address was heavily ‘on-message’, and clearly 
patterned upon phrases and keywords drawn from the rhetoric of the Howard era. Examples 
included an emphasis on the ‘criminality’ of people smugglers and asylum seekers and 
repeated description of Labor as a ‘soft-touch’ on border protection, specific rhetorical tactics 
documented by Poynting and Mason as effective for the Coalition in its 2001 election 
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campaign.649 The addresses of Morrison and Wicks drew enthusiastic applause from the 
packed auditorium of several hundred people. 
Perhaps learning from the lessons of 2010, Morrison was extremely careful to avoid any 
openly racist or Islamophobic statements at the ‘forum’, as he has been of late in the media. 
Yet there were instances of phrasing in his address which seemed to be invoking these 
notions through dog-whistling. As one particularly pertinent example, he mentioned the tens 
of thousands of refugees from the conflict now either living in refugee camps or attempting to 
leave Syria. He implied that if Australia didn’t have a ‘problem’ with ‘boat-people’, we 
would be able to selectively resettle some refugees from this conflict, many of whom he 
emphasised were Christian Syrians fleeing persecution (although the majority of Syrian 
refugees are Sunni Muslims). An appreciative murmur sprang up through the crowd at this, 
and a later audience question specifically referred to the hope that once Australia had dealt 
appropriately with the asylum seeker issue, we would be able to assist those Christian Syrian 
refugees. Further questions included a query as to how the Coalition would ‘screen for 
religious fundamentalists’ if it won the election, and a question on how the Coalition would 
help prevent immigrants from eroding the British character of Australian society.  
Following the forum, which I attended myself, one audience member was sympathetic to the 
suggestion, made in personal conversation, that through such forums and rhetoric the 
Coalition was stoking people’s anxieties and fears about immigrants and asylum seekers. She 
recalled a recent story on the news about ‘young Brotherhood men’ killing people with axes 
in Egypt. After seeing stories like that, she said, it’s understandable that people ‘don’t want 
those kind of people here’. Her statement strongly echoed John Howard’s assertion that ‘I 
don’t want people like that in Australia’, when referring to Muslim asylum seekers in 2001.650 
The linkage between immigration anxieties and mediated representations of Muslims 
overseas is clearly still at work in Australia, at least for some people. In August 2013, the 
Essential Report’s pre-election polling indicated that 71% of respondents considered asylum 
seekers as one of or the most important election issue.651 
Kevin Rudd’s resumption of the leadership of the Labor Party in June 2013 initially boosted 
Labor’s performance in the polls and suggested that a Coalition victory was not necessarily a 
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fait accompli. The sense of hope that had mobilised support in 2007 was strongly invoked by 
Rudd in his early days back in office, as he emphasised his optimism for Australia’s future, 
and excoriated the Opposition Leader for his unrelenting negativity: 
Mr Abbott…is the nation’s most formidable exponent of negative politics, and 
negative politics above all is designed to induce feelings of worry, of anxiety and fear 
in the community. He and the Liberal Party have concluded that fear is a far better 
political bet than engaging in a debate on the facts.652 
Rudd’s firm dismissal of the Coalition’s ‘turn back the boats’ policy on asylum seekers and 
his denunciation of the type of ‘politics of fear’ which were the trademark of Abbott’s 
mentor, John Howard, was echoed by his presiding over other symbolic acts in his early days 
in office, such as the swearing-in of Australia’s first Muslim frontbencher, Ed Husic, member 
for Chifley.  
Husic’s appointment potentially indicated a substantive move away from the divisive, 
reactionary politics in which Islamophobic attitudes took such a strong hold in Australian 
political and social discourses over the past decade. The impact of the tacit support for such 
views under the Howard Government have not yet relinquished their hold on sections of the 
Australian public, and open expression of Islamophobia could seethe to the surface again 
given re-legitimisation. Emblematic of this lingering threat is the torrent of abuse directed at 
Ed Husic after he took oath on the Quran. Reactions to Husic’s swearing in were 
characterised by hysteria over Muslims ‘infiltrating’ and invading ‘our country’,653 and near 
the end of the campaign his sister was verbally abused and threatened by a Liberal staffer 
with a knife.654 Husic was not new to such blatant prejudice and hostility, having been the 
recipient of Islamophobic abuse and campaigning during his first effort to run for public 
office, in Greenway at the 2004 Federal Election (as discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter). 
Despite these early indications of a more compassionate and progressive approach to the 
totemic issues of asylum seekers and social cohesion, Rudd consequently announced a 
hardline strategy towards asylum seekers, included the ruling out of any resettlement in 
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Australia of asylum seekers arriving by boat.655 His policy received an approval rating of 61% 
in Essential Report polling in August 2013.656 Rudd’s endorsement of policies which were in 
large part consonant with those of the Coalition on this matter recalled the lack of substantive 
change by the Labor Government in other matters pertaining to asylum seekers, counter-
terrorism and social cohesion, as outlined above. 
George and Huynh have argued that progressive Australians ‘significantly misunderstood’ 
Rudd’s agenda subsequent to the 2007 Election, perceiving his symbolic acts such as the 
Apology as signalling a return to the Keating era of ‘big picture reform and a progressivist 
social agenda’. Even if Rudd had intended to radically change the policy framework of the 
Howard Government, George and Huynh have conjectured that he could not feasibly create 
real change because the Rudd Government was ‘effectively beholden to the same 
constituencies which gave Howard electoral support after 1996’.657 George and Huynh’s 
argument is consistent with the justification given by Greg Sheridan for The Australian’s 
endorsement of Kevin Rudd at the 2007 election in a key article from my sample, ‘Liberal 
future lies in Tony Abbott’s ideas’: 
Much has been made of Rudd’s policy me-tooism. He earns no criticism from me on 
that score. It means that Rudd has embraced mainstream, moderate policies and as a 
result Labor is doing extremely well… The Left… will argue that the Howard defeat 
marks the repudiation of the Howard Government’s lies on Iraq, racism on 
Aborigines, hostility to multiculturalism, construction of a national security state, un-
Australian subservience to Washington, hostility to Muslims and so on. In fact, this is 
almost wholly untrue, as Rudd’s embrace of the Government’s position on almost all 
of this stuff indicates (A07_28). 
Sheridan’s analysis also accords with David McKnight’s observation that in many cases 
when News Ltd. publications have shifted their allegiance away from conservative 
governments, it was not necessarily because they were embracing a more progressive stance, 
but because opposition parties had shifted their positions significantly and become markedly 
more conservative. ‘Indeed’, McKnight argued, ‘Murdoch’s newspapers helped to create this 
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shift in the nation’s political consensus, which underlay the convergence of its political 
parties’.658 
Although writing in 2009, George and Huynh’s observations ring true for the current political 
situation in Australia. They write that the optimistic ‘misunderstanding’ of Rudd’s agenda 
represented a ‘dangerous complacency’ in the face of the conservative resurgence of the past 
two decades, which ‘has clawed back much of the progressive ground won during the heady 
days of the Vietnam War era and the New Left cultural revolution’. They argue that despite a 
perception that the ‘culture wars’ were ended in the mid-2000s with the defeat of 
conservatively-inspired governments like the Howard Government in Australia, and the Bush 
Administration in the US, the war is far from over: in fact, the significance of the culture 
wars ‘for governance and everyday life in these societies’ has increased.659 The resources at 
the disposal of proponents of this ‘conservative resurgence’ are considerable. Just months 
ago, for example, the 70th birthday gala dinner of right-wing think-tank the Institute of Public 
Affairs featured a ‘who’s-who’ of leading conservatives in Australian politics, business, 
society and the media, including then Opposition Leader Tony Abbott, Archbishop George 
Pell, Rupert Murdoch, Gina Rinehart, and Andrew Bolt. A fundraising auction at the dinner 
sold prizes such as a tour of the Reagan ranch in Santa Barbara (bought by Rinehart for 
$25,000), behind-the-scenes visits to Andrew Bolt’s controversial television program The 
Bolt Report, morning tea with News Ltd. columnist Janet Albrechtsen, and a tour of the Fox 
News Studio in New York (each selling for $20,000). The IPA is generously supported by 
Rinehart, Murdoch and other business figures, and its views are frequently promoted through 
the Murdoch media.660 
This ‘conservative resurgence’ has fuelled the September 7 return to government of the 
Coalition, under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Abbott. The Coalition’s election 
slogan of ‘stop the boats’ proved a powerful message in the election, particularly in marginal 
seats. The key seats of Greenway and Lindsay once again drew national media coverage, as 
Liberal candidates made major gaffes in their attempts to promote their fiercely anti-asylum 
stances.661 The conservative social agenda of many of the new Liberal members of 
parliament, of Abbott and of senior members of the Coalition – particularly Scott Morrison – 
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will have a distinct impact upon discourses of belonging and social inclusion in Australia 
over the next government term. In addition, as I write, the balance of power in the Upper 
House has not yet been determined but may rest upon representatives of far-right anti-
immigration and anti-Muslim parties. These developments herald the beginning of a new 
chapter in the ‘culture wars’ in Australia, in which the fanning of anti-Muslim prejudice has 
potential to once again become a significant factor in political and public discourse. 
The contemporary media landscape 
The recent election campaign has been emblematic of the changes not only in the Australian 
political landscape but in the media landscape. Rudd’s high media profile and his party’s 
willingness to return him to leadership of the party in a last-ditch effort to prevent electoral 
defeat is representative of a shift towards a politics of personality and an emphasis on 
‘entertainment’ to make political news more palatable to mainstream audiences.662 The 
campaign was also marked by extremely hostile coverage of the campaign by the News Ltd. 
press; reporting in The Australian and Sydney’s The Daily Telegraph were particularly 
vitriolic. Their support for Rudd at the 2007 election proved a particularly short-lived 
phenomenon and the relaxation of media ownership and regulation following the 2001 
election has enabled the further concentration of the News Ltd. market share in Australia and 
maximised the influence of Murdoch’s newspapers. As an indication of the colonisation of 
social media by political figures, Murdoch and Rudd subsequently flamed each other via 
Twitter. Rudd then proved unsuccessful in his attempt to focus attention on the claim that 
Murdoch’s attacks on Labor being based on the potential threat the party’s National 
Broadband Network represented to Murdoch’s cable channel, Foxtel.663 Thus, several long-
term trends of political reporting in general – and election coverage in particular – can be 
seen to have accelerated and converged during the recent election campaign. 
Over the past decade, the ‘digital revolution’ has gained greater momentum year-by-year; as 
it did so, circulation, readership, and advertising revenues for newspapers declined and the 
rate of newspaper and bureau closure, and job cuts among journalists, accelerated – not just 
in Australia but throughout much of the world. The Global Financial Crisis compounded the 
effects of this long-term trend, facilitating what has been heralded as the end of the 
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newspaper business model. At the same time, the reputation of the ‘mainstream media’ 
(MSM) took a major buffeting in recent years as a result of scandals such as the complicity of 
prominent journalists in the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ fiasco and the News International 
phone hacking scandal. Despite understandable anxiety over the future of ‘quality’ journalism 
occasioned by these developments, optimism about the future of the media has in some areas 
been raised by the belief that in becoming a networked society, we are potentially entering a 
hopeful new era of media and communications.664  
This optimism has been fuelled by the emergence of alternative forms of media, such as 
online alternative media, blogging, open source journalism, citizen journalism, and 
WikiLeaks. In many cases in recent years, the traditional functions imputed to the ‘Fourth 
Estate’ under the social responsibility of journalism model have been fulfilled more ably by 
bloggers and other alternative forms of media (particularly WikiLeaks) than by the 
mainstream media. Arianna Huffington, founder of the Huffington Post, emphasised this 
point in regards to the coverage of the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ case: 
In the run-up to the Iraq war, many in the mainstream media, including the New York 
Times, lost their veneer of unassailable trustworthiness for many readers and viewers, 
and it became clear that new media sources could be trusted—and indeed are often 
much quicker at correcting mistakes than old media sources.665 
Such developments have led to claims for some forms of alternative and social media 
reporting to be considered as a ‘Fifth Estate’.666 
Despite such claims, there is strong evidence for a continuing role of ‘legacy’ media such as 
the ‘quality’ broadsheet press, as in many cases alternative media are constrained to acting as 
adjuncts to the mainstream media. In other cases, alternative media, or ‘challenger 
paradigms’, exist in ‘parallel’ to but not connecting with the mainstream media, thus limiting 
their reach and impact.667 Bridging this gap can sometimes be done through the formation of 
partnerships between mainstream and alternative media sources in order to engage with 
broader audiences and maximise credibility. An example of such accommodations are the 
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‘formal arrangements with professional news organisations’ which WikiLeaks entered into in 
order to publicise significant information from leaked diplomatic cables. The mainstream 
media were essential to this endeavour because, as Lynch et al. highlight, they have  
‘traditional safeguards – trained observers, edited copy – [and] had built up reputational 
resources to support them’.668 Despite the optimism occasioned by the rise of alternative 
media sources, therefore, the more limited reach of media outside the mainstream and the 
persistence of dependence of the ‘fifth estate’ upon an unreformed ‘fourth estate’ continues to 
set limitations upon the potential of alternative media sources. 
Reducing Islamophobia in the media 
The current media landscape is one in which there exists considerable opportunity for 
transformation of existing mainstream and alternative media, as well as potentially altering 
the relationships between the two, as emphasised by Elissa Tivona: 
I argue that the timing for a new journalistic framework could not be better. 
Established news agencies and global networks are hungry to reinvent themselves, 
especially given intense pressure created by the internet’s ease of alternative 
information delivery. 
Tivona advocates wider adoption of a ‘peace journalism’ model for reform of existing 
mainstream media outlets, encouraging journalists to move away from representations of 
‘intractable conflict’ and instead ‘push for the strong amplification of healing and revealing 
news: stories of peace and reconciliation between former warriors and perceived enemies’.669 
Given the significant impact of articles related to narratives of violent conflict in the 
escalation and entrenchment of Islamophobic representations in my sample, strategies which 
are specifically targeted towards combating the stereotypes and negativity characteristic of 
such articles and negating the feelings of despair and hopelessness which they can evoke will 
likely have strong concomitant effects on reducing the preponderance and impact of ‘closed’ 
views of Islam in ‘hard’ news reporting. 
Peace journalism advocates the ‘iteration and exploration of backgrounds and contexts’, in 
order to support ‘the provision of cues to form negotiated and/or oppositional readings of war 
propaganda, and the coverage of suggestions and initiatives for peace, from whatever 
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quarter’.670 Peace journalism promotes the contextualisation of conflict narratives, directs 
attention to the challenging of dominant news conventions such as the focus on elite, 
bureaucratic sources and interrogates the assumptions of the ‘regime of objectivity’. Finally, 
peace journalism aims to supply ‘opportunities for readers and audiences to activate their 
empathic capacities’, through the humanisation of actors in conflict narratives.671 Many of 
these features were highlighted in my research as characteristics of articles with lower levels 
of Islamophobic representational patterns and higher levels of contestation of war propaganda 
such as the ‘War on Terror’ consensus. As Lynch et al. have observed, sometimes journalists 
are already adopting a ‘peace journalism’ approach to reporting – even if they don’t know 
it.672 Strategies which support and encourage such approaches to conflict reporting would be 
positive steps towards combating Islamophobic representations in the mainstream media. A 
fruitful avenue for exploration here would be adoption of standards for conflict reporting, 
such as are set out in Jake Lynch’s latest work, A Global Standard for Reporting Conflict.673 
 
Peace journalism may serve as a significant common thread in the reform and expansion of 
both the mainstream media and the alternative media, and could conceivably serve as a 
shared framework bridging current gaps between the two. According to Robert Hackett, 
peace journalism shares ‘profound complementarities’ with alternative media: they share a 
commitment to social justice, social critique, and the combating of structural and cultural 
violence; reject the ‘regime of objectivity’, emphasising instead the social embededness of 
journalists; and seek to challenge war propaganda.674Moreover, the two paradigms have 
shared interests in campaigning on media reform; this has significant implications for many 
of the issues raised in this study as increased media reform and regulation in the areas of 
content diversity, media ownership and reporting standards. Reforms in these areas would 
have significant benefits in terms of increased contestation of hegemonic discourses which 
have negative impacts upon the representation of Muslims and Islam.675Nevertheless, peace 
journalism ‘has relatively well-defined institutional locations – journalism education and 
established news organisations – albeit to date it generally operates in the margins of 
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these’.676 Increased opportunities for ‘penetrating and transforming the category of 
mainstream news – its values, practices, and definitions – to give peace more of a chance’ 
therefore remains a goal for many peace journalism advocates.677  
As was highlighted by the comparison between the differential strategies adopted by the two 
publications in this study to redressing complaints about problematic coverage of Muslims 
and Islam, programs which encourage reflexivity and ‘back to basics’ approaches for 
journalists may be more effective at reducing overall levels of Islamophobic reporting than 
artificial attempts to construct ‘balance’. Other programs which have had positive impacts 
upon reporting practices in regards to Muslims and Islam have included the institution of new 
practices by the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) aimed at ‘deepening journalistic practice 
[and] moving beyond superficial reporting’ in order to reduce stereotyping and prejudice in 
news bulletin stories.678 Abdalla et al. also highlight practical programs for journalist training 
such as the Journalism in Multicultural Australia project and the Reporting Diversity Project, 
which emphasise strategies such as promoting ‘the inclusion of multicultural content in pre-
employment journalist education and training’. These programs were once again particularly 
associated with SBS.679 Given the continued agenda setting function of The Australian and 
The SMH in mediatised political discourse in Australia, it is imperative that strategies for 
reform move beyond the public broadcasters, alternative media, and the fringes of the 
mainstream media, and are targeted as well at these bastions of the ‘legacy’, mainstream 
media. 
Concluding thoughts 
As was indicated by the quote from ibn Khaldun with which I opened this thesis, ‘conditions 
within nations and races change with the change of periods and the passage of time’.680 The 
construction of Muslims as a ‘threat’ and as a ‘problem’ and their representation through an 
Islamophobic lens declined between the two election periods of 2004 and 2007, as I have 
demonstrated in content analysis of the coverage offered by two broadsheet newspapers 
during these two key periods. The climate of political and media discourse during the past six 
years has continued the trends set during the lead up to the 2007 election, and the open and 
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uncontested expression of Islamophobic sentiments and practices has been relatively limited, 
compared with some of the examples I have highlighted from the early and mid-2000s. 
Nevertheless, anti-Muslim prejudice remains a strong undercurrent in Australian society, 
which finds expression through incidents such as the attacks on Muslim politician Ed Husic 
and the emergence of new anti-Muslim political parties such as Pastor Danny Nalliah’s Rise 
Up Australia. Without vigilance and continued delegitimisation, there is potential for 
Islamophobia to once again become a prominent feature of public discourse and to have re-
escalating negative impacts upon Australian Muslim communities.  
Tanja Dreher noted in regards to the impact of Islamophobic attitudes and practices under the 
Howard Government that ‘communities living in fear are unable to enjoy a sense of 
belonging or to fully exercise the rights and freedoms of citizenship’.681 Muslim communities 
have experienced a relative reduction in the levels of such fear in recent years, enabling much 
needed healing and expanded opportunities for developing their sense of belonging and 
exploring their citizenship.682 Yet it is a concerning development that the new Government of 
Australia includes senior members of parliament who have already demonstrated a 
willingness to resurrect the Howard era strategy of fomenting and exploiting anti-Muslim 
prejudice for electoral gain, as highlighted above. With Australia’s economy slowing and 
unemployment rising,683 we may see the re-emergence of ‘conditions of instability where the 
status hierarchy might change or be weakened’, which as discussed in Chapter 2 have 
historically contributed to members of dominant groups in Australian society feeling strongly 
threatened. Under such conditions, intergroup attitudes which condone discriminatory 
behaviour towards outgroups are more likely to be reinforced, particularly if high profile 
public figures appear to condone or encourage them.684 To maintain power under such 
conditions, the Coalition may return to its tactics of contriving mediated dramas on issues 
related to Islam and Muslim in order to create ‘political spectacles’ which can be leveraged 
for their electoral benefit. 
Although this thesis has largely concentrated on the specific phenomenon of Islamophobia, 
my findings have broader application. Whilst during the early to mid 2000s Muslims were a 
politically expedient ‘scapegoat’ given the conjunction of circumstances outlined in Part 2 of 
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this thesis, the processes by which one group of people was demonised, dehumanised and 
targeted can just as easily be applied to other groups in the future, as consideration of 
Australian history shows this to have been a recurrent pattern which has affected different 
groups at different times in the past. To combat and redress prejudice and discrimination in 
all its forms is essential to ensure that all Australians are enabled ‘to enjoy a sense of 
belonging [and] to fully exercise the rights and freedoms of citizenship’.685 Any 
programmatic effort to extend this benison, in modern-day Australia, must attend to the need 
for reform in media, as well as in other areas such as legal and political domains. 
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THE AUSTRALIAN (2004) 
  
     
No. Date Title Author/Source Source 
1 9-Oct-04 Unbridgeable divide William Maley William Maley is director of 
the Asia-Pacific College of 
Diplomacy at the Australian 
National University 
2 9-Oct-04 Counter to Islamic Extremism John Hughes  The Christian Science Monitor 
3 9-Oct-04 Reward for Robust Stance  Stephen Robinson The Daily Telegraph 
4 9-Oct-04 Turkish delight     
5 9-Oct-04 Insurgency redoubles in northeast     
6 9-Oct-04 A democratic Iraq will be worth the 
war 
    
7 9-Oct-04 Bomb suspect's wife tells police of 
life on the run 
Sian Powell   
8 9-Oct-04 Jets hit rebel city in payback for 
hotel raid 
  AFP 
9 9-Oct-04 Bombers strike Israeli tourists Abraham 
Rabinovich 
Jerusalem 
10 8-Oct-04  Americans dig in to hold Samarra   AP 
11 8-Oct-04 39 Sunnis killed in `revenge' blasts A correspondent in 
Multan, Pakistan 
AFP, AP 
12 7-Oct-04 EU puts Turks on 10-year time line Nicolas Rothwell   
13 7-Oct-04 For Afghan voters, democracy's still 
a bit hard to believe 
Catherine Phipp The Times, AFP 
14 6-Oct-04 Children suffer as Gaza war grinds 
on 
Correspondents in 
Gaza City and 
New York 
AFP, AP, Reuters 
15 6-Oct-04 Shoe-bomber accomplice charged   AFP 
16 6-Oct-04 Behind in the polls ...and loving it Matt Price   
17 6-Oct-04 Twice the cash to fight Asian terror John Kerin   
18 5-Oct-04 Indonesians freed in Iraq   AFP, AP 
19 5-Oct-04 Howard seen as a safe bet Neil Brown Neil Brown, a former Federal 
Minister and Deputy Leader of 
the Liberal Party, is a 
Melbourne QC who practises in 
mediation and arbitration  
20 5-Oct-04 Foreign policy battle is a matter of 
nuance 
    
21 4-Oct-04 Divided Iran swings to Right Nicolas Rothwell   
22 4-Oct-04 Wave of violence sweeps 
northeastern India 
  AFP, AP 
23 4-Oct-04 Terrorist's wife now suspect Sian Powell, 
Olivia Mellisa 
  
24 4-Oct-04 Five suicide bombers awaiting 
orders, warns analyst 
Sian Powell   
25 4-Oct-04 US says corner turned in Iraq Nicolas Rothwell Middle East Correspondent 
26 4-Oct-04 Showbiz takes to the stage `to end 
the lies' 
Rosalie Higson   
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27 2-Oct-04 Mother weeps for her suicide 
bomber son 
Sian Powell   
28 2-Oct-04 A chronicle of dispossession Shakira Hussein   
29 2-Oct-04 Troops storm militants in `no-go 
zone' 
Nicolas Rothwell Middle East Correspondent 
30 2-Oct-04 Still Smokin' - `I handed out ass-
whuppins in here like lollipops at 
the doctor's office' 
Brian Doogan The Times, Sunday Times 
31 2-Oct-04 Throwaway line hits home Christopher 
Caldwell 
The Weekly Standard 
32 2-Oct-04 Struggle within the Muslim world      
33 2-Oct-04 Crafty Musharraf a problem partner     
34 1-Oct-04 Out to lunch with Australia's 
chattering classes 
David Marr   
35 1-Oct-04 Abductors apologised, say liberated 
Italians 
Richard Owen   
36 29-Sep-04 Jakarta demands UN council seat Sian Powell Jakarta correspondent 
37 29-Sep-04 Labor man looping the loopy Matt Price, Steve 
Lewis 
  
38 29-Sep-04 Top 10 Reader’s Poll Kerrie Murphy   
39 29-Sep-04 Media sucked in to terrorist game   The Times 
40 28-Sep-04 Swiss roll referendum   The Times, AFP 
41 28-Sep-04 Turkey reforms penal code with eye 
on EU 
  AFP 
42 27-Sep-04 Yudhoyono waits in the West Wings 
for his rainbow connection 
Sian Powell   
43 27-Sep-04 Sudan leader in call after `coup' bid   AP 
44 27-Sep-04 Magazine lets no-fly Cat out of the 
bag 
  AFP 
45 27-Sep-04 London tabloid foils `dirty bombers'   AFP 
46 27-Sep-04 Britons' mission to free Bigley Nicolas Rothwell Middle East Correspondent 
47 25-Sep-04 Washington defends decision to put 
Cat out 
  AFP 
48 25-Sep-04 Mum begs kidnap gang to spare son   The Times, AFP 
49 25-Sep-04 New terror charges for Bashir Sian Powell, 
Cameron Stewart 
Additional reporting: Trudy 
Harris 
50 25-Sep-04 All the president's thugs Cameron Stewart   
51 25-Sep-04 Reforms stop at adultery  Fareed Zakaria The Washington Post 
52 25-Sep-04 In the news     
53 25-Sep-04 End to uncertainty     
54 25-Sep-04 Journals     
55 25-Sep-04 Journals     
56 25-Sep-04 Credo of the knife Paul Kelly, 
Nicolas Rothwell 
  
57 25-Sep-04 Iraq is now the crucible of freedom     
58 25-Sep-04 Turkey still in race for entry to EU Anthony Browne The Times 
59 25-Sep-04 SBY puts victory celebrations on ice Sian Powell Jakarta correspondent 
60 25-Sep-04 Trial threat for warlord of Beslan   AFP 
61 24-Sep-04 Banking & finance     
62 24-Sep-04 Washington puts Cat among 
pigeons 
  The Times, AFP, AP 
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63 24-Sep-04 Battle lines drawn as EU debates 
Turkey's entry 
Anthony Browne The Times 
64 24-Sep-04 Leaders' grim dilemma Nicolas Rothwell Middle East Correspondent 
65 24-Sep-04 PM blasts West over terrorism   AFP 
66 24-Sep-04 Divining a conscience vote Daniel Hoare   
67 24-Sep-04 Why me, asks grounded JI `backer' Martin Chulov   
68 23-Sep-04 City voice announces retirement Richard Sproull   
69 23-Sep-04 Yudhoyono's tasks extend beyond 
Indonesia 
Greg Sheridan Foreign Editor 
70 23-Sep-04 UN's poll team face mission 
`possible' 
Richard Beeston The Times 
71 23-Sep-04 Cat gets kicked off the peace plane Robert Lusetich Los Angeles correspondent 
72 23-Sep-04 Blast as hostage's family begs Blair   Correspondents in Baghdad 
and London (AFP) 
73 22-Sep-04 Power behind Suharto's presidency Tim Scott   
74 22-Sep-04 Indonesian hopes fly high with SBY     
75 22-Sep-04 Yudhoyono's call to arms Patrick Walters   
76 22-Sep-04 Dr Germ' and 'Mrs Anthrax' the 
only jailed women 
Stephen Farrell The Times 
77 22-Sep-04 Top 10 Reader’s Poll Kerrie Murphy   
78 22-Sep-04 Editor's fate no cause for despair Jim Nolan   
79 22-Sep-04 It'll pay to stay Right Neil Brown   
80 22-Sep-04 Macabre dance with the devil to 
stop slaughter in Sudan 
Cameron Stewart   
81 22-Sep-04 Headscarves stay on     
82 22-Sep-04 Deadline passes for Iraq hostages   Correspondents in Baghdad, 
AFP 
83 22-Sep-04 Region's terrorists in secret alliance Martin Chulov   
84 21-Sep-04 Adultery law stops Turkey at EU 
gates 
Anthony Browne The Times 
85 21-Sep-04 US spies play out strike on Iran   AFP 
86 20-Sep-04 Hunger strike hopefuls   AAP 
87 20-Sep-04 Innocents die in `precision' US 
attack 
Hala Jaber The Sunday Times 
88 20-Sep-04 Bin Laden's new butchers Martin Chulov   
89 18-Sep-04 Desperately Seeking Paradise  Tony Maniaty   
90 18-Sep-04 Judge shot dead     
91 18-Sep-04 Logistics of democracy Geraldine Doogue   
92 18-Sep-04 Lessons in militant ivy league Sian Powell, 
Kimina Lyall 
Additional reporting by Olivia 
Melissa and Angela Tresnasari 
93 18-Sep-04 Uneasy marriage of East and West     
94 18-Sep-04 Global watch     
95 18-Sep-04       
96 18-Sep-04 The unenlightenment   Chris Bond, West Perth WA 
97 18-Sep-04 Yudhoyono's to make grade as 
president 
Patrick Walters Jakarta 
98 18-Sep-04 Kidnapping for ransom a fast-
growing industry 
Richard Beeston, 
Stephen Farrell 
The Times 
99 18-Sep-04 Chechen warlord admits to Beslan   A correspondent in Moscow, 
AFP 
100 17-Sep-04 Muslim woman quits     
101 17-Sep-04 US puts Saudis on religious blacklist   AFP 
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102 17-Sep-04 Latham to gain seats, but not 
enough 
Dennis Shanahan Political editor 
103 17-Sep-04 Embassy bombing: couple quizzed Kimina Lyall, Sian 
Powell 
  
104 16-Sep-04 World that brooks no compomise Greg Sheridan Foreign Editor 
105 16-Sep-04 Reply to M. Tahir   Andrew Murphy, Kangaroo 
Point, QLD 
106 16-Sep-04 Guerilla toll 59 as US strategy takes 
direct hit 
  Correspondents in Baghdad, 
AP 
107 16-Sep-04 Police check 'curse' on Sharon Abraham 
Rabinovich 
  
108 16-Sep-04 Lib likes to think God's on his side Sid Maher   
109 15-Sep-04 Divisive 9/11 books damage 
children 
Louise Perry   
110 15-Sep-04 Not negotiable   Norman McGreevy, Malvern 
East, VIC 
111 15-Sep-04 Islam a haven of peace    M. Tahir, Coopers Plains, QLD 
112 15-Sep-04 Herein lies the problem   Amal Awad, Vaucluse, NSW 
113 15-Sep-04 I was a hostage - and survived Stephen Farrell   
114 15-Sep-04 Targeted because of race   AP 
115 15-Sep-04 Baghdad blast targets police 
recruits 
  Correspondents in Baghdad, 
AFP, Reuters 
116 14-Sep-04 Zarqawi forces targeted in US 
'payback raids' 
  Correspondents in Baghdad 
(AP, AFP) 
117 14-Sep-04 Cold shoulder dish on menu for 
media 
Greg Roberts   
118 14-Sep-04 SAS team flies into Iraq as hostage 
mystery deepens 
John Kerin, Brad 
Norington 
  
119 14-Sep-04 Ultimatum to Howard: pull out 
within 24 hours or hostages die 
  Correspondents in Samarra, 
AFP 
120 14-Sep-04 School silent on alumni's deeds Kimina Lyall Solo, Indonesia 
121 14-Sep-04 Letters indicate at least two 
bombers 
Sian Powell Jakarta correspondent 
122 13-Sep-04 Decision time as Turks wait 
anxiously at gates of the Continent 
Nicolas Rothwell   
123 13-Sep-04 Abdullah rules Anwar out of UMNO   AP, AFP 
124 13-Sep-04 For God's sake, rescue Islam from 
killers 
Irshad Manji Irshad Manji is a novelist 
125 13-Sep-04 We are a target regardless Mark Steyn Mark Steyn is a columnist for 
Britain's Telegraph Group and 
the Chicago Sun Times 
126 13-Sep-04 No negotiating with ideology of 
unreason 
  Responsibility for election 
comment in this issue is taken 
by David Armstrong, 2 Holt 
Street, Surry Hills. 
127 13-Sep-04 High time for accurate debate   Jimi Bostock, Curtin, ACT 
128 13-Sep-04 Little suburban cottage that housed 
evil 
Kimina Lyall Southeast Asia correspodent in 
Solo, Indonesia 
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THE AUSTRALIAN (2007)   
 
    
No. Date Title Author Author description/source 
1 24-Nov-07 Arabs' wilful neglect deepens Israeli 
misery 
Jeff Robbins   
2 24-Nov-07 Ban no setback for Musharraf Bruce Loudon South Asia 
Correspondent/Additional 
Reporting AFP 
3 24-Nov-07 Author secreted out of Kolkata Bruce Loudon   
4 24-Nov-07 The multicultural gang's all here Justine Ettler Justine Ettler is a novelist, 
academic and journalist who 
lives in Sydney 
5 24-Nov-07 Continental drift Michael Palin   
6 24-Nov-07 Saudi rape stirs social revolution Martin Chulov   
7 24-Nov-07 Flyer an isolated act Brad Norington, 
Nicola Berkovic 
  
8 23-Nov-07 The tragedy of extremism reveals a 
hero in Hicks 
Fiona Gruber   
9 23-Nov-07 Leader faces ire of Asian migrants George 
Megalogenis 
  
10 23-Nov-07 Bomber urges on execution   AAP 
11 23-Nov-07 Labor gets a flyer as shocked locals 
switch sides 
  Staff Reporters 
12 23-Nov-07 Election '07   Geoff Hinds, Merrylands 
13 23-Nov-07 Don't automatically blame a 
husband's error on his wife 
Daniel Hannan, 
Paul Keating 
  
14 23-Nov-07 South Carolina contests swamped in 
dirty tricks 
Tim Reid  Columbia, South Carolina 
15 23-Nov-07 Victim of rape to fight sentence   AFP 
16 23-Nov-07 Kolkata mobs hunt for anti-Islam 
author 
Bruce Loudon   
17 23-Nov-07 Headscarf order     
18 23-Nov-07 Musharraf cleared to quit army Bruce Loudon South Asia Correspondent 
19 23-Nov-07 Labor gets a flyer as shocked locals 
switch sides 
  Staff Reporters 
20 23-Nov-07 Leaflet affair may play to 
Coalition's advantage 
Brad Norington   
21 23-Nov-07 What in the beep-beep was she 
thinking? 
Christine Jackman   
22 23-Nov-07 Bogus flyer stunt hijacks final 
address 
Patricia Karvelas, 
Matthew Franklin 
Additional reporting: Richard 
Kerbaj, Sanna Trad, Cath Hart 
23 23-Nov-07 Rudd to turn back boatpeople Paul Kelly, Dennis 
Shanahan 
  
24 23-Nov-07 Tip-off that led to Howard's 
nightmare 
Brad Norington   
25 22-Nov-07 Liberals' desperate dirt tactic 
exposed 
Nicola Berkovic, 
James Madden 
Additional reporting:  AAP 
26 22-Nov-07 Libs kicked out for Islamic ruse Nicola Berkovic, 
James Madden 
  
27 22-Nov-07 Libs kicked out for Islamic ruse James Madden Additional reporting:  AAP 
28 22-Nov-07 Liberal future lies in Tony Abbott's 
ideas 
Greg Sheridan Foreign Editor 
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29 22-Nov-07 White House aghast at Saudi rape 
victim's sentence for `using media' 
AFP, AP   
30 21-Nov-07 We don't have to ruin our planet Robert M. May Robert McCredie, Lord May of 
Oxford, is the immediate past 
president of the Royal Society 
and holds a professorship 
jointly at Oxford University 
and Imperial College, London. 
He was chief scientific adviser 
to the British government. His 
career includes a personal chair 
in physics at the University of 
Sydney. This is an edited 
version of the Lowy institute's 
annual lectuer, Australia in the 
World, given in Sydney on 
Monday 
31 21-Nov-07 The US is missing the point Patrick Buchanan Former US Republican 
presidential candidate and 
advisor, is a columnist with 
Creators Sydnicate 
32 21-Nov-07 PM frees political prisoners as 
Musharraf talks to Saudis 
Bruce Loudon South Asia Correspondent 
33 20-Nov-07 Real lives become an open book     
34 20-Nov-07 Rock of ages puts faithful in 
harmony  
    
35 20-Nov-07 Stand-off after Kosovo poll   Reuters 
36 20-Nov-07 Corruption threatens anti-terror bid 
in jails 
Stephen 
Fitzpatrick 
Jakarta correspondent 
37 19-Nov-07 Saudi King set to pull out of 
Annapolis 
Martin Chulov Middle East correspondent 
38 19-Nov-07 Israel puts up new obstacle for 
peace talks 
Martin Chulov Middle East correspondent 
39 19-Nov-07 Sudan's leader readies for war, 
lashes West 
  Correspondents in Khartoum, 
AP, AFP 
40 17-Nov-07 Bomb cleric faces extradition Peter Wilson Europe correspondent 
41 17-Nov-07 War on simplistic populism Roy Williams   
42 17-Nov-07 To die for Graeme Blundell   
43 17-Nov-07 Islam for Prophet and Tsar     
44 17-Nov-07 Quagmire of conspiracy theory Bret Stephens   
45 17-Nov-07 Jakarta merits Mid-East role Greg Sheridan Foreign Editor 
46 17-Nov-07 Blind to the greatest threats Cameron Stewart   
47 17-Nov-07 Muslim wedlock can be brief   Ursula Konig, Marylands, WA 
48 17-Nov-07 As Iran's birthrate falls, a new 
modernity beckons 
Philip Jenkins Philip Jenkins is the author of 
God's Continent: Christianity, 
Islam and Europe's Religious 
Crisis the New Republic 
49 17-Nov-07 Bomb cleric faces extradition Peter Wilson Europe correspondent 
50 17-Nov-07 Krekar taunts Norway on terror Peter Wilson Europe correspondent 
51 17-Nov-07 Get a grip or go, Musharraf told Bruce Loudon South Asia Correspondent 
52 16-Nov-07 Manila's deal on Muslim homeland   AP 
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53 16-Nov-07 Radical cleric faces extradition to 
US 
  Reuters 
54 16-Nov-07 Battle for hearts and minds   Hal Wootten QC, Hawks Nest, 
NSW 
55 16-Nov-07 Norway to review ABC Krekar tape Peter Wilson Europe correspondent 
56 16-Nov-07 Iraq forces seize Sunni clerical 
group's HQ 
  AP 
57 16-Nov-07 Think of Iraq war when you vote, 
Muslims told 
Richard Kerbaj   
58 15-Nov-07 Danish PM in bloc talks with anti-
Muslims 
  Correspondents in Copenhagen 
59 15-Nov-07 Norway unable to gag Islamist Peter Wilson Europe correspondent 
60 15-Nov-07 Labor is more economically 
conservative than Howard 
Robert Manne The Monthly 
61 15-Nov-07 Anwar ready to take rightful place 
on the world stage 
Greg Sheridan Foreign Editor 
62 15-Nov-07 Danish party needs Muslim's 
backing to rule 
  Correspondents in 
Copenhagen, AP, AFP 
63 15-Nov-07 Congressman killed in Abu Sayyaf 
payback 
Emma-Kate 
Symons 
Manila 
64 15-Nov-07 imran arrested at protest march Bruce Loudon South Asia Correspondent, 
Additional reporting: agencies 
65 14-Nov-07 It's an offence against basic 
principles of justice 
  Colin Mitchell, Parkville, VIC 
66 14-Nov-07 Spying on the spies Natalie O'Brien   
67 13-Nov-07 ASIO under fire after case falls over David King   
68 13-Nov-07 Unlucky or incompetent?   John Pasquarelli, Newstead 
VIC 
69 13-Nov-07 Chinese support for death sentences Rowan Callick China correspondent 
70 13-Nov-07 Private acts of kindness come to 
light 
Michael Davis   
71 13-Nov-07 Terrorist leader targets Diggers Sally Neighbour   
72 13-Nov-07 Charge as many as you can' Sally Neighbour   
73 13-Nov-07 Terror laws on trial Editorial   
74 13-Nov-07 Legal bungles will harm us     
75 12-Nov-07 Phillipines electoral commission 
chief gunned down in Manila 
Emma-Kate 
Symons 
  
76 12-Nov-07 Family party prefers Pauline over 
'extreme' Greens 
Ewin Hannan   
77 10-Nov-07 Jihadis under the bed multiply in 
authoritarian's federation of 
fragility 
Francesca Beddie   
78 10-Nov-07 Islam the Caliph's Ghost     
79 10-Nov-07 All enemies aren't equal Noel Pearson Noel Pearson is director of the 
Cape York Institute for Policy 
and Leadership 
80 10-Nov-07 The crumbling of one Muslim's 
American dream 
Simon Kearney   
81 10-Nov-07 Radical longs for death penalty   AP 
82 10-Nov-07 Ruddock faces Muslim ire with a 
solo voice of support 
Sian Powell   
83 10-Nov-07 Musharraf rampant     
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84 10-Nov-07 The worst is yet to come Greg Sheridan   
85 9-Nov-07 The US has got to know its 
limitations 
Andrew Bacevich   
86 9-Nov-07 Over their dead bodies Sally Neighbour Sally Neighbour is a senior 
reporter with The Australian 
and the ABC's Four Corners 
87 8-Nov-07 Cynicism sees light at bottom of the 
barrel 
Imre Salusinszky   
88 8-Nov-07 Questions about school   Mervyn F. Bendle, Senior 
Lecturer, James Cook 
University, Townsville, QLD 
89 8-Nov-07 Tougher  on Terror     
90 8-Nov-07 If only Pervez Musharraf were more 
like Suharto 
Greg Sheridan Foreign Editor 
91 7-Nov-07 Police swoop on bomber recruiters   Correspondents in Rome 
92 7-Nov-07 Sorry state of affairs Raymond Gaita   
93 7-Nov-07 Police swoop on terror suspects   Correspondents in Rome 
94 7-Nov-07 Muslim-Catholic research chair Sanna Trad   
95 7-Nov-07 Good doctor googles up fresh 
challenges 
Sanna Trad   
96 7-Nov-07 Democracy never flourished   Farah Adeeb, Cannington, WA 
97 7-Nov-07 Rudd would seize more power as 
PM 
Paul Kelly Editor-at-large 
98 7-Nov-07 Candidate joins outcry over Muslim 
school 
Sian Powell   
99 6-Nov-07 Military leader's last gasp Ramesh Thakur   
100 6-Nov-07 Imam urges 'exile' for Howard Richard Kerbaj   
101 6-Nov-07 Hunt for 'deviant' Muslim disciples Stephen 
Fitzpatrick 
Jakarta correspondent 
102 5-Nov-07 Fact or fiction: the day nobody was 
killed in Iran  
Tom Baldwin, 
Deborah Haynes 
The Times, AP 
103 5-Nov-07 It's hard to spy on Muslims: top cop Richard Kerbaj   
104 3-Nov-07 Enemy in the mirror Frank Furedi   
105 3-Nov-07 Faced with one more tricky knot to 
untangle 
Martin Chulov Middle East correspondent 
106 2-Nov-07 Bali bomber says he cried for the 
Muslims he killed 
Stephen 
Fitzpatrick 
Jakarta correspondent 
107 2-Nov-07 A view to transcend religious 
borders  
Miriam Cosic   
108 2-Nov-07 Islamic council stripped of housing 
control 
Richard Kerbaj   
109 2-Nov-07 Deterrence v pre-emption in 
collision over Tehran 
Fareed Zakaria, 
Norman Podhoretz 
US Foreign Policy realist 
Fareed Zakaria clashes with 
Norman Podhoretz, a founding 
father of neo-conservatism 
110 2-Nov-07 No balm fr Spain's pain Peter Wilson Peter Wilson is Europe 
correspondent for The 
Australian (BOTTOM) 
111 2-Nov-07 Blanchett film condemned as 'anti-
papal travesty' 
Richard Owen Rome 
112 2-Nov-07 Another key Bush adviser departs 
the White House 
  AFP 
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113 2-Nov-07 Women's fashion causes men 
sleepless nights, says Malaysian 
cleric 
Leo Lewis The Times 
114 1-Nov-07 Terrorist link in Russian bus blast   AFP 
115 1-Nov-07 Madrid bombing suspects guilty Peter Wilson Europe correspondent 
116 1-Nov-07 Madrid bombing suspects guilty   AFP 
117 1-Nov-07 It's a simple narrative   S. Perry, Randwick NSW 
118 1-Nov-07 Japan pulls navy out of Afghan role Peter Alford Tokyo correspondent 
119 31-Oct-07 An important relationship on the 
brink of maturity  
Jamie Mackie   
120 30-Oct-07 No regrets as Bali bombers see 
families for last time 
Stephen 
Fitzpatrick 
Jakarta correspondent 
121 30-Oct-07 Please, no more victimhood   John Lang, Epping NSW 
122 30-Oct-07 Please, no more victimhood   Kuranda Seyit, Strawberry 
Hills, NSW 
123 29-Oct-07 Nailing down Mid-East deal is the 
easy part 
Henry Kissinger Edited extract from an article 
by the former US secretary of 
state 
124 29-Oct-07 Don't attack Kurds, Iran urges 
Turkey 
Martin Chulov Middle East correspondent 
125 29-Oct-07 ASIO got its wires crossed Natalie O'Brien   
126 29-Oct-07 Muslims must vote says sheik Sanna Trad   
127 29-Oct-07 Islamic leader warns of terror strike John Lyons   
 
    
THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (2004)   
 
    
No. Date Title Author Author description/source 
1 9-Oct-04 EU: Talking Turkey Editorial Daily Telegraph, London 
2 9-Oct-04 EU: Talking Turkey Yusuf Kanli Turkish Daily News 
3 9-Oct-04 Africa begins final push to beat 
polio 
Craig Timberg In Johannesburg, washington 
Post, Associated Press 
4 9-Oct-04 Faint echoes from afar Matthew Moore   
5 9-Oct-04 Cambodia confronts its demons as 
trial of Khmer Rouge moves closer 
Connie Levett  Herald Correspondent in 
Phnom Penh 
6 9-Oct-04 America sought retribution on 
Afghanistan soon after September 
11. Today a mire of poverty, 
corruption and tribal hatred hangs 
over the country as it goes to the 
polls 
Paul McGeough   
7 9-Oct-04 Retirement of MPs heats up the 
competition in marginal seats 
Cosima Marriner   
8 9-Oct-04 The people versus al-Qaeda Deborah Scroggins   
9 8-Oct-04 Where vicious battles loom Anne Davies and 
Gerard Noonan 
  
10 8-Oct-04 Europe cautious in talking Turkey Peter Fray  Herald Correspondent in 
London 
11 7-Oct-04 Maligned Greens are not so deluded 
on defense 
Fergus Hancock, 
Muswellbrook 
  
12 7-Oct-04 Success at a price for Islamic 
college 
Linda Doherty Education editor 
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13 7-Oct-04 Parties stake their claims in front-
line NSW 
Anne Davies   
14 6-Oct-04 Abbott's behaviour invites scrutiny, 
not sectarianism 
Reverend Dr 
Vincent Zankin, 
Rivett (ACT) 
  
15 6-Oct-04 Green on the outside, empty inside Ted Lapkin Associate Editor of The 
Review (published by the 
Australia/Israel  and Jewish 
Affairs Council' 
16 6-Oct-04 Their future at stake as Afghanistan 
votes 
Paul McGeough 
(from Kabul) 
  
17 6-Oct-04 Pure theatre: Latham takes stage 
with no script and wows 600 
Tom Allard   
18 5-Oct-04 North Indian Violence Ben Cubby   
19 4-Oct-04 Descent into desperation a sideline 
to choice already made 
Robert Manne Robert Manne is professor of 
politics at La Trobe University' 
20 4-Oct-04 Spreading the word of intolerance Paul Sheehan   
21 2-Oct-04 Home-grown terrorism Connie Levett   
22 2-Oct-04 Bomber came from new group Matthew Moore Herald Correspondent in 
Jakarta 
23 1-Oct-04 Rushdie threat put cat among 
pigeons 
Laurie Strachan, 
Lapstone 
  
24 1-Oct-04 Rushdie threat put cat among 
pigeons 
Nahid Kabur, 
Churchlands (WA) 
  
25 1-Oct-04 Rushdie threat put cat among 
pigeons 
Scott Poynting, 
Newtown 
  
26 30-Sep-04 Interpreter of Islam respected 
across the Muslim world 
Michael Smith   
27 30-Sep-04 Did you hear the one about the 
dictator? 
John Birmingham John Birmingham is the author 
of He Died with a Felafel in 
His Hand and Weapons of 
Choice' 
28 29-Sep-04 Hamas joins calls to release 
kidnapped CNN producer 
Ed O'Loughlin Herald Correspondent in 
Jerusalem 
29 29-Sep-04 Ivan the Terrible Damien Murphy   
30 27-Sep-04 PM's Fahrenheit 9/11 moment has 
arrived 
Gary Maddox Film reporter 
31 29-Sep-04 Candidate's silence could speak 
volumes 
Paul Sheehan   
32 27-Sep-04 Any Tom, Dick or Harry can beat 
prejudice 
Joseph Wakim Joseph Wakim is founder of the 
Australian Arabic Council and 
a former multicultural affairs 
commissioner' 
33 25-Sep-04 Satire's guerilla makes a life whole Andrew Riemer Chief book reviewer 
34 25-Sep-04 Security blanket Paul McGeough   
35 25-Sep-04 More DNA taken in search for 
bombers 
Matthew Moore Herald Correspondent in 
Jakarta 
36 24-Sep-04 Inevitable backlash Nick Kenny, North 
Ryde 
  
37 24-Sep-04 FBI should pause for a good hard 
think 
B. Forde, Young   
38 23-Sep-04 The awful rituals of terror in Iraq none given   
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39 22-Sep-04 Terrorism's causes need exploring Tom Allard and 
Cynthia Banham 
  
40 21-Sep-04 Yudhoyono's win clear, but his 
policies aren't 
Matthew Moore With agencies 
41 21-Sep-04 Why trials for war crimes collapse Michael Sexton Michael Sexton is the NSW 
Solicitor-General' 
42 21-Sep-04 Regional terrorism, regional 
response 
none   
43 21-Sep-04 Yudhoyono's victory is clear but not 
his policies 
Matthew Moore Herald Correspondent in 
Indonesia 
44 21-Sep-04 More weight watchers Damien Murphy   
45 20-Sep-04 God liberally involved Con Vaitsas, 
Ashbury 
  
46 20-Sep-04 PM should convert, says Bashir Steve Pennells and 
Matthew Moore, 
In Jakarta 
  
47 18-Sep-04 Credit to France's Muslims Alan Kennedy and 
Ben Cubby 
  
48 18-Sep-04 One step ahead Mark Coultan, 
Catharine Munro, 
Craig Skehan 
  
49 17-Sep-04 Brother says suspected bomber gave 
suicide note to family 
Matthew Moore Herald Correspondent in 
Surabaya 
50 17-Sep-04 Reflections of lives at the 
crossroads 
Steve Meacham   
51 17-Sep-04 There'll be quite a song and dance if 
Hazem gets 300 points, but not on 
the MTV stage 
Doug Anderson   
52 17-Sep-04 Muslims just as outraged but are 
silenced by torn loyalties 
Shahram 
Akbarzadeh 
Shahram Akbarzadeh is a 
senior lecturer in global politics 
at Monash University and co-
editor of Islam and the West 
53 17-Sep-04 El Masri's political goal Edited by Ben 
Wyld and Bonnie 
Malkin 
  
54 17-Sep-04 Released hostage grateful to be 
alive 
Ellen Connolly 
and AAP 
  
55 16-Sep-04 Hostage drama politicised, says  
ALP 
Mike Seccombe 
and Tom Allard 
  
56 23-Sep-04 Conspiracies abound, the only fact 
is  Australia remains a scapegoat 
Damien Kingsbury Dr Damian Kingsbury is senior 
lecturer in international 
development at Deakin 
University and is author of the 
third edition of The Politics of 
Indonesia, Oxford' 
57 16-Sep-04 Certain defeat awaits Megawati, 
say polls 
Matthew Moore Herald Correspondent in 
Jakarta 
58 15-Sep-04 When the President starts quoting 
Popeye, it's time to be articulate and 
make your voice heard 
Doug Anderson   
59 15-Sep-04 Lottery of life down to backroom 
deals 
Paul McGeough   
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60 15-Sep-04 Bashir points finger at Australia 
and US 
Cynthia Banham   
61 14-Sep-04 Ways and means to make 
candidates' debate truly great 
George Finlay, 
Byron Bay 
  
62 14-Sep-04 Forget the moral blackmail, we 
need a real strategy 
Eric Bundock, 
Ottawa 
  
63 14-Sep-04 Sifting through the web of motives 
behind the Jakarta bombing 
Hamish McDonald Hamish McDonald is the 
Herald's Beijing correspondent 
and has worked most of his 
career in Asia, including 
Indonesia' 
64 14-Sep-04 Evidence not enough to ban JI: 
Indonesia 
Matthew Moore 
and Karuni 
Romple in Jakarta 
  
65 14-Sep-04 Puritanical form of Islam puts 
brakes on terrorism 
Mark Coultan in 
Jakarta 
  
66 13-Sep-04 There's nothing overboard about 
public resentment of moral 
blackmail 
Paul Sheehan   
67 13-Sep-04 Many heads of jihad hard targets to 
hit 
Zachary Abuza Zachary Abuza is a terrorism 
specialist with Simmons 
College, Boston' 
68 13-Sep-04 Backdown over text message 
warning 
Tom Allard and 
Matthew Moore 
  
 
    
THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (2007)   
 
    
No. Date Title Author Author description/source 
1 24-Nov-07 Lebanon on brink of political 
calamity 
Ed O'Loughlin Herald Correspondent in 
Jerusalem and agencies 
2 24-Nov-07 Odd couple in a war of words Sandra Hall   
3 24-Nov-07 Sober, sensible, professional are 
survival tactics in a conservative's 
world 
Lisa Pryor   
4 24-Nov-07 Jackie Kelly's husband makes 
Howard a battler 
The Chaser   
5 24-Nov-07 White tracksuit bottoms flutter over 
the bunker 
Mike Carlton   
6 24-Nov-07 Revenge of the betrayed battlers Mike Carlton   
7 24-Nov-07 Jihad Jackie's on the nose Damian Murphy   
8 24-Nov-07 Turkman Queen Peter Fish   
9 24-Nov-07 Somalia descends into fresh hell Steve Bloomfield   
10 24-Nov-07 Economic tigers may hang up on 
each other 
Eric Ellis South-East Asia Correspondent 
for Fortune Magazine 
11 23-Nov-07 Taste the difference Peter Hartcher   
12 23-Nov-07 Proton plans niche car for Islamic 
market 
Jaedene Hudson   
13 23-Nov-07 Say 'aloha' to guerilla campaigning Chris Henning   
14 23-Nov-07 Jihad Jackie's poor sense of humour 
blows up in her hapless boss's face 
Annabel Crabb   
15 23-Nov-07 Howard needs a miracle Phillip Coorey Chief Political Correspondent 
16 23-Nov-07 Husband behind race hate campaign Phillip Coorey Chief Political Correspondent 
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17 23-Nov-07 Playing dirty an artform in the west Andrew West, 
Jacob Saulwick 
and Paul Bibby 
  
18 22-Nov-07 Lib shame over fake pamphlet Phillip Coorey Chief Political Correspondent 
19 22-Nov-07 Saudi Arabia crucial to peace talks 
success 
Ed O'Loughlin Herald Correspondent in 
Jerusalem 
20 22-Nov-07 Honour for journalist hostage Louise Williams   
21 19-Nov-07 Selective tolerance is not tolerance 
at all 
Michael Kirby Michael Kirby is a judge of the 
High Court of Australia' 
22 17-Nov-07 Jane Nicholls is the victim of some 
monkey business in Java 
Jane Nicholls submission for prize 
23 17-Nov-07 Bully for you, ASIO - the dumb face 
of intelligence 
Mike Carlton   
24 17-Nov-07 Iraqi influx putting Jordan to the 
test 
Ed O'Loughlin (in 
Amman) 
  
25 17-Nov-07 Spies in the eyes of others Tom Allard   
26 16-Nov-07 Ten years on David Dale   
27 15-Nov-07 Deadly rivalry at rally for Arafat Ed O'Loughlin Herald Correspondent in 
Jerusalem 
28 14-Nov-07 Puttnam urges studios to tell 
Muslim stories 
Garry Maddox   
29 14-Nov-07 ASIO's credibility now on trial none given   
30 14-Nov-07 If there was a coup on the go, he'd 
be in it 
Sophie Nicholson Guardian News & Media 
31 13-Nov-07 Carmaker looks to God David Dale & 
Kerry Coleman 
  
32 13-Nov-07 Democratic gong for Indonesia Mark Forbes Herald Correspondent in 
Denpasar 
33 12-Nov-07 Holy war, on message Erik Jensen   
34 10-Nov-07 Losing their religion Andrew Bain Andrew Bain travelled courtesy 
of Peregrine Adventures 
35 10-Nov-07 Be careful of those you call friends Tom Allard   
36 10-Nov-07 Europe still struggles to face up to 
reality 
James Button (in 
London) 
  
37 10-Nov-07 Museum crosses borders as 
everyday objects tell the hard story 
Garry Maddox   
38 10-Nov-07 A little cleaning springs to mind James Bone   
39 10-Nov-07 Why Bhutto would be bad for 
business 
Eric Ellis South-East Asia Correspondent 
for Fortune Magazine 
40 10-Nov-07 West's faith in Musharraf bears 
barren fruit 
Hamish McDonald Asia-Pacific Editor 
41 3-Nov-07 Unimagined Bruce Elder   
42 3-Nov-07 Catholic uni sets up chair of Islam Harriet Alexander Higher Education Reporter 
43 3-Nov-07 Boxing clever: Jordan's women 
fight hard to keep their place in ring 
Ed O'Loughlin Herald Correspondent in 
Amman 
44 1-Nov-07 A final fling but I'm not yesterday's 
hero 
Paul Bibby    
45 20-Oct-07 Australian lives on the line - 
Indonesia rules on death penalty 
Mark Forbes Herald Correspondent in 
Jakarta 
46 30-Oct-07 Closure for some folks, nascent 
beginnings for others 
Doug Anderson   
  296 
47 30-Oct-07 Religious life a native species, Pell 
declares 
Linda Morris   
48 29-Oct-07 Have a lend of us Jacqui Taffel   
49 29-Oct-07 Why democracy? Judy Adamson   
50 29-Oct-07 The Crusaders' lost fort Melissa Gaudron   
 
    
 
 
Appendix B – Pilot Study Coding Data 
 297 
Appendix B – Pilot Study Coding Data
 
References 
 298 
References 
 
AAP. "Pastor Says Kevin Rudd to Blame for Floods."  Sydney: news.com.au, January 11 
2011. Retrieved 10 July 2013 from  http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/pastor-
says-kevin-rudd-to-blame-for-floods/story-e6frfku0-1225985730895. 
ABC. "Asylum Seekers Arriving in Australia by Boat to Be Resettled in Papua New Guinea."  
Sydney: ABC Online, 19 July 2013. Retrieved 19 July 2013 from  
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-19/manus-island-detention-centre-to-be-
expanded-under-rudd27s-asy/4830778. 
Abdalla, Mohamad, Jacqui Ewart, and Halim Rane. "A Way Forward?". In Islam and the 
Australian News Media, edited by Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart and Mohamad Abdalla. 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010, 228-37. 
AEC. "Electoral Offences."  Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission, 2007. Retrieved 20 
August 2010 from 
http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/australian_electoral_system/electoral_procedures/El
ectoral_Offences.htm. 
———. "Voter Turnout for Referendums and Elections (1901 - Present)."  Canberra: 
Australian Electoral Commission, 2009. Retrieved 20 August 2010 from  
http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/Australian_Electoral_History/Voter_Turnout.htm. 
Affinity Intercultural Foundation. "Who We Are." Affinity Intercultural Foundation Website, 
retrieved 7 April 2013 from  http://affinity.org.au/?page_id=2  
Aitkin, Don. "Perceptions of Bias in the Australian Mass Media." Australian Journal of 
Political Science 7, no. 2 (1972): 160-69. 
Akbarzadeh, Shahram, and Bianca Smith. "The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the 
Media."  Melbourne: Monash University, 2005. Available at 
http://asiainstitute.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/571625/akbarzadeh-
islam-media.pdf. 
Allan, Stuart. News Culture. 2nd. ed.  Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2004. 
Allen, Chris. "The Impact of the Runnymede Trust on Islamophobia in the U.K.". Boèce: 
revue romande des sciences humaines May/June (2003): 51-68. 
———. Islamophobia.  London: Ashgate, 2010. 
———. "Islamophobia: From K.I.S.S. To R.I.P.". In Thinking through Islamophobia: Global 
Perspectives, edited by S. Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil. London: Hurst and 
Company, 2010, 51-64. 
Ally, Mustafa. "Holland Park Mosque."  Brisbane: Holland Park Mosque, 2008. Retrieved 8 
June 2013 from  http://www.nazimahansa.com/The Holland Park Mosque.pdf. 
Alterman, Eric. "The News Business: Out of Print."  New York: The New Yorker, March 31 
2008. Retrieved 18 July 2012 from  
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/03/31/080331fa_fact_alterman?currentPa
ge=all. 
Aly, Waleed. "Axioms of Aggression: Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Productivity in 
Australia." Alternative Law Journal 33, no. 1 (March 2008): 20-26. 
———. People Like Us: How Arrogance Is Dividing Islam and the West.  Sydney: Pan 
McMillan, 2007. 
Anderson, Warwick. The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health and Racial Destiny in 
Australia.  Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003. 
References 
 299 
Ang, Ien, and John Stratton. "Multiculturalism in Crisis: The New Politics of Race and 
National Identity in Australia." Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies 2 (1998): 22-41. 
Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales. "Race for the Headlines: Racism and Media 
Discourse."  Sydney: Anti-Discrimination Board of New South Wales, 2003.   
Aslan, Alice. Islamophobia in Australia.  Glebe, N.S.W.: Agora Press, 2009. 
Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault. "Reporting on Sexual Assault: Media 
Backgrounder."  Canberra: Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2013. Retrieved 15 
August 2013 from  http://www.aifs.gov.au/acssa/media/index.html. 
Attwood, Bain, and Andrew Markus. The 1967 Referendum: Race, Power and the Australian 
Constitution. 2nd ed.  Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2007. 
Austen, Ian. "Reuters Asks a Chain to Remove Its Bylines."  New York: New York Times, 
September 20th, 2004.  Retrieved 15 August 2010 from 
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0917F63F5D0C738EDDA00894D
C404482. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. "A Century of Change in the Australian Labour Market."  
Canberra: ABS, 2001. Available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/0/12D509E0F07F37BFCA2569DE0021ED
48?Open. 
———. "The Chinese in Australia."  Canberra: ABS, 2012.  Available at  
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/featurearticlesbyReleaseDate/4A6A63F3D8
5F7770CA2569DE00200137?OpenDocument. 
———. "Cultural Diversity in Australia: Reflecting a Nation." In Reflecting a Nation: Stories 
from the 2011 Census. Canberra: ABS, 2012. 
———. "Overseas Born Population."  Canberra: ABS, 2010.  Available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/bb8db737e2af84b8ca2571780015701e/f045
caf8d91fd768ca25779e001c4740!OpenDocument. 
Australian Federal Police. "Media Statement."  Canberra: AFP, 2007. Retrieved 30 May 2008 
from  http://www.afp.gov.au/media_releases/national/2007/media_statement.html. 
Australian Human Rights Commission. "Nation Inquiry into Children in Immigration 
Detention."  Sydney: AHRC, 2004.  Available at  
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/executive-summary. 
Australian National Security. "Listing of Terrorist Organisations."  Canberra: Australian 
Government 2008. Retrieved 30 August 2008 from  
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/nationalsecurity.nsf/AllDocs/95FB057CA3DECF30
CA256FAB001F7FBD?OpenDocument. 
Australian Press Council. "State of the News: Print Media in Australia 2008 Report."  
Sydney: Australian Press Council, 2008. Available at 
http://www.presscouncil.org.au/snpma/snpma2008/snpma2008.pdf. 
AustralianPolitics.com. "1998 Election." AustralianPolitics.com, retrieved 1 July 2013 from  
http://australianpolitics.com/elections/1998/. 
———. "2001 Election." AustralianPolitics.com, retrieved 1 July 2013 from  
http://australianpolitics.com/elections/2001/. 
Barker, Martin. The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe.  London: 
Junction Books, 1981. 
———. "Reflections on 'the Problems with Racism'." In Race Critical Theories: Text and 
Context, edited by Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg. Oxford: Blackwell, 
2002, 471-80. 
Barton, Edmund. "House of Representatives Hansard: Immigration Restriction Bill (26 
September 1901)." Parliament of Australia, retrieved 3 May 2013 from  
References 
 300 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hans
ard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1901-09-26%2F0023%22. 
Benson, Simon. "Police Investigating Claims Liberal Staffer Threatened Labor M.P. Ed 
Husic's Sister with a Knife "  Sydney: The Daily Telegraph, September 6 2013. 
Retrieved 7 September 2013 from  http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/police-
investigating-claims-liberal-staffer-threatened-labor-mp-ed-husic8217s-sister-with-a-
knife/story-fnihsrk2-1226713394668?from=google_rss. 
Berg, Bruce L. Qualitative Methods for the Social Sciences.  New York: Pearson, 2007. 
Betts, Katharine. "Boat People and Public Opinion in Australia." People and Place 9, no. 4 
(2001): 34-48. 
Bhutto, Benazir. "Exclusive: Benazir Bhutto's Last Testament."  London: The Sunday Times, 
February 3, 2008.  from  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3294410.ece. 
———. "Exclusive: Benazir Bhutto's Last Testament."  London: The Sunday Times, 
February 3, 2008. Retrieved 13 June 2010 from  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3294410.ece. 
———. Reconciliation:  Islam, Democracy and the West.  New York: HarperCollins, 2008. 
———. Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West.  London: Simon & Schuster, 2008. 
Birks, Melanie, and Jane Mills. Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide.  London: SAGE 
Publications, 2011. 
Brand, Jeffrey E., and Mark Pearson. "The Newsroom Vs. The Loungeroom: Journalists' and 
Audiences' Views on News." Australian Journalism Review 23, no. 2 (2001): 63-89. 
Brangwin, Nicole, and Ann Rann. "Australia's Military Involvement in Afghanistan since 
2001: A Chronology."  Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2010. Retrieved 30 July 
2013 from  
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary
_Library/pubs/BN/1011/MilitaryInvolvementAfghanistan. 
Bull, Melissa, and Mark Craig. "The Problem of Terrorism: Balancing Risk between State 
and Civic Responsibility." Current Issues in Criminal Justice 18, no. 2 (2006): 202-
20. 
Bush, George. "President Rallies the Troops in Alaska (2002)." The White House, retrieved 6 
May 2011 from  http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020216-1.html. 
———. "September 11 Memorial Address to the Nation (2006)."  Washington: The 
Washington Post, 2006. Retrieved 10 January 2011 from  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/11/AR2006091100775.html. 
———. "Today We Mourn, and Tomorrow We Go Back to Work (2001)."  Washington: The 
White House, 2001. Retrieved 10 January 2011 from  http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html. 
Calwell, Arthur. Be Just and Fear Not.  Melbourne: Rigby, 1972. 
Carey, Jane, and Claire McLisky. "Creating White Australia: New Perspectives on Race, 
Whiteness and History." In Creating White Australia, edited by Jane Carey and Claire 
McLisky. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2009, ix-xv. 
Carlyle, Thomas. "On Heroes and Hero Worship." 1841. Retrieved 20 August 2010 from  
http://www.online-literature.com/thomas-carlyle/heroes-and-hero-worship/. 
Carr, Robert. "The Safe Haven Visa Policy: A Compassionate Intervention with Cruel 
Intentions." Australian Policy and History October (2012): 1-7. 
Castells, Manuel. "Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society." 
International Journal of Communication 1 (2007): 238-66. 
References 
 301 
Chow-White, Peter A., and Rob McMahon. "Examining the 'Dark Past' and 'Hopeful Future' 
in Representations of Race and Canada's Truth and Reconciliation Commission." In 
Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches, edited by 
Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch and Robert A. Hackett. Sydney: Sydney University 
Press, 2011, 347-75. 
Clarke, Michael J. "Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef: Volume 
One."  Canberra: Clarke Inquiry, 2008.  Available at  
http://www.haneefcaseinquiry.gov.au/www/inquiry/haneefcaseinquiry.nsf/Page/Repor
t. 
Cleland, Bilal. The Muslims in Australia: A Brief History.  Melbourne: Islamic Council of 
Victoria, 2002. 
Cockburn, Alexander. "Judy Miller's War." Counterpunch, 18 August 2003.  from. 
———. "The Tenth Crusade."  Petrolia, CA: Counterpunch, 6 May 2002.  from  
http://www.counterpunch.org/2002/09/07/the-tenth-crusade/. 
Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia. "Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All."  
London: Runnymede Trust, 1997. Retrieved 30 August 2008 from  
http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/17/74.html. 
Commonwealth. "Anti-Terrorism Act 2005."  Canberra: Australian Government, 2005. 
Retrieved 10 December 2010 from  
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/Act1.nsf/0/53D2DEBD3AFB7825C
A2570B2000B29D5?OpenDocument. 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. "Statement in the Matter of Davd Hicks 
(Media Release)."  Canberra: DPP, 2012.  Available at  
http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Media/Releases/20120724-David-Hicks.pdf. 
Conley, David, and Stephen Lamble. The Daily Miracle: An Introduction to Journalism.  
Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Cottle, Simon. "Global Crisis and World News Ecology." In The Routledge Companion to 
News and Journalism, edited by Stuart Allan. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010, 473-84. 
Crook, Andrew. "Fairfax Cuts Deep: Papers to Tabloid, 1900 Staff Axed." In   Crikey (2012). 
Retrieved 3rd March, 2013 from  http://www.crikey.com.au/2012/06/18/fairfax-sacks-
1900-moves-age-smh-to-tabloid/. 
Curthoys, Ann. "'Men of All Nations, except Chinamen': Europeans and Chinese on the 
Goldfields of New South Wales." In Gold: Forgotten Histories and Lost Objects of 
Australia, edited by Iain McCalman, Alexander Cook and Andrew Reeves. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 103-13. 
Davies, Nick. Flat Earth News.  London: Chatto & Windis, 2008. 
Denzin, Norman K. The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods. 
2nd ed.  New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978. 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. "Immigration: Federation to Century's 
End 1901-2000."  Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001.  Available at  
http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/statistics/federation/federation.pdf. 
Deuze, Mark. "‘What Is Journalism? Professional Identity and Ideology of Journalists Re-
Considered’." Journalism: Theory, Criticism and Practice 6, no. 4 (2005): 442-64. 
Devine, Miranda. "Triumph of Evil in Dancing on American Graves."  Sydney: Sun-Herald, 
11 November 2001.   
Dixon, David. "Interrogating Terrorist Suspects: Criminal Justice and Control Process in 
Three Australian Cases." UNSW Faculty of Law Research Series, no. 24 (2008). 
Dreher, Tanja. "News Media Responsibilities in Reporting on Terrorism." In Law and Liberty 
in the War on Terror, edited by Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George 
Williams. Annandale: Federation Press, 2007, 211-20. 
References 
 302 
Dreher, Tanya. "Community Media Intervention." In Islam and the Australian News Media, 
edited by Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart and Mohamad Abdalla. Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2010, 185-208. 
———. "'Targeted': Experiences of Racism in N.S.W. After September 11, 2001." In   UTS 
Shopfront Monograph Series No. 2 (2006).  Available at  
http://www.shopfront.uts.edu.au. 
Dunn, Kevin. "Representations of Islam in the Politics of Mosque Development in Sydney." 
Tijdscrift voor Economische en Sociaale Geografie 92, no. 3 (2001): 291-308. 
Dunn, Kevin, and Alana Kemp. "A Failed Political Attempt to Use Global Islamophobia in 
Western Sydney: The 'Lindsay Leaflet Scandal'." In Global Islamophobia: Muslims 
and Moral Panic in the West, edited by George Morgan and Scott Poynting. Farnham, 
Surrey: Ashgate, 2012, ch. 8. 
Dunn, Kevin, Natascha Klocker, and Tanya Salabay. "Contemporary Racism and 
Islamophobia in Australia: Racialising Religion." Ethnicities 7, no. 4 (2007): 564-89. 
Dunn, Michael. "The 'Clash of Civilisations' and the 'War on Terror'." 49th Parallel 20 
(2007): 1-11. 
Dutton, David. One of Us? A Century of Australian Citizenship.  Sydney: University of New 
South Wales Press, 2002. 
Dutton, William. "Through the Network (of Networks): The Fifth Estate."  Oxford: 
University of Oxford, 15th October 2007.  from. 
Dwyer, Tim, Fiona Martin, and Gerard Goggin. "News Diversity and Broadband 
Applications: Challenges for Content and Distribution." Telecommunications Journal 
of Australia 61, no. 4 (2011): 65.1-65.11. 
Dyer, Glenn. "Newspaper Circulation Carnage - Biggest March Fall on Record." Crikey, 11 
May 2012. Retrieved 30 March 2013 from  
http://www.crikey.com.au/2012/05/11/newspaper-circulation-carnage-biggest-march-
fall-on-record/. 
Economou, Nicholas, and Stephen J. Tanner. Media, Power and Politics in Australia.  
Frenchs Forest, N.S.W.: Pearson Education Australia, 2008. 
Edelman, Murray. Constructing the Political Spectacle.  Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1988. 
———. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. 2nd ed.  Chicago: University of Illinois, 1985. 
Editorial. "It's Time for a Vote of Greater Independence."  Sydney: The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 8 October 2004.  
———. "The Times and Iraq."  New York: The New York Times, 26 May 2004. Retrieved 
10th September 2010 from  
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/26/international/middleeast/26FTE_NOTE.html. 
Entman, Robert M. "Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power." Journal of 
Communication 57, no. 1 (2007): 163-73. 
———. "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." Journal of 
Communication 43, no. 4 (1993): 51-58. 
Errington, Wayne, and Peter van Onselen. John Winston Howard: The Definitive Biography.  
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2007. 
Esposito, John. "Introduction." In Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st 
Century, edited by John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011, xxi-xxx. 
Esposito, John, and Ibrahim Kalin, eds. Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st 
Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
Esposito, John, and John Voll. Islam and Democracy.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996. 
References 
 303 
Essential Report. "Approval of Asylum Seeker Policy."  Sydney: Essential Media 
Corporation, 2013.  Retrieved 30 August 2013 from  
http://essentialvision.com.au/approval-of-asylum-seeker-policy. 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. "Muslims in the European Union: 
Discrimination and Islamophobia."  Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism 
and Xenophobia.  Retrieved 15 January 2010 from  
http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_Manifestations_EN.pdf. 
Evans, Tim. "Compulsory Voting."  Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission, 2006/2011. 
Retrieved 11th May 2013 from  
http://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/Publications/voting/. 
Ewart, Jacqui. Haneef: A Question of Character.  Canberra: Halstead Press, 2009. 
———. "Media and Myth: Dr Haneef and the Fourth Estate." In Islam and the Australian 
News Media, edited by Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart and Mohamad Abdalla. Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2010, 209-27. 
———. "What's New in Newspapers? Reconnecting with Readers." Paper presented at the 
Journalism Education Australia Annual Conference, Griffith University, November 
29th - December 2nd  2005. 
Fairclough, Norman. Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research.  London; 
New York: Routledge, 2003. 
———. "A Dialectical-Relational Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis in Social 
Research." In Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, edited by Ruth Wodak and 
Michael Meyer. London: SAGE, 2009. 
Fairclough, Norman, and Ruth Wodak. "Critical Discourse Analysis." In Discourse Studies: 
A Multidisciplinary Introduction, edited by Teun van Dijk. London: SAGE, 1997, 
271-80. 
Fear, Josh. "Under the Radar: Dog-Whistle Politics in Australia."  Canberra: The Australia 
Institute, 2007.  Available at  
https://http://www.tai.org.au/documents/downloads/DP96.pdf. 
Fekete, Liz. "The Muslim Conspiracy Theory and the Oslo Massacre." Race Class 53, no. 30 
(2012): 30-47. 
Feneley, Rick. "Plenty of Voter Appeal in Fiona Scott's Tilt for Lindsay."  Sydney: The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 7 September 2013. Retrieved 8 September 2013 from  
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/federal-election-2013/plenty-of-voter-appeal-
in-fiona-scotts-tilt-for-lindsay-20130907-2tca9.html. 
Fidler, Richard. "John Howard on 9/11."  Brisbane: ABC, 9 September 2011. Retrieved 5 
May 2013 from  http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2011/09/09/3313801.htm. 
Fisk, Catherine. "The Law and Norms of Attribution." The Georgetown Law Journal 95, no. 
49 (2008): 50-117. 
Fitzgerald, John. Big White Lie: Chinese Australians in White Australia.  Sydney: University 
of New South Wales Press, 2007. 
Flew, Terry, and Ben Goldsmith. "Factcheck: Does Murdoch Own 70% of Newspapers in 
Australia?"  Melbourne: The Conversation August 8th 2013.  from  
http://theconversation.com/factcheck-does-murdoch-own-70-of-newspapers-in-
australia-16812. 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan 
Sheridan.  London: Allen Lane, 1977. 
———. The History of Sexuality. Translated by Robert Hurley.  London: Penguin, 1978. 
———. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. Translated by Colin 
Gordon.  New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1980. 
References 
 304 
Fox, Jonathon. "Paradigm Lost: Huntington's Unfulfilled Clash of Civlisations Prediction into 
the 21st Century." International Politics 42 (2005): 428-57. 
Frances, Raeleen. "Green Demons: Irish-Catholics and Muslims in Australian History." Islam 
and Christian-Muslim Relations 22, no. 4 (2011): 443-50. 
Freedman, Des. "'Smooth Operator?': The Propaganda Model and Moments of Crisis." 
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 6, no. 2 (2009): 59-72. 
French, Patrick. Review of Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West by Benazir 
Bhutto. London: The Sunday Times, February 17, 2008. Retrieved 13th June 2010 
from  http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/books/non-
fiction/article3365143.ece. 
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man.  New York: Free Press, 1992. 
Galtung, Johan. After Violence: 3R, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, Resolution.  Princeton, 
N.J.: TRANSCEND, 1998. 
———. "Cultural Violence." Journal of Peace Research 27, no. 3 (1990): 291-305. 
———. "On the Role of the Media in Worldwide Security and Peace." In Peace and 
Communication, edited by T. Varis. San Jose, Costa Rica: Universidad para La Paz, 
1986, 249-66. 
———. "Violence, Peace and Peace Research." Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 
167-91. 
Galtung, Johan, and Mari Holmboe Ruge. "The Structure of Foreign News." In Essays in 
Peace Research, edited by Johan Galtung. Copenhagen: Eljers, 1965, 118-51. 
———. "The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus 
Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers." Journal of Peace Research 2, no. 1 (1965): 
64-90. 
Garrett, Peter, and Allan Bell. "Media and Discourse: A Critical Overview." In Approaches 
to Media Discourse: A Critical Overview, edited by Allan Bell and Peter Garrett. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1998, 1-20. 
George, Jim, and Kim Huynh. The Culture Wars: Australian and American Politics in the 
21st Century.  South Yarra: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009. 
Girard, René. Violence and the Sacred. Translated by Patrick Gregory.  Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1977. Violence et le sacré. 
Goodall, Heather, Andrew Jakubowicz, Jeannie Martin, Tony Mitchell, Lois Randall, and 
Kalinga Seneviratne. Racism, Ethnicity and the Media.  Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1994. 
Goot, Murray. "Questions of Deception: Contested Understandings of the Polls on WMD, 
Political Leaders and Governments in Australia, Britain and the United States." 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 61, no. 1 (2007): 41-64. 
Gottschalk, Peter, and Gabriel Greenberg. Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy.  
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008. 
Green, Antony. "Electoral Pendulum." ABC, retrieved July 14 2013 from  
http://www.abc.net.au/news/federal-election-2013/guide/pendulum/. 
———. "Federal Election 2013: Opinion Poll Results."  Sydney: ABC, 2013. Retrieved 8 
September 2013 from  http://www.abc.net.au/news/federal-election-2013/opinion-
polls/. 
Grewal, Kiran. "The 'Young Muslim Man' in Australian Public Discourse." Transforming 
Cultures eJournal 2, no. 1 (2007). 
Griffen-Foley, Bridget. Party Games: Australian Politicians and the Media from War to 
Dismissal.  Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2003. 
References 
 305 
Griffiths, Phil. "From Humiliation to Triumph: Sir Henry Parkes, the Squatters and the Anti-
Chinese Movement, 1877-1878." Journal of Australian Colonial History 12 (2010): 
143-70. 
———. "Racism: Whitewashing the Class Divide." In Class and Struggle in Australia, 
edited by Rick Kuhn. Frenchs Forest: Pearson Australia, 2005, 159-75. 
Gunew, Sneja. Haunted Nations: The Colonial Dimensions of Multiculturalisms.  Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2004. 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society. Translated by Thomas Burger.  Cambridge, M.A.: 
MIT Press, 1962/1989. 
Habib, Mamdouh. My Story: The Tale of a Terrorist Who Wasn't.  Melbourne: Scribe, 2008. 
Hackett, Robert A. "Is Peace Journalism Possible? Three Frameworks for Assessing Structure 
and Agency in News Media." Conflict and Communication Online 5, no. 2 (2006): 1-
13. 
———. "New Vistas for Peace Journalism: Alternative Media and Communication Rights." 
In Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches, edited by 
Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch and Robert A. Hackett. Sydney: Sydney University 
Press, 2011, 35-69. 
Hage, Ghassan. Against Paranoid Nationalism: Searching for Hope in a Shrinking Society.  
Sydney: Pluto Press, 2003. 
Hall, Bianca. "Labor Gives Preferences to Extremists."  Sydney: The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 3 September 2013. Retrieved 5 September 2013 from  
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/federal-election-2013/labor-gives-
preferences-to-extremists-20130902-2t166.html. 
Hall, Stuart. "Encoding/Decoding." In Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works, edited by 
Meenkashi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980/2006, 
163-73. 
———. Representation: Cultural Representation and Signifying Practices.  London: Sage, 
1997. 
———. "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power." In Race and Racialization: Essential 
Readings, edited by Tania das Gupta, Carl E. James, Roger C. A. Maaka, Grace-
Edward Galabuzi and Chris Andersen. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc., 2007, 
56-64. 
Halliday, Fred. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle 
East.  London: IB Tauris, 1999. 
Hallin, Daniel. The Uncensored War.  Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986. 
Hallin, Daniel, and Paolo Mancini. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and 
Politics.  Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
Hammer, Chris. "Papers Link Howard's Department to Haneef."  Melbourne: The Age, June 
18 2008. Retrieved 30 June 2008 from  http://www.theage.com.au/national/papers-
link-howards-department-to-haneef-20080617-2s97.html. 
Hanitzsch, Thomas. "Deconstructing Journalism Culture: Toward a Universal Theory." 
Communication Theory 17, no. 4 (11 2007): 367-85. 
Hanitzsch, Thomas "Worlds of Journalism Project."  retrieved 20th May 2010 from  
http://www.worldsofjournalisms.org/. 
Hanson, Pauline. "Maiden Speech in the House of Representatives (1996)." 
AustralianPolitics.com.  Available at http://australianpolitics.com/1996/09/10/pauline-
hanson-maiden-speech.html. 
References 
 306 
Hanusch, Folker. "Mapping Australian Journalism Culture: Results from a Survey of 
Journalist's Role Perceptions." Australian Journalism Review 30, no. 2 (2008): 97-
109. 
Hartley, John. "Journalism and Popular Culture." In The Handbook of Journalism Studies, 
edited by Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch. New York: Routledge, 2008, 
310-24. 
Hartmann, Paul, and Charles Husband. Racism and the Mass Media: A Study of the Role of 
the Mass Media in the Formation of White Beliefs and Attitudes in Britain.  London: 
Davis-Poynter, 1974. 
Head, Michael. "The Haneef Inquiry: Some Unanswered Questions." Journal of the 
Australasian Law Teachers Association 14 (2009): 99-112. 
Henderson, Errol A. "Not Letting Evidence Get in the Way of Assumptions: Testing the 
Clash of Civlisations Thesis with More Recent Data." International Politics 42 
(2005): 458-69. 
Henderson, Gerard. "It's Time to Put Away the Big Stick."  Melbourne: The Age, May 25 
2004. Retrieved 30 June 2013 from  
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/05/24/1085389331037.html. 
Henningham, John. "Australian Journalists." In The Global Journalist: Journalists around 
the World, edited by David Weaver and Wei Wu. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1998, 
91-107. 
Herman, Edward, and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of 
the Mass Media.  New York: Pantheon, 2002. 
Hicks, David. Guantanamo: My Journey.  North Sydney: Random House, 2010. 
Hillenbrand, Carole. "The Legacy of the Crusades." In Crusades: The Illustrated History, 
edited by Thomas F. Madden. Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 2004, 202-
11. 
Howard, John. "2001 Election Policy Speech." AustralianPolitics.com,  retrieved 1 June 2013 
from http://australianpolitics.com/2001/10/28/john-howard-election-policy-
speech.html. 
———. "House of Representatives Hansard (8 October 1996)." Parliament of Australia, 
retrieved 2 June 2013 from  
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=ch
amber%2Fhansardr%2F1996-10-
08%2F0006;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1996-10-08%2F0000%22. 
———. "The Liberal Tradition: Sir Robert Menzies Lecture (1996)." Menzies Lecture Trust, 
retrieved 2 June 2013 from  http://menzieslecture.org/1996.html. 
———. "The Role of Government (1995 Headland Speech)." AustralianPolitics.com, 
retrieved 1 June 2013 from  http://australianpolitics.com/1995/06/06/john-howard-
headland-speech-role-of-govt.html. 
Howard-Wagner, Deirdre. "Colonialism and the Science of Race Difference." In   
TASA/SAANZ Annual Conference Proceedings (Auckland, N.Z.: 2007). Retrieved 15 
March 2013 from  http://sydney.edu.au/arts/sociology_social_policy/docs/TASA-
SAANZ-Science of Race Difference.pdf. 
Hugo, Graeme. "A Century of Population Change in Australia."  Canberra: ABS, 2001. 
Retrieved 1 May 2013 from  
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca25682000192af2/0b82
c2f2654c3694ca2569de002139d9!OpenDocument. 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. An International Comparison of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975.  Sydney: HREOC, 2008. 
References 
 307 
———. "Ismaعﻉ Listen: National Consultations on Eliminating Prejudice against Arab and 
Muslim Australians."  Sydney: HREOC, 2004. Retrieved 3 April 2008 from  
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/racial_discrimination/isma/report/index.html. 
———. "Report of the National Enquiry into Racist Violence."  Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1991. Available at 
http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/doc/racediscrimcomm_2.pdf. 
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order.  
London: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 
———. "The Clash of Civilisations?". Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49. 
———. "The Erosion of American National Interests." Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997): 28-
49. 
IRIS. "Baby Used as Suicide Bomber." Information Regarding Israel's Security, retrieved 13 
June 2010 from  http://www.iris.org.il/blog/archives/2603-Baby-Used-as-Suicide-
Bomber.html. 
Isakhan, Benjamin. "Orientalism and the Australian News Media: Origins and Questions." In 
Islam and the Australian News Media, edited by Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart and 
Mohamad Abdalla. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010, 3-25. 
Islam, Yan. "A Lapse of Reason or Islamophobia at Work?". In Islam and the Australian 
News Media, edited by Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart and Mohamad Abdalla. Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 2010, 137-60. 
Janda, Michael. "'Decent' Economic Growth Not Enough to Stop Unemployment Rising."  
Sydney: ABC, 4 September 2013. Retrieved 6 September 2013 from  
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-04/decent-economic-growth-not-enough-to-
stop/4936058. 
Jericho, Greg. The Rise of the Fifth Estate: Social Media and Blogging in Australian Politics.  
Melbourne: Scribe Publications, 2012. 
Johnston, Jane, and Susan Forde. "'Not Wrong for Long': The Role and Penetration of News 
Wire Agencies in the 24/7 News Landscape." Global Media Journal: Australian 
Edition 3, no. 2 (2009): 1-16. 
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. "Conduct of the 2007 Federal Election and 
Matters Related Thereto: Events in the Division of Lindsay."  Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2009. Retrieved 1st June 2010 from. 
Jones, Paul K., and Michael Pusey. "Political Communication and 'Media System': The 
Australian Canary." Media, culture and society 32, no. 3 (2010): 451-71. 
Jones, Philip, and Anna Kenny. Australia's Muslim Cameleers: Pioneers of the Inland 1860s-
1930s. 2nd ed.  Kent Town, SA: Wakefield Press, 2010. 
Jones, Tony. "Family First Close to Gaining Pivotal Senate Role." Lateline, 11 October 2004. 
Retrieved 15 August 2013 from  
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2004/s1217824.htm. 
Jupp, James. "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in Australia."  Canberra: ABS, 1995.  from  
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/bb8db737e2af84b8ca2571780015701e/f045
caf8d91fd768ca25779e001c4740!OpenDocument. 
———. From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Kabir, Nahid. "Muslims in a 'White Australia': Colour or Religion?". Immigrants and 
Minorities 24, no. 2 (2006): 193-223. 
———. Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History. 2nd ed.  
Abingdon: Routledge, 2010. 
Kabir, Nahid, and Raymond Evans. "Muslims and the Australian Labour Market, 1980-
2001." Immigrants and Minorities 21, no. 3 (2002): 70-95. 
References 
 308 
Kaldor, Mary. The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict.  Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1990. 
———. "Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars and the War on Terror." International Politics 42 
(2005): 491-98. 
Keim, Stephen. "Reflections Upon the Trial of Dr Haneef." Precedent, no. 82 (September / 
October 2007): 36-39. 
———. "Whither Now? Pondering the Mohamed Haneef Case." Bulletin (Law Society of 
South Australia) 30, no. 3 (April 2008): 18-22. 
Kerbaj, Richard. "Andrews' Agenda Was "Anti-Islam"."  Sydney: The Australian, July 21 
2008. Retrieved 15th August 2013 from  
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/andrews-agenda-was-anti-islam/story-
e6frg6no-1111116967310. 
———. "Muslim Leader Blames Women for Sex Attacks."  Sydney: The Australian, October 
26 2006. Retrieved 15th August 2013 from  
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/muslim-leader-blames-women-for-sex-
attacks/story-e6frg6nf-1111112419114. 
Kerr, Christian. "Peter Costello Slams Cult's Victorian Bushfire Retribution Claims."  
Sydney: The Australian, February 11 2009. Retrieved July 10th, 2013 from  
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/costello-slams-cults-retribution-claims/story-
e6frg6of-1111118814587. 
Kevin, Tony. A Certain Maritime Incident: The Sinking of Siev X.  North Carlton, VIC: 
Scribe Publications, 2004. 
Khaldun, Ibn. The Muqaddimah. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. Edited by N. J. Dawood.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. 
Khan, Mujeeb R. "The Islamic and Western Worlds: 'End of History' or the 'Clash of 
Civilisations'?". In The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy, edited by 
Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, 
170-204. 
Khoo, Siew-Ean. "A Greater Diversity of Origins." In The Transformation of Australia's 
Population 1970-2030, edited by Siew-Ean Khoo and Peter McDonald. Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 2003, 158-84. 
Khosrokhavar, Farhad. Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide.  
London: Paradigm Publishers, 2009. 
King George III. "Governor Phillip's Instructions (1787)." Museum of Australian Democracy, 
retrieved 15 March 2013 from  http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-did-35.html. 
Kirby, Michael. "Dinner Address." University of Sydney, retrieved 15th July from  
http://sydney.edu.au/news/84.html?newsstoryid=3089. 
Knight, Alan. "Australian Based Foreign Correspondents and Their Sources." eJournalist 7, 
no. 1 (2007): 1-28. 
Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker 
from the Crimea to Kosovo.  London: Prion Books, 2000. 
Koukoulas, Stephen. "Simple Formula to Cut Debt Served Us Badly."  Melbourne: The Age, 
August 14 2013. Retrieved 15 August 2013 from  
http://www.theage.com.au/comment/simple-formula-to-cut-debt-served-us-badly-
20130813-2rucs.html. 
Krippendorff, Klaus. Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. 2nd ed.  
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2004. 
Kutz, Daniel O., and Susan C. Herring. "Micro-Longitudinal Analysis of Web News 
Updates." In Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on System Sciences. 
Hawaii, 2005. 
References 
 309 
Lake, Marilyn, and Henry Reynolds. Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's 
Countries and the Question of Racial Equality.  Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
2008. 
Lean, Nathan. The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims.  
London: Pluto Press, 2012. 
Lee, Seow Ting. "Peace Journalism." In Handbook of Ethics in Mass Media, edited by Lee 
Wilkins and Clifford G. Christians. New York: Routledge, 2009, 258-75. 
Lee, Seow Ting, and Crispin C. Maslog. "War or Peace Journalism? Asian Newspaper 
Coverage of Conflicts." Journal of Communication 55, no. 3 (2005): 311-29. 
Lentin, Alana. "Why Scott Morrison Is Wrong on Immigration."  Sydney: The Guardian, 19 
July 2013.  Retrieved 10 August 2013 from  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jul/19/scott-morrison-immigration-
speech. 
Lewis, Bernard. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 3 (1990): 47-
60. 
Liberal Party of Australia. "Labor's Illegal Boat Arrivals (Postcard)." Wetherill Park: LPA, 
2013. 
Loomba, Ania. "Remembering Said." Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East 23, no. 1-2 (2003): 12-14. 
Louth, Jonathon, and Lisa Hill. "Compulsory Voting in Australia: Turnout with and without 
It." Australian Review of Public Affairs 6, no. 1 (2005): 25-37. 
Lukes, Steven. Power: A Radical View. 2nd ed.  Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1974/2005. 
Lynch, Andrew, and George Williams. What Price Security? Taking Stock of Australia's 
Anti-Terror Laws. Briefings. Edited by Peter Browne and Julian Thomas Sydney: 
UNSW Press, 2006. 
Lynch, Jake. "Can the Centre Hold? Prospects for Mobilising Media Activism around Public 
Service Broadcasting Using Peace Journalism." In Expanding Peace Journalism: 
Comparative and Critical Approaches, edited by Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch 
and Robert A. Hackett. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2011, 289-318. 
———. Debates in Peace Journalism.  Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2008. 
———. A Global Standard for Reporting Conflict.  New York: Routledge, 2013. 
Lynch, Jake, and Johan Galtung. Reporting Conflict: New Directions in Peace Journalism.  
St Lucia: Queensland University Press, 2010. 
Lynch, Jake, Robert A. Hackett, and Ibrahim Seaga Shaw. "Expanding Peace Journalism: 
Comparative and Critical Approaches." In Expanding Peace Journalism: 
Comparative and Critical Approaches, edited by Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch 
and Robert A. Hackett. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2011, 7-31. 
Lynch, Jake, and Annabel McGoldrick. Peace Journalism.  Stroud: Hawthorn Press, 2005. 
Macnab, Ken. "Implications of the War on Terrorism." Paper presented at the Blurred 
Boundaries: Australians and Globalisation (ISAA Annual Conference), Canberra,  
2002. 
Maddox, Marion. "Christianity in Australia and New Zealand: Faith and Politics in Secular 
Soil." In Introducing World Christianity, edited by Charles E. Farhadian. Chichester: 
Blackwell, 2012, 203-17. 
———. "People Like That." In God under Howard: The Rise of the Religious Right in 
Australian Politics. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2005, 166-92. 
———. "A Secular Cancellation of the Secularist Truce: Religion and Political Legitimation 
in Australia." Annual review of the Sociology of Religion: Religion and Politics 2 
(2011): 286-308. 
References 
 310 
Maguire, Sean. "When Does Reuters Use the Word Terrorist or Terrorism?" Reuters, 
retrieved 12th September 2010 from  http://blogs.reuters.com/reuters-
editors/2007/06/13/when-does-reuters-use-the-word-terrorist-or-terrorism/. 
Mahony, Inez. "Diverging Frames: A Comparison of Indonesian and Australian Press 
Portrayals of Terrorism and Islamic Groups in Indonesia." International 
Communication Gazette 72, no. 8 (2010): 739-58. 
Manne, Robert. Making Trouble: Essays against the New Australian Complacency.  
Melbourne: Black Inc., 2011. 
Manning, Peter. Dog Whistle Politics and Journalism: Reporting Arabic and Muslim People 
in Sydney Newspapers 2000-2002.  Sydney: Australian Center for Independent 
Journalism, 2004. 
———. "Transmitting Meanings: Defining 'Muslim' in the Federal Election Seat of 
Greenway." Social Alternatives 24, no. 1 (2005): 27-30. 
Mansouri, Fethi, and Michael Leach. "The Evolution of the Temporary Protection Visa 
Regime in Australia." International Migration 47, no. 2 (2008): 101-26. 
Markus, Andrew. Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia.  Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 2001. 
Marr, David. Panic: Terror! Invasion! Disorder! Drugs! Kids! Blacks! Boats!  Collingwood, 
VIC: Black Inc., 2011. 
Marr, David, and Marian Wilkinson. Dark Victory.  Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2003. 
Mastnak, Tomaz. "Europe and the Muslims: The Permanent Crusade?". In The New 
Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy, edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael A. 
Sells. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, 205-48. 
McAllister, Ian. "Calculating or Capricious? The New Politics of Late Deciding Voters." In 
Do Political Campaigns Matter? Campaign Effects in Elections and Referendums, 
edited by David M. Farrell and Rudiger Schmitt-Beck. London; New York: 
Routledge, 2004, 22-40. 
McGowan, Barry. "Reconsidering Race: The Chinese Experience on the Goldfields of 
Southern New South Wales." Australian Historical Studies 36, no. 124 (2004): 312-
31. 
McHoul, Alec, and Wendy Grace. A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject.  
Abingdon: Routledge, 1995. 
McKnight, David. Rupert Murdoch: An Investigation of Political Power.  Sydney: Allen & 
Unwin, 2012. 
McLeod, Judi. "Benazir Bhutto Can Identify Jihadist Carrying Bomb-Strapped Baby?"  
Toronto: Canada Free Press, November 23 2007. Retrieved 13 June 2010 from  
http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/757. 
McNair, Brian. Cultural Chaos: Journalism, News and Power in a Globalised World.  
Abingdon: Routledge, 2006. 
Media Watch. "The Australian's Sheik Swap."  Sydney: ABC, 31 July 2006. Retrieved 15 
August 2013 from  http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/s1701906.htm. 
———. "Rupert Tweets, the Tele Repeats."  Sydney: ABC, 26th August 2013.  from  
http://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/s3834127.htm. 
Meer, Nasir, and Tariq Modood. "The Racialisation of Muslims." In Thinking through 
Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, edited by S. Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil. 
London: Hurst and Company, 2010, 69-83. 
Michaelsen, Chris. "Terrorism in Australia: An Inflated Threat." Security Challenges 6, no. 2 
(2010): 19-25. 
Mill, John Stuart. "On Liberty." 1859. Available at 
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645o. 
References 
 311 
Moran, Anthony. "White Australia, Settler Nationalism and Aboriginal Assimilation." 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 2 (2005): 168-93. 
Morgan, George, and Scott Poynting, eds. Global Islamophobia: Muslims and Moral Panic 
in the West. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2012. 
Morrison, Scott. "Robertson Immigration Forum, 21st June 2013." Liberal Party of Australia. 
Moses, A. Dirk. "Genocide and Settler Society in Australian History." In Genocide and 
Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in Australian 
History, edited by A. Dirk Moses. New York: Berghahn Books, 2004, 3-48. 
Mottahedeh, Roy P. "The Clash of Civilisations: An Islamicist's Critique." In The New 
Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy, edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael A. 
Sells. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, 131-52. 
Mykonos, George, and Simon Watmough. "Perceptions of Islamic and Middle Eastern 
People in Australian Media: Scope for Improvement."  Melbourne: Centre for 
Dialogue, La Trobe University, 2007.  
Neighbour, Sally. "The United States of Chris Mitchell."  Sydney: The Monthly, July 2011.   
Nicholson, Brendan. "Police and PM at Odds on Terror."  Melbourne: The Age, March 16 
2004. Retrieved 30th July 2013 from  
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/03/15/1079199160473.html. 
Noble, Greg, ed. Lines in the Sand: The Cronulla Riots, Multiculturalism and Nation 
Belonging. Sydney: Institute of Criminology Press, 2009. 
Noble, Greg, Scott Poynting, and Paul Tabar. Kebabs, Kids, Cops and Crime: Youth, 
Ethnicity and Crime.  Sydney: Pluto Press, 2000. 
Norton-Taylor, Richard. "Memo to Mendacity."  London: The Guardian, 19 April 2007. 
Retrieved July 13th from  
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/apr/19/iraq.iraq. 
O'Connor, Brendan. "Liberals Bereft of Immigration Policy (Ministerial Press Release)."  
Canberra: Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2009.  Retrieved 1 June 2010 
from http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2009/ce09096.htm. 
O'Donnell, Penny, David McKnight, and Jonathan Este. "Journalism at the Speed of Bytes: 
Australian Newspapers in the 21st Century."  Sydney: The Walkley Foundation, 
2012.  
O'Malley, Nick, and Matt Wade. "In Denial over a Deep Vein of Hate."  Sydney: The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 6 February 2010. Retrieved 15th August 2013 from  
http://www.smh.com.au/national/in-denial-over-a-deep-vein-of-hate-20100205-
niqm.html. 
Olding, Rachel. "'Shame, Shame, Shame': Australia's First Muslim Frontbencher Abused for 
Taking Oath on Koran."  Sydney: Sydney Morning Herald, 2 July 2013. Retrieved 30 
July 2013 from  http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/shame-shame-shame-
australias-first-muslim-frontbencher-abused-for-taking-oath-on-koran-20130702-
2p8l2.html. 
Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s 
to the 1990s.  New York; London: Routledge, 1994. 
———. Racial Formation in the United States: From the Sixties to the Nineties.  New York: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1999. 
Ortiz, Christopher, and David Young. "#14 - Bylines." Stuff Journalists Like, retrieved 21 
August 2010 from  http://www.stuffjournalistslike.com/2008/12/14-bylines.html. 
Packham, Ben, and Gerard McManus. "Howard Defends Haneef Case."  Sydney: Herald 
Sun, July 31 2007.  Retrieved 20 August 2010 from  
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/archive/news/howard-defends-haneef-case/story-
e6frf7l6-1111114073806. 
References 
 312 
Palmer, Mick. "Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Immigration Detention of Cornelia 
Rau: Report."  Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2005. Retrieved 20 August 2010 
from  http://rspas.anu.edu.au/asiarightsjournal/palmer-report.pdf. 
Parliament of Australia. "The Electoral System." In   Parliamentary Handbook (2008). 
Retrieved 6 March 2010 from  
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;adv=;db=HANDBOO
K;group=;holdingType=;id=handbook%2Fnewhandbook%2F2008-12-
19%2F0049;orderBy=;page=;query=Id%3A%22handbook%2Fnewhandbook%2F200
8-12-19%2F0000%22;querytype=;rec=;resCount=. 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. "Inquiry into the Terrorist 
Organisation Listing Provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995." Canberra: 
Parliament of Australia, 2007. 
Paterson, Chris. "News Agency Dominance in International News on the Internet." In 
Converging Media, Diverging Politics: A Political Economy of News Media in the 
United States and Canada, edited by David Skinner and James Robert Compton. 
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005, 145-64. 
Pearce, Dennis. "General Elections and the Media."  Sydney: Australian Press Council, 1999. 
Retrieved 20 August 2010 from  
http://www.presscouncil.org.au/pcsite/apcnews/feb99/elect.html. 
Pearson, Mark, Jeffrey E. Brand, Deborah Archbold, and Halim Rane. "Sources of News and 
Current Affairs."  Robina, QLD: Bond University, 2001. Retrieved 9 September 2010 
from  http://works.bepress.com/mark_pearson/30/. 
Pedersen, Anne, Susan Watt, and Brian Griffiths. "Prejudice against Asylum Seekers and the 
Fear of Terrorism: The Importance of Context." In Settling in Australia: The Social 
Inclusion of Refugees, edited by Val Colic-Peisker and Farida Tilbury. Perth: Centre 
for Social and Community Research, 2007, 38-55. 
Phillips, Janet. "Asylum Seekers and Refugees: What Are the Facts?"  Canberra: Parliament 
of Australia, 2011.  Retrieved 1 May 2013 from 
http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bn/sp/asylumfacts.pdf. 
Phillips, Janet, Michael Klapdor, and Joanne Simon-Davies. "Migration to Australia since 
Federation: A Guide to the Statistics."  Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2010. 
Retrieved 1 May 2013 from  
http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/library/pubs/bn/sp/migrationpopulation.pdf. 
Phillips, Janet, and Harriet Spinks. "Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976."  Canberra: 
Parliament of Australia, 2013. Retrieved 2nd June 2013 from  
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary
_Library/pubs/BN/2011-2012/BoatArrivals - _Toc285178607. 
Pickering, Sharon. "Common Sense and Original Deviancy: News Discourses and Asylum 
Seekers in Australia." Journal of Refugee Studies 14, no. 2 (2001): 169-86. 
Pickering, Sharon, Jude McCulloch, David Wright-Neville, and Pete Lentini. "Counter-
Terrorism Policing and Culturally Diverse Communities: Final Report 2007."  
Melbourne: Australian Research Council Linkage Project, 2007. Retrieved 10 May 
2009 from  http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/criminology/news-and-
events/counterterrorreport-07.pdf. 
Pintor, Rafael López, Maria Gratschew, and Kate Sullivan. "Voter Turnout Rates from a 
Comparative Perspective." In Voter Turnout since 1945: A Global Report, edited by 
Rafael López Pintor and Maria Gratschew. Stockholm: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2002, 75-116. 
Poole, Elizabeth. "Framing Islam: An Analysis of Newspaper Coverage of Islam in the 
British Press." In Islam and the West in the Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a 
References 
 313 
Globalising World, edited by Kai Hafez. Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press, 2000, 157-
80. 
Poynting, Scott. "What Caused the Cronulla Riot?". Race & Class 48, no. 1 (2006): 85-92. 
Poynting, Scott, and Victoria Mason. "The Resistable Rise of Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim 
Racism in the U.K. And Australia before September 11." Journal of Sociology 43, no. 
1 (2007): 61-86. 
Poynting, Scott, and Greg Noble. "Living with Racism: The Experience and Reporting by 
Arab and Muslim Australians of Discrimination, Abuse and Violence since 11 
September 2001."  Sydney: Centre for Cultural Research, 2004.  from  
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/racial_discrimination/isma/
research/UWSReport.pdf. 
Poynting, Scott, Greg Noble, Paul Tabar, and Jock Collins. Bin Laden in the Suburbs: 
Criminalising the Arab Other.  Sydney: Sydney Institutue of Criminology, 2004. 
Poynting, Scott, and Barbara Perry. "Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired 
Victimisation of Muslims in Canada and Australia since 9/11." Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice 19, no. 2 (Nov 2007): 151-71. 
Pybus, Catherine. Black Founders: The Unknown Story of Australia's First Black Settlers.  
Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2006. 
Ramadan, Tariq. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005. 
Ramsey, Alex. "Howard's Team Are Not the Only Suckholes."  Sydney: The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 18 October 2003. Retrieved July 13 2013 from  
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/10/17/1066364484462.html. 
Rane, Halim, Jacqui Ewart, and Mohamad Abdalla. Islam and the Australian News Media.  
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010. 
Reich, Zvi. "Constrained Authors: Bylines and Authorship in American News Reporting." In 
Proceedings of the International Communication Association Annual Conference. 
Montreal, 2008. 
Richardson, John E. "Who Gets to Speak? A Study of Sources in the Broadsheet Press." In 
Muslims and the News Media, edited by Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson. 
London: I.B. Tauris, 2006, 103-15. 
Richardson, John E., and Bob Franklin. "Letters of Intent: Election Campaigning and 
Orchestrated Public Debate in Local Newspapers' Letters to the Editor." Political 
Communication 21, no. 4 (2004): 459-78. 
Robertson, Geoffrey. "Introduction." In Haneef: A Question of Character, edited by Jacqui 
Ewart. Canberra: Halstead Press, 2009, 6-9. 
Rudd, Kevin. "National Press Club Address (11th July, 2013)." ABC, retrieved June 11 from  
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-11/national-press-club-kevin-rudd/4814514. 
Ruddock, Phillip. "Anti-Terrorism Bill, Second Reading ( Hansard, 31 March, 2004)."  
Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2004.  Retrieved 20 August 2010 from  
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=ch
amber%2Fhansardr%2F2004-03-
31%2F0007;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F2004-03-31%2F0129%22. 
Rundle, Guy. "The Rise of the Right." In Do Not Disturb: Is the Media Failing Australia?, 
edited by Robert Manne. Melbourne: Black Inc., 2005, 28-52. 
Runnymede Trust. "Runnymede Trust Activities Report 2005-2006."  London: Runnymede 
Trust, 2007. Retrieved 10 June 2010 from 
http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/ActivitiesReport-2005-
2006.pdf. 
References 
 314 
Ruscher, Janet B. Prejudiced Communication: A Social Psychological Perspective.  New 
York: The Guildford Press, 2001. 
Saeed, Abdullah. Islam in Australia.  Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2003. 
Said, Edward. "The Clash of Ignorance." The Nation 273, no. 12 (2001): 11-13. 
———. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of 
the World. 2nd ed.  London: Vintage, 1997. 
———. Orientalism. 2nd ed.  London: Penguin, 1995. 
Said, Edward W. "The Clash of Definitions." In The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim 
Enemy, edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003, 68-87. 
Sales, Leigh. Detainee 002: The Case of David Hicks.  Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 2007. 
Sayyid, Salman, and AbdoolKarim Vakil. Thinking through Islamophobia: Global 
Perspectives.  London: Hurst and Company, 2010. 
Scheufele, Dietram A. "Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at 
Cognitive Effects of Political Communication." Mass Communication and Society 3, 
no. 2-3 (2000): 297-316. 
———. "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects." Journal of Communication 49, no. 1 
(1999): 103-22. 
Schneider, David. The Psychology of Sterotyping.  New York: The Guildford Press, 2004. 
Schultz, Julianne. Reviving the Fourth Estate.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998. 
Schulze, Jane. "Newspaper Readership Figures Strong."  Sydney: The Australian, 20 
February 2009. Retrieved 16 August 2010 from  
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/news/newspaper-readership. 
Select Senate Committee. "Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident Report."  
Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002.  Retrieved 30 May 2013 from  
http://www.aphref.aph.gov.au_senate_committee_maritime_incident_ctte_report_rep
ort. 
Sells, Michael A. "Christ Killer, Kremlin, Contagion." In The New Crusades: Constructing 
the Muslim Enemy, edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003, 352-88. 
Shahar, Shulamith. The Fourth Estate: A History of Women in the Middle Ages. 2nd ed.  
London: Routledge, 2003. 
Shanahan, Leo. "John Howard, George Pell Cited in Breivik Diatribe."  Sydney: The 
Australian, 26 July 2011. Retrieved 15 August 2013 from  
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/john-howard-george-pell-cited-in-
breivik-diatribe/story-e6frg6so-1226101697828. 
Shboul, Ahmad. "Islam and the Australian Media: The Implications of Distorting Mirrors." 
Australian Religious Studies Review 1, no. 2 (1988): 18-23. 
Sheehi, Stephen. Islamophobia: The Ideological Campaign against Muslims.  Atlanta: Clarity 
Press, 2011. 
Shoemaker, Pamela, and Steven Reese. Mediating the Message: Theories of Influence on 
Mass Media Content. 2nd ed.  White Plains, N.Y.: Longman Publishers, 1996. 
Simons, Margaret. The Content Makers: Understanding the Media in Australia.  Camberwell, 
VIC: Penguin, 2007. 
Smiles Persinger, Sara. "Reporting on Islam for the Australian Media." In Islam and the 
Australian News Media, edited by Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart and Mohamad Abdalla. 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010, 50-68. 
Smith, Keith. "Bennelong among His People." Aboriginal History 33 (2009): 7-30. 
References 
 315 
Solomon, V. "House of Representatives Hansard: Immigration Restriction Bill (26 September 
1901)." Parliament of Australia, retrieved 3rd May 2013 from  
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hans
ard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1901-09-26%2F0023%22. 
Stangor, Charles. "The Study of Sterotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination within Social 
Psychology: A Quick History of Theory and Research." In Handbook of Prejudice, 
Stereotyping and Discrimination, edited by Todd D. Nelson. New York: Psychology 
Press, 2009, 1-22. 
Starr, Paul. "Democratic Theory and the History of Communications." In Explorations in 
Communications and History, edited by Barbie Zelizer. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008, 
35-45. 
Stephenson, Carolyn. "Peace Studies: Overview." In Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and 
Conflict, edited by Lester Kurtz. Oxford: Elsevier, 2008, 809-20. 
Sullivan, Wendy. "Not All Religions Are Equal." Girl on the Right, retrieved 13 June 2010 
from  http://girlontheright.com/category/jihad/. 
Suter, Keith. "Australia, the Media and the Politics of Anger." Media Development 45, no. 3 
(1998): 38-40. 
Sutton, Ron. "Anti-Islam Group Seeks to Expand."  Sydney: SBS, 1 July 2013. Retrieved 29 
August from  http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/07/01/anti-islam-group-seeks-
expand. 
Switzer, Tom. "Why Muslims Make Headlines." In Islam and the Australian News Media, 
edited by Halim Rane, Jacqui Ewart and Mohamad Abdalla. Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 2010, 123-36. 
Tanner, Lindsay. Sideshow: Dumbing Down Democracy.  Melbourne: Scribe, 2011. 
Taylor, Lenore. "Kevin Rudd Turns up Heat in Row with Rupert Murdoch."  Sydney: The 
Guardian, 6 August 2013. Retrieved 30 August 2013 from  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/06/kevin-rudd-rupert-murdoch-row. 
———. "Morrison Sees Votes in Anti-Muslim Strategy."  Sydney: The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 17 February 2011.  from  http://www.smh.com.au/national/morrison-sees-
votes-in-antimuslim-strategy-20110216-1awmo.html. 
Tehranian, Majid. "Peace Journalism: Negotiating Media Ethics." The International Journal 
of Press/Politics 7, no. 2 (2002): 58-83. 
Teo, Peter. "Racism in the News: A Critical Discourse Analysis of News Reporting in Two 
Australian Newspapers." Discourse & Society 11, no. 1 (January 1, 2000 2000): 7-49. 
Terry, Deborah J., Michael A. Hogg, and Leda Blackwood. "Prejudiced Attitudes, Group 
Norms, and Discriminatory Behaviour." In Understanding Prejudice, Racism and 
Social Conflict, edited by Martha Augoustinos and Katherine J. Reynolds. London: 
SAGE, 2001, 140-58. 
Teti, Andrea, and Andrea Mura. "Islam and Islamism." In Routledge Handbook of Religion 
and Politics, edited by Jeffrey Haynes. London; New York: Routledge, 2009, 92-110. 
Thorpe, Osmund. First Catholic Mission to the Australian Aborigines.  Sydney: Pellegrini, 
1950. 
Tivona, Elissa. "Globalisation of Compassion: Women's Narratives as Models for Peace 
Journalism." In Expanding Peace Journalism: Comparative and Critical Approaches, 
edited by Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, Jake Lynch and Robert A. Hackett. Sydney: Sydney 
University Press, 2011, 319-46. 
Tolan, John V. Saracens: Islam in the Medieval European Imagination New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002. 
References 
 316 
Topsfield, Jewel. "The Asylum Seeker We Sent Home to His Death."  Melbourne: The Age, 
April 3 2009. Retrieved 30 July 2013 from  http://www.theage.com.au/national/the-
asylum-seeker-we-sent-home-to-his-death-20090402-9l57.html. 
Trad, Sanna. "Muslim Leaders Back the Killings, but Not Time Lag."  Sydney: The 
Australia, November 10 2008. Retrieved August 15 2013 from  
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/muslim-leaders-back-the-killings-but-
not-time-lag/story-e6frg6nf-1111117989277. 
Trumpbour, John. "The Clash of Civilisations: Samuel P. Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and the 
Remaking of Post-Cold War World Order." In The New Crusades: Constructing the 
Muslim Enemy, edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003, 89-130. 
Tuchman, Gaye. Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality.  New York: Free 
Press, 1978. 
United Nations Commission of Inquiry. "Report of the United Nations Commission of 
Inquiry into the Facts and Circumstances of the Assassination of Former Pakistani 
Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto."  New York: United Nations, 2010.  
Retrieved 30 August 2010 from  
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Pakistan/UN_Bhutto_Report_15April2010.pdf. 
Vakil, AbdoolKarim. "Is the Islam in Islamophobia the Same as the Islam in Anti-Islam; or, 
When Is It Islamophobia Time?". In Thinking through Islamophobia: Global 
Perspectives, edited by S. Sayyid and AbdoolKarim Vakil. London: Hurst and 
Company, 2010, 23-44. 
van Dijk, Teun. "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis." Discourse and Society 4, no. 2 
(1993): 249-83. 
van Dijk, Teun A. Discourse and Power.  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
———. "Discourse and the Denial of Racism." Discourse & Society 3, no. 1 (January 1, 
1992 1992): 87-118. 
———. "New(S) Racism: A Discourse Analytical Approach." In Ethnic Minorities and the 
Media: Changing Cultural Boundaries, edited by Simon Cottle. Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 2000, 33-49. 
Van Tiggelen, John. "June 2013 Editor's Note."  Sydney: The Monthly, 1st June 2013. 
Retrieved 10 June 2013 from  http://www.themonthly.com.au/blog/john-van-
tiggelen/2013/06/03/1370217762/june-2013-editors-note. 
Wade, Matt. "We Are Typecast, Haneef Tells Muslims."  Sydney: Sydney Morning Herald, 4 
June 2008. Retrieved 30 August 2008 from  http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/we-
are-typecast-haneef-tells-muslims/2008/06/03/1212258825700.html. 
Ward, Ian. "The Tampa, Wedge Politics, and a Lesson for Political Journalism." Australian 
Journalism Review 24, no. 1 (July 2002): 21-39. 
Watson, Nicole. "Northern Territory Emergency Response: The More Things Change, the 
More They Stay the Same." Alberta Law Review 48, no. 4 (2011): 905-18. 
Welch, Dylan. "Barrister Admits Haneef Leak."  Sydney: Sydney Morning Herald, 18 July 
2007. Retrieved 30 May 2008 from  http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/barrister-
admits-haneef-leak/2007/07/18/1184559847836.html?sssdmh=dm16.269622. 
White, David Manning. "The Gatekeeper: A Case Study in the Selection of News." 
Journalism Quarterly 27 (1950): 383-90. 
White, Richard. Inventing Australia.  Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen and Unwin, 1981. 
Whiting, Francis. "Is He Really the Mad Katter?"  Brisbane: The Courier-Mail, 17 March 
2012.  Retrieved 10 February 2013 from  http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/is-he-
really-the-mad-katter/story-fn6ck45n-1226302109703. 
Wilkie, Andrew. Axis of Deceit.  Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2004. 
References 
 317 
Williams, George. "Some of Our Anti-Terrorism Laws Are Past Their Use-by Date."  
Sydney: The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 2012. Retrieved 30 July 2013 from  
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/some-of-our-antiterrorism-
laws-are-well-past-their-useby-date-20120813-244vf.html. 
Wilson, Clint C., and Félix Gutiérrez. Race, Multiculturalism and the Media: From Mass to 
Class Communication. 2nd ed.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995. 
Wilson, Shaun, and Nick Turnbull. "Wedge Politics and Welfare Reform in Australia." 
Australian Journal of Politics & History 47, no. 3 (2001): 384-404. 
Windschuttle, Keith. "The White Australia Policy." In Address to the Sydney Institute. 
Sydney: Quadrant Online, 2005. 
———. The White Australia Policy.  Paddington, N.S.W.: Macleay Press, 2004. 
Wise, Amanda, and Jan Ali. "Muslims in Australia." In Muslim-Australians and Local 
Government: Grassroots Strategies to Improve Relations between Muslim and Non-
Muslim Australians. Sydney: Centre for Research on Social Inclusion, 2008, 11-21. 
Wodak, Ruth. "The Discourse-Historical Approach." In Methods of Critical Discourse 
Analysis, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer. London: SAGE, 2001, 63-94. 
Woolmington, Jean, ed. Aborigines in Colonial Society, 1788-1850: From 'Noble Savage' to 
'Rural Pest'. 2nd ed. Armidale, N.S.W.: University of New England, 1988. 
Wu, Dennis H. "The World's Windows to the World: An Overview of 44 Nations' 
International News Coverage." In International News in the 21st Century, edited by 
Chris A. Paterson and Annabelle Sreberny. Eastleigh: John Libbey Publishing, 2004, 
95-110. 
Young, Sally. How Australia Decides: Election Reporting and the Media.  Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Zakaria, Fareed "Bhutto and the Future of Pakistan."  New York: New York Times, April 6 
2008. Retrieved 13 June 2010 from  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/books/review/Zakaria-t.html. 
 
 
  318 
 
